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0.1 The Life and Scholarly Works of Robert Grosseteste
0.1.1 Life 
On 27 March, 1235 Robert Grosseteste was elected bishop of Lincoln, an event that 
changed the life of this almost unknown English Archdeacon.1 Grosseteste was born into a 
humble Anglo-Norman family in the county of Suffolk in England. His name appears for the 
first time in the historical record as a witness to a charter of the Bishop of Lincoln, written 
between 1189 and 1192. His title of Master of Arts indicates that he had acquired sufficient 
learning to be entitled to teach. He probably completed the first stages of his education at a 
cathedral school in England, perhaps Hereford.  Assuming that Grosseteste would therefore 
have been in his early twenties, a suggested birth date would be around 1168. Circa 1192, in a  
letter  of  recommendation  to  the  Bishop  of  Hereford,  William de  Vere,  Gerald  of  Wales 
commends Grosseteste for his wide reading and skill in business and legal affairs, medicine, 
and the liberal arts, and remarks on his exceptional standards of conduct. Grosseteste appears 
as a witness to several of de Vere’s charters over the next few years, but disappears from the 
historical record after de Vere’s death in 1198. In 1229 he was made Archdeacon of Leicester 
and presented with a prebend in Lincoln Cathedral.  Three years later, Grosseteste became 
seriously ill.  Taking this  as a divine warning against  holding more than one benefice,  he 
resigned from all, save his position of canon. During this period, Grosseteste also lectured on 
theology at Oxford. 
There has been some controversy as to when he became a master of theology. Joseph 
Goering observes that there is no concrete evidence that Grosseteste taught at Oxford before 
the late 1220s, or that his teaching in the secular schools at Oxford was in theology, rather 
than the arts. Grosseteste’s association with Oxford and chancellorship may indeed have only 
been in the late 1220s as a master of arts – the fact that he was a master in the lower faculty of 
1
I draw Grosseteste’s biography from Callus 1955, McEvoy 1982, Southern 1986, Goering 1995, and McEvoy 
2000.
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arts, not the higher faculty of theology, would perhaps explain why he was not permitted to be 
called chancellor. In 1229/30 Grosseteste began a formal association with the Franciscans at 
Oxford as  their  first  lecturer.  The Franciscan chronicler,  Thomas of Eccleston,  wrote that 
Grosseteste’s  teaching  was  of  considerable  benefit  to  the  convent,  and  this  explains  his 
influence on Franciscan theology for the century.
In  1235  he  was  elected  Bishop  of  Lincoln.  During  his  eighteen  years  as  bishop, 
Grosseteste became known as a brilliant, but highly demanding, church leader. He insisted 
that all his clergy be literate and receive some training in theology. His high standards for 
Christian practice and ministry landed him in a number of disputes with various parts of his 
dioceses,  especially  monasteries,  and most  notably his  own cathedral  chapter.  The  1240s 
marked  an  important  period  of  ecclesiastical  activity.  Conflict  between  the  papacy  and 
emperor Frederick II had led pope Innocent IV to flee to Lyon in 1244, and relocate the papal 
court there until 1251. In the hope of resolving this conflict, among other pressing concerns, 
Innocent convened the First Council of Lyon in 1245. Grosseteste was included among the 
English delegation. Grosseteste returned to the papal court in 1250. Addressing the pope and 
cardinals, he bemoaned the failings of the church, which he believed lay in its deviation from 
its pastoral mission. In 1253, the last year of his life, Grosseteste addressed a famous and 
angry letter to the pope, wherein he, in no uncertain terms, emphatically refused to obey the 
pope’s instructions; to confer a benefice on one of the pope’s nephews, whom Grosseteste 
viewed as unfit for pastoral care. He died on 8/9 October 1253 with a reputation for sanctity, 
but all attempts to canonize him failed.
 
A peculiar aspect of Grosseteste’s life – that will emerge in our work – is the conflation 
of a series of couples: the twelfth and thirteenth century; Oxford and Paris; the Latin and 
Greek Churches. The first couple is expounded upon by Dales: “Robert Grosseteste was one 
of  the  principal  links  between  the  thought  of  the  twelfth  century  and  the  period  of 
scholasticism. Born in or slightly before 1168 [...], he was undoubtedly educated according to 
the curriculum which had been established during the earlier part of the twelfth century. His 
works show an intimate knowledge of the Timaeus and Calcidius’s commentary, of Priscian, 
and of Martianus Capella’s  De nuptiis; writings which, although sometimes cited, declined 
drastically in popularity in the thirteenth century. He also shows a better knowledge of the 
classical authors than one usually encounters in a scholastic theologian, and he knows and 
uses  Eriugena’s  Periphyseon,  although  he  does  not  cite  it  by name.”2 Dales  stresses  the 
2 Dales 1986, 544. See also, for a similar opinion, McEvoy 1982, 373: “Grosseteste is the figure in whom the  
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twelfth century element, while it is also worthy to note that Grosseteste is one of the first 
medium’s through which Aristotle enters the Medieval Latin world.  Grosseteste’s long life 
gave him the opportunity to absorb the various tendencies of both the twelfth and thirteenth 
century. On one hand he was fascinated by the new Aristotelian movement of the first half of 
the thirteenth century, and the commentaries on Posterior Analytics and on Physics showcase 
this. Even in regard to theology he held modern and innovative views – such as the absolute 
predestination of Christ and the Immaculate Conception – that would have success especially 
among the Franciscans.3 On the other hand, on numerous matters he thought the old way best,  
as is evidenced by his opposition to the scholastic trend towards Scripture, wherein he rejects 
the divisio textus and the multiplication of the quaestiones.4 
The  second  couple  concerns  Grosseteste’s  relationship  with  Oxford  and  Paris. 
Grosseteste was an Englishman, but his life was not lived solely enclosed on the island. It is 
undeniable that most of Grosseteste’s original ideas stem from an education that was partly 
different from one he could have received in Paris, but it is also undeniable that Grosseteste 
had  spent  some  time  in  Paris.  Scholars  have  proposed  varied  hypotheses  regarding 
Grosseteste’s life between approximately 1200 and 1230. For at least part of the years, 1208 
to 1213, when England was under papal interdict, Grosseteste was in France. In a death-bed 
conversation he recalled having seen and heard in France the preaching of Eustace of Flay, 
James of Vitry, Robert of Courson and the exiled Archbishop Steven Langton. There is also an 
early thirteenth-century charter from Paris that names a Robert Grosseteste residing at a house 
in  Paris;  however,  since  this  charter  concerns  the  property  claims  of  his  children,  some 
historians have suggested that this may be another Robert Grosseteste. According to the study 
of Joseph Goering, the most recent research on this matter, the sources used by Grosseteste in 
his theological writings, as well as his well-known relations with important Parisian thinkers, 
clearly support the view that Grosseteste’s study of scholastic theology included at least some 
time in Paris in the 1220s. Possibly around 1225, after receiving his substantial prebend in 
Abbotsley, which made (and perhaps was intended to make) such a course of study possible.5 
Furthermore, Grosseteste counted among his many friends a number of Frenchmen, including 
prominent figures like Thomas Gallus, William of Auvergne, and William of Cerda, who may 
have been,companions, during his student years at Paris.
transition from the twelfth to the thirteen century is most visible.”
3 See Horan 2011. 
4 McEvoy 1982, 26: “It is somewhat paradoxical that, though he was for a period of years in the van of the 
new philosophical thinking of his time, the Aristotelian movement, he was by then already too old to conform 
to the changing pattern of academic expression.”
5 See Goering 1995.
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Finally, there is another couple that coexists in Grosseteste’s speculation, namely the 
Latin  and  Greek  Traditions.  It  is  impossible  to  overestimate  Grosseteste’s  debt  towards 
Augustine, but at the same time Grosseteste was one of the few thinkers of the thirteenth 
century to have read (and translated) some important works of the Greek Fathers from their 
own language. The Greek school of thought did not remain extrinsic to his thinking; on the 
contrary, from the time he began to read the Greek Fathers, their subsequent influence upon 
him is evident in his writings.
0.2.2 Works
When reconstructing the thought of a thinker who lived for an extensive period, one 
may  presuppose  two  problems:  firstly,  the  large  number  of  writings  of  different  genres; 
secondly, the chronology of these works. The latter is far from resolved, due to the scarcity of 
information regarding Grosseteste’s life before 1235.6 However, this problem is marginal for 
the present work, as I am interested in a simple distinction, namely the distinction between the 
works written before 1235 and those written after, rather than the exact order of the works. In 
1235 Grosseteste was not only elected bishop of Lincoln, but had also quit teaching, and this 
had a significant influence upon his production of works, upon which I will later elaborate.
The variety of Grosseteste’s writings poses the question of whether it is possible to 
find  a  common  feature,  a  fil  rouge,  that  may  connect,  for  example,  a  commentary  on 
Aristotle’s Physics, with a treatise in vernacular on the sacrament of Confession. A brief (and 
incomplete) overview of Grosseteste’s works may help us to answer this question.7 The  De 
artibus liberalibus is  one of the earliest of Grosseteste’s writings that has reached us. His 
psychological teaching, based largely on Augustine’s De musica, is quite traditional, while the 
De generatione  sonorum,  written  a  few years  later,  already betrays  the  fact  that  he  was 
influenced by Aristotelian psychology. When we consider the De sphaera, on the other hand, 
we find a natural philosopher at work. Grosseteste also wrote the  Computus correctorius, a 
treatise on the calendar,  which contains advanced scientific material, and this proves that it 
was not conceived as an elementary book for the ordinary arts student. Grosseteste was also 
interested both in astronomy (De cometis) and astrology (De impressionibus aeris also named 
6 Panti (2011, 3) is the most recent attempt to date Grosseteste’s works written before 1235.
7 The complete catologue of Grosseteste’s works is  in Thomson 1940. Thomson’s  distinction between the 
authentic and spurious work must be taken cum grano salis, because some of Thomson’s conclusions have 
been corrected by the most recent scholarship. 
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De prognosticatione). He commented on two of Aristotle’s works,  Posterior Analytics and 
Physics. We have no reportationes of his lectures; however, some of his works are very likely 
the outcome of his lectures having been edited; indeed echoes of disputationes can be found 
in works like De libero arbitrio, De veritate, De ordine emanandi causatorum a Deo. The last 
work of this incomplete list that needs to be mentioned is the  De luce,  a little treatise on 
cosmology and  cosmogony that  granted  him fame  among  the  historians  of  science  also, 
especially after the theory of the Big Bang was developed centuries later.8
His theological works present the same variety of genres. According to McEvoy, this 
production  may  be  classified  in  exegetical  works,  Greek  translations  and  commentaries, 
pastoral works and Anglo-Norman works.9 In the first group we can count the Hexaëmeron, 
the  most  impressive  and  the  only  complete  and  finished  example  of  Grosseteste’s  Old 
Testament exegesis. As further evidence for his exegesis of the Old Testament we have the 
extensive commentary on  Psalms 1-100 and a comment on  Ecclesiasticus 43:1-5 (probably 
fragmentary). Grosseteste also wrote two treatises dealing with biblical matters which also 
incorporated  portions  of  biblical  commentary:  the  De  cessations  legalium,  based  on  a 
commentary on Isaiah 52:13 – 53:12, and on Daniel 9:24-27 (concerning the passion of the 
Messiah); the De decem mandatis, intended to be a commentary on the Decalogue of Exodus 
20:1-17. Concerning his exegesis on the New Testament, all that remains is a commentary on 
Galatians and fragmentary glosses on the other Pauline epistles. 
Grosseteste  also  achieved  European  celebrity-status  by  translating  from Greek  the 
Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, an apocryphal of the Old Testament, several writings by 
St.  John  of  Damascus, the  Letters of  Saint  Ignatius,  the  Corpus  Dionysiacum and  the 
Nicomachean Ethics.
Grosseteste is the author also of several writings on the sacrament of Confession and 
the  most  famous  of  them was  Templum Dei.  Grosseteste  was  also  a  prolific  preacher  as 
attested by his several sermons. It was Grosseteste’s practice to preach in Latin to the clergy, 
and in the vernacular to the laity, but all the surviving material is in Latin. In addition to  
sermons, we also have a great number of Dicta that were defined by Grosseteste himself as 
“brief notes which I wrote down roughly, while I was in the schools, to preserve them.” 10 
Some notes are real sermons, but many others are nothing else than notulae, that is, material 
for  preaching.  The  chronology of  his  sermons  or  the  occasions  of  their  composition  are 
unknown.  Significant  theological  analyses  can  also be  found in his  collection  of  Letters. 
8 Bower 2014.
9 McEvoy 2000.
10 Thomson 1940, 214.
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When Grosseteste became bishop, he composed a set of constitutions that were intended for 
the parochial clergy of his diocese that were widely read in England for two centuries after 
him.
The last category of theological works is a series of writings written in Anglo-Norman, 
which includes in particular a brief work on Confession, two prayers and a poem entitled Le 
manage des neuf filles du diable ascribed to Grosseteste. However, the most famous of these 
works  is  a  poem on the  history of  salvation  in  allegorical  form,  known as  Le Chasteau 
d’Amour.
As a result, it seems impossible to put Grosseteste’s works into any definite literary 
genre or historiographical category. We may, however, wonder if he tried to systematize some 
of his interests in a coherent form, for example in a summa. Actually, there are two Summae 
ascribed to Grosseteste. It was debated if the Summa philosophie edited by Ludwig Baur was 
written by Grosseteste, but it is instead accepted today as a spurious work. More problematic 
is the authenticity of the Summa theologiae, a fragment containing four questions, edited by 
Daniel Callus.11 However, the lack of systematic works should not induce us to think that 
Grosseteste was unable to organize the theological material at his disposal. In fact, during his 
period  as  regent  master  of  the  Franciscan  school  at  Oxford,  he  completed  the  Tabula 
distinctionum, a theological index that reveals the extent of Grosseteste’s reading program.12 It 
is more than a simple index, because he did not simply arrange the  Tabula in alphabetical 
order, as per usual, but also divided them into nine distinctions (ranging from God until the 
soul and its  powers) and each distinction in several topics.13 The originality of this index 
culminates in the presence of ideographs for each topic, inserted in the margins of the books 
that  he read.  If  one  checked the symbols  recurrent  in  Grosseteste’s  manuscripts  with the 
Tabula, he would immediately have a list of other authorities on the same topic. Even though 
Grosseteste never fully marked up his own books, nor did he complete the index, however, he 
used it to write some of his own treatises.14
0.1.3 Scholarship
11 Goering (1995, 24f), after reconsidering the historiographical debate, is inclined to accept the authenticity. In 
the present dissertation I will consider the Summa theologiae an authentic work of Grosseteste. 
12 The Tabula is printed in Grosseteste 1995.
13 See Rosemann 1995, 324f.
14 See Ginther 2004, 6.
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The  scope  and  variety  of  literary  genres,  sources  and  topics  is  reflected  in  the 
secondary literature. No study has been devoted to comprehensively reconstruct the thought 
of  this  prolific  and  versatile  author  in  all  aspects.  Many articles  on  selected  topics  and 
miscellaneous  publications  are  however,  thankfully  available  due  to  the  efforts  of  the 
International Robert Grosseteste’s Society. In this paragraph I will not consider these works, 
but limit my attention to the monographs that sum up the trends of Grosseteste’s scholarship. 
Over  the past  thirty years,  three monographs have been devoted to Grosseteste’s  life and 
works. 
In 1982 James McEvoy wrote The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, based upon his 
doctoral dissertation, defended at the Université catholique de Louvain in 1974. As the title 
conveys, the perspective of this work is philosophical. The structure is directed by the theme 
of “light”, which is treated in a threefold dimension: angelic, natural, and human. McEvoy 
analyzes: the world of the intelligences (or angels), that of material creation (as cosmology 
and cosmogony), and finally the philosophical anthropology.15 
In 1986 Richard Southern wrote a biography  Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an  
English  Mind in  Medieval  Europe,  which  especially  focused on Grosseteste’s  intellectual 
development. Southern proposed an unconventional interpretation that gave rise to long and 
fruitful discussions. Many scholars have rejected Southern’s main conclusions. According to 
Southern,  Grosseteste  was essentially an  independent  thinker,  outside  the  main  scholastic 
traditions.  This  is  essentially  a  consequence  of  his  humble  origins  and  his  “provincial” 
education: Grosseteste was an autodidact theologian, who never attended the schools of Paris, 
and embarked relatively late in life upon a teaching career at Oxford.  One of the merits of 
Southern’s controversial book is to have called attention to the insular roots of Grosseteste’s 
thought; this emphasis, at the same time, is the limitation of Southern’s book.
In 2004 a monograph by James Ginther, entitled  Master of Sacred Page: A Study of  
Theology  of  Robert  Grosseteste,  ca.1229/30-1235 appeared,  and  its  originality  is  evident 
because  it  was  the  first  and  only  monograph  until  that  date  dedicated  to  Grosseteste’s 
theology, a part of Grosseteste’s teaching that, as the author points out, has received little 
attention by scholars.16 The author reconsiders the meaning of theology for Grosseteste, and 
the  institutional  and  intellectual  role  of  a  theologian,  taking  a  stance  against  some 
simplifications  that,  on  his  reconstruction,  did  not  give  justice  to  the  complexity  of 
Grosseteste’s thought. Even though the theological themes studied by Ginther had separately 
15 In 2000, McEvoy devoted another study to Grosseteste, with a particular emphasis on his theology. These  
monographs were more a collection of previous contributions than an original work. 
16 Ginther 2004, 89.
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received close consideration by scholars, a unified synthesis was still lacking. It is a fact that 
in Grosseteste’s bibliography, the theme of ‘God’ does not occupy first place.17 The difficulty 
to pursue this kind of research was principally due to the lack of edited texts. In 1912, Ludwig 
Baur published two volumes containing Grosseteste’s philosophical works, and they remained 
as almost the unique primary source for several years. In 1940, Samuel Harrison Thomson 
prepared a catalogue of Grosseteste’s authentic and spurious works with the list of the extant 
manuscripts, after a long examination of manuscripts in many European libraries. From that 
moment, a series of editions appeared, especially in the theological field, like the edition of 
Grosseteste’s  theological  masterpiece,  i.e.  the  Hexaëmeron,  and  the  edition  of  the 
Commentary on the De mystica theologia, while many others still remain unedited. 
The present dissertation proposes to unify the approaches of these three monographs: it 
is a philosophical study of the subject-matter of theology for Grosseteste, namely God, and 
His relationship with the created world, but close attention will be also paid to the historical 
evolution of Grosseteste’s writings.
0.2 The object of this dissertation: God and Creation
0.2.1 Filling a gap in scholarship
Ginther’s monograph on Grosseteste’s theology does not consider the life and works of 
Grosseteste after 1235. This does not mean that Grosseteste did not write on theology after 
that date; Ginther’s choice is rather due to the fact that the context of Grosseteste’s theological 
investigation  changes,  for  his  late  writings  are  no  more  the  result  of  his  pedagogical 
responsibilities, but instead the outcome of his episcopal office, namely the care for the clergy 
and laity.  Ginther concludes that “the need to explain the changes to his institutional and 
intellectual contexts really warrants another volume.”18 This necessity was already expressed 
by McEvoy: “When we compare his writings up until c. 1240 with those after that date, not a 
few notable and novel elements in the latter are seen to derive from his reading of Dionysius. 
No  complete  assessment  of  Pseudo-Dionysius’s  contribution  to  Grosseteste’s  thought  has 
been attempted as yet.”19 The present dissertation aims to take a first step in filling in that 
17 The most complete bibliography is Gieben 1962, revised and updated in Gieben 1995.
18 Ginther 2004, 8.
19 McEvoy 1982, 115.
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blank sector in Grosseteste’s scholarship.
It is a difficult task to fulfill McEvoy and Ginther’s wishes, and write a comprehensive 
study of Dionysius’s influence on Grosseteste. Once again, the difficulty is due to the scarcity 
of  edited  texts.  Specifically,  most  of  Grosseteste’s  commentaries  on  the  treatises  of  the 
Corpus  Dionysiacum (henceforth  Corpus)  are  not  available  in  a  critical  edition.  The 
Commentary on the De ecclesiastica hierarchia was edited as a PhD thesis by Candice Taylor 
Hogan (Cornell University 1991), but as a diplomatic edition. The Commentary on the  De 
coelesti hierarchia was edited separately, as an appendix to their theses by James Stanley 
McQuade and James McEvoy. The former edited the first nine chapters in his doctoral thesis 
(Belfast University 1961) while the latter edited the other six chapters in his master thesis 
(Belfast 1967) although in this case the critical edition by Declan Lawell has been published 
by Brepols at the end of 2015.20 The Commentary on the De mystica theologia was edited by 
Ulderico Gamba in 1942. It is a good edition, based upon four manuscripts of the thirteenth 
century, and supported by the collation of four other witnesses. In 2003 McEvoy revised the 
text, alongside the other manuscripts that were unavailable to Gamba. With respect to the 
Commentary on the  De divinis nominibus, finally,  there is only a transcription of the first 
Book prepared by Francis Ruello.21 I revised and completed the transcription of Grosseteste’s 
Commentary on the De divinis nominibus, of which, a little part will appear in the appendix of 
the present dissertation – initiated by Professor Jean-Michel Counet, to whom I would like to 
express here my gratitude for having shared with me the result of his work.
A great part of the texts discussed in the dissertation are drawn from Grosseteste’s 
Commentary on the Corpus Dionysiacum (henceforth  Commentary) in its  entirety,  and on 
other works from his episcopal period, but I will consider all Grosseteste’s works in order to 
reconstruct the development of his thought. From the reading of the Commentary, it emerges 
that  most  themes  that  characterize  Grosseteste’s  intellectual  life,  such  as  creation,  the 
transcendence of God, angels and so on, tend to recur; but other topics like the problem of 
naming God, and that of evil, are fully developed for the first time. The former, in particular, 
has been considered by Francis Ruello in an article that contains the edition of Book I of the 
Commentary on the De divinis nominibus, and by Jean-Michel Counet.22 The latter problem, 
however, has not received attention from scholars, since it is not treated in any of his edited 
works. Grosseteste devotes the second part of his Commentary on Book IV of the De divinis  
nominibus to theodicy.
20 Unfortunately I did not have the opportunity to use the critical edition in the present work.
21 Ruello 1959.
22 Ruello 1959; Counet 2012.
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This dissertation, however, does intend to be a disorderly collection of topics drawn 
from the Commentary. The notion that brings together the separated parts of my thesis is the 
concept of ‘God’. 
 
0.2.2 God as Principle and End of Creation
0.2.2.1 The threefold scheme: moné-próodos-epistrophé
The Hexaëmeron, written by Grosseteste during his regency as master of theology at 
Oxford,  is  one  of  the  last  works  of  the  first  period  of  his  life,  since  it  dates  between 
1230/1235. In the very first pages of this work, Grosseteste presents his idea of theology:  
Unde  et  ab  hoc  uno sic  aggregato  et  unito,  tamquam a  subiecto,  potest  esse  descensus 
ordinabilis in trinitatem, et trinitatis unitatem, et Verbum incarnatum, et corpus eius quod est  
ecclesia,  et  in  deiforme  nostrum cum Trinitate.  […]  Creature  eciam omnes,  in  quantum 
habent essentialem ordinem ad dictum unum huius sapiencie subiectum, hoc est in quanto ab 
hoc uno uno fluunt et in hoc unum recurrunt, ad istam pertinent sapienciam.23
Grosseteste explains that everything comes from God, called the ‘One’. The unity of 
God is the origin of the Trinity, namely, the relationships among the three Persons are founded 
on the unity of the substance. God as unity is also the origin of the incarnate Word and his 
body, which is the church. Finally, He is the principle of all creatures, in so far as they have an 
ordering of essence of the aforesaid One. Creatures flow from this One and return to this One, 
and  both  of  them  belong  to  the  domain  of  theology,  even  though,  according  to  other 
characteristics, the creatures could belong to other domains. Everything pertains to theology 
because everything derives from God and returns to Him, and theology is the science that 
concerns these relationships. In the text quoted above, the words in bold refer to the typical 
Neoplatonic (i.e. Proclean) scheme of moné-próodos-epistrophé, and Grosseteste gains access 
to  this  tradition  through  Dionysius.  James  Ginther  does  not  note  this  scheme  and  its 
Neoplatonic source, while in my work I will prove that Grosseteste’s theological thought is 
inscribed within this scheme.
The same triad recurs in the treatise on Confession, known as Deus est. The preamble 
presents the whole economy of Salvation enclosed in the Anselmian definition of God as “that 
23 Hexaëmeron I, i, 2-3, 50.
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than which nothing better could be thought,” which opens and concludes the work. From this 
definition it follows, according to Grosseteste, that God did not content Himself with staying 
alone in His absolute perfection: although God remains the same in Himself and does need 
anything other  than  Himself,  however,  because  of  His  overabundant  goodness,  He called 
things from non-being to being in order to participate in His excellence.24 This overflow of 
goodness  and  being  extends  through  various  degrees  and  thus  establishes  a  hierarchy of 
beings. The preamble continues with the issue of angelical and human fall, and concludes 
with the work of redemption realized by Christ. Since Christ cannot die a second time, He 
established the  sacraments  to  free  those  who could  fall  into  sin  again.  The sacrament  of 
Confession, in particular, represents the beginning of the development of good in the sinner, 
on her/his pathway returning to God. 
The triadic movement of the First Principle (remaining-procession-return) combines 
the Hexaëmeron and the Deus est, but, as I will demonstrate, the Commentary is the work in 
which Grosseteste directly borrows from the Neoplatonic source, namely Dionysius, his own 
theological view and develops it further. 
0.2.2.2 Theology and philosophy
The object of this dissertation is God, who is considered as the principle and end of 
creation.  The  analysis  of  this  object  leads  us  to  a  meditation  on  Grosseteste’s  view  on 
theology. According to Grosseteste, the subject-matter of theology is something more than 
“whole Christ” (Christus integer), that is, Christ and His members, the Church.25 Grosseteste 
extends the subject-matter of theology by keeping together three unions: the union of God and 
humanity in Christ, the union of Christ and the Church in Christ’s assumed human nature, and 
the  reunion  of  Christ  and  the  Church  through  the  sacrament  of  Eucharist.  These  unions 
include not only God, but also the whole created world, since every creature is related to God 
as its creator. 
Grosseteste  is  a  creative  theologian  that  elaborated  a  theology  different  from the 
twelfth-century,  biblico-moral,  theology.  Twelfth-century  theologians  tend  to  consider 
creatures merely as symbols of the divine, so that nature is more a medium for attaining God 
24 Deus est, 239f: “Deus est quo nihil melius excogitari potest, cuius posse maximum, scire verissimum, et velle 
optimum. Est enim aeternus in essentia, simplex simpliciter, et invariabilis in manentia, alio non indigens sed 
sibi et aliis sufficiens in gloria. Igitur propter exuberantiam bonitatis propriae placuit ei alia a non esse in sui  
praesentiam vocare, ut haberent tantae excellentiae participationem.”
25 The first to use this definition was probably Gilbert of Poitiers, cf. Ghinter 2004, 36.
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than an object of knowledge in itself;26 Grosseteste, instead, concedes more autonomy and 
dignity to the created world and even as a theologian, considers it necessary to continue his 
studies of the physical world. This is demonstrated by his interest in Aristotle’s writings even 
in the very late years of his long life. In the 1240s, Grosseteste returned to the writings of 
Aristotle on which he had previously commented upon in the 1220s.27 The translation of the 
Nicomachean  Ethics,  one  of  Grosseteste’s  later  works,  was  made  because  Grosseteste 
considered it as a source for pastoral education.28 But  Grosseteste did not abandon his own 
scientific-philosophical interests: indeed one of his last works was a translation of substantial 
parts of Aristotle’s De Coelo and Simplicius’s commentary on it. Such interest can be found 
also in his  Commentary, where he devotes some digressions to the movements of planets or 
the characteristics of the four elements.29 Grosseteste’s enduring interest in philosophy and 
science must be understood, not as an interest in those disciplines as such, but as an interest in 
disciplines that can serve a function with respect to the ultimate goal of human life, namely 
salvation. 
An emblematic  text  that  explains  this  idea  is  the notula to  chapter  twenty-four  of 
Grosseteste’s translation of John Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa. Facing a fault in the textual 
tradition of the work, Grosseteste explains: 
These two chapters, namely the twenty-fourth about seas and the twenty-five about winds,  
are omitted in some Greek manuscripts;  perhaps because they did not  seem to contain a 
theological subject. But according to truly wise men, every notice of truth is useful in the 
explanation  and  understanding  of  theology.  Therefore,  having  found  those  chapters  in  a 
Greek manuscript, we do not want to omit them, for we are sure that so great an author would 
not have written them in this book, had he not recognised some utility for holy scripture.30
The study of seas and winds surely reminded Grosseteste of his previous scientific 
works. The fact that he finds those studies in a theological authority, confirms his conviction 
that every secular type of knowledge, even if it maintains its autonomy, has to be brought 
26 On the relevance of symbols in the twelfth century theology, cf. Gaybba 1988, 23ff.
27 Lewis 2013.
28 See  Ginther  2004,  14.  McEvoy (1982,  24)  believes  that  the  reason  of  Grosseteste’s  translation  of  the 
Nicomachean Ethics was to win a place in the uprising Aristotelian movement in the school. However, the 
reason conflicts with what he says some pages later: “[…] as he grew older he wrote more and more for  
himself and cared less whether his writings would find a public” (at p. 27). 
29 See DN IV, M 199vb-200va.
30 “Haec duo capitula, scilicet vigesimum quartum de pelagis et vigesimum quintum de ventis omissa sunt in 
quibusdam exemplaribus  graecis;  forte  quia  non  multum videntur  esse  materiae  theologiae,  cum tamen 
scundum vere sapientes omnis veritatis notitia utilis est ad theologiam exponendam et intelligendam. Ideo 
nos invenientes haec exemplari in graeco nolumus ea omittere, tenentes pro certo quod tantus auctor ea in  
hoc  libro  non  scripsisset  nosi  eorum  utilitatem  aliquam  in  sacra  scriptura  cognovisset”,  in  Biblioteca 
Vaticana, MS Chigi A.VIII.245, fol. 16va.  English translation is from Gieben 2003, 236f.
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back  to  theology.  The  passage  above  is  consistent  with  Grosseteste’s  idea  about  the 
relationship between philosophy and theology. Unfortunately he has not devoted a specific 
text on the matter, but we may infer his point from the authority that he quotes in his Tabula.31 
The biblical authority mentioned in the Tabula is a passage from Deuteronomy that deals with 
the law of war. The text that Grosseteste has before his eyes is the following one: “If you 
notice among the captives a beautiful woman and are attracted to her, you may take her as 
your wife. Bring her into your home and have her shave her head, trim her nails and put aside 
the  clothes  she  was  wearing  when  captured”  (Deuteronomy 21:11-13).  The  passage’s 
meaning, according to Grosseteste, is that one may fall in love with a captive woman, who is 
an  image  of  the  pagan  wisdom,  but  she  needs  to  be  purified.  It  is  not  stated  what  this 
purification comprises of. What remains constant in Grosseteste’s account of the relationship 
between philosophy and theology is the idea that the former is a pale image of the latter, and 
that philosophy’s most serious lack is of moral matter.32
The present dissertation, therefore, concerns Grosseteste’s theology, in the sense that it 
studies  the  relationship  between  the  Creator  and  the  creatures,  however,  adopting  a 
philosophical point of view. This means that I shall search for Grosseteste’s  argumenta that 
account for this relationship and that are beyond the authority of the Scriptures. Finally, the 
present dissertation is a work about history: the personal history of a man who passed from 
being a master of arts, to being a master of theology, and then the bishop of Lincoln.
0.2.3 Why did Grosseteste comment on the Corpus Dionysiacum?
Grosseteste translated and commented on the  Corpus from 1239 till 1243, when he 
was already in his seventies, which ought to be highlighted as a rather impressive biographical 
feat. One may question what possibly moved Grosseteste to pursue such an undertaking at a 
time when his life was already filled with every kind of vexation and administrative drudgery. 
As  some  historians  pointed  out,  his  task  as  a  bishop  was  complex,  since  he  was  the 
ecclesiastical ruler of about one-fifth of the total population of England. His pastoral work 
31 Gieben (1963) has studied all the biblical authorities mentioned in this sub-distinction of the Tabula.
32 On the  first  aspect,  Grosseteste  says:  “Ante  Christi  vero  adventum quasi  sol  et  lux  mundi  fuit  in  tota  
gentilitate  philosophorum  sapientia.  Sed  iste  sol  sapientiae  philosophicae  a  luce  doctrina  Christi  et  
apostolorum mirabiliter obscuratus.” (unedited sermon quoted in Gieben 1963, 525f.). A similar idea is stated 
in Dictum 147. On the second aspect see Dictum 118 (analysed below at § II.2.2).
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was  so  impressive  that  at  his  death  he  was  considered  a  saint.33 Contemporary  scholars 
adduced several reasons to explain Grosseteste’s interest for the Corpus, and each of them is 
correct in partiality. Some scholars say: it partly provided a welcome relief from the endless 
business of his diocese; partly, it gave him an opportunity for that large and far sighted use of 
his episcopal resources too, which was perhaps the main enjoyment that his position gave 
him; partly, because Dionysius dealt with topics that were important to Grosseteste, like the 
connection  between  Greek  and  Latin  Churches,  the  Apostolic  Age  and  the  present  day, 
Platonism and Christianity; partly because Dionysius’s work satisfied Grosseteste’s instinct 
for seeing order in a vast array of details.34 The Dionysian emphasis on the role of the hierarch 
(interpreted by Grosseteste as bishop) also supported Grosseteste’s role as a religious leader.35 
All  aforementioned  reasons  feature  in  this  dissertation,  but  I  would  like  to  add  another 
possible reason, and to stress this particular one amidst those just mentioned. 
A possible reason for explaining Grosseteste’s interest for the Corpus is that it could be 
used to combat heresies. All scholars agree that “the most fundamental of Grosseteste’s ideas 
is the supreme importance of the cure of souls; this is the key to all the rest”.36 If this were 
granted as being true, what could the pastoral aim of the Commentary on the  Corpus be? 
Unlike Ulderico Gamba, I do not believe that Grosseteste’s aim in commenting on Dionysius 
was to make the Corpus more accessible; if this were the case, he would have rendered it in a 
more readable Latin, as he did in the Testaments of the twelve patriarchs.37 The reason lies in 
the Commentary itself, and in the works written in those years, especially in the sermon on 
Redemption  called  Ex  rerum  initiarum,  which  dates  to  almost  the  same  years  of  the 
Commentary. In this sermon, Grosseteste makes a comparison between the physician and the 
preacher: “A preacher is a far better physician: by healing the leprosy of heresy, the gout of 
obstinacy etc.”38 The first duty of a preacher is to “heal” from the heresy. Some pages later,  
when he expounds on the ecclesiastical hierarchy, from the lowest grades to the Pope, he 
explains  that  the  lowest  among  the  ordines  inferiores is  the  ostiary,  who  must  prevent 
unworthy  persons  from  entering  the  church.  This  implies,  according  to  Grosseteste,  an 
adequate knowledge of heretical sects, sins and vices.39 This aspect of Grosseteste’s pastoral 
care  is  quite  underestimated  by  contemporary  scholars.40 If  we  pass  on  considering  the 
33 Hylson-Smith 2000, 174.
34 See Southern 1986, 202f.
35 Hogan 1991, 117f. 
36 Pantin 1955, 179.
37 Gamba 1944, 127.
38 Ex rerum initiarum, 108.
39 Ex rerum initiarum, 117.
40 The most extensive study on Grosseteste and pastoral care is by Boyle 1979, but there is no mention of  
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Commentary,  Grosseteste’s  interest  in  heresy  becomes  manifest.  Some  (rare)  digressions 
become comprehensible only if we consider heresies like Catharism in the background. It will 
be clear that Grosseteste shares with some of his contemporaries, an optimistic view of reality. 
For  him,  whatever  is  created  is  good,  because  the  Creator  left  His  imprint  on  it.  The 
Dionysian doctrine that Goodness rather than Being (as said in  Exodus 3:14) is God’s most 
proper attribute, is perfectly appropriate to reject any kind of dualism. 
Amidst the reasons listed by Southern, I would like to stress and specify the last one, 
namely the search for unity. The opening passage from the  Hexaëmeron, where the subject 
matter of theology  is expounded, demonstrates that the key concept is union, in particular, 
union between the human and divine realm. I will show that in the Commentary, Grosseteste 
elaborates a sort of summary of theology that encompasses the three moments indicated in the 
prologue of the Hexaëmeron: he proposes an analysis of the way to approach the transcendent 
One,  the  source  of  everything  (in  particular  in  De  mystica  theologia and  De  divinis  
nominibus);  an  analysis  of  the  processions  flowing from that  source  (in  particular  in  De 
divinis nominibus and De coelesti hierarchia); and finally, an analysis of the way of returning 
to  that  One,  in  Church,  through the  sacraments  –  with  a  particular  emphasis  put  on  the 
conformity of human beings to this model (in particular, this is contained in De ecclesiastica  
hierarchia and in De coelesti hierarchia).
0.3 The structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is divided into four Chapters. The first Chapter is a presentation of 
Grosseteste, as translator and commentator of the Corpus. Grosseteste has knowledge of the 
entire  Corpus before commenting on it,  in  particular  the  Hierarchies (§ I.1). In 1239, he 
began to translate and comment on each treatise. He demonstrated having knowledge of all 
the translations available at his time (§ I.2), but he decided, then, to approach the original 
Greek text, and produce a new translation (§ I.3). Grosseteste realized that it was impossible 
to  convey  Dionysius’s  thought  with  a  mere  translation,  and  for  that  reason  he  wrote  a 
commentary as a necessary part of his work (§ I.4). Grosseteste’s method of translation is 
based on a specific idea of language that the work of translation helps to develop (§ I.5).
From  Chapter  II  to  Chapter  IV,  I  analyse  the  three  moments  of  the  Thearchy 
Grosseteste’s engagement against heresy.
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(remaining-procession-return).  The  analysis  of  each  reveals  an  evolution  in  Grosseteste’s 
thought, from the doctrines of works written before the Commentary to those present in the 
Commentary itself, and in the coeval works. After presenting two definitions of God (§ II.2.1), 
the focus  of  Chapter  II  considers  God in  His  transcendence.  In  order  to  approach God’s 
mystery as close as a man can, Grosseteste observes that knowledge needs to be strengthened 
by pure love for Him, based on the principle that intelligence goes hand in hand with will (§  
II.2.2). The transcendence of God challenges the capacity of human language, that is called to 
meaningfully express a transcendent, totally simple spiritual being (§ II.2.3). The first issue of 
the Commentary to be studied, is Grosseteste’s theory of the human capacity to know God (§ 
II.2.1). Having realized that intellectual knowledge is not enough, the role of love is taken into 
consideration (§ II.2.2). The limit of human knowledge is reflected in the limited capacity of 
human beings to name God, because there is no name that could express God’s transcendence; 
nevertheless, there is a method that guides human language,  namely negative theology (§ 
II.2.3).
The third Chapter concerns the idea of God as the cause of everything. In particular, I 
shall  analyse  Grosseteste’s  definition  of  God  as  the  form  of  everything  that  guided 
Grosseteste’s theology in the first part of his life. In particular I will explain the meaning of 
‘God is  form’ (§ III.2.1),  that He is the  first form (§ III.2.2),  and that He is  the form of 
everything (§ III.2.3). The second part of the Chapter will deal with the idea of procession in 
the Commentary (§ III.3.1), and its consequences for religious language (§ III.3.2).
The fourth Chapter deals with the return of all of creation, to God. This is possible 
because  of  two  elements:  the  first  is  that  everything  is  comprehended,  in  some  sort,  in 
humanity (§ IV.2.1); the second is the Incarnation of the Son that completed the universe, and 
united the nature of the Creator and creatures (§ IV.2.2). Unsurprisingly, Grosseteste shows 
particular interest in the return of men to God. This process is realized at the resurrection (§ 
IV.3.1), and consists in the recovery of the image of God (deification), which was lost because 
of sin (§ IV.3.2). 
After a general Conclusion, two texts will be inserted in the Appendix, namely: Book 
V (dedicated to the theonym ‘Being’) and Book VII (dedicated to the theonym ‘Wisdom’) of 
Grosseteste’s Commentary on the De divinis nominibus. The edition of these texts is based on 
a  transcription  from  the  manuscript  Oxford,  Merton  College  86,  corrected  against  the 
manuscripts  Paris,  Bibliothèque  Nationale  de  France,  lat.  1620,  and  Paris,  Bibliothèque 




In the foot notes I have used the following abbreviations:
CH: Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on the De coelesti hierarchia.
EH: Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on the De ecclesiastica hierarchia.
DN: Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on the De divinis nominibus.
MT: Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on the De mystica theologia.
DCL: De cessatione legalium.
InPoAn:  Robert Grosseteste’s Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros.
InPhy:  Robert Grosseteste’s Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis.
In the texts quoted from Grosseteste’s  Commentary on the Corpus Dionysiacum, the 
words of Dionysius are in italics.
Translations
CH:  English  translation  in J.  Stanley  McQuade  (ed.),  Robert  Grosseteste’s  
Commentary on the “Celestial Hierarchy” of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Thesis (Ph. 
D.) Queens’ University of Belfast, 1961.
MT:  McEvoy  J.,  Mystical  Theology:  the  Glosses  by  Thomasus  Gallus  and  the  
commentary of Robert Grosseteste on “De Mystica Theologia”, Leuven 2003.
Hexaëmeron: Robert Grosseteste,  On the Six Days of Creation: A Translation of the  
Hexæmeron, C. F. J. Martin (ed.), Oxford 1996. 
Le Château d’Amour:  Mackie E.A.,  Robert Grosseteste’s Anglo-Norman Treatise on  
the Loss and Restoration of Creation, commonly known as Le Château d’Amour: An English  
Prose translation, in Maura O’Carroll (ed.), Robert Grosseteste and the beginning of a British  
Theological tradition, Roma 2003, 151-179.




Robert Grosseteste: translator and commentator of the 
Corpus Dionysiacum 
I.1 The Corpus Dionysiacum before the Commentary
Daniel Callus has demonstrated that Grosseteste’s Commentary was completed in 1243 
and began at the earliest in 1238. Grosseteste first wrote the translations and commentaries on 
the De coelesti and the De ecclesiastica hierachia, then those on the De divinis nominibus and 
the De mystica theologia.41 Grosseteste translated the marginal scholia attributed to Maximus 
the Confessor but not the Epistulae. Assistants helped him in translating; and because of this 
fact, it has led nineteenth century scholars to cast doubts on the authenticity of Grosseteste’s 
works. But after the studies of Ezio Franceschini, no one doubts Grosseteste as the author of 
translations and commentaries belonging to him.42 He knew the previous translations of the 
Corpus.  In his  time,  there were hints  that  suggest  that  there were more than three extant 
translations,  namely,  those  of  Hilduin,  Eriugena,  and  Sarrazin  because  there  are  some 
references to other translations not ascribable to these three authors.43 
Grosseteste  began  his  work  on  Dionysius  in  his  mature  age.  It  is  hard  to  think, 
however, that he did not know anything of the Corpus before this period since Dionysius was 
already  an  authority  among  theologians.44 In  general,  scholars  tend  to  underestimate 
Grosseteste’s knowledge of the Corpus before his Commentary, especially because there are 
few references to it in Grosseteste’s earlier writings. One of the most significant proof of his  
knowledge  of  the  Corpus can  be  found  in  the  Tabula,  where  Grosseteste  refers  to  the 
Hierarchies. The editor of the Tabula supposed that the Hierarchies have to be identified with 
the De ecclesiastica hierarchia and De coelesti hierarchia.45 Here is the list of Grosseteste’s 
references to Dionysius in the Tabula:46 
41
See Callus 1947, 196.
42 See Franceschini 1933.
43 See Franceschini 1933, 37.
44 On Dionysius’s reception in the Middle Ages, see De Andia 1997 and more recently Coackley – Stang 2009.
45 Rosemann 1995, 345.
46 Every box reports the title of the sub-distinction, the page of the Tabula, and between brackets the reference 
to the chapter or the book of the treatise. The letter case follows that of the Tabula.
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As one can see from the table, there is only one explicit reference to De ecclesiatica  
hierarchia and  two  to  De  coelesti  hierarchia.47 The  Tabula also  contains  some  explicit 
references to the Commentary on the De coelesti hierarchia by Hugh of St. Victor and three 
references to an unspecified  Super Ierarchiam. It could probably be identified with Hugh’s 
Commentary, but it is also possible that Grosseteste refers to Eriugena’s Commentary on the 
De coelesti hierarchia. As McEvoy demonstrated, Grosseteste knows Eriugena’s Commentary 
and  follows  its  method  on  many  occasions.48 Pace the  editor,  the  eleven references  to 
“Dionysius Ierarchia” or those to “Ierarchia: dei” are so generic that it is difficult to say what 
Dionysian passage Grosseteste had in mind when he wrote the Tabula. Moreover, they could 
recur in more than one Dionysian treatise.49 However, some references are clear. For example, 
among the sources quoted in the sub-distinction, “De libero arbitrio,” the entry “Dionysius 
Hierachia c.  9” is  surely a  reference to Book IX of the  De coelesti  hierarchia.50 But  my 
impression  is  that  many  occurrences  of  the  heading  “Dionysius  Ierarchia” are  in  fact  a 
reference  to  the  other  treatises,  namely,  the  De divinis  nominibus and  the  De theologia  
mystica.51 Upon  closer  examination,  the  reference  given  by Grosseteste  can  support  this 
supposition.  For example, in the sub-distinction “De contemplatione,” Grosseteste refers to 
“Dionysius Ierarchia.I.c.3.” There is no reference to contemplation in the third Book of the 
De coelesti hierarchia. It could be a reference to the  De ecclesiastica hierarchia, Book III, 
where there he hints to the contemplation of the Eucharist, or it could refer to the De divinis  
nominibus, Book  III,  where  the  word  ‘contemplation’ occurs  twice.52 But,  very  likely, 
Grosseste was thinking of the De mystica theologia, Book III, where Dionysius describes the 
ascension to God.53 There are at least three possible references to the De divinis nominibus in 
the Tabula, which could prove that Grosseteste was acquainted with such a work when he was 
47 Grosseteste considers the EH as a source for the sub-distinction on the Baptism (cf. Tabula, 307). The CH is 
quoted among the sources for the sub-distinction on good and evil angels (cf. Tabula, 278) and on silence (cf. 
Tabula, 294).
48 See McEvoy 1987, 200f.
49 See  Tabula,  311:  in  the  sub-distinction  “De  perfectione  sacrae  scripturae”  the  heading  “Dionysius  
Ierarchia.I.c.1” could refer to CH as well as to EH and DN because the first chapter of each treatise has a 
reference to the Scripture and its necessity for the treatise.
50 See  Tabula,  298.  The  passage  from  Dionysius  is  in  Dionysiaca,  905  (“neque  enim  coactam  habemus 
vitam...”).  Cf.  Tabula,  302:  in  the  sub-distinction  “De  Eligendo  prelatum,”  the  heading  “Dionysius 
Ierarchia.I.c.3” probably refers to EH Book III.
51 It is not unusual for a medieval author to call the treatise on divine names ‘hierarchy’ as the Commentary of 
William of Lucca shows. Between 1169 and 1177, William wrote a commentary on the De divinis nominibus 
entitled Commentarium in tertiam Ierarchiam Dionisii que est de divinis nominibus. For an edition and study 
of  this  text,  see  Wilhelmus  Lucensis,  Commentarium in  tertiam ierarchiam Dionisii  que  est  de  divinis  
nominibus.
52 See Tabula, 291. The occurrences of ‘contemplatio’ are at Dionysiaca, 130 and 142. 
53 MT III, 99.
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a master of theology.54 I said ‘could’ because this treatise is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Tabula; in fact, the De divinis nominibus does not appear in those sub-distinctions where it 
would be expected to occur like those on “unde malum” or on “de nominibus dictis de deo.”
The Tabula is not the only work that informs us about Grosseteste’s sources. It is an 
inventory of sources, and we know that it was not completed and that many other works were 
not listed in it. As stated, no reference to the De divinis nominibus is present in the Tabula. 
However, in his treatise De libero arbitrio, written in the late 1220s or on the very beginning 
of the 1230s, Grosseteste quotes a passage from Book VII of the  De divinis nominibus on 
divine wisdom according to Eriugena’s translation.55 Despite the little number  of quotations 
and the difficulty of identifying the references, it seems undeniable that Grosseteste had some 
knowledge  of  the  Corpus and  its  commentaries  already in  the  1230s  before  starting  the 
enterprise  of translating and commenting on it.  The treatise on Confession  Deus est bears 
witness to  the doctrinal  continuity between the late period of his  teaching career  and the 
episcopacy, as well as, to his increasing interest for Dionysius. The editor dates this work 
between 1215 and some years before 1250. Further researches have shown the presence of 
Pseudo-Dionysius’s doctrines in this work and the similarities between it and Grosseteste’s 
De cessatione legalium. From this presence, some scholars suggested dating the treatise after 
1230, probably in the period of Grosseteste’s episcopacy, after 1235.56  This new date does not 
imply that the Deus est was written during or after the Commentary. It could have been one of 
the first treatises that Grosseteste wrote as a bishop, a work dedicated to a theme that he had 
already treated in the past and that vividly manifests the influence of a source, Dionysius, that 
was latent in the previous works.
Some years after his consecration, Grosseteste begins a serious work on the Corpus as 
we shall show in the following paragraphs. He does not want to limit himself to study and 
compare  all  the  older  translations  (§ I.2),  but  he  wants  to  go  directly  to  the  Greek text, 
elaborating a new and original way of translation (§ I.3). He realizes that it is impossible to 
render Dionysius’s thought only by way of a literal or even sense-translation.  Dionysius’s 
style and doctrine are complex; and for that reason, he decides to write commentaries for each 
Dionysian treatise, considering them as necessary parts of his work of translation (§ I.4). 
54 (1) Cf. Tabula, 294: in the sub-distinction “De silencio” the heading “Dionysius Ierarchia.I.c.4” might refer 
to  DN Book IV with two occurrences of ‘silentii’ (Dionysiaca, 153; 270). (2) Cf.  Tabula, 313: in the sub-
distinction “Quomodo philosophia accipienda sit  a nobis” the heading “Dionysius Ierarchia.I.c.2” might 
refer to DN Book II, where Dionysius writes about nostra philosophia (Dionysiaca, 68). (3) Cf. Tabula, 313-
314: in the sub-distinction “De modo discendi et  docendi” the heading “Dionysius Ierarchia.I.c.2” might 
refer to DN Book II where Dionysius speaks on “learning from the Scripture” (cf. Dionysiaca, 57). 
55 See De Libero Arbitrio I, cap. 4, p. 43. Dionysius’s text is in Dionysiaca, 389-399. 
56 See Goering 1995, 34; McEvoy 2000, 143.
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Roger Bacon will make this aspect clear observing that his master, Grosseteste, was the only 
translator who had, at the same time, a great intellectual acuity.57 Not only is the content of 
Grosseteste’s work on the  Corpus philosophically relevant as I will show in my discussion, 
but  also  his  method  of  translation  and  commentary  raises  interesting  questions  on  his 
philosophy of language (§ I.5).
I.2 Aliae translationes
When Grosseteste becomes bishop, he has the financial means to collect manuscripts 
from Greece and this availability gives him the opportunity to correct the previous translations 
of the Corpus. Grosseteste works first on the Latin versions and then compares them with the 
original Greek. His favourite Latin translation is that of Sarrazin, but he knows and compares 
all the previous Latin versions of the Corpus. In this paragraph, I will give some examples of 
how Grosseteste uses each of them. 
The  most  ancient  translation  of  the  Corpus is  that  of  Hilduin  who,  around  835, 
coordinated the translation made by a little group of Byzantine monks at  Saint Denys,  in 
Paris.58 The translation was extremely poor as shown by Théry.59 Grosseteste knows Hilduin’s 
translation, as it is clear from the following passage: 
Et stans et immobilis ipse enim dicit:  «Ego deus et non mutor [Malachias 3,6]» et de eo 
dicitur «deus stetit in synagoga deorum [Psalm 81,1]» et similia multa. Aliud autem exemplar 
habet  «et  stans  et  mobilis», «omnibus  enim  mobilibus  mobilior  est  sapientia  [Wisdom 
7,24])».60
The other exemplar (aliud exemplar) mentioned in the text is Hilduin’s translation61 
(for  Dionysius’s  ‘ἀχίνητος’ is  translated  as  immobilis by  Grosseteste  and  as  mobilis by 
57 Franceschini (1933, 9-13) has collected some passages where Bacon speaks of Grosseteste as translator and 
makes a critical analysis of them.
58 See Théry 1932, 4-9. For the edition, see Théry 1937. On the Dionysian influence on the Greek studies in the 
Latin West, see W. Berschin 1980, 62. Berschin underlines that during the Middle Ages, the interest in Greek 
language  was  born  from the  demand to  read  and  comprehend Dionysius  and  not  the classics  of  Greek 
literature. 
59 See Théry 1932, 123-134.
60 DN IX, M 256va. Some other occurrences of Hilduin’s translation are at: DN I §14, p. 138 (Dionysiaca, 10): 
Grosseteste  ‘formatione,’ Hilduin  ‘plasmatione;’  DN I  §65,  p.  158  (Dionysiaca 36f):  Grosseteste  ‘unius 
deitatis et unius bonitatis,’ Hilduin ‘unideam et unibonam.’
61 Dionysiaca, 451.
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Hilduin). Grosseteste tries to make sense of Hilduin’s reading that says exactly the opposite of 
Dionysius, and he finds another verse of the Bible that supports Hilduin’s reading. As often 
happens,  Grosseteste does  not  develop  the  consequences  of  this  difference.  But  this  is  a 
characteristic  of  Grosseteste’s  method,  and  it  follows  from  a  fundamental  conviction. 
Reconciling  two  opposite  readings  is  an  application  of  his  understanding  of  Dionysius’s 
affirmative and negative theology. Grosseteste believes that it is possible to affirm and deny, 
one in the same, an attribute of God.62 
Around 860-862, John Scotus Eriugena realized a new translation of the Corpus. Even 
though it conveys the meaning of the text better than Hilduin’s version, Eriugena’s translation 
is still too complex in what concerns the structure of the period and it is overburdened with 
Greek words transliterated into Latin. Eriugena was immediately aware of the imperfections 
of his work, especially due to his rigid fidelity to the letter of the text in spite of the spirit.  
This led him to revise the translation of the two Hierarchiae while the translations of the other 
works were done only superficially.63 As a result of it, we have an older version of Eriugena’s 
translation (versio vetustior) and a revised version, which is the version used and improved by 
Anastasius Bibliothecarius.64 Grosseteste borrows from Eriugena his method of translation. 
Like Eriugena,  he refuses to “gloss over difficulties in the original text,  thus taking their 
translations  somewhat  opaque,  and  very dependent  on  the  accompanying  commentary.”65 
Grosseteste, however, thanks to the availability of a great number of manuscripts, has the 
opportunity to correct Eriugena.66
In 875, Anastasius revised Eriugena’s translation and enriched it with the  scholia by 
Maximus the Confessor and John of Scythopolis, also with the addition of some personal 
interlinear notes. Anastasius’s work was mostly lexical for he suggested synonyms or clarified 
some headwords.67 Grosseteste translates those marginal notes and puts them, explicitly or 
62 See § II.3.3.1.
63 See Dondaine 1953, 63-64. 
64 Anastasius became cardinal about 848 after gaining prominence as a Greek scholar. He stood for a short time 
as antipope to Benedict III (855–858). After reconciliation, Anastasius became papal librarian and disputed 
with the Greek Orthodox theologian, Photius. 
65 Kavanagh 2012, 61.
66 For some examples of these corrections, see Kavanagh 2012, 57-58. Some other references to Eriugena’s 
translation are at: DN I, § 53, p. 154 (Dionysiaca, 28): Grosseteste ‘intelligibilia,’ Eriugena ‘invisibilia;’ DN 
IV, M 200rb (Dionysiaca, 160): Grosseteste ‘substantie,’ Eriugena ‘latitudine;’ DN IV, M 203rb (Dionysiaca, 
175):  Grosseteste  ‘excedens,’  Eriugena  ‘continens;’  DN IV,  M  204rb  (Dionysiaca,  180):  Grosseteste 
‘fulgoris,’ Eriugena ‘claritatis;’ DN IV, M 210vb (Dionysiaca, 206f): Grosseteste ‘pretiosiores omnino sunt,’ 
Eriugena ‘pretiosores omnibus sunt;’ DN IV, M 219vb (Dionyisaca, 260): Grosseteste ‘dependet,’ Eriugena 
‘aufertur;’ DN V, M 232 va (Dionysiaca, 324): Grosseteste ‘ipsius supersubtantialis deitatis,’ Eriugena ‘per se 
supersubstantialis deitatis;’ DN V, M 236vb (Dionysiaca, 348): Grosseteste ‘completio,’ Eriugena ‘judicium;’ 
DN V,  M  238vb  (Dionysiaca,  358):  Grosseteste  ‘germinabilia,’  Eriugena  ‘fecunda;’  DN V,  M  239rb 
(Dionysiaca, 360): Grosseteste ‘predeterminationes,’ Eriugena ‘predestinationes.’
67 See Dondaine 1953, 59-62.
32
implicitly, in his commentary. Most of the references to Greek grammar or antiquities are 
derived from this source.68 McEvoy states that, albeit useful, those marginal notes are not a 
determinant in Grosseteste’s comments.69 The scholia, however, at times help Grosseteste in 
clarifying Dionysius’s thought. Consider, for example, the following reference: in Book VI of 
De divinis nominibus, devoted to the name ‘Life’, Dionysius applies the biblical verse “take 
back their  breath and they die  and revert  to dust”  (Psalm 104,29) to  animals  and plants. 
Grosseteste resorts to the scholium for explaining Dionysius. He argues that, as the scholium 
says, the verse has to be applied to every living creature, even to angels. This means that 
every form of life, not only the lower ones, are strictly dependent on and come from God.70
In the twelfth century, the increasing interest in Dionysian thought and the difficulties 
of Eriugena’s translation led John of Salisbury to ask his friend, John Sarrazin, for a new 
translation of the  Corpus. Sarrazin does not plan to write a completely new translation. He 
proposes to check Eriugena’s version, as enriched by Anastasius, using a Greek manuscript as 
reference text only in a few cases.71 It has been said that Grosseteste adopts Sarrazin as his 
reference  text  and  that  they  both  complain  about  the  insufficiency  of  Latin  language  to 
translate Dionysius’s writings.72 This statement is essentially true, but it has to be corrected on 
one point. One must keep in mind that Grosseteste always reads the Latin translations on the 
back of the Greek manuscripts, and this allows him to correct the mistakes, even those shared 
by Sarrazin and Eriugena. For example, in Book II of the  De divinis nominibus, Dionysius 
attaches two couples of opposites to God. Eriugena translates them as ineffabile, multivocum, 
ignorantia, and  omne  invisibile.73 Sarrazin  replaces  the  last  attribute  with  perfecte  non 
intelligibile (not perfectly intelligible). Théry suggests that Sarrazin’s choice is due to the fact 
that he wants to weaken the radical, Dionysian agnosticism.74 It is clear that both Eriugena 
and Sarrazin misunderstand the point because Dionysius meant quite the opposite.75 Sarrazin 
clearly follows Eriugena’s translation without checking the Greek manuscript in this case. 
Grosseteste instead sees the error and correctly translates omne intelligibile. He is guided only 
68 See  Franceschini 1933, 38-29.
69 See McEvoy 1982, 87.
70 DN VI, M 241ra: “Et quod illud intelligit Dionisius in animalibus irrationalibus et plantis solum manifeste  
dicit  scolium maxime  generale  ex  greco  sumptum potest  tamen  quod hic  dici  et  predictum psalmicum 
generaliter  comprehendere  omnia  corporalia  viventia  inter  que  comprehenditur  et  homo.  Et  potest  esse  
auctoris intentio manifestare quod omne vivere creatum, seu primum seu renovatum seu incorporalium ut  
angelorum et animarum seu corporalium ut hominum et irrationalium sensibilium et plantarum, est a divina 
vita.” For further explanations on this passage, see § IV.3.1.3.
71 On Sarrazin’s method of translation, see the previously quoted articles by Théry and Dondaine.
72 McEvoy, 1982, 77.
73 Dionysiaca, 77.
74 Théry 1950-1951, 82. 
75 Dionysius wrote παννόητον.
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by the desire of finding the true author’s mind, and therefore, he has no intention to adjust the 
translation in order to make Dionysius closer to the Western mentality. 
Another example will make this point clearer. In a passage from Book V of the  De 
divinis nominibus,  once again Sarrazin tries to make Dionysius’s agnosticism less radical. 
Eriugena  translated  παντελῶς  ἀνέκφαντον  to  universaliter  inexplanabile,  but  Sarrazin 
modifies Eriugena’s translation and renders it as perfecte non manifestabile. Contrary to what 
Eriugena’s translation suggested, Sarrazin does not state that God is completely unknowable 
or completely not-manifestable, but only that He is not perfectly knowable or manifestable. 
Grosseteste  translates  such  an  expression  as  completely  not-manifestable  (omnino 
immanifestabile),  much  closer  to  Dionysius’s  thought.76 By  this  intervention,  Grosseteste 
seems to suggest that the translator must respect the author’s mind and never betray it; any 
disagreement must be reconciled in the commentary.77 
This is not the only point of divergence in their method. A second feature of Sarrazin’s 
translation is his attitude to divest the Oriental nature of Dionysius.78 Sarrazin wants to erase 
every reference  or  allusion  to  the  Oriental  mysteries.  For  example,  ieron  is  translated  as 
sacrum by Eriugena but as  sanctum by Sarrazin.  Theosophi  becomes  periti deitatis or  Dei 
veneratio in Sarrazin’s version, while Eriugena keeps the transliteration teosophi. Grosseteste 
does  not  share  with  Sarrazin  this  attitude.  In  the  De ecclesiastica  hierarchia,  where  he 
perceives the distance between the liturgy of his times and that of Dionysius, Grosseteste 
remains as close as possible to Dionysius’s authority and vocabulary, preferring to leave to the 
commentary the explanation of the terms.79 
Just as in the case of Hilduin, Grosseteste resorts to other translations, even wrong, if 
they can help him in interpreting Dionysius. For example, speaking of the excellent light of 
God, Grosseteste says:
Superexcellentiam invisibilis  luminis  vel  secundum aliud exemplar  [i.e. Sarrazin]  «visibilis 
luminis».  Attribuentes  enim  deo  caliginem  significamus  ipsum  esse  lumen  inaccessibile  propter  
superexcellentiam  luminis  eiusdem  nobis  invisibilis  propter  suam  supereminentiam  ad  nostram 
76 Dionyisaca, 322. 
77 Some other explicit references to Sarrazin’s translation are: DN IV, M 202ra (Dionysiaca, 168): Grosseteste 
‘profundo,’ Sarrazin  ‘plantatione;’ Ibid.: Grosseteste ‘in quod omnia,’ Sarrazin ‘ad quod omnia;’ DN IV, M 
219vb (Dionyisaca, 260): Gross ‘dependet,’ Sarr ‘segregatur.’
78 Théry 1950-1951, 79.
79 See  EH  V, 774: “Theurgie,  id est divne operacionis creatricis omnium et gubernatricis,  theophanie id est 
divine apparicionis et revelacionis divinorum, sacrologie, id est racionis et sermonis sacros efficientis.” On 
Grosseteste’s ackowledgement of the differences between the rites in Dionysius’s times and in his own times,  
cf. EH II, 397 (on Baptism) and EH VII, 849 (on Exequies).
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videndi possibilitatem, secundum sui tamen manifestum maxime intelligibilis.80
Grosseteste  keeps  together  two  opposite  readings  of  Dionysius  to  express  a 
fundamental belief, namely, that God is invisible to us due to his inaccessible excellence; but 
at the same time, He is the most knowable object in Himself.81
I.3 Grosseteste’s translation
 
The examination of the relationship between Grosseteste and the previous translators 
of the Corpus has revealed some important features of his method of translation. A number of 
books have been written on Grosseteste as a Greek scholar.82 In what follows, I will give an 
overview of Grosseteste’s method as translator and then show its originality.
Grosseteste’s translation of the  Corpus had not received great success. For example, 
Albert  the  Great  who will  comment on the  Corpus some years  later,  and certainly knew 
Grosseteste’s translation, mentions it a few times preferring to adopt older versions.83 Thomas 
Aquinas  does  not  consider  Grosseteste  at  all.  The  reason  of  this  failure  is  very  simple: 
Grosseteste’s Latin is clumsy and hard to read.84 Grosseteste himself acknowledged the limits 
of his work;85 but he was also sensible to the criticisms as it appears from the preface to the 
translations of the Corpus.86 
The theoretical roots of his method are in the  Vulgate, where Jerome sacrificed the 
classical canon of taste in order to stay as close as possible to the original text in a word-for-
word kind of translation.87 Grosseteste’s declared aim is to render the author’s intention and 
80 DN VII, M 245vb – 246ra.
81 On this point, see below § II.3.1.1.
82 Besides fundamental study of Franceschini and the others already mentioned, important works are Dionisotti 
1988 and McEvoy 1998.
83 Curiello 2013, 132f.
84 Franceschini (1933, 74-84) shows all Grosseteste’s “offenses” to Latin language.
85 CH XV (English translation in McEvoy 2012, 23): “But if anyone should accuse us of exceeding the proper 
limits of discourse, and nevertheless having expressed ourselves without much grace and clarity, we confess  
that it is true.”
86 Grosseteste says: “Even if people who do not know Greek might on occasion expound ambiguous meanings  
of this kind and bring out true interpretations […] their only title of superiority in their own estimation might  
be  that  when it  comes to  ambiguities  they are  better  at  guessing and conjecturing!”  (Prologue.  English 
translation  in  Kavanagh  2012,58-59).  Kavanagh  (20012,  59)  thinks  that  those  words  are  addressed  to 
Eriugena’s errors, but Eriugena knew Greek and Grosseteste was very respectful with the previous translators 
of  the  Corpus.  It  is  more plausible that  this criticism was addressed to Thomas Gallus as suggested by 
McEvoy (2012, 26). 
87 Kavanagh 2012, 46-48. 
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the beauty of the speech (mens auctoris et venustas sermonis),88 but his adherence to this 
principle is strict in such a way that the outcome at times looks bizarre. Every element of 
language has its semantic value so that it needs to be translated. Take, for example, the case of 
the Greek article that  Grosseteste renders by way of a relative pronoun, or the use of the 
double negation, which Grosseteste endorses although he acknowledges it to be redundant in 
Latin.89 He let  the  Greek shine  through his  Latin,  but  he  help  the  Latin  reader  with  his 
commentaries,  which  are  conceived  as  necessarily  joined  with  the  translations.90 In  the 
commentary,  he  explains  Greek  grammar  and  the  reasons  for  his  choices.  Moreover,  he 
translates the scholia, which contain not only linguistic but also historical notes that may help 
the reader approach the Greek culture.
It is worth noting, however, that not all Grosseteste’s translations are made according 
to these criteria. In fact, he produces a flowing, readable version of the  Testaments of the  
Twelve Patriarchs, which was destined for a wider Latin readership. The Testaments is one of 
the few works that he translates directly from the Greek, without the help of any previous 
Latin translation.91 The translation of the Corpus and that of the Testaments are different: their 
different methods reflect a difference in purposes. When translating the Corpus, Grosseteste’s 
aim is to produce a version for study, not simply for reading.92 Grosseteste was offering to 
Latin scholars – in particular cultivated priests, probably those who belonged to his familia – 
a new kind of instrument, a text that could allow them to go beyond what they already knew 
about Dionysius.
According to  the fundamental  study of Ezio Franceschini,  it  is  possible  to classify 
Grosseteste’s  notes  on  his  own  translation  in  the  following  categories:  spelling  and 
phonetics;93 comparison  between  Greek  and  Latin;94 etymologies;95 and  translation  of 
88 DN I, § 27, 144.
89 See Franceschini 1933, 74-84.
90 Prologue, 15-16.
91 Francecshini (1933, 45-46). 
92 McEvoy 2000, 117.
93 See Franceschini 1933, 85-88.  E.g. CH IV: “Hec enim et  huic in greco non differunt nisi solo accentu, et 
invenitur dictio illa in diversis exemplaribus diversimode accentuata;” Ibid.: “Ubi autem nos posuimus sine 
copulativa coniunctione: theologie, theurgie, theophanie, aliquod exemplar habet copulativam coniunctionem 
interpositam.”
94 See  Franceschini  1933,  88-98.  E.g. DN IV:  “Quod autem diximus  genitive:  per  se  motorum ut  per  se  
motorum et totorum et eorum que secundum unumquodque, diximus secundum proprietatem ydiomatis greci 
in quo verbum providendi exigit  genitivum casum, quem nos in latinum possumus transferre cum verbo 
providendi in dativum vel accusativum;” DN I: “[...] thearchica lumina data per ipsos, splendores videlicet, 
seu per ipsa, eloquia videlicet: greca enim littera utrumque potest dicere.”
95 See  Franceschini  1933,  98-116:  E.g.  EH I:  “Forte  autem  quis  redderet  hic  singula  trium  adiectivorum 
secundum quandam adapropriacionem singulis substantivorum et diceret: scienciam in Deo manentem seu a 
Deo illuminatam et  datam. Hec enim potest dictio greca entheos significare;”  EH IV: “Ad hanc dictionem 
teetHn, oportet referri relativum:  ipsius, secundum grecam litteram. Et considera quod hoc nomen:  teleta, 
secundum  grecam  linguam  significat  in  perfectionem  et  communiter  significat  omnem  oblacionem  et 
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compound nouns and coining of their equivalent Latin noun.96 As stated above, Grosseteste 
knows the previous Latin translations of the Corpus and his choices show that he read several 
Greek manuscripts at his disposal against those translations. 
His  philological  work  is  appreciated  today,  but  it  was  not  during  his  time,  when 
theologians  were  more  interested  in  the  eternal  truths  contained  in  the  Corpus than  in 
knowing what exactly Dionysius thought.97 Although  Grosseteste’s method of translation is 
philologically significant and extremely modern, the figure of Grosseteste as a translator does 
not raise interest. In the anthology dedicated to the history of translation theories, for example, 
Douglas Robinson recalls several medieval authors – even those who were not translators – 
but  no  mention  of  Grosseteste  is  present.98 Comparing  Grosseteste’s  translation  with  the 
controversial translation of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin by Vladimir Nabokov, will demonstrate 
not only that Grosseteste deserves a place among the theorists of translating in the past, but 
his theory is very actual. In the introduction, Nabokov explains his method of translating as 
follows: “To my ideal of literalism, I sacrificed everything – elegance, euphony, clarity, good 
taste,  modern usage,  even grammar”99 Nabokov and Grosseteste sacrificed the clarity and 
grammar to let appear the source’s language and filled the gap between the two languages by 
a series of notes.100 It has been said that “Nabokov was translating for scholarly readers who 
knew no Russian and would be able, with the help of his notes, to construct an accurate poetic 
image of Pushkin’s poem; he was also attempting to efface the many fanciful and romantic 
images of Pushkin current at the time.”101 This is also Grosseteste’s purpose, namely, allowing 
Latin scholars to appreciate a Greek work, helping them with several notes. At the same time, 
Grosseteste wants to rediscover the true face of Dionysius clouded by – according to him – 
unsatisfying translation and commentaries.  His polemic against those who can only guess 
what  Dionysius  thought  may  reveal  a  complaint  against  some  misinterpretations  of  the 
Corpus. Nabokov, just like Grosseteste, was harshly criticized for his work, in particular for 
using unfamiliar  words and creating new words.102 This criticism is  similar to that of the 
actionem Deo oblatam perfectiva.”
96 See Franceschini  1933, 116-124:  E.g. EH III:  “Sunt  autem:  sacre perficiente,  et  a deo tradito et  divine 
generationis et  in lumen ductionum et  sacram operationem, in greco singule dictiones composite;”  EH I: 
“[...]  in  Deo  manentia,  seu,  si  latine  diceretur  unico  vocabulo  composito  sicut  est  in  greco,  indea seu 
indivina.”
97 Dondaine 1953, 116f. 
98 Robinson 1997.
99  See Nabokov 1964. 
100 Newmark (2009, 25) comments: “In return, he provided the ‘pyramids of notes’ for which he has become 
famous, which he [...] sees as a separate but integral part of the translation which uniquely establishes the 
translator’s presence in the translation.”
101 Newmark 2009, 25.
102 Wilson 1965: “The only characteristic Nabokov trait that one recognizes in this uneven and sometimes banal 
translation is the addiction to rare and unfamiliar words, which, in view of his declared intention to stick so  
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humanist, Leonardo Bruni, who qualified Grosseteste’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics 
as crude and verging upon the barbaric.103
It is now clearer that Grosseteste could not be simply classified among the ancient 
translators who were loyal to literal translation. His translation is more than that. I am not 
trying to consider Grosseteste a forerunner of contemporary translation studies, but it is true 
that his  theory of translation was innovative,  and in a loose sense,  modern.  According to 
Grosseteste,  language is  not  an  external  garment  that  can  be exchanged for  another.  The 
translation word-for-word does not imply a one-to-one correspondence between a Greek and a 
Latin word, as he clearly states in his commentaries. This method of translation has profound 
philosophical consequences that will be discussed below. 
I.4 Grosseteste as commentator
Grosseteste  never  meant  to  be  only a  translator.  The Greek works  translated  were 
always equipped with notes and often with a thorough commentary, written by himself, or 
translated from an ancient source, as is the case of Aristotelian works. In fact, he never meant  
to  separate  the  translations  from his  exposition.  Only  in  the  fifteenth  century  were  they 
separated and, as we saw, harshly criticized by humanists.104 In what follows, I would like to 
focus  on  two  aspects  that  characterize  Grosseteste’s  way  of  commenting  that  are 
overshadowed by scholars: first, his respect for the authority, and accordingly, his caution in 
proposing  his  interpretation  of  the  text;  and  second,  his  ecclesiastical  point  of  view  in 
approaching some passages. 
Grosseteste was criticized not only for the obscurity of his translation but also for the 
prolixity of his exposition.105 Some scholars stated that Grosseteste was a commentator in the 
full sense of word since the text of Dionysius was, for him, an occasion not to introduce and 
discuss his own ideas but to clarify the thought of the author.106 In fact, there are very few 
passages where it is possible to perceive clearly Grosseteste’s voice, where he goes beyond 
the pure exposition of the text and makes some digressions. The passages where he “gently 
close to the text that his version may be used as a trot, are entirely inappropriate here. It would be more to the  
point for the student to look up the Russian word than to have to have recourse to the OED (Oxford English 
Dictionary) for an English word he has never seen and which he will never have occasion to use. To inflict on 
the reader such words is not really to translate at all, for it is not to write idiomatic and recognizable English.”
103 See Franceschini 1955.
104 See Gamba 1944, 104f.
105 See McEvoy 1982, 79 n.34.
106 See McEvoy 1982, 79, and Gamba 1944, 105. 
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disagrees” with his source are particularly interesting.  Grosseteste never criticizes directly 
Dionysius’s statement. I give two examples to show that Grosseteste is consistent with his 
approach to other authorities in previous works. In a passage from the De libero arbitrio, a 
statement from John Chrysostom (“the Father precedes the Son  causaliter”) gives him the 
occasion to define the criterion for interpreting the writings of an authority.  According to 
Grosseteste,  although  Chrysostom’s  words  are  correct,  someone  can  misunderstand  and 
introduce a gradation inside the Trinity,  with the Father superior to the Son. But it is not 
possible, Grosseteste says, that a man so religious and expert both in philosophy and theology, 
like John Chrysostom, can commit such a mistake. Grosseteste suggests that it is not correct 
to interpret the words of a man so religious against the Truth, but we must search for its  
original  meaning.107 In  general,  when  he  disagrees,  first,  he  paraphrases  the  position  of 
Dionysius, then he argues for another view. This happens in the De coelesti hierarchia in the 
chapter  on beatific  vision.  Grosseteste realizes that,  according to  Dionysius,  the object of 
heavenly vision is  a created theophany emanating from God, and not God in Himself,  as 
stated by the Latin Fathers. Grosseteste does not criticize Dionysius, neither does he try to 
reconcile  the  Corpus with  the  Latin  tradition;  he  simply  explains  the  divergence  in  the 
commentary discussing the doctrine of the Latin Fathers.108
This respect for the authority was also the reason for his  caution in  proposing his 
interpretation  of  the  text.  In  their  introduction  to  the  English  translation  of  Grosseteste’s 
Epistulae, Mantello and Goering state that “in these letters one see Grosseteste making the 
transition  from his  earlier  career  as  a  master  in  the  schools  to  his  new role  as  supreme 
authority in his diocese. As a teacher and scholar he wrote with deference and curiosity. […] 
In  these  collected  letters  […]  we  see  him  finding  his  voice  as  one  who  speaks  with 
authority.”109 If  this  is  true  for  the  Letters,  we  can  note  that  bishop  Grosseteste,  qua 
commentator,  continued  to  be  respectful  towards  his  authorities  and  very  scrupulous  in 
107 De libero arbitrio, 186: “Item: in determinando assumptum fuit hoc verbum Chrysostomi super «in principio 
erat  verbum»,  «praecedit  Pater  Verbum  non  natura,  sed  causa,»  «praecedit  Pater  Verbum  causaliter,» 
«praecedit  Filius  omnia,  quae  per  ipsum  facta  sunt  naturaliter.» Hoc  verbum  iterum  videtur  habere 
obscuritatem, quia nulla est, ut videtur, in Trinitate processio, nulla causalitas nisi ad creaturas. -- Et sine  
dubio  vir  ille  sanctus  catholicus,  inter  scriptores  catholicos  eminenter  commendatus  et  approbatus, 
philosophia mundana et divina excellentissime imbutus, multo perspicatius et limpidius quam nos novit in 
Trinitate  nullum  esse  gradum,  nihil  prius  aut  posterius,  nihil  maius  aut  minus,  sed  totas  tres  personas 
coaeternas sibi esse et coaequales, nihil ibi velut causalitate aliqua creatum aut factum, sed solum procedens  
et genitum. Quapropter si intelligimus in suis verbis aut eis imponimus aliquid falsum et veritati contrarium,  
haec nostra praesumptio et nostrum vitium, et non est, quod ipse in suis verbis aliquid intellexerit impium.  
Non igitur in verbis tam pii, tam scii, tam sanctissimi viri est a nobis perperam aliquid interpretandum, sed ut  
accipiamus, quod ipse intelligat  devote petendum, et  ut  inveniamus sollicite quaerendum, et  ut  aperiatur 
nobis instanter est pulsandum.”
108 This topic was studied by McEvoy (1982, 93ff; 248ff).
109 Matello – Goering 2009, 19.
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approaching the texts. It is astonishing how many times the adverb ‘maybe’ (forte) appears in 
the commentaries on the Corpus. For example, there are three occurrences of ‘maybe’ in the 
first four pages of the Commentary on the De ecclesiastica hierarchia.110
Grosseteste  manifests  the  respect  for  the  authority  even  if  that  causes  him  some 
difficulties in commenting on the Corpus. A feature that especially troubled Grosseteste  was 
Dionysius’s tendency to write down long lists. The most important are the order of divine 
names in the De divinis nominibus and the negations in the De mystica theologia.111 Here, I 
focus on another passage where Dionysius lists a series of attributes coming from God taken 
as principle of everything: beginning, end, life, immortality, wisdom, order, harmony and so 
on.112 Grosseteste observes that the text is clear, but the reason of that order of words is not. 
According to Grosseteste,  the list  cannot be given at random, therefore,  it  is necessary to 
make sense of it.113 Despite his efforts, he acknowledges that it is not necessary to understand 
the proper meaning of each single word, but it is enough to understand the most important 
ones.114 What  is  important  to  Grosseteste  is  to  preserve  the  authority  from  any  explicit 
criticism that may induce in error. The authority of Dionysius (called tantus pater) – as well 
as that of John Chrysostom (called tam sanctissumus vir), and that of John Damascene (called 
tantus auctor) – cannot be explicitly call into question. 
The second aspect on which I want to focus is Grosseteste’s ecclesiastical concerns in 
his commentaries. In particular, in the commentary on the  De ecclesiastica hierarchia, the 
reader clearly realizes that a bishop is speaking for the role of the bishop (hierarca) is highly 
emphasized.115 The figure of bishop that emerges from these pages is not that of a mediator 
between God and the lower orders of the human hierarchy; but rather, that of a symbol of God 
Himself.116 In order to appreciate the relevance of the bishop in the  Commentary, it can be 
110 See  EH I,  293-296.  Grosseteste  employs  different  expressions  to  manifest  caution  in  proposing  his 
interpretation of the text. Here it follows some examples: DN II, M 181rb “potest forte considerare;” DN II, 
M 182va “videbatur forte;” DN II, 183vb “sicut forte explanata equivocatione;” DN II, M 192va “forte hos 
insinuavit;” DN IV, M 208ra: “forte hic sumpsit auctor;” DN IV, M 208rb: “forte comprehendit;” DN V, M 
234ra “forte per hoc insinuans;”  DN V, M 234ra “forte per hoc insinuans […] vel aliud aliquid quod nos 
latet;” DN V, M 234rb “forte intelligit hic;” DN VI, M 242va “ut si forte diceret.”
111 I will analyze the first list below, § II.3.3.1; the second one is studied in Curiello 2016.
112 See Dionysiaca, 347-350.
113 DN V, M 237ra: “Sermo itaque iste quo ad seriem constructionis planissimus est, sed quo ad rationem ordinis  
verborum in eo positorum dilucide assignandam non sic, neque enim verisimile est quod tantus pater casu et 
irrationabiliter verba hic posita collocaverit. Posset autem quis circa ordinis rationem studiosus forte sic vel 
aliter melius dicere. ”
114 DN V, M 237rb: “Nec  forte querenda est ratio ordinis verborum hic positorum secundum omnis sensus quos 
habent singula verba hic posita sed secundum sensus eorum principaliores et de quibus principaliter intendit  
auctor.”
115 The importance of the bishop in Grosseteste’s thought has been studied in Quinn 1991, 211-255.
116 See  EH 414,  13-16:  “Posita  theoria  subiungit  secundum  quas  proprietates  est  huius  theorie  simbolum 
ierarcha. Est enim ierarcha huius typus et figura secundum quod ad dei imitacionem expandit copiose ad 
omnes divine doctrine splendores […]” Note that ‘theoria’ is a theoretical consideration on the reality that 
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useful to compare the interpretation of Grosseteste with Albert’s commentary on the same 
Dionysian work. One example will suffice. When Dionysius discusses how Christ can be one 
in  substance  and  multiplied  in  the  Eucharistic  species,  Albert  dwells  on  the  ontological 
problem and poses a quaestio to demonstrate that Christ remains numerically the same in the 
multiplicity of hosts, while Grosseteste puts aside the discussion on the sacrament. He rather 
comments on that passage making a comparison between Christ, who stays in Himself and, at 
the same time, is participated by everyone in the host, and the bishop, who is the symbol of 
God spreading his goodness towards creature, while remaining steadfast in his own goodness 
and unity.117 In the case of Albert, it is absolutely clear that a master is writing, who finds in 
Dionysius’s text an occasion to develop a topic of sacramental theology. Grosseteste, instead, 
as a bishop, highlights the passages that can endorse the primary role of his own ministry.118
This pastoral intent is not only present in the De ecclesiastica hierachia, as could be 
expected to a certain degree, but also in the  De divinis nominibus. For example, in Book I, 
Grosseteste adds a note that apparently has nothing to do with the context. Dionysius says that 
we embrace truths about God in that Union that exceeds our reason by the power of the Holy 
Spirit.119 Grosseteste wants to preserve Dionysius from any suspicion of arrogance, saying that 
Dionysius’s  words  are  entirely  drawn  from  the  Scriptures,  as  Dionysius  himself 
acknowledges,  and that  the  authors  of  the  Bible  are  those  who are  united  ineffably with 
God.120 Divine names, Grosseteste says, can be praised independently of the moral state of 
those who praise just  like the priest  who is  in  state  of mortal  sin  can validly confer  the  
Eucharist.121 Unfortunately, Grosseteste is not explicit, so we are left to conjecture about the 
reason he added this note. A plausible reason is that in the passage, Grosseteste endorses the 
catholic  doctrine  ex  opere  operato,  which  means  that  the  efficacy  of  the  action  of  the 
lies beyond the acts of the rite. See also EH III, 599.
117 Cf. Albertus Magnus,  De ecclesiastica hierarchia, 66,24 – 66,67. The text is too long to be quoted here. 
Grosseteste’s account is in EH 493, 2-11: “Quamvis enim deitas ex sua bonitate se tribuat omnibus et singulis 
participandam secundum cuiusque susceptibilitatem et ita diversimode, in seipsa tamen est secundum sui 
substancia omnino permanet immota et invaria. […] Huius itaque immutabilitatis et idenptitatis secundum 
subtanciam deitatis et in se reflexionis typos, symbolum, ymago et agalma est ierarcha [...]”
118 On the  differences  between Albert  and  Grosseteste  about  the  centrality of  the  bishop see  also Albertus 
Magnus, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, 43,44 ss and the parallel text commented by Grosseteste in EH I, 410
119 Dionysiaca, 6-7.
120 DN I, § 5, 135: “Sed ex hiis videri posset alicui quod iste beatus Pater presumptuose ascriberet sibi divini  
Spiritus  participationem et  ea participatione se unitum eo et  ineffabilibus et  incognitis  se ineffabiliter  et 
incognite coniunctum; cuius presumptionis suspicionem rationabiliter tollit cum adiicit se nihil intellecturum 
aut dicturum de Deo in reseratione nominum divinorum, nisi que ex eloquiis divinitus sunt manifestata […].  
Non igitur asserit auctor se asseveraturum veritatem dictorum de Deo in demonstratione virtutis Spiritus  
quam ipse participat, sed quam participaverunt theologi qui eloquia ediderunt.”
121 DN I, § 5, 135f: “Potest enim divina verba dicere, in quibus operatur summe divine divina virtus, etiam qui  
divina virtute et gratia eum cum Deo uniente non participat, utpote sacerdos in mortali peccato existens verba  
consecrationis Eucharistie, in quibus divina virtus conficit corpus Domini divinissimum et ipsius sanguinem 
pretiosum.”
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sacraments does not depend on anything human but only by the will of God as expressed by 
Christ’s institution and promise. This implies that the moral status of the priest does not affect 
the validity of the sacraments. It was an ancient doctrine that was stated by Augustine against 
the Donatists, and Grosseteste needed to repeat what could seem an obvious truth but it was 
not. Indeed, the Donatist view was relaunched by the Waldenses who reached England at the 
end of the twelfth century.122 Another element that supports my hypothesis is that the formula 
ex opere operato comes probably from Peter of Poitiers (†1205), while its counterpart  ex 
opere operantis appears for the first time in William of Auxerre, and both are authors well 
known by Grosseteste.123 These elements imply that at the beginning of the thirteenth century, 
Donatism is perceived as an urgent problem to be solved. Grosseteste may have heard of it  
during his studies in Paris; and when he becomes bishop, he is more and more involved in the 
struggle against it.
Grosseteste’s  concern  is  not  limited  to  the  Eucharist.  In  the  commentaries  on  the 
Corpus, references  to  heresies  are  very  numerous,  especially  in  the  De  ecclesiastica  
hierarchia. Nestorianism, Manicheism, Apollinarism, and many other heresies are mentioned 
in this work.124 Grosseteste gives us detailed information about them, and it is not just because 
he was an “inveterate scribbler.”125 He borrows most of his knowledge of heresies from the 
scholia, and the fact that he reports them in the commentary can be just a consequence of his 
lack of sense of proportion when he composes a treatise,  as McEvoy emphasized.126 This 
explanation  sounds  weak  considering  that  the  struggle  against  heresies  is  a  pillar  of 
Grosseteste’s thought. When he was a master of arts, he was involved in the discussion of the 
eternity of the world, a problem that emerges in several works, and Grosseteste strenuously 
defended the creation in time of the universe against Aristotle.127 It was a doctrine diffused in 
the  Universities;  but  when  Grosseteste  became  bishop  other  heresies  bothered  him  and 
episcopacy was a favourable moment for studying and fighting them. Another significant case 
is the Manichean heresy and its dualism professed by Cathars, which was probably the spur to 
develop the doctrine of transcendentals. The case of Catharism is another example, together 
with the Waldenses of an old error, fought by the Fathers, which comes back in Grosseteste’s 
122 On Waldenses doctrine of Eucharist, see Peters 1980, 159. On the diffusion of Waldenses in England, see  
Jones 1816, vol. II, 156f.
123 On the genesis of the formulas, see Berkouwer 1969, 64. 
124 Unfortunately, there is no analytical index in the edition. Reading through the text, I have found these places  
devoted to heresies: EH, 304; 580f; 672; 686; 806; 823; 837; 894.
125 McEvoy 1982, 27.
126 Ibidem.
127 Cf. Dales 1986.
42
time. Besides his theological passion for the origin of Christianity,128 his pastoral interest for 
heresies could be one of the reasons that induced Grosseteste to deepen his knowledge of the 
beginning of the Church, to which the Corpus is supposed to belong. 
Ian Forrest stated that before the 1380s England had seen no widespread heresy like 
Catharism in Languedoc or Waldensianism in the Alps, Germany, and Bohemia, but at the 
same time it was not completely immune from the major heretical movements of continental 
Europe.129 A personality  like  bishop Grosseteste  could  not  have  been indifferent  to  those 
events. He understood heresy in its biblical Greek meaning, as a choice or a thing chosen. 
According to  him,  a  heretic  is  a  person who chooses to be outside the church,  believing 
her/his choices to be truer than God’s revealed word.130 As a pastor, he tries to bring back the 
lost sheep into the sheepfold. Maybe he was zealous to such a point that King Henry III in  
1252 prohibited him from using his inquisitorial techniques, which being something new in 
his reign, generated a lot of polemics.131 This aspect must not be a surprise for the readers of 
Grosseteste’s  Epistulae, in particular the CXXVII, where he firmly states that the bishop’s 
duty of preaching is not enough if it is not accompanied with the ecclesiastical discipline that, 
like the shepherd’s crook, is a spur to lift up again and go in the right direction.132
Grosseteste’s interest in heresy becomes more intense during his episcopacy not only 
because  of  his  duty as  shepherd  but  also  because  his  knowledge  of  Greek  leads  him to 
reconsider another thorny issue of Christianity, namely, the discussion on the  Filioque that 
opposes  the  Latin  and  Greek  Church.  In  the  next  paragraph,  we  will  consider  how  his 
translation theory, together with his peculiar way of commenting, influenced Grosseteste’s 
theory of language. Even in this case, we will realize that also pastoral concerns are at play.
128 McEvoy 2000, 120: “If we leave aside his retranslation of works by Damascene, then we can regard a group  
of his versions as the expression of that passionate interest he took in the origins of Christianity and in its  
earliest history. His translations of St. Ignatius, Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, and the  Testaments  run 
parallel  to  the  theological  explorations  that  he  conducted  in  his  commentary  on  Galatians  and  in  De 
Cessatione Legalium.”
129 Forrest 2005, 19; 23.
130 Southern 1986, 292f. 
131 Close  Rolls 1251–53,  224f:  “Rex episcopo Lincolniensi,  salutem. Ex querela  multorum accepimus,  tam 
magnatum de dyocesi vestra quam aliorum, per quosdam clericos vestros, et decanos quosdam, citari facitis 
passim et indifferenter pauperes homines de diocesi vestra, et quosdam liberos homines, cujuscumque sint 
homines, et trahitis eos de locis varus ad loca varia, et eos artari facitis per penam excommunicacionis ad 
capiendum coram predictis  clericis et  subditis  vestris  ad loca varia et  eis  honerosa,  dum vacare debeant  
agrorum culture et aliis temporalibus agendis suis necessariis, pro quo depauperantur indebite et enormiter  
vexanturet; insuper, quod inauditum est, eos jurare compellunt predicti scrutatores vestri de privatis peccatis  
aliorum, que non sunt, ut dicitur, publica cohercione purganda, [...] vobis prohibemus ne decetero hujusmodi 
convocaciones populi fieri faciatis in diocesi vestra contra regni nostri consuetudinem et usum longevum.”
132  Epistulae CXXVII, 383-385.
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I.5 Philosophical implications of Grosseteste’s translation theory 
Grosseteste’s theory of translation is inspired by his reflections on language that began 
before the translations themselves, and conversely, the translations were the occasion for new 
inquiries on language. The clarification of this interaction is the topic of this paragraph. First, 
I will offer an overview of some of Grosseteste’s works dedicated to the topic; second, I will 
present the three pillars of Grosseteste’s theory of language; and third, after having identified 
the sources of these pillars,  I  will  discuss in detail  the first  of them (i.e.  the relationship 
between  the  internal  and the  external  language).  Finally,  I  will  show how this  theory of 
language was useful for Grosseteste’s translation work.
The first  known work about  language was  written  when he was a  master  of  arts, 
entitled  De generatione sonorum,  and dedicated to the material aspects of language (vox). 
Grosseteste dedicate also several  Dicta to language in particular  Dictum 9, entitled  De hoc 
verbo “Velociter currit sermo eius,” and  Dictum 54, entitled  Quomodo lingua est calamus. 
When he becomes a master of theology, he is more and more interested in mental language. In 
the De cessatione legalium (ca. 1235), for example, Grosseteste manifests a certain interest in 
angelic language, a topic that will receive particular attention in the Commentary.133 McEvoy, 
one of the first to consider the philosophical relevance of Grosseteste’s thought on language, 
pointed out that the idea of a dialogue among intellects (angels and blessed) was an echo of 
the theory of thinkers like Philo, Gregory of Nyssa, and Proclus. They held that language is a 
sign of human weakness because its corporality prevents human beings from communicating 
directly through the mind.134 According to McEvoy, Grosseteste does not draw this explicitly 
negative anthropological conclusion because according to the bishop of Lincoln,  language 
results  from the  combination  of  the  spiritual  and  the  physical  aspects  of  human  nature, 
namely, its rationality and its power to produce sounds. Language is not classified among the 
faculties  pertaining to  the human soul  nor  among those possessed  by human beings  qua 
animals,  but  it  has  its  proper  place  in  the  “incarnate  rationality.”135 This  reference  to  the 
animals calls for clarification since on at least two occasions Grosseteste states the superiority 
of human beings over animals because of language. 
133 De cessatione  legalium,  121:  “If  our  intellects  were  manifest  to  each  other,  then  the  signs  we  use  for 
communication, external words (exteriorum verborum signa), would be quite redundant.” English translation 
in McEvoy 1981, 586.
134  McEvoy 1981, 586. 
135  McEvoy 1981, 586.
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This multi-faceted interest of Grosseteste for language is based on three principles. 
First,  the  interaction  external/internal:  the  external  voice  and  the  written  words  are 
conventional  signs  of  the  interior  voice,  or  the  concept.136 The  second  principle  is  the 
comparison of the  human word with the second person of the Trinity, or the Word: spoken 
words are like the flesh while the internal word is like the Verbum.137 Third, as a consequence 
from the previous points: human beings have to guard their talk from evil.138 I will present the 
sources of these principles, then I will discuss in particular the first one and its relation with  
the other two.
These principles are not original, historically speaking. On the authority of Aristotle 
and Augustine, most medieval logicians admitted that there are three kinds of terms: written, 
spoken, and mental (or conceptual).139 Concepts or mental terms are the most fundamental, 
they signify “naturally;” spoken terms signify derivatively, by a conventional relation with the 
concepts; written terms are related to spoken terms in the same way.140
It was Augustine, again, on the basis of the second principle, for he formulated the 
view of human language as an image of the Incarnation.141 Also the necessity to preserve the 
tongue from sinning was a common theme among the preachers at the end of the twelfth 
century.142 With respect to this point, I would like to note that Grosseteste does not develop a 
speculative treatise on the  peccatum oris, which was from the  Summa Halensis  onward, an 
important subject of speculation for the masters.143 Even though Grosseteste is aware of this 
scholastic interest for the sins that are related to language, his style is closer to the preachers 
of the twelfth century. Those preachers were more interested in the moral aspect of the sins, in 
order to awake the conscience of the listeners, than in the rational classification of sins as the 
University masters did.
Grosseteste devotes many passages to the first principle.  There are passages where 
uttered or written words are considered expressions, or vehicles, of the internal ones, and this 
136  Dictum 48: “Manifestius quoque et cercius signant et loquuntur opera sensibilia verba interiora operancium 
quam voces vel nutus, que ex sola institucione sunt signa.”
137 Super  Psalterium,  cap.  100,  p.  173ra:  “Et  quia  sermo  est  id  quod  inter  omnes  res  precipuam  gerit  
similitudinem verbi  Dei  incarnati,  sicut  enim eternum Dei  verbum assumpsit  sibi  carnem sensibilem in  
vnitatem persone,  sic  verbum mentis  interius  intellegibile  assumunt  sibi  vnitatem persone verbi  exterius 
sonans audibile vt sit vnus sermo ex intelligibili et audibili.”
138 A passage that summarizes those three elements is  Dictum 54  Quomodo lingua est calamus  fol. 43va-b: 
“Adde ad hoc quod in interiori verbo sumus Dei similitudo; in verbo autem sonante et signante exteriori est  
expressiva similitudo verbi incarnati. Quid igitur tam diligenti custodia observandum ut verbum in quo nostra 
summa consistit dignitas, quod qui custodit, ut patet ex iam dictis, custodit animam suam.”
139  See Aristotle, De interpretatione 1, 16a3-8; Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 10-11.
140  Spade 1982, 189.
141  Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 10-11.
142  See Casagrande - Vecchio 1987, 15.
143 Ibidem, 13.
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relation is never disputed by Grosseteste.144 From these presuppositions,  Grosseteste  holds 
that  there  is  an  immediate  correspondence  between  the  concept  and  the  word.  In  some 
occasions,  Grosseteste specifies that there is a priority and superiority of internal language 
over the external, that which is uttered. In particular, the following passage is puzzling: 
And this is what some say truth is, the adequation of speech and thing and the adequation of 
the thing to understanding. – But since the speech is truer which is silent within than the one  
which sounds without, namely, the concept of the understanding through vocal speech, truth 
will be rather an adequation of interior speech and the thing, than of exterior speech; but if  
interior speech itself were an adequation of itself to the thing, it  would be, not only true  
speech, but truth itself. – Wisdom, however, and the word, or the Speech of the Father is in  
the highest degree adequated by this manner of adequation to the thing which it speaks of and  
states.145
This  passage  is  important  for  Grosseteste’s  conception  of  truth,  which  I  analysed 
elsewhere.146 Here we can limit ourselves to note that Grosseteste searches for a definition of 
truth and that he finds it in the famous ‘adequation formula,’ (misattributed to Isaac Israeli) a 
formula  much  popular  among  the  masters.147 In  the  last  part  of  the  quotation,  the 
Christological reference is another witness of the second principle of Grosseteste’s theory of 
language. But the most interesting part is Grosseteste’s quotation of another version of the 
‘adequation formula,’ namely,  the adequation of interior speech and thing, which  probably 
comes from William of Auvergne, and Grosseteste feels the need to clarify it.148 The point in 
discussion is that the internal word is truer than the word that is uttered. Ginther explains this 
passage saying that an unvocalised concept is truer than a vocalised one “presumably because 
there is  one less layer of temporal signification.”149 This interpretation relates truth to the 
144 Dictum  54  (Quomodo  lingua  est  calamus),  fol.  43vb:  “Verbum  autem  interius,  de  thalamo  memorie 
procedens, quasi vehiculum verbi sonantis ascendit, et progreditur per cavum oris quasi per ostii aperturam, 
cuius ostii valve sunt instrumenta vocalia.” The generation of the concept from the memory is a doctrine 
borrowed from Augustine. See De Trinitate, XV, 22. 
145 De veritate, 134:  “Aliqui dicunt veritatem esse «adaequationem sermonis et rei» et «adaequationem rei ad 
intellectum». Sed cum verior sit sermo, qui intus silet, quam qui foris sonat, intellectus videlicet conceptus  
per sermonem vocalem, magis erit veritas adaequatio sermonis interioris et rei, quam exterioris; quod si ipse 
sermo interior esset adaequatio sui ad rem, non solum esset sermo verus, sed ipsa veritas. Sapientia autem et  
verbum,  sive  «Sermo  Patris» maxime  adaequatur  hoc  modo  adaequationis  rei,  quam dicit  et  loquitur.”  
English translation in McKeon 1929, 269.
146 See Curiello 2016.
147 On the misattribution of the ‘adequation formula’ to Isaac Israele,  see Altman – Stern 1958, 58. On the 
diffusion of the ‘adequation formula’ among the Masters of the first half of the 13 th century, see Pouillon 
1939, 59 f. 
148 William of Auvergne,  De Universo III,  I,  c.26,  p.  749 b A s.s.:  “Intentio  veri  et  veritas  [...]  et  hoc,  ait 
Avicenna, est adequatio orationis et rerum.” 
149 Ginther 2004, 96.
46
rapidity of its medium. It is plausible, but I think that a different interpretation is possible. A 
different answer, more based on Grosseteste’s words, could be that the uttered language can 
be separated from the internal word, as it happens when someone lies. In one of his  Dicta, 
where Grosseteste shows his ability in using images and metaphors, he compares the uttered 
word to a leaf. When the leaf is detached from the tree, it falls down and dies; just as the 
uttered word detached from the truth of the internal one is destined to fall down, namely, to 
not reach God.150
The idea of the superiority of the internal  word on the external one is  constant  in 
Grosseteste both before and after his  translation work.151 Behind this belief  there is,  once 
again, Augustine who considered the internal word as something which comes before any 
linguistic articulation and that is the closest image to reality. The uttered word instead is just a  
sign, and its linguistic nature hides the reality because it is a limited instrument that cannot 
signify the reality as it is.152 The truth is in the interior of men and no language can attain it.
These principles, and in particular the first one, are determinant also for Grosseteste’s 
theory  of  translation.  A  passage  from  the  Confessiones seems  to  describe  perfectly 
Grosseteste’s translating work and its relation with truth. In that passage, Augustine asserts 
that  truth  speaks  without  voice  or  tongue,  neither  in  Hebrew,  nor  Greek,  nor  Latin,  nor 
barbarian.153 These words resound in Grosseteste’s works. Commenting on Paul’s  Epistle to  
Galatians,  Grosseteste finds the following verse: “God sent the Spirit  of his Son into our 
hearts, the Spirit who calls out, «Abba, Father»” (Galatians 4,6). Grosseteste believes that 
Paul, employing both the Greek and Hebrew term, meant to signify that the Holy Spirit does 
not speak with audible voice but that He refers directly to the concept that is signified by 
150 Dictum 98 (De Folio),  fol  75ra:  “Folii  autem spiritualis  discontinuacio est  verbi  exteriorum ab  interiori 
disiunctio. Hoc autem est cum aliud dicit verbum exterius et aliud sentit mens interius. Causa autem casus  
foliorum est condensacio et siccacio succi glutinosi. Similiter cum siccatur humor caritatis, amor vidilecet  
veritatis, cadit folium verbi discontinuatum a verbo interiori. Folium autem cadens in terram decidit, quia 
illuc cadit  verbum ubi terminatur intencio dicentis.  Omnis autem mencientis intencio in terra terminatur,  
quapropter  eius verbum in terram cadit.  Veridicorum autem verba nusquam cadunt,  sed usque ad celum 
intencionis directione pertingunt.”
151  Another  passage  on  the  topic  written  during  the  years  of  regency of  the  chair  of  theology is  Super 
Psalterium, cap. 100, p. 173ra: “Item, sermo est in quo solo preeminet homo omni animali. In sermone etiam 
ratio interior comprehenditur quia igitur in hoc est hominis preeminentia et decus hunc debet super omnia 
custodiri  immaculum. Sermo autem malus pessimos parit fructus quia corrumpit  bonos mores auditorum 
colloquia praua.”
152  Koch 2009, 12-13: “En effet, si le verb intérieur peut etre simillimum rei notae, c’est parce qu’il ‘ne tient 
rien de lui-meme’, mais que tout en lui vient de la connaissance qu’il dit dans le coeur. […] Car le propre des  
verba qui appartient à une langue particulier, c’est que, lorsqu’ils signifient, ils comportent quelque chose 
qu’ils “tiennent” d’eux-memes. [...] Le propre de signes, linguistique ou autres (gestuels par example), c’est 
qu’ils  ne  disent  pas  ce  qu’ils  signifient  comme cela  est,  mais  comme eux-memes  sont,  c’est-à-dire  par  
traduction dans la structure qui est la leur et qui ne ressemble pas à la structure de l’object signifié.” Cf.  
Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 20 and 22; Sermon 288, 3.
153 Augustine, Confessiones, XI, 3: “Intus utique mihi, intus in domicilio cogitationis nec hebraea nec graeca nec 
latina nec barbara veritas sine oris et linguae organis, sine strepitu syllabarum diceret: verum dicit.”
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those words.154 
The  passage  from  De veritate quoted  above  and  that  on  Ad  Galatas recalls  how 
important  was  this  Augustinian  idea  in  Grosseteste’s  mind,  but  he  can  fully  appreciate 
Augustine’s  analysis  only  after  his  Greek  study.  While  reading  the  works  of  the  Greek 
Fathers, he realizes how Augustine was right and how the historical languages may lead far 
from the truth.  Grosseteste, as translator, becomes  more and more aware of the ambiguities 
generated by language, and realizes that it is impossible to put a one-to-one correspondence 
between Greek and Latin. McEvoy lists four kinds of discrepancy among these languages 
according to  Grosseteste:  first,  a  single Greek word has two Latin equivalents;  second,  a 
Greek word has no direct Latin equivalent; third, two Greek words are rendered by a single 
Latin one; fourth, the meaning of a single Greek word is rendered by a number of Latin forms, 
each of which signifies (taken separately) only part of the meaning of the Greek word.155 A 
paradigmatic example of the ambiguity to render a Greek word in Latin is the term logos. In 
Book  VII  of  the  De  divinis  nominibus,  God  is  praised  as  ratio,  or  according  to  other 
translations, sermo. Grosseteste comments that in Greek the word logos means both “reason” 
and “word” which are not different in God.156 This means that while in God there is a perfect 
correspondence of what He thinks and what He says, this is not the case for human beings as  
asserted in the quoted text from De Veritate. 
Concerning human beings, there is, however, some proportionality between thoughts 
and words. In  the De mystica theologia, Dionysius explains why the treatise that concerns 
divine names drawn from material things, the De symbolica theologia, is longer than the De 
divinis nominibus and this one is longer that the Theologicas subfigurationes that deals with 
Trinitarian  names.  Grosseteste,  following Dionysius,  asserts  that  superior  things  are  more 
simple than inferior, sensible things “and for that reason the insights into them (intelligentie  
eorum) are less numerous, and as a consequence the words that signify the understanding of 
them are fewer.”157 This means not only that the less a reality can be grasped by the intellect, 
the less it can be expressed by words, but also that sensible things are more composed than 
the superior. On this point Grosseteste says, “they [i.e sensible things] need more words to 
show them forth in the wholeness of what they are (totalitatis ostensionem), and to clarify 
154 Ad Galatas, 105: “Postest quoque per haec diversa nomina insinuari, quod Spiritus Sanctus clamat in nobis 
non tam diversas voces audibiles, quae apud diversas gentes sunt diversae, quam ipsarum vocum diversarum 
unum significatum, quod apud omnes gentes est idem.”
155 McEvoy 1975, 81.
156 DN VII: “Laudat ipsum ex nominationibus rationis seu verbi. In greco enim habetur logos quod significat 
rationem et verbum que de deo dicta non differunt.” Other references to logos and its double meaning of ratio 
and sermo are at DN II, M186vb; DN III, M 195vb; DN IX, M 259ra; DN IX, M 260va; DN IX, M 261va.
157 MT III, 101.
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what  they  mean  symbolically  (symbolice  significatorum  declarationem).”158 This  is  an 
application to language of a metaphysical principle, namely, that the spiritual realities belong 
to the domain of unity while the material ones to that of plurality. Those expressions suggest 
that material realities are in some way covered by several layers. Words are needed to disclose 
what they really are while spiritual realities are more easily accessible by the insights of the 
intellect.  We  may  infer  from  these  assertions  a  moral  consequence,  namely,  verbosity 
characterizes someone who deals with material  things,  and therefore,  it  can lead to sin.159 
While  those  who live  in  contemplation  do  not  need  to  use  many words,  actually  in  the 
mystical union “the whole word, that is the speech power, in terms both of the word which is 
framed interiorly and the word that is brought forth exteriorly, will be voiceless.”160 
In the De ecclesiastica hierarchia, Grosseteste explains that the concept is the internal 
word while the proper word is the uttered one and the latter is a symbol of the former.161 
Grosseteste reaffirms that vocal words are symbols of the internal words some pages later, in 
a  liturgical  context,  where  Grosseteste  explains  that  the  hymn,  the  song of  praise  that  is 
chanted during the Mass, is just a symbol of the interior thanksgiving.162 Both occurrences of 
‘symbol’  are  not  present  in  the  Dionysian  text,  but  they  are  Grosseteste’s  original 
developments. 
At this point, we must clarify what is a symbol for Grosseteste in order to understand 
the relationship between internal and external word. Grosseteste calls the symbol “something 
sensible which takes the place of something intelligible (pro intelligibili assumptum).”163 On 
many occasions, Grosseteste deals with symbols in the Commentary on the De ecclesiastica  
hierarchia. Dionysius refers to symbol when he deals with theological knowledge. Sensible 
symbols are necessary to hide holy realities (God, sacraments) from the impures, but at the 
same time they represent the first step to know those realities, because while we are on earth,  
we need those symbols to climb towards God. The first who received the Revelation, the 
authors of the Scriptures, bequeathed their knowledge using symbols just to reach this double 
158 MT III, 99.
159 See  Dictum 54,  fol.  43ra:  “Multiloquii  prolixitatem incurtat  Salomon in Parabolis 10: [Prov.  10:19] «In 
multiloquio non deerit peccatum.» Et Dominus ipse in Matthei sexto: [Matt. 6:7] «Orantes nolite multum 
loqui».”
160 MT III, 101.
161 EH I, 357, 8-12: “Ubi nos ponimus ‘raciones,’ in greco habetur ‘logos’ quod significat non solum interiores  
raciones et raciocinaciones sed et exteriores sermones et verba. Unde hic diversi diversimode transtrulerunt  
non dissonanter veritati cum sermones simbolorum sint revelati et cogniti sacreperfectoribus.”
162 EH III, 540, 12 – 541,9: “Hec autem ympnizacio vocalis corporaliter audibilis symbolum est ympnizacionis  
interioris in mente racionabiliter et intus disposicio sermone facte. Unde vocatur ympnologia ab ympnos et 
logos quod est racio [...] Logos enim, id est sermo exterior, audibilis corporalis ympnizacionis symbolum est  
interioris sermocinacionis et iocundacionis.”
163 MT III, 97.
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goal:  hide  and  reveal.164 The  symbol  qua symbol  is  neutral,  its  function  depends  on  the 
receiver. The more saint and pure the receiver is, the clearer will be the reality signified by the 
symbol; on the contrary,  for the impures the symbols will obscure the reality behind it.165 
These considerations applied to the language imply that we have no other choice than using 
language,  our  poor  historical  languages.  At  the  same  time,  we  must  remember  that  the 
language  does  not  always  reveal  our  thought  since  it  can  also  veil  it.  Thus,  the  uttered 
language is, with its physical aspects (voice or handwriting), a symbol of the concept, which 
is the intelligible part of language. Grosseteste does not add any other detail to this picture, 
and  a  modern  reader  can  be  disappointed  to  not  see  a  full-fledged  theory  of  internal 
language.166 
Despite the lack in his account, Grosseteste’s theory of translation is so decisive in his 
thought  that  it  allows him to solve a  thorny theological  question.  Destined to  have great 
fortune in the Franciscan school, McEvoy, again, sheds light on this solution. I am referring to 
Grosseteste’s  solution  of  the  conflict  between the  Greek and the  Latin  Church about  the 
formula Filioque.167 According to the Greek Church, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father 
alone, while for the Latin Church He proceeds from the Father and the Son (Filioque). Our 
attention must not be fixed here on the theological aspects of the controversy. Grosseteste 
believes  that  the  difference  that  opposes  them  represents  only  a  verbal  and  not  a  real 
disagreement; after closer analysis of the expressions involved, it emerges that the doctrine is 
the same.168 Even in this case the interplay between a spoken/written word (i.e. the linguistic 
expressions of the dogma) and an inner  language (i.e.  the dogma itself),  as well  as  their 
discrepancy, is due to the impossibility of finding a proper translation for the expressions. If it  
164 EH I, 353, 7-17: “Dicto quod eloquia sunt nostre ierarchie substancia et que sunt illa eloquia nobis a deo per  
sacros  viros  nostros  sacre  perfectores  in  simbolis  tradita  et  infert  quod  ipsi  sacri  viri  […]  in  simbolis  
tradiderunt,  nec  hunc modum tradicionis  observaverunt  solum causa  occultandi  sub velamine figurarum 
symbolicarum sacra execratis sed et quia nostra hierarchia indiget sensibilibus simbolis comproporcionaliter  
nobis ut per ea divinius sursum ducamur ad intelligibilia ex ipis intelligenda.” See also EH I, 349.
165 EH  II,  404, 7-10: “Hec namque teletH unicuique ordini convenientem sibi tribuit ad deum reduccionem: 
capaciori  videlicet  spiritualium  plus  tribuens  participationis  eorumdem,  et  minus  capaci  minus  et 
perfectissimo perfectissime.” TeletH is the liturgical rite of a sacrament; it is what appears but not the divine  
reality signified (theoria).
166 We may feel the same disappointment reading Augustine, cf. Koch 2009, 11: “La notion de verbe intérieur, 
telle quela définit Augustin, est assez peu en accord avec ce que l’on attendrai du modèle verbal appliqueé à  
la pensée.”
167 McEvoy 1975, 42-53.
168 DN II: “But let the reader beware of taking statements similarly expressed as having a single sense, such as 
the following, e.g.:  «from someone»,  «through someone»,  «in someone», and other such expressions […] 
Ignorance of this fact deceives good scholars, and the outward expression sets them at variance and leads 
them to contradict each other; yet  if  the ambiguity were once ironed out there would be no controversy 
between  them;  just  as,  it  may  be,  an  analysis  of  the  ambiguous  phrase,  «from  X» would  remove  all 
controversy between the  Greeks’ doctrine  that  the  Holy Spirit  proceeds  from the  Father  alone,  and  the 
Latins’, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.” English translation in McEvoy 1981, 591.
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is impossible to translate exactly the expressions of a language into those of another language, 
one may wonder how it is possible to fill the gap between the spoken and the inner word. The  
answer is Grosseteste’s method of translation. It is not by chance that he states his idea on the 
Filioque in two commentaries on Greek works (De hymno trisagio by Damascene and the 
Dionysian  De  divinis  nominibus).  His  translations,  furnished  with  the  indispensable 
commentary and the  abundance  of  philological,  grammatical  and historical  notes,  are  his 
original way to solve the problem of the ambiguity of language. The Corpus, therefore, is not 
only a source of information about old heresies which permitted to detect the roots of new 
heretical movements, but also the place to show that what is considered a heresy (for example, 
the refusal of Filioque by the Greek Fathers), in actuality is not. 
All  that  being  said,  we can  return  to  McEvoy’s  evaluation  of  Grosseteste  and his 
positive  view of  language.  We  realize  that  the  Neoplatonic  influence,  via  Dionysius,  on 
Grosseteste  is  undeniable.  Historical,  spoken  languages  are,  indeed,  a  sign  of  human 
weakness, and the superiority of human beings over animals is manifested in the internal 
language rather than in language in general.169 It is the ability of human beings to bring to 
unity, in a concept formed before any linguistic expression, the richness and the plurality of 
material reality that puts human beings in a higher position in the hierarchy of beings.170
I.6 Conclusion
In  1238,  Robert  Grosseteste  begins  to  translate  and  comment  on  the  Corpus,  an 
authority  well  known  among  the  masters  of  the  twelfth  and  the  thirteenth  century.  But 
Grosseteste knew very well Dionysius’s works before that date. As I have demonstrated, he 
reads not only the Hierarchies, as generally believed, but he has also some knowledge of the 
other two treatises. 
When he decided to translate the Corpus, he began to collect manuscripts from Greece. 
169 See  Super Psalterium, cap. 100, p. 173ra: “Item, sermo est in quo solo preeminet homo omni animali. In 
sermone etiam ratio interior comprehenditur quia igitur in hoc est hominis preeminentia et decus hunc debet  
super omnia custodiri immaculum.” Cf. Dictum 98: “Folia vero arboris sunt ornamenta; sic sermo est solus 
quo homo plus aliis animantibus decoratur. [Ecclus. 5:15] «Honor enim et gloria in sermone sensati,» sicut  
scribitur in Ecclesiastico 5°, et in eodem, capitulo 4 [x MS]: [Ecclus. 4:29] «In lingua agnoscitur sapiencia, et  
sensus, et sciencia, et doctrina in verbis veritatis».”
170 This does not imply that also spoken language has its own positivity. In the  Dictum 136 (De orando), he 
exalted the prayer expressed vocally over the silent prayer chiefly because it hurts the devil, who does not 
perceive the thought, but can hear the prayers. However, if uttered words are not connected with the interior 
affection, they are vain.
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These resources gave him the opportunity to correct the previous translations of the Corpus. 
Indeed, Grosseteste works first on the Latin versions and then comares them with the original 
Greek. Grosseteste translates also the  scholia and uses them, explicitly or implicitly, in his 
commentary. Most of the references to Greek grammar or antiquities comes from this source. 
Despite this great effort,  Grosseteste’s translation of the Corpus was not widespread. 
The  reason  of  this  failure  is  that  Grosseteste’s  Latin  is  clumsy and  hard  to  read.  When 
translating the  Corpus, Grosseteste’s aim is to produce a version for study, not simply for 
reading. Grosseteste was offering to Latin scholars, in particular cultivated priests, a new kind 
of  instrument,  a  text  that  could  allow  them  to  go  beyond  what  they  already  knew  on 
Dionysius. Grosseteste, however, never meant to be only a translator. As a commentator, his 
first  duty  was  to  respect  the  authority,  and  accordingly,  he  is  cautious  in  proposing  his 
interpretation of the text. His comment shows also some of his concerns such as the relevance 
of the bishop and the fight against heresies. 
For Grosseteste, the  Corpus is not only a source of information about old heresies, 
which permitted to detect the roots of new heretical movements, but also the place to show 
that  what  is  considered  a  heresy,  in  actuality  is  not.  The case  of  the  controversy on  the  
Filioque is a paradigmatic example of how Grosseteste’s theory of translation, inspired by his 
reflections  on  language,  has  important  theological  and  philosophical  consequences.  The 
interplay between a spoken/written word (i.e. the linguistic expressions of the dogma) and an 
inner language (i.e. the dogma itself), as well as their discrepancy, is due to the impossibility 
of finding a proper translation for the expressions. If it is impossible to translate exactly the 
expressions of a language into those of another language, one may wonder how it is possible 
to fill the gap between the spoken and the inner word. The answer is Grosseteste’s method of 
translation. His translations, furnished with the indispensable commentary and the abundance 
of philological, grammatical, and historical notes, are his original way to solve the problem of 





According  to  James  Ginther,  Grosseteste’s  teaching  on  the  doctrine  of  God  has 
received little attention by scholars.171 This statement may seem surprising, but it is essentially 
valid,  and  it  is  even  more  unexpected  when  one  realizes  that  it  comes  from  the  only 
monograph devoted to Grosseteste’s theology. Indeed, the theme of ‘God’ does not feature 
prominently in  Grosseteste’s scholarship.172 However, Grosseteste himself, a theologian and 
bishop as he was, would be astonished to know that he is remembered for his scientific and 
philosophical works rather than for his work in theology. It is indisputable that his scientific 
works  are  significant,  and  regardless  of  whether  he  may  be  considered  a  forerunner  of 
scientific  method or not,  the value of his  work and method is  appreciated even today by 
scholars  belonging  to  scientific  disciplines.173 This  does  not  mean  that  some  topics  of 
Grosseteste’s theology have not  received any attention.  For  example,  his  Christology and 
pastoral works have been well-received by commentators.174 Nevertheless, his speculation on 
God qua God has been unduly neglected.
In  this chapter, I deal with the first point of my thesis, namely,  to reconstruct the 
doctrine of the threefold state of the First Principle in Grosseteste’s works. Specifically, the 
present chapter focuses on the first phase of the First Principle, which we called the remaining 
(moné). Grosseteste holds as a basic tenet that while it is impossible to say or know something 
about God in Himself, human beings are not destined to a complete ignorance or silence about 
171
  Ginther 2004, 89.
172 The most complete bibliography, as said in the Introduction, is Gieben 1962 and Gieben 1995.
173 On Grosseteste as forerunner of modern science see Crombie 1953 and more recently Oliver 2004. For what 
concern the appreciation of Grosseteste as a “scientist” who is worthy of being considered today, I refer to 
the  “Ordered  Universe  Project”  that  is  presented  in  the  web  page  (ordered-universe.com)  as  follows: 
“Bringing together  a  unique configuration of  natural  scientists,  social  scientists  and arts  and  humanities 
scholars,  the  project  integrates  the  conceptual  tools  of  modern  science  with  the textual  methods of  the  
humanities to explore the richness of Grosseteste’s thought. Our translations, many for the first time, and  
which incorporate the groundbreaking concept of translation into mathematics, enable wider access to this 
wonderful mind, compelling us to make new assessments of his perceptive and inventive imagination”. 
174 On christology, see McEvoy 1980. On Grosseteste’s pastoral care see Boyle 1979.
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Him. 
In his pioneering work, Ginther points to three topics that characterize Grosseteste’s 
speculation about God in the years of his regency as master of theology: God as first form of 
everything; what God can know and do; the traces of the Trinity in the world.175 These themes 
also occur in the Commentary. In particular, Grosseteste treats God as form in Book V of the 
De divinis nominibus; there he deals with how God knows all things in Book VII of the same 
treatise, while Trinity is the topic of Book II. While these various themes are important for 
Grosseteste’s work as a whole, the topic most developed in the De divinis nominibus and De 
mystica theologia but also in some important parts of the  Hierachiae is the human being’s 
capacity for knowing and naming God. The theological themes indicated by Ginther have 
received, separately, attention by scholars. For this reason, I shall not discuss them in detail, 
but I shall refer to them only when they are relevant for the present argument. Unlike the 
other topics just mentioned, the theme of the human being’s capacity for knowing and naming 
God has received only sparse attention from the likes of Francis Ruello and Jean-Michel 
Counet.176
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify Grosseteste’s conception of God qua God. In 
order to accomplish this task, we begin by examining his theory of theological language. This 
choice may seem unusual insofar as theological language can be considered only a part of 
theology, and hence, secondary with respect to other topics. But it is Grosseteste himself who 
suggests  this  path.  According  to  him,  naming  God properly  amounts  to  having  a  proper 
concept of Him. By contrast, having an improper concept of God entails a kind of blasphemy 
that  leads  to  heresy.  This  is  the  fundamental  thesis  of  the  second  commandment  in 
Grosseteste’s  De decem mandatis, which forbids one to believe that God is something less 
than  He  actually  is.  As  explained  above,177 human  language  is  intrinsically  problematic 
because it has normally been introduced to express our thoughts, but on some occasions, it 
can hide our thoughts to a certain degree. A particular case is that of theological language that, 
according to Grosseteste, reaches the peak of this paradox because no thought or word can be 
adequate to God’s infinity. While ordinary language can be corrected through correcting our 
understanding of reality, a correct understanding of God is impossible because His reality is 
simply beyond all understanding. This is why only a keen analysis of Grosseteste’s theory of 
theological  knowledge  and  language,  considered  in  their  mutual  interplay,  permits  us  to 
understand Grosseteste’s idea of God qua God.
175 Ginther 2004, 89-105.
176 Ruello 1959; Counet 2012.  Their studies consider only a little part of the Commentary.  
177 See § I.5.
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Who is God, according to Grosseteste? The first distinctio of his Tabula is entitled de 
Deo and numerous authorities are mentioned. The sub-distinctions reveal how Grosseteste 
intends to develop the subject: from the questions concerning the existence of God and his 
quiddity (an Deus sit,  quid sit Deus) until the questions concerning praising God and the 
dictum that God created in “number, weight, and measure” (de laudando deo;  de numero,  
pondere et mensura).”178 These questions illustrate two different ways of approaching God 
insofar  as  they  consider  God  qua God  and  God  in  relation  to  the  creatures.  The  two 
approaches of the  Tabula recur in other works of Grosseteste, belonging to his regency as 
master of theology (§ II.2) as well as to his episcopacy (§ II.3). In this chapter I shall consider  
Grosseteste’s  attempts  to  express  God in  His  transcendence,  while  the  next  chapter  shall 
examine  Grosseteste’s  explanation  of  God’s  procession  towards  creatures.  In  order  to 
approach God’s mystery as close as a man can do, Grosseteste observes that knowledge needs 
to be strengthened by a pure love for Him, according to the principle that intelligence goes 
hand-in-hand with the will (§ II.2.2). As a master of arts and then as master of theology, 
Grosseteste discusses theological language in order to decide upon either the equivocity or the 
univocity  of  divine  names  (§  II.2.3).  From  the  Commentary onwards,  the  priorities  of 
Grosseteste change. The first issue I will discuss is Grosseteste’s theory of the human capacity 
to  know God.  We shall  see that,  for  Grosseteste,  this  knowledge can  be  based either  on 
Scripture or on reason (§ II.3.1). Once realized that intellectual knowledge is not, according to 
Grosseteste,  enough to reach God, we have to take the role of love into consideration (§ 
II.3.2). The limit of human knowledge is reflected in the limit of a human being’s capacity for 
naming God. There is no name (except, maybe, for one) that can define God’s transcendence; 
nonetheless, there is a method that guides human language to express (as far as possible) it, 
namely, the affirmative and negative theology: the first begins from the most proper names of 
God and descends to the less noble ones, while the second ascends from the less noble names 
to the silence. From the Commentary onwards, Dionysius becomes Grosseteste’s first source 
for a discourse on the divine transcendence, together with the authority of Anselm (§ II.2.3). 
178 See Tabula, 265-272. The dictum refers to Wisdom 11:20.
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II.2 The doctrine of God before the Corpus Dionysiacum
II.2.1 Definitions of God
If  we  search  for  a  definition  of  God,  we  find  two  very  different  answers  in 
Grosseteste’s early writings: the first is that “God is the first form of everything” (Deus est  
prima forma omnium),  the second is the Anselmian formula that “God is that than which 
nothing  greater  can  be  thought”  (Deus  est  quo  nihil  maius  excogitari  potest).  These 
definitions evoke two different aspects of God: the first indicates the proximity of God to 
creatures by virtue of His universal causality, a view that I will discuss in the next chapter; the 
focus of this chapter, however, concerns the second definition, which refers to His absolute 
transcendence. 
Yet the meaning of a ‘definition’ itself needs clarification before we assess the content 
of Grosseteste’s point. McEvoy points out that, for Grosseteste, the Anselmian formula id quo 
maius … is not, strictly speaking, a definition of God. McEvoy follows a suggestion of Karl 
Barth – one of the few, McEvoy claims, to have understood Anselm’s intention – and holds 
that the formula “expresses nothing about the nature of God, but rather lays down a rule of 
thought which enables us to endorse the statements about the Nature of God accepted in faith 
as our own necessary thoughts”.179 Even though it is true that the formula is not an essential 
definition,  since it  does not express the  quid of God, Grosseteste,  however,  notes that no 
definition of God can be quidditative as He is in Himself ineffable. By the use of the term,  
‘definition, I, therefore, intend to convey a descriptive definition.
As  McEvoy  notes,  Anselm’s  argument  recurs  in  many  works  of  Grosseteste:  De 
cessatione legalium,  Sermo  19, and  Deus est  (known also as  De confessione).180 The first 
work studies the prophecies of the Messiah, their fulfillment in Christ, and in particular, it 
deals with the theory of the necessity of Christ’s Incarnation. According to the authorities that 
Grosseteste consulted, the Incarnation would not have taken place if Adam had not sinned.181 
Grosseteste, instead, believes that there are reasons to believe the opposite, namely, that God 
would have become man even if Adam had not sinned. Grosseteste begins his discussion with 
this words: “God is the greatest power, wisdom and goodness, and is more good than can even 
179 McEvoy 1995b, 272-3. Giulio d’Onofrio recently endorsed a similar position on Anselm’s argument, see 
d’Onofrio 2005, 139.
180 McEvoy 1995b, 261-264.
181 Grosseteste mentions Augustine, Gregory the Great and Anselm as authorities on this matter. Cf. Augustine, 
Enchiridion, 108 and Id., De Trinitate, 13-14; Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, 17, 30; Anslem, Cur Deus 
homo, 2, 6-7.
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be thought.”182 The first part of the sentence has a long history reaching back to Boethius and 
Augustine.183 The second part of the sentence elicits Anselm’s argument. From this established 
truth, Grosseteste argues that God created a world that is as good as it can possibly be, and 
from which no good that could be granted is withheld. According to Grosseteste, God would 
not be extremely good (summe bonus) if the universe were capable of more goodness than 
that received from God.184 It follows, in particular, that the world is capable of receiving the 
Son of God and this capacity does not come from Adam’s sin, but from divine goodness that 
is greater than any idea of which it can be conceived. In this first text, we see the element that 
characterizes Grosseteste’s reading of Anselm argument, i.e., the strict connection between 
thought  and  goodness:  God  is  beyond  every  thought  because  His  goodness  is  also 
unsurpassable by thought.
The other occurrences of Anselm’s argument are in writings devoted to the sacrament 
of confession. The first,  Sermo  19, is a sermon written at the request of the papal legate, 
cardinal Otto, to be delivered at a Council in London.185 The second, Deus est, is Grosseteste’s 
most popular work on the subject of which I will focus. Anselm’s argument is at the incipit 
and epilogue of the treatise. From this definition it follows, according to Grosseteste, that God 
did not content Himself with staying alone in His absolute perfection; on the contrary, because 
of  His  overabundant  goodness,  He  called  things  from  non-being  to  being  in  order  to 
participate in His excellence.186 The preamble concludes with the work of redemption realized 
by Christ. Since God cannot die a second time, He established the sacraments to free those 
who could fall into sin again. The sacrament of confession, in particular, allows the sinner to 
return to God, who is qualified, again, as “quo nihil melius excogitari potest.”187 Thus, the 
entire treatise is framed by the thought of God’s transcendence formulated in the terms set by 
Anselm.  
To McEvoy’s list, we may add another occurrence found in the second edition of De 
libero arbitrio. In the second chapter, Grosseteste presents many arguments to prove that God 
knows  particulars.  Among  the  authorities  quoted  there  is  Anselm with  his  formula.  The 
182 De cessatione legalium, 120: “Deus est summa potentia et sapientia et bonitas et magis bonum quam etiam 
possit excogitari”.
183 See Boethius, Consolatio Philosophiae, III, pr. 10; Augustine, Confessiones, VII, iv, 6. 
184 De cessatione legalium, 120: “Si enim ipsa [universitats] esset capabilis aliquante bonitatis quam ipse illi non 
influeret, non esset summe largus et ita nec summe bonus.”
185 It is an unedited sermon contained in MS. Bod. 830, fol. 184rb.
186 Deus est, 239f: “Deus est quo nihil melius excogitari potest, cuius posse maximum, scire verissimum, et velle 
optimum. Est enim aeternus in essentia, simplex simpliciter, et invariabilis in manentia, alio non indigens sed 
sibi et aliis sufficiens in gloria. Igitur propter exuberantiam bonitatis propriae placuit ei alia a non esse in sui  
praesentiam vocare, ut haberent tantae excellentiae participationem.”
187 See Deus est, 293.
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argument goes as follows: in every genre, it is better to know than not to know. If God would 
know only universals, but not particulars, He would be inferior than the one who knows both 
universals and particulars, but this is against Anselm who stated that God is greater than that  
which can be thought.188 Here Grosseteste applies Anselm’s argument of the existence of God 
to a specific divine attribute, i.e.,  His omniscience: as God cannot not  exist, He cannot not 
know something.
But it is in the De decem mandatis that Anselm’s argument is developed, which tells us 
that  Grosseteste shows is  one of the first  theologians to have read the  Proslogion with a 
careful  attention  to  the  text  in  the  thirteenth  century.  In  the  commentary  on  the  first 
commandment, Grosseteste connects the prohibition of having strange gods before the God of 
Israel with Anselm’s formula. 
Qui enim Deum super omnia diligit, illi soli ut summo bono amore inheret, eundemque solum 
summum bonum credit. Si enim aliquid aliud crederet esse equale bonum illi quod summe 
amat vel maius bonum ipso, illud summe amatum Deus non esset, cum Deus sit id quo magis 
excogitari non potest, immo etiam maius quam excogitari potest.189
Grosseteste’s argument goes as follows: he whoever loves God above all also believes that He 
alone is the supreme good. For if someone believed that there exists something else that is a 
greater good than what he supremely loves, then what he supremely loves would not be God, 
since God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. This passage, together with those 
mentioned above, reveals important tenets of Grosseteste’s thought. First, Anselm’s formula is 
strictly connected with love. The Prologue of De decem mandatis begins with the quotation 
from Saint Paul: “love is the fulfillement of the law” (Romans 13:10). The explanation of the 
first  commandment begins with the quotation of Anselm with the emphasis on love.  This 
means that, according to Grosseteste, God is not only that than which nothing greater can be 
thought, but, first of all, He is that than which nothing greater can be loved. Second, Anselm’s 
formula is at the beginning of his argument. The same occurs also in the Deus est, and in a 
certain way, also in the De cessatione legalium where the formula opens his argument for the 
necessity  of  Incarnation.  Grosseteste  sets  God’s  absolute  transcendence,  formulated  in 
Anselm’s terms, at the beginning of his argument because all further claims derive from this 
one, including the argument concerning creation and redemption. 
188 De libero arbitrio II, II, 157: “Item dicit Anselmus: «Deus est maius, quam quod possit excogitari.» Sed in 
unoquoque genere melius est sciens nesciente et maius, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio [Ench. 17, n.5]. 
Ergo, si posuerimus quod Deus solum sciat universalia et non singularia et posuerimus, quod aliud sit per  
impossibile, quod sciat et universalia et singularia, maius erit, quod scit utrumque, quam alterum tantum. 
Ergo  contingit  secundum intellectum intelligere  aliquid  maius  Deo,  cuius  oppositum dicit  Anselmus,  ut 
praedictum est.”
189 De decem mandatis, 6.
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On the second commandment, Grosseteste comments that “we should think of him as 
being, not this or that true being, but the true truth itself, not this or that good but the good 
goodness itself; we should think of Him as that than which nothing is higher, nothing better – 
as not merely the best which can be thought of but also better than can be thought of”.190 
These texts show Grosseteste’s originality in reading not only Anselm’s Proslogion, but also 
his Monologion, which is the source of the idea that God is not a determined good (or being) 
but the source of goodness, the only good to be good through itself.191 Grosseteste moves from 
the definition of God as summum bonum (first commandment) to the designation of Him as 
that which is not only the best (optimum), but also better (melius) than anything else that can 
be thought. It is a movement from the highest thing that exists in the created world to the 
highest  thing  that  can  be  thought  by  us.192 Not  every  connection  with  His  creatures  is 
considered, for God as Creator is not in question, but God qua God. Only in God qua God is 
there fully identity of being, goodness, and truth: God is the supreme good, but also the true  
being, thus He deserves the supreme love.193 He is being in such a true way that any other 
thing can be called ‘not being’.194 God’s transcendence, therefore, is also the ground of the 
absolute ontological dependence of creatures upon the Creator.195
The  relationship  of  God  with  creatures,  however,  is  not  absent  in  Grosseteste’s 
comments. A way of breaking the second commandment (not taking the name of the Lord in 
vain) is to think that He created something without reason, or even worse, that He created 
something bad such as wild and dangerous beasts. A full-fledged theodicy could explain these 
cases, upon which Grosseteste actually elaborates. But his first argument for rejecting the 
thesis  that God created irrationally or that He created evil  things is that every creature is 
greatly useful insofar as it has been created in size, species, and order, and in this triad a 
rational intelligence may recognize the signs of the Trinity: from the size, he may recognize 
the Creator’s power;  from the species,  he may recognize the Creator’s wisdom; from the 
order, he may recognize the Creator’s goodness.196 One could note a tension in Grosseteste’s 
190 De decem mandatis, 24: “Intelligamus eum non hoc vel illud verum, sed ipsum verum verum; non hoc vel 
illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum bonum. Intelligamus eum quo nochil est superius, sed et melius; non solum 
optimum quod excogitari potest, sed et melius quam excogitari potest.”
191 Anselm,  Monologion, I,  15: “Ergo consequitur, ut omnia alia bona sint per aliud quam quod ipsa sunt, et 
ipsum solum per seipsum. At nullum bonum, quod per aliud est, aequale aut maius est eo bono, quod per se 
est bonum. Illud itaque solum est summe bonum, quod solum est per se bonum.”
192  See McEvoy 1995b, 269.
193 On the identity of transcendentals in God according to Grosseteste, see Curiello 2016.
194 De decem mandatis,  17: “Preterea,  hoc verbum  sum,  cum dicit  Ego sum Deus,  ponitur substancialiter et 
signat quod per se et substancialiter et necessario est, cuius comparacione alia non sunt.”
195 See below § III.2.1.2b.
196 De decem mandatis, 25: “Item, in vanum assumit nomen Dei qui credit Deum aliquid fecisse sine fine utili  
[…]. Sunt autem aliqui qui putant bestias crudeles et animalia venenosa et muscas non solum carere fine utili,  
sed  insupr  in  hac  universitate  creature  esse  nociva.  Et  tamen,  si  queratur  ab  illis  quis  hec  fecerit,  non 
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texts, for here the creatures are considered as a rung on the ladder to reach the most inner truth 
about God, i.e., His being a Triune God, while just some lines before Grosseteste stated that 
the best way to think about God is to abandon any kind of comparison with the created world.  
This tension is only an apparent one, however, as Grosseteste’s claims become clear when 
considered in the light of his theological method and convictions. His basic principle is that 
transcendence  cannot  be  expressed  adequately  by  words,  but  reached  only  by  way  of 
“dialectical  thought,”  as  McEvoy  calls  it.197 This  means  that,  for  Grosseteste  there  is  a 
dynamic  relationship  between  transcendence  and  immanence,  which  is  expressed  by  an 
ascending movement from the creatures to God. Assuming this perspective, the Trinity can be 
considered as a stage of this ascent: the Trinity can be understood by the human intellect – 
albeit in an imperfect way – since It has a certain relationship with creatures, revealed by the 
fact that they bear the signs of It. Recall that the first distinction of the Tabula, i.e., regarding 
God, ends with a sub-distinction on “number, weight and measure” (Wisdom 11:20), which 
expresses  one  of  the  imperfect  analogies  of  the  Trinity  found  in  nature,  according  to 
Augustine.198 In other words, it appears that the knowledge of the Trinity does not complete 
the human ascent to God, but this perspective only becomes manifest in the last Book of 
Grosseteste’s Commentary on the De mystica theologia: God in Himself is neither Father, nor 
Son, nor Spirit.199 This can be considered a consequence of Anselm’s formula: if God is that 
than which nothing greater can be thought, the only way to know Him is, paradoxically, to be 
ignorant,  and  to  recognize  that  even  the  trinitarian  names  are  inadequate  to  express  His 
transcendence.
The numerous signs of the Trinity in the created world do not compel human beings to 
know It.  The  reason  why they cannot  have  a  full  comprehension  of  the  Trinity  is  their 
insufficient  love.  This  consideration  is  what  makes  Grosseteste’s  approach  to  Anselm’s 
argument  new  and  original,  and  which  requires  a  further  investigation  of  Grosseteste’s 
theology. 
inveniunt horum factorem nosi Deum. […] Sed omnia talia immensas habere utitlitates manifestum est. Cum 
enim  quodlibet  talium  habeat  magnitudinem,  speciem,  et  ordinem,  potest  mens  conspicientis  de  facili 
intelligere ex magnitudine creature creantis potenciam, et ex specie creature creantis sapienciam, et ex ordine 
creature creantis bonitatem, et ita ex creatura qualibet potest acendere in Trinitatem creatricem.” Grosseteste 
presents the same argument in Hexaëmeron VIII, iv, 4, 222f.
197 Mcevoy 1995b, 267.
198 De Trinitate, VI,10.
199 See below § II.3.3.1.
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II.2.2 Naming God means loving God
A distinguishing feature of Grosseteste’s philosophy is the interplay of knowing and desiring, 
which Grosseteste renders by the coupled term, aspectus/affectus mentis. This is a basic tenet 
of his thought that features from his first works until the mature  Commentary.200 Grosseteste 
applies Anselm’s definition of God both to intellect and will so that God works out to be not 
only that than which nothing greater can be thought, but also that than which nothing greater 
can be loved.201 As Ginther has pointed out “there is a reflexivity between knowledge and 
will. The more ordered the mind’s desires are to God’s will, the more opportunity a person has 
to gain certain knowledge of God.”202 By this principle, i.e., the direct proportionality between 
knowledge  and  love,  Grosseteste  also  distinguishes  philosophy  and  theology.  They  are 
different not only for their different approaches to truth, but also for their different ethical 
consequences: only theology teaches human beings to live according to something superior to 
them, namely, God’s law. Grossetese uses a metaphor to describe this difference. He compares 
the secular sciences (mundane sciencie) to the fishnets: some fishnets leave the fish under the 
sea, other fishnets bring the fish to the surface of the sea. This means that some kind of 
philosophy (identified with Epicurus) leaves human beings to live according to their instinct, 
namely,  to  live  under  the  human  dignity.  The  other  kind  of  philosophy  (identified  with 
Diogenes)203 is superior because it guides human beings to live according to their reason. But 
even more noble is theology because it allows men to live according to God’s will.204
Grosseteste devotes other two of his Dicta to the limits of the philosophical knowledge 
200 E.g.  InPoAn, I, 14, pp. 215f: “Causa autem quare obnubilatur visus anime per molem corporis corrupti est  
quod affectus et aspectus anime non sunt divisi, nec attingit aspectus eius nisi quo attingit affectus sive amor 
eius.” InPhy, lib. 8, pp. 146 - 147: “[…] cum mentis aspectus, vel intelligencia, non possit superius ascendere  
quam ascendat eius affectus vel appetitus.”
201 De decem mandatis, 6: “Prohibetur itaque isto mandato primo, ne aliud a vero summo bono vel summum 
bonu credamus, vel ut summum bonum maxime amemus.”
202  Ginther 2004, 56.
203 Maybe Grosseteste refers to Diogenes of Apollonia, mentioned by Augustine in De civitate Dei, VIII, 2. It is 
implausible that Grosseteste refers to Diogenes of Sinope that is accused of lust, “worthy undeed of dogs,” in 
De civitate Dei, XIV, 20.
204 Dictum 118, fol. 96va: “Mundane namque sciencie que trahunt hominem ut vivat secundum illud quod sub se 
est, id est secundum appetitus carnis, bestiales sunt, sicut retia deorsum mergencia. Ille vero sciencie que  
docent hominem vivere secundum illud quod sibi compar est, hoc est secundum hominem, id est secundum 
humanam racionem, sunt sicut retia equilibratim in aqua fluctantia. In priori rethe captus fuit Epicurus, in  
secundo Diogenes. Sola autem theologia docet hominem vivere secundum illud quod super se est, id est  
secundum Deum. Qui igitur vivit secundum iillud quod sub se est, in aquis mutabilitatis submergitur. Qui 
vero vivit secundum hominem, id est secundum humanam racionem, nondum de aquis mutabilitatis emersit.  
Qui autem vivit secundum Deum, vivit secundum illud quod incommutabile est, et aquas mutabilitatis in 
tantum excessit in quantum secundum <Deum> vivit.”  Servus Gieben (1963) studied Grosseteste’s idea of 
philosophy through the sources quoted in the Tabula, and he consider this Dictum a summary of Grosseteste’s 
opinion about philosophy.
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of God. In the  Dictum 104, entitled “On praising God,” Grosseteste makes the relationship 
between knowledge,  linguistic  expression and love clear.  Grosseteste  presents  the gradual 
process of acquiring knowledge of God as a reflection of the different ways of recognizing 
God’s work and to praise Him for it; the true knowledge of God owes to ordered love and 
faith  (accordingly a lesser degree of love causes lesser clarity in knowledge),  so the true 
praise of God is to love Him. Grosseteste explains that praising God does not simply mean to 
narrate His works, and implicitly to recognize that He is the Creator, but to rejoice in them 
and to love Him back. The limit of philosophers, in particular, is that they did not praise Him, 
although they reached some knowledge of the Creator from the creatures.205 In this passage, 
there is an echo of the twelfth century monastic theology and its homological character, which 
prescribed that the knowledge of God proceed hand-in-hand with the admiration of God’s 
goodness.206 
The  lack  of  praise  entails  a  lack  of  love  towards  God.  On  the  principle  that,  in 
theological knowledge, love and cognition are strictly connected, according to Grosseteste, 
the lack of love prevents philosophers from knowing God accurately. This idea derives, once 
again,  from monastic  theology.207 Following  this  idea,  Grosseteste  distinguishes  different 
kinds of philosophers. The first kind of philosophers lack love, that entails a weakness of 
knowledge, for they come to claim two divine persons rather than three, namely they derived 
the two persons from human being’s power and wisdom.208 The second kind of philosophers, 
endowed with a purer love (and knowledge), detected a trace of  the Trinity, as occurs in the 
definition from the so-called Book of the twenty-four philosophers: “God is a monad begetting 
205 Dictum 104, fol. 86va: “Item, qui narrat alicuius bone et recte voluntatis opera, ipsa ad eam referendo, nisi  
eidem voluntati congaudeat, affectumque dilectionis rependat, non dicitur vere laudare. Unde qui Dei enarrat  
opera, eaque ad ipsum refert ut ad auctorem, eidem tamen ob hoc non congaudet nec dilectionis affectum 
rependit, non laudat,  sicut  philosophi qui per visibilia Dei invisibilia cognoverunt,  et  per facta,  factorem 
intellexerunt,  non  tamen  sicut  Deum  glorificaverunt,  [cf.  Rom.  1:18-23]  quia  dilectionis  affectum  aut  
graciarum actionem non rependerunt, ipsum nequaquam laudaverunt.”
206 See,  for  example,  Bernard  of  Clairvaux,  Sermones super Cantica canticorum,  42;  Rupert  of  Deutz,  De 
operibus Spritus Sancti, I, iv.
207 Gaybba 1988,  32:  “Texts  abound in which understanding the things of  God is  directly linked to  moral  
dispositions, all of which, of course, are expressions of love”.
208 Dictum 33,  fol.  24rb:  “Philosophi  et  curiosi  amatores  potencie  et  sapiencie,  et  non  habentes  amorem 
ordinatum, et  ideo habentes  oculum cordis  obscuratum, plus noverunt  in se,  licet  impure,  tum noverunt  
memoriam gignentem intelligenciam, et intelligenciam genitam de memoria, quam amoris ordinem, et ideo in 
speculo anime plus cognoverunt duas personas quam terciam. Unde quidam illorum tetigerunt de duabus, 
nichil dicentes de tercia; quidam obscure valde aliquid intellexerunt de tercia, magis limpide agnoscentes 
duas”.  This theory is the same mentioned by Aquinas,  ST I, q. 32, a.1, ob. 1, who gives more information 
about the identity of those philosophers: “Dicitur etiam in Glossa Rom. I, et Exod. VIII, quod magi Pharaonis 
defecerunt  in  tertio  signo,  idest  in  notitia  tertiae  personae,  scilicet  spiritus  sancti,  et  sic  ad  minus duas  
cognoverunt”. From this passage we deduce that the source is the Glossa ordinaria: “Quia enim per ipsam 
corruptionem  mentis  inquieti  fuerunt,  in  signo  tertio  defecerunt,  fatentes  sibi  adversum  esse  Spiritum 
Sanctum qui erat in Moyse” (cf. Biblia latina cum glossa ordinaria, I, 130).
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a monad in itself reflecting its own ardour.”209 Other thinkers attributed power, wisdom, and 
goodness respectively to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but they never understood 
how they were related to each other.210 Finally,  there is  the case involving the Jews who 
worshipped God as the Father, but they did not relate Him to the Son because they took the 
name ‘father’ not for his essential feature (to be related to a son), but as a proprium (to be a 
person).211 This  hierarchy of  philosophers  means that,  according to  Grosseteste,  there  are 
many ways of approaching, knowing, and naming God. All philosophers knew God as Creator 
from creation, but they did not glorify Him and did not love Him in return for His deeds. This 
does not imply, however, that even if a human being had the right degree of love and faith that 
it would be possible for him to know everything about God. Despite all the efforts one could 
make to investigate God, there will be always something hidden from his sight.212 
Not only does intellectual knowledge alone prove to be insufficient in theology, but 
language also shows its limits if it is not supported by faith. The case of the Hebrews shows 
that even the name of the ‘father’ may be conceived according to two completely different 
interpretations: according to one, it implies the “son,” but according to the other it does not 
imply the ‘son’ at all (this is the position held by Jews). This instance regarding the name of 
the ‘father’ shows that Grosseteste’s interest in clarifying the theological language was present 
already in the works before the Commentary, which needs further investigations.
209 Dictum 33, fol. 24rb: “Quidam vero illorum qui plus accesserunt ad amorem ordinatum, et habuerunt oculum 
mentis puriorem, eciam trinitatem investigaverunt, sicut ille qui dixit [Liber XXIV Philosophorum, 1] «monas 
monadem genuit, et in se suum reflectit ardorem».”
210 Dictum 33, fol.  24rb-va:  “Preterea,  licet  omnes magni philosophi,  vel  plures,  qui  <de> Deo loquti  sunt, 
noverunt [noverunt] ipsum esse potentem, sapientem, et bonum; et potencia attribuatur Patri, sapiencia Filio, 
bonitas  Spiritui  Sancto.  Non tamen omnes noverunt  Trinitatem,  quia  non noverunt  omnes  potenciam in 
quantum ipsa est gignens sapienciam, nec sapienciam inquantum ipsa est genita, nec bonitatem inquantum 
ipsa est procedens vel spirata.” The triad power, wisdom and goodness and its attribution to the Trinitarian 
Persons originates from Abelard and became popular among the Victorines; see Luscombe 1969, 115-121.
211 Dictum 33, fol. 24va: “Item, cum dicat auctoritas quod Iudei credunt Patrem et negant Filium et Spiritum 
Sanctum,  forte  hoc  est  intelligendum  non  solum  eo  modo  quo  dicitur  quod  Deus  est  Pater  omnium 
creatuarum, sed ideo eciam dicuntur credere Patrem quia credunt unicam personam cui convenit proprium 
Patris. Credunt namque Deum esse individuam essenciam racionalem, non factam, nec creatam, nec genitam, 
nec procedentem, et hoc soli Patri convenit. Non tamen credunt Patrem, hoc est gignentem Filium, quia tunc 
crederent et Filium. Credunt ergo Patrem, hoc est eam personam que est Pater. Non tamen credunt Patrem 
secundum racionem et diffinicionem Patris, sed credunt eum qui est Pater secundum proprium Patris, velut si  
quis agnosceret animal risibile, non agnoscens racionale, agnosceret hominem secundum suum proprium, et  
non agnosceret ipsum secundum suam diffinicionem; et diceretur agnoscere hominem quia agnoscit hominis  
proprium, licet non eius diffinicionem.”
212 De  decem  mandatis,  29:  “Vietur  quoque  multis  quod,  cum  non  sit  in  hominis  potestatem  veritatem 
cognoscere, sed lateant plerumque multe veritates etiam diligentissimos investigatores suos ingnoranciam vel 




The fundamental problem of theological language it that it seeks to explain how we 
can speak about a transcendent, yet totally simple, spiritual being without altering the sense of 
the words that we use. At the same time, theology must explain how, and if, it is possible to 
speak meaningfully of God. During Grosseteste’s time, medieval thinkers set out to explain 
our human disposition, which, they claimed could allow us to provide a name for God. They 
divide words into three sorts. Some are univocal (always used with the same sense), some are 
purely equivocal (used with quite different senses), and some are analogical (used with related 
senses).213 Grosseteste does not develop a full-fledged theory of divine predication, but he 
incidentally comes across this subject. The three following passages illustrate his approach to 
this issue.
The first text is in a Dictum about mercy. Grosseteste gives two definitions of it: the 
first is “the will to relieve a wretched from his wretchedness,” the second is “compassion for 
the wretchedness.”214 He explains that the first definition applies to God and angels because 
there is no passion in them, while the second applies to human beings while they are on earth 
(in via). Therefore, ‘mercy’ is equivocally said of God/angels and human beings because there 
is  no passion  in  God and the  angels  unless  taken in  a  metaphorical  sense.215 Grosseteste 
resorts to the equivocity argument to explain how an attribute can be differently predicated of 
superior (God and angels) and inferior (humans) beings,  but his  account does not develop a 
detailed description of the distinction between the Creator and the creatures. This is probably 
due to the literary genre of the Dicta, namely, brief notes written down roughly, while he was 
in the school.
The second, and more extended, passage is from the De libero arbitrio. In the first part 
of the treatise (chapters 1–15), Grosseteste presents arguments against the existence of free 
choice; by contrast, the second part (chapters 16–18) concerns the arguments for the exact 
opposite, namely, that free choice is possible. In chapter 17, Grosseteste begins the account of 
the nature of free choice, but it is preceded by a discussion of whether free choice is said 
213 Valente 2007.
214 Dictum 2, fol. 1va: “Misericordia est amor sive voluntas relevandi miserum a sua miseria. [...]. Voluntatem  
autem talem relevandi hominem a miseria in homine viatore concomitantur dolor et compassio de miseri  
miseria. Unde a proprietate concomitante sic solet diffiniri: Misericordia est compassio miserie qua utique si 
possimus subvenire compellimur.”
215 Dicta 2, fol. 1va-b: “Prior ergo diffinicio misericordie magis est substancialis, et convenit Deo et celestibus 
spiritibus. Secunda vero diffinicio homini viatori convenit. Deo autem et supernis spiritibus non convenit 
dolor et compassio, quia non est in eis passio nisi metaphorice sumantur hec nomina et equivoce dicuntur de  
illis et de nobis.”
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univocally of God, angels, and man. Against Anselm’s view, Grosseteste holds that nothing 
can be said univocally of the Creator and the creatures.216 More specifically,  according to 
Anselm, the definition of free choice is the same for God, the good angels, and men, while 
‘animal’ is said univocally of many kinds of beasts.217 Grosseteste presents four reasons to 
rejects  univocity  in  theological  language.  First,  in  God  a  quality  is  identical  with  His 
substance, and therefore, ‘free will’ is the same as ‘divinity,’ while in creatures it is not the 
case.  Second,  nothing can be interchanged (in  nullo  communicant)  between God and the 
creatures. Third, if something would be interchanged, this would mean that God is not simple, 
but has parts. Finally, ‘free will’ as ascribed to the creatures is in one of the ten categories, but 
this is impossible in the case of God.218 In sum, Grosseteste leaves no space for univocity in 
theological  language  because  of  God’s  transcendence;  there  is  nothing  that  God  and  the 
creatures share ontologically, and thus, nothing can be said in the same sense of them. Other 
versions of the doctrine of univocity were circulating among the masters of theology, but 
Grosseteste  does  not  discuss  them  before  the  Commentary.219 We  will  see  that  in  the 
Commentary, Grosseteste concedes that some names can be said univocally of God and the 
creatures. 
Grosseteste tries to account for Anselm’s view in order to justify the univocal  meaning 
of an attribute applied to God and the creatures:
Concedimus autem quod nihil  univoce dicitur de creatura et Creatore, sed tamen creatura 
rationalis  ita  propinqua  est  vestigium et  similitudo  et  imago  sui  Creatoris,  quod  in  his 
secundum quae est ita propinquum et assimulatum vestigium, meretur etiam communicare et 
nomen,  non  quidem  univoce  sed  propinqua,  imitatoria  similitudine;  sic  et  nominis 
definitionem habet unam non univoce sed propinqua, imitatoria similitudine.220
Grosseteste holds that no name is said univocally of God and creatures, however, a 
216 De  libero  arbitrio  I,  cap.  17,  pp.  79f:  “Univoce  enim videtur  dici  secundum  Anselmum,  qui  unam et 
communem assignat liberi arbitrii definitionem, secundum quod dicitur de Deo et de homine et angelo.”
217 Anslem,  De libertate arbitrii,  I,  ed Schmitt, 208: “Quamvis differat liberum arbitrium hominum a libero 
arbitrio  Dei  et  angelorum bonorum diffinitio  tamen hujus  libertatis  in  utriusque,  secundum hoc nomen,  
eadem debet esse:  licet  enim animal  differat  ab animali  sive substantialiter,  sive accidentaliter,  diffinitio 
tamen, secundum nomen animalis, omnibus animalibus est eadem.”
218 De libero arbitrio I, cap. 17, p. 80: “Quod vero liberum arbitrium non dicatur univoce de creatura et creatore,  
patet sic: arbitrii libertas in creatore substantia est et divinitas est; in creatura qualitas est et divinitas non est. 
Ergo non univoce dicitur de his.  Item: in nullo communicant creator et creatura. Univoca autem in aliquo 
communicant. Ergo creator et creatura in nullo univocantur. Item: si univocaretur Deus cum aliquo in aliquo 
dicto non secundum relativum, oporteret Deum esse compositum et non simplicem, vel ipsum esse partem 
substantiae  alterius  vel  qualitatem  vel  quantitatem  alterius. Item:  liberum  arbitrium  dictum  de  creatura 
continetur  sub  genere  aliquo  praedicamentali;  dictum  vero  de  Deo  sub  nullo  genere  praedicamentali  
continetur. Ergo non univoce de illis dicitur.”
219 Univocity in theological language was defended by Prevostin of Cremona, Stephen Langton and William of  
Auxerre, see Valente 2007, 234-272. The last two authors were surely known to Grosseteste.
220 De libero arbitrio I, cap. 17, p. 80.
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distinction must be made between the rational and non-rational creatures because the former 
are closer to God and imitate Him better, thus they may share names with Him, though not 
univocally. Grosseteste implicitly admits that metaphysics and meaning are isomorphic: as 
rational creatures are images of the Creator, so the names applied to rational creatures are 
images  of  those  attributed  to  the  Creator.  The  imitative  similitude  is  realized  when  the 
intellect can look at the model in the modelled, and conversely at one glance, such as the 
image of the seal and the image impressed in the wax by the seal.221 In the case of the attribute 
of ‘free choice,’ Grosseteste concedes that it can be shared by the Creator and the creatures 
because the intellect perceives the kind of similitude of the seal in the wax.222 Grosseteste 
explicitly  says  that  ‘free  choice’ is  not  said  univocally  –  against  Anselm –  of  God  and 
creatures, but it is not a completely equivocal name. Grosseteste also rejects the idea of those 
who attended to the essential diversity between the free will in God and in creatures and gave 
differing definitions of free choice in each case, or even denied the existence of free choice in 
God, a denial that Grosseteste rejects.223
The third text devoted to the theme of the equivocity/univocity of names comes from 
the Commentary on the Physics. Silvia Donati reconstructed in great detail the tradition of the 
Latin medieval commentaries on the Physics, both in Paris and Oxford.224 Unfortunately, she 
began her study with the commentaries of the late fifties of the thirteenth century.  Donati 
shows  that  the  English  commentators  clearly  distinguished  between  a  logical  and  a 
metaphysical level of discussion about being.225 She refers to authors like Geoffrey of Aspall 
whose Commentary on the Physics was written in the fifties. Geoffrey holds that in logic the 
sufficient  condition  for  a  term to  be equivocal  is  to  be predicated  according to  different 
notions; by contrast, in metaphysics and physics, the conditions to predicate being equivocally 
are stronger. A term is equivocal not only if it is predicated according to different notions, but 
also  if  the  things  of  which  it  is  predicated  are  not  ontologically  or  epistemologically 
dependent on each other. The consequence is that ‘being’ is equivocal for the logician since it 
221 De libero arbitrio I,  cap. 17, p. 80: “Est quoque similitudo tam vicine imitatoria, quod intellectus unico 
aspectu contueri potest exemplar in exemplato et e contrario <sicut imaginem sigilli in cera ab illo sigillo  
impressa et e contrario>.” 
222 De libero arbitrio I, cap. 17, p. 80: “Et intellectui sic contemplanti, assignandum est unum nomen et una 
definitio liberi arbitrii in Creatore et creatura, quia unico et non diviso aspectu contuetur haec in creatura et 
Creatore propter vicinae imitationis similitudinem.”
223 De libero arbitrio I, cap. 17, p. 81: “Alii vero […] differenter definierunt liberum arbitrium in creatura et 
Creatore,  vel etiam liberum arbitrium abnegare videntur a Creatore.” The reference is to Peter Lombard,  
Libri quatuor sententiarum, II, 25.1-2, where he states that the definition of free choice as free ad utrumlibet 
cannot apply to God but only to human beings. He then adds that God and good angels are free in the sense  
that they can choose what has been decreed by reason without necessity.
224 Donati 2005.
225 Donati 2005, 7ff.
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is  predicated  of  substance  and  accidents  according  to  different  notions,  whereas  it  is 
analogical for the metaphysician since accidents depend on substance.
Grosseteste’s position is less developed than that of Geoffrey; nonetheless there are 
interesting elements that are shared by the two authors. Grosseteste holds that a word is used 
for  several  things  either  univocally  or  equivocally.  Although  he  does  not  define  an 
intermediate category, he distinguishes the case of equivocal names that are said in to a prior 
and  a  posterior  sense  (per  prius  et  posterius).  Grosseteste’s  thesis  is  that  ‘being’ is  said 
equivocally of the First existent, to whom existence is substantial, and of creatures, to which it 
is not. His arguments are based on the idea that being is said substantially of the First Being 
because substantial being is necessarily being in virtue of itself; but what is being in virtue of 
itself  can  absolutely  be  only  one  eternal  being.226 From  this  premise  follows  the  first 
argument:  “Quod autem ens  equivoce  dicatur,  ostendetur  primo per  impossibile.  Si  enim 
dicatur univoce sequitur omnia esse unum simplicissimum, sicud posuerunt quidam.”227 The 
target  of  Grosseteste’s  criticism becomes  clear  some  pages  later  where  he comments  on 
Aristotle’s  criticism  of  Eleatic  monism:  “Parmenides  peccavit  falsum  dicendo  et  non 
sillogizando. Falsum enim dixit dicendo ens dici univoce cum dicatur multipliciter.”228 This 
argument, therefore, is against monism because ‘being’ said univocally cannot account for the 
difference in reality. The principle of difference is indeed something that is “not-being,” as the 
principle of difference of humanity is something “not-humanity,” but it is impossible to derive 
particular beings from “not-being”.229
The second argument stems from the same premise, namely, that only one eternal thing 
is  necessary  to  exist  substantially,  and  everything  that  begins  to  exist  does  not  exist 
substantially. From there, Grosseteste specifies his position and affirms that for a thing that 
begins to exist is nothing other than to depend on eternal substantial existence, or to be upheld 
by its Word. Grosseteste concludes that since ‘being’ is said only of one thing substantially, 
and of other things with respect to its dependence on that one thing, in a prior and a posterior 
sense, it is clear that it is said equivocally.230 According to Grosseteste, God is the only being 
226 InPhy, 6f: “Si ens dicatur univoce de omnibus cum substancialiter dicatur de primo ente, dicetur de omnibus  
substancialiter. Sed de quocumque dicitur substancialiter ens, ipum necesse est esse per se. Necesse autem 
esse per se non potest nisi unum solum simpliciter eternum.”
227 InPhy, 7.
228 InPhy, 12. I accept the reading ‘dici’ instead of ‘dividi’ suggested by Lewis 2009, 45, n. 24.
229 InPhy, 7: “Si enim univoce dicitur non distrahitur in multitudinem nisi per diversas differencias quarum nulla 
est ens, sicut humanitas non distrahitur in multas humanitates, nisi per multas differencias quarum nulla est  
humanitas; ac impossibile est ens distrahi in multitudinem per id quod non est.”
230 InPhy, 7: “Item cum unum solum eternum necesse sit substancialiter esse, omne autem quod incipit esse non 
substancialiter est, quicquid incipit esse in tantum est in quantum ab eterno esse substanciali dependet, et rem 
que incipit  esse  nichil  aliud  est  quam ab  esse  eterno  substanciali  dependere  vel  a  Verbo  ipsius  portari;  
magisque est quod ei propinquius adheret, minusque quod minus propinque. Cum ergo esse de uno tantum 
67
that can be called ‘being’ substantially, while all the other things can be called ‘being’ after 
Him and in relation (of dependence) to Him. Like Geoffrey of Aspall, Grosseteste recognizes 
the existence of an ontological dependence that links the things of the outer world, but unlike 
Geoffrey, Grosseteste is more interested in the dependence of creatural beings on God than 
the dependence of accidents on substance.  
The  case  of  the  equivocity  of  ‘being’ is  different  from the  case  of  ‘mercy’ seen 
previously in the first text. In Dictum 2, the equivocity represents the pure equivocity that is 
identical with the metaphor: there is no passion or pain in God, but metaphorically (or as 
Grosseteste  says,  equivocally)  they  can  be  attributed  to  Him.  In  the  case  of  ‘being,’ by 
contrast,  the equivocity that connects different things is  de facto an analogy based on the 
relation of dependence, which is different from the pure equivocity.
II.2.4 Conclusion
During his years as master of theology, Grosseteste gives two answers to the question “Who is 
God?”: the first is “God is the first form of all things,” the second is “God is that than which 
nothing greater can be thought.” Those definitions mirror two ways of considering God: the 
first  is  about  thinking of  God as  the  causal  principle  of  everything,  the  second  is  about 
thinking God as He is in Himself. 
Grosseteste point out that even though philosophers have reached some knowledge of 
God, as for instance when someone also glimpsed the mystery of Trinity, they did not actually 
praise God because they did not love Him. The lack of love is a lack of knowledge and vice 
versa, and this  correlation is  a consequence of the anthropological principle that will  and 
understanding (affectus/aspectus mentis) are dependent on each other. Who does not love God 
cannot have a proper concept of God and therefore cannot attribute to Him a proper name. 
Searching  for  a  quaestio by  Grosseteste  on  theological  language  will  not  yield  a 
fruitful outcome. Ginther admits that Grosseteste’s analysis of theological language may seem 
philosophically unsatisfactory.231 I  also showed that the theological debate on univocity or 
dicatur  substancialiter  et  de  aliis  secundum  dependenciam  ab  illo  uno  secundum  prius  et  posterius, 
manifestum est quod dicitur equivoce.” I accept the emendation to the text suggested by Lewis (2009, 45 n. 
27).
231 Ginther  (2004,  54) considers  that  before  1250 there  were  few discussions  on  the  nature  of  theological 
language, thus Grosseteste was not an exception. Ginther’s view is highly debatable. The study of Luisa  
Valente, in fact, has proven the presence of a rich debate over theological language in the years between 1150 
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equivocity is rather slim in Grosseteste’s works. In the remaining portion of this chapter and 
in the one to follow, I will show that Grosseteste indeed has his own theory of theological 
language, although he did not develop it in the form of a treatise or a quaestio. Such a theory 
must be derived from scattered remarks in his Commentary.
 
II.3 God as manentia in the Corpus Dionysiacum
McEvoy notes that Anselm was for Grosseteste the theologian who most accurately 
expressed the transcendence of God.232 Commenting on the Corpus, Grosseteste finds another 
authority and yet another way to express this concept. In the commentaries on the De divinis  
nominibus and  De mystica theologia, there is no explicit quotation or reference to the two 
perspectives  on  God  qua God mentioned  above,  but  their  meaning  is  present.  The main 
characteristic  of  the  Commentary is  that  Grosseteste,  in  the  wake  of  Dionysius,  holds  a 
paradox: God is at the same time unknowable and knowable (ignorantia/omne intelligibile), 
ineffable  and  many-named  (ineffabile,  multivocum).233 The  alternative  in  the  paradox 
expresses  the  two  perspectives  indicated  in  the  previous  paragraph:  the  first  attribute 
expresses God’s absolute transcendence, while the second his causal proximity to creatures. 
The peculiarity of the  Commentary is that those two perspectives are kept together: divine 
names  signify at  the  same time the  process  of  God towards  the  creatures  and His  super 
excellent divinity.234
The first two paragraphs are dedicated to theological knowledge, while the latter to 
theological  language.  The  first  paragraph  presents  three  sub-paragraphs  that  deal  with 
theological knowledge per se. The topic of human beings’ possibility to know God is twofold 
because human beings can be considered as beings on earth (in via) or beings in heaven (in  
patria).235 Grosseteste’s central concern is about ordinary knowledge, i.e.,  in via. This topic 
can be further divided to account for the knowledge of God based on the Bible,  but also 
according to the natural knowledge of God, such as that described by the philosophers. First, 
we will discuss the possibility of human beings to know directly God without the help of 
and 1220. The absence of a full-fledged doctrine of theological language – along with other topics – is very 
likely due to the short amount of time that he dedicated to the teaching of theology.
232 McEvoy 1995b, 262.
233 Dionysiaca, 77.
234 DN V, M 232rb: “Hos itaque beneficos processus significant hec  praedicte nominationes ita quod simul 
insinuant et significant super excellentiam divinitatis ad ea ad que se extendunt iidem processus.”
235 On knowledge of God in Heaven, see below § IV.3.3.2B.
69
senses and the role of God in this process (II.3.1.1). I will argue that Grosseteste contemplates 
that  direct  knowledge  of  God  occurs  in  more  cases  than  commonly  believed.  However, 
normally, human beings climb towards God starting from the knowledge of material things 
that are considered as symbols of God’s presence in the universe (§ II.3.1.2). The last sub-
paragraph is dedicated to the philosophical knowledge of God that does not clearly recognize 
the signs of God’s presence in the universe (§ II.3.1.2).
In  the  second  paragraph  (II.3.2),  I  will  show  how  Grosseteste  applies  the 
anthropological principle that knowledge and love, aspectus/affectus, go hand-in-hand in the 
Commentary. It will be clear that the Corpus permits one to break the isomorphism between 
love and knowledge and argues for the superiority of love in theological knowledge.
The  third  paragraph  is  dedicated  to  theological  language.  Following  Dionysius, 
Grosseteste considers the via negativa as the best way to speak of God (II.3.3.1). This means 
that the most proper name attachable to God is indeed no-name at all (II.3.3.2).
II.3.1 Knowing God
II.3.1.1 The steps of the ascent
Grosseteste never provides a demonstration of the existence of God, nor before the 
Commentary nor afterwards.236 When he comments on the Corpus, Grosseteste is no longer a 
teacher, so he does not dwell on natural theology but he takes for granted that his readership  
already presupposed the existence of God, but also believed in a Christian God with proper 
attributes.237 Nevertheless, the problem of how it is possible to have knowledge of an infinite 
being by a finite intellect calls for a solution. Grosseteste does not try to demonstrate the 
human  knowledge  of  God  because  he  takes  it  as  a  fact;  rather,  he  aims  to  explain  the 
psychological mechanism that makes this  knowledge possible.238 First,  we need to outline 
Grosseteste’s  philosophical  psychology,  then  we  can  discuss  the  grades  of  theological 
knowledge. 
236 McEvoy 1995b, 274.
237 It must be recalled that the principle according to which the subject of theology cannot be understood, unless  
it is first believed, cf.  Hexaëmeron I, 2, i, 50: “[...] istius sapiencie [i.e. theology] subiectum neque per se 
notum est, neque per scienciam acceptum, sed sola fide assumptum et creditum. Nec posset esse intellectum,  
nisi prius esset creditum.”
238 It is not a case that Grosseteste develops his anthropology only after the Commentary in the sermon Ecclesia  
sancta celebrat, which is deeply influenced by Dionysius’s thought, see McEvoy 1980b, 141.
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Grosseteste illustrates his view on the faculties of the soul and their objects in two 
sermons:  Ecclesia sancta celebrat and  Ex rerum initiarum,  both written in the forties, the 
same  years  of  the  Commentary.  In  the  latter  sermon,  the  starting-point  of  Grosseteste’s 
argument is the consideration that the human being qua human being is a rational being. From 
this, Grosseteste argues that human beings have the natural power to contemplate God as He 
is, without images, and to know everything in His rationes, the eternal exemplars of a created 
thing  in  His  mind.239 In  the  Ecclesia  sancta  celebrat,  Grosseteste  gives  a  more  detailed 
account. There he aruges that God is the highest object of human knowledge, and therefore, 
He can be known and loved by the highest faculty, wisdom (sapientia), which is a natural 
power that allows human beings to see God directly.240 Grosseteste insists on two points: God 
is not only an object of knowledge, but also the aim of the will; this tendency to know and 
love Him is natural and not a gift from Grace.241 This means that everyone is potentially able 
to know God directly, but actually it is not the case. Why? Grosseteste posed his answer to 
this difficult question in a previous work, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, where the 
the faculty of wisdom is called intelligence (intelligentia). It is a faculty that does not need 
any corporeal instrument because it is immaterial, and its natural way of knowing is the direct 
irradiation of the supreme light, God, and not by abstraction from the data of senses. This is 
the kind of knowledge that is normally acquired in patria when the soul is delivered from the 
body.  However,  in  via, this  power is  normally asleep because of the weight of the body, 
except for someone who is already completely free from love of corporeal things and their 
phantasms.242 Below we will try to identify who are those who can see God directly already in 
this life.
The second faculty of  the  human soul  is  the  intellect  (intellectus),  which  has  two 
objects: the principles of knowledge that are self-evident, and the separate substances.243 The 
239 Ex rerum initiarum, 121: “Et in quantum rationalis, habet potestatem naturalem et virtutem contemplandi 
Deum Unum et Trinum, veritatem nec fallibilem nec fallacem, iustitiam et  bonitatem, sucuti  est, absque 
imaginibus, et in rationibus aeternis et causalibus omnium in Ipso […] cognoscendi omnia.”
240 Ecclesia  sancta  celebrat,  171:  “Deus  autem  supremus  est  entium,  [...]propterea  potentia  naturalis  dei  
apprehensiva,  appetitiva  et  motiva  ad  apprehendendum [...]suprema  potentia  est,  et  pars  vitae  humanae 
nobilissima. Licet enim deus sit incomprehensibilis, videbimus tamen eum «facie ad faciem» et «sicuti est», 
testante scriptura, quod non fieret nisi inesset nobis adhuc naturalis potentia.”
241  The first point was discussed in § II.2.2 and it will be reconsidered also in § II.3.3. The second point will be  
discussed in § IV.3.1.3b.
242 InPoAn, I, ch. 14, p. 213-214: “Si pars suprema anime humane, que vocatur intellectiva et que non est actus 
alicuius  corporis  neque  egens  in  operatione  sui  propria  instrumento  corporeo,  non  esset  mole  corporis 
corrupti  obnubilata  et  aggravata,  ipsa per  irradiationem acceptam a lumine  superiori  haberet  completam 
scientiam absque sensus adminiculo, sicut habebit cum anima erit exuta a corpore et sicut forte habent aliqui  
penitus absoluti ab amore et phantasmatibus rerum corporalium. Sed, quia puritas oculi anime per corpus 
corruptum obnubilata et aggravata est, omnes vires ipsius anime rationalis in homine nato occupate sunt per  
molem corporis, ne possint agere, et ita quodammodo sopite.”
243 Ex rerum initiarum,  121: “Habet etiam virtutem intellectivam ad cognoscendum, sine medio, principium 
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third power pertains to the demonstrative knowledge concerning the permanent aspects of the 
material world, while the objects of this faculty are the mutable realities.244 In this paragraph, I 
shall focus on the first faculty (wisdom), its object (God), and those who can achieve this kind 
of knowledge. Grosseteste considers this topic crucial to such a point that he treats it in every 
treatise of the Corpus, and in each one, Grosseteste introduces nuances due to the peculiarity 
of the treatise. 
The first Book of the Commentary on the De divinis nominibus poses the basis for the 
discussion. I consider a text in particular as Grosseteste’s manifesto about the progress of 
theological  knowledge.  As  it  usually  happens,  Grosseteste  presents  his  own view on  the 
subject by paraphrasing Dionysius.
[Dionysius] insinuat ordinem progressus nostre conspectionis donec pertingimus ut fas ad 
supersubstantialem radium incomprehensibilem[...] ait itaque:  nunc autem,  in hac videlicet 
vita,  utimur,  ut  nobis  possibile,  propriis  quidem seu  familiaribus,  id  est  congruentibus 
symbolis in divina, id est in spiritalia conspicienda videlicet, et ex hiis, id est symbolis, rursus  
extendimur  analogice nostre  videlicet  possibilitati  ad  simplicem  et  unitam  veritatem  
intelligibilium speculaminum, id est adornationum angelicarum […], quarum veritas absque 
phantasmatibus  et  symbolis  speculata  simplex  est  et  unita.  [...]  Unde  post  intelligentiam 
supremarum  creaturarum  non  restat  intellectui  nisi  in  solo  et  summo  desiderio 
supersubstantialis  radii  quiescere  et  quiete  et  inoperabilitate  expectare  superfusionem  et 
contactum et infusionem supersubstantialis radii  ipsum sibi coniuncturi et post se tracturi,  
secundum analogiam susceptibilitatis sue.245
In  this  life,  the  starting-point  of  theological  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of  the 
symbols more familiar to us; Grosseteste is probably thinking about material things, which are 
closer to our knowledge as they are symbols of the spiritual realities. Indeed, we have the 
power of climbing from the material realm to the spiritual one. The aim of this progress is a 
kind of knowledge similar to that of the angels. They do not need phantasms and symbols, but 
can grasp directly their objects. Beyond this kind of knowledge there is not activity, but only a 
quiet waiting for the divine ray that enlightens the mind. Accordingly, we can identify three 
moments in which the human intellect climbs towards God: (1) knowledge of God through 
material things; (2) direct knowledge of God without phantasm; (3) ignorance of God in the 
mystical union. The third point is the last step for a created mind, but there is yet a further 
step, namely, to know the divine ray that contains the divine rationes, which are the efficient 
scientiarum immediata, et intellectualem ad cognoscendum, sicuti sunt, sine imaginibus, substantias separatas 
et intelligibiles.”
244 Ex rerum initiarum,  121: “Habet quoque virtutem scitivam ad sciendum per propria media proprie dicta 
scibilia et uno modo semper se habet. Habet quoque et vitutem cognoscendi, per congrua media, ea que non 
semper necessario uno modo se habent, ut frequentius, que dicitur virtus artis.” There are slight differences in 
the account given in Ecclesia sancta celebret, which is more detailed; on this, see McEvoy 1980b, 144-158.
245 DN I, § 57-58, 155-156. 
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causes of everything and the divine science itself. But Grosseteste, following Dionysius, holds 
that it is impossible for a created nature to attain this kind of knowledge because it would 
mean to know God as God knows Himself.246 The fact that the blessed in Heaven can see God 
directly does not entail that they can know everything, as God knows everything by knowing 
Himself.247 The reason of this impossibility is due to the infinity of God: it is impossible to  
circumscribe God in a created mind, as it is impossible for the sight of the created to see the 
whole of the sky in one glance.
Those three steps are also described in another short passage from the Commentary on 
the De  divinis  nominibus.  There  Grosseteste  explains  the  meaning  of  the  Dionysian 
expression “illuminated by the Wisdom.” He explains: 
 
Illuminatus imperscutabili profunditate sapientie hoc enim est rapi in tertium et supremum 
celum. Et videre ibi secreta que non licet homini loqui. In primum namque caelum rapitur qui 
in actus virtutis artis et scientiae sustollitur incognitis per artem et scientiam speculans Deum. 
In secundum vero  qui in actus virtutis intellectus elevatur et in intellectis limpidius Deum 
speculatur.  Post  quod caelum non est  superius  nisi  illud quod prediximus.  In  hac itaque 
cognitione omnia a Deo auferuntur et sic quasi opposita non inconvenienter ei attribuuntur.248
To be illuminated by Wisdom is what occurred to Saint Paul (see 2  Corinthians 12:2). It 
represents the highest degree of knowledge. Grosseteste also explains the other degrees. The 
first one (1) is that of science, or as we said, knowledge of God through material things; the 
second degree (2) is a more clear knowledge of God; (3) ignorance of God, in the mystical 
union, and at this degree it is possible to deny and affirm every attribute of God because it 
becomes evident that He is beyond every thing. Now we will analyze these three steps in 
detail.
(1) In Book VII of the De divinis nominibus, the discussion of the human knowledge 
of God retains all of Dionysius’s (and Grosseteste’s) attention. The problem is thus stated: 
how is it possible to know God who is beyond every cognitive faculty,  both sensible and 
intellectual?249 Grosseteste initially responds that the source of our knowledge is not from 
246 DN I § 59, 156: “In mente enim divina preextiterunt ab eterno eterne rationes omnium creandorum, in quibus 
rationibus omnia vivunt […]. Cum enim eternaliter sint [scil. rationes] in ipso thearchico radio non ab alio 
extra sint cause efficientes et conditrices omnium ex nihilo et ita in infinitum superexcedentes et finales et 
terminates, nullo modo potest essentia vel virtus creata ad hanc admirabilem et sic confortatam scientiam. 
Ipse enim rationes divina sunt scientia.”
247 DN VII, M 246va: “Divinus intellectus, qui idem est cum divina sapientia, cognoscens se, cognoscit omnia.”
248 DN VII, M 248ra.
249 DN VII, M 247ra-b: “Querit consequenter qualiter nos cognoscimus Deum, cum ipse sit superior omni virtute 
nostra apprehensiva et cognoscitiva et omni operatione omnis virtutis nostre apprehensive et cognoscitive,  
dicens: in hiis autem, id est consequenter predictis, oportet quaerere qualiter nos cognoscimus Deum, neque 
intelligibilem,  id  est  inappehensibilem,  vel  cognoscibilem  virtute  creata  cognoscitiva  immaterialium  et 
spiritalium, neque sensibilem id est apprehensibilem virtute apprehensiva materialium et corporalium; neque 
existentem universaliter quid  entium,  vel  secundum aliud  exemplar  ‘quid  intelligibilium’.  Nullum enim 
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God’s nature, but that the sensible and intelligible species are derived from material things. 
The process is bottom-up, and not vice-versa, ascending through the hierarchy of beings.250 At 
this point, Grosseteste departs from the paraphrase of the Dionysian text, and adds his point-
of-view: every being is a similitude of God, and reminds us not only of the unity of its cause,  
but also the Trinity because everything is made of three elements, scil. matter, form, and the 
composite of both.251 The images of God present in the material things are not of the same 
quality; they are like a mirror, some reflect the image of God better than others.252 Grosseteste, 
however, believes that it is possible and desirable to transcend images to reach the reality they 
signify. The act of transcending is not strictly speaking an operation because the intellect is, at 
this point, passive, its role is just to receive God’s illumination without images. This passivity 
is clearly expressed by the fact that the intellect can receive only what God wants to reveal.253 
There is a faculty appointed for this job, namely, the faculty of wisdom (sapientia).254 Sense 
perception is only the first step of the ladder by which human beings ascend to God; it is a 
necessary,  but not sufficient condition,  for it  becomes useless when the mystical union is 
realized.
Indeed, the role of sense perception can be invalidated in two cases: first, it is possible, 
although  it  is  rare,  that  someone  can  receive  knowledge  directly  from God  by  way  of 
illumination and without the help of the senses; second, senses configure themselves only as 
the occasion for the soul to operate.255 A proof that an a-sensorial knowledge of divine things 
omnino ens aut intelligibile est Deus, sed super omne ens et omnem intellectum ac per hoc nullum ens aut 
intellectus potest ad ipsum.”
250 DN VII, M 247rb: “Posita itaque questione et motivus ad dubitandum subiungit solutionem dicens quod non 
cognoscimus  deum ex  ipsius  natura.  Quemadmodum cognoscimus  intelligibilia  et  sensibilia  per  species 
horum intelligibiles et sensibiles nostris viribus apprehensivis eis apponentes, sed cognoscimus eum primo ex 
entium ordinatione. [...] Cum vero per ordinem creaturarum ordinatis operationibus virium apprehensivarum 
sic ascendimus ab imis usque ad supremas.”
251 See below, § III.2.2.2.
252 DN VII,  M  247rb:  “In  cuiusque  entis  comprehensi  a  nobis,  unitate  quasi in  vestigio  et  speculo 
comprehendentes Dei factoris unitatem in materia et forma et compositione ipsius entis potentiam factoris ex 
nihilo educentis et sapientiam formantis et bonitatem compositis  et sic in unitatem trinitatem. Et in entibus 
inferioribus inferiori virtute comprehensis, cognoscitur minus limpide tanquam in vestigio minus formato et 
speculo minus lucido et imagine minus imitante.  In entibus vero superioribus superiori virtute comprehensis, 
cognoscitur limpidius tanquam in predictis formationibus lucidioribus et magis imitantibus.”
253 DN VII,  M  247rb-va:  “Oportet  etiam  transcendere  supremas  creaturas  et  operationes  omnium  virium 
apprehensivarum et fieri in actuali omnium ignorantia et in illa supersplendentem divinum <247va> radium 
suscipere et ab eo illuminari et ei uniri. Et in hac unione Deum, ut possibile, sine imaginibus videre. [...] sed 
solum potens suscipere ab ipso quod dignatur largiri.”
254 DN VII, M 247va: “Potentiam itaque quam dicimus virtutem naturalem sapientie, id est cognitionis Dei in se, 
ut possibile, sine imaginibus, est potentia transcendendi operationes omnium virium apprehensivarum et  fieri 
in supereminentia,  in ignorantia omnium, secundum se impotens,  superius agere et  apponere in divinum 
radium.”
255 On this second point, see DN IV, M 210vb: “Nec intelligat aliquis ex hiis verbis auctoris vel nostris asserere 
vel  insinuare quod virtutes  et  potentie  naturaliter  inferiores  directe agant  in naturaliter  superiores  et  eas  
moveant sed quod occasione actionum inferiorum virtutum agant virtutes superiores.”
74
is possible is given, according to Grosseteste, by human beings’ natural desire. The premises 
are that nothing in nature is in vain (natura nihil facit frustra), and that human beings’ desire 
to  know  God  purely  and  without  phantasm  is  natural.  In  conclusion,  this  a-sensorial 
knowledge cannot be frustrated, and consequently, it is possible for humans.256 Even if we 
accept the first premise, what makes the argument weack is the second premise. In particular, 
we may wonder how it is possible that pure knowledge without phantasm can be natural if  
this kind of knowledge, Grosseteste admits, is possible only in rare cases in via. In this life, 
indeed, the normal way of knowing is by abstraction from the sensory perception. However 
Grosseteste, since his early works, states that sensory perception is not the highest mean to 
reach the truth.257
(2) Some contemporary scholars wondered about the identity of those who can attain a 
direct knowledge of God without the help of senses. The question is not trivial because if, for 
Grosseteste,  this  were  the  ordinary way to  acquire  knowledge,  then  his  theory would  be 
strictly  Augustinian.  Aristotle’s  psychology would  stand in  stark  contrast  to  Grosseteste’s 
view, and hence, he would never have blended it with Augustine’s psychology. Grosseteste 
speaks of “the pure in heart and those perfectly purified” and McEvoy identifies them with a 
small number of mystics who had the privilege of seeing God on earth, such as Moses, Saint 
Paul, the Virgin Mary, while normally this experience is accessible only to the blessed and the 
saints in Heaven.258 From this, McEvoy rightly concludes that “the opposition is not between 
Augustinian  illumination  on  the  one  hand  and  Aristotelian  abstraction  on  the  other,  but 
between human knowledge in the present limited condition and the direct vision of God.”259
We can add another category of beings that can reach divine knowledge without the 
help of phantasms already during their lives on earth, which has neglected by commentators. 
In the Commentary on the De ecclesiastica hierarchia, Grosseteste distinguishes the way of 
knowledge of angels from that of human beings: angels comprehend God without sensible 
images and phantasms, while human beings can only speculate about God by starting from 
sense  perception.260 The  same  expression  that  characterizes  angelical  knowledge,  “sine 
256 DN III,  M 197va:  “Quod  autem possibilis  sit  nuda et  pura  cognitio  divinorum absque  phantasmatibus, 
manifestum est ex hoc quod naturaliter appetimus nudum et purum eorum intellectum et contemplationem. 
Non enim naturaliter appetimus impossibilia.”
257 See InPoAn, I, 14, p. 213, ll.228ff; see note 71.
258 McEvoy 1982, 326. Grosseteste speaks of the pure of heart, an evangelical expressions (Matthew 5,8), in De 
Veritate, 138: “Mundicordes vero et perfecte purgati ipsam lucem veritatis in se conspiciunt, quod immundi 
facere nequeunt”
259 McEvoy 1982, 329. Christina Van Dyke (2009) studied the role of illumination in ordinary knowledge and  
spoke of “an Aristotelian theory of divine illumination.”
260 EH I, 320, 12-17: “Secunda autem differentia est quod celestes ordines et substancie existentes intellectus 
intelligunt deum et divinam virtutem secundum ipsi fas est hoc est absque sensibilibus ymaginibus intellectu 
ab omni fantasmate abstracto; nos autem reducimur ad divinas speculaciones sensibilibus ymaginibus quia 
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phantasma,” however, denotes another category of beings, namely, the highest members of 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy. 
Dionysius  carefully  distinguishes  common people  from the  hierarchs:  the  first  can 
understand only the appearances of the rites, while those who celebrate move from the images 
to the divine realities signified by the rites. The expression used by Grosseteste to qualify the 
ascensus of the hierarchs is once again “naked and without phantasms.”261 The monks, who 
constitute an order inferior to that of priests and deacons can also attain, to a certain degree, 
this knowledge. This possibility is, however, mediated by the superior order of the priests.262 
Grosseteste, thus, applies the Dionysian principle of the influence of the superior order on the 
inferior one to the capacity of knowing God directly. For Grosseteste, to be illuminated means 
to receive theological knowledge directly from the source, God, but there is no evidence, in 
Grosseteste, that orders inferior to the monks are capable of this knowledge.
All  that being said, generally speaking, Grosseteste confirms that,  normally,  during 
their life on earth, human beings cannot reach a direct and immediate vision of God, but it is  
necessary that something falls between the human intellect and God for the intellect’s sake, as 
when the eye needs something dark to look at the sun: the more sensitive the eye is, the more 
the medium has to be dark. This is Grosseteste’s way of arguing for the Aristotelian principle 
that reason cannot perceive the most evident realities, just like a bat’s eye cannot stare at the 
sun.263 The accent here is on the weakness of the eye more than on the clarity of the object.
The principle that a medium is needed in order to know God, and that this medium 
must veil the divine in some kind of way, plays a role in the context of the history of salvation 
because during the time of the Old Testament, eyes were so sensitive that they need dark 
images to approach to God.264 What the metaphor conveys is that the Revelation of God was 
nostre infirmitati non est aliter possibile in ipsas sersum duci.” See also EH I, 345, 13-16.
261 EH II, 405, 3-6: “[...] nos autem scilicet perfectores respicientes oculo mentis videlicet sacris ascensionibus a 
sensibilibus simbolis videlicet ascendentes gradatim per gradus virium anime usque ad vim illam que nude et  
sine fatasmatibus conspicit spiritalia.”  The same expression recurs to state the same truth, namely that the 
hierarch goes beyond the symbols of  the rite to grasp the divine reality signified,  in  EH III,  491, 9-14: 
“Oportet utique igitur existimo nos hoc est me et te o Timothee et alios volentes in hoc negocio nos sequi, 
adesse intus omnino sacrorum seu intus omnino sacra hoc est relictis exterioribus intencione et intelligencia 
penetrare ad omnino sacrorum interiora et sic consequenter denudantes hoc est nude et absque fantasmatibus 
conspicientes.” Other occurences are in EH III, 496, 3-5, and EH IV, 630, 7-8.
262 EH VI, 794, 3-9: “Per illuminativam enim virtutem sacerdotalem fit hec adornacio in contemplacione que est  
divina operacio intellectuali absque fantasmatibus videlicet materialibus qua contemplacione secundum suam 
possibilitatem  contemplatur  sacras  operaciones  intellectuales  videlicet  angelicas  et  divinas  ut  ad  earum 
exemplar  quantum  possibile  est  dirigat  sacre  suas  operaciones  humanas  per  hoc  facta  in  earum eciam 
communicacione.”
263 Aristotle, Metaphysics, II, 993b.
264 EH IV, 700, 6-16 “Quia igitur sicut oculus carnis infirmus non potest conspicere solem hunc absque velamine 
nubis aut aliuius interpositi […] et quanto infirmior est tanto crassioribus indiget interpositis [...]. Antiquorum 
autem mentales oculi erant infirmi et quidam aliis infirmiores et quidam infirmissimi necesse fuit spiritalem 
solem et spiritales eius fulgores visuum mentalium infirmitati comproporcionaliter velari; non solum per 
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gradual, and that it was harder for people who lived before Christ to know God because His 
manifestation  was  more  unclear  than  for  those  who  during  Christ’s  time.  Grosseteste’s 
considerations on this issue aim to outline the passage from the ancient hierarchy of the Old 
Testament to the ecclesiastical hierarchy instituted in the New Testament. Here Grosseteste is 
developing an idea already stated in the De cessatione legalium, which was written before the 
episcopacy. This  treatise focuses on the history of salvation by bringing the interrelationship 
of the Old and New Testaments into light, and thus, demonstrating how the prophecies are 
fulfilled by Christ. In that treatise, Grosseteste also explains the passage from the Revelation 
of the Old Testament, characterized by allegories and metaphors, to the Revelation of the New 
Testament, which is characterized by straightforward explanations.265
(3) For Grosseteste, no matter how clear and direct human knowledge could become, 
God is still called ‘ignorance’ because He is incomprehensible to us. Ignorance of God is the 
topic of the Commentary on the De mystica theologia. In the Commentary on the De divinis  
nominibus, however, Grosseteste follows Dionysius’s attempt to take together the ignorance 
of God and the fact that He is called ‘completely knowable’ because He is knowable precisely 
in that kind of ignorance.266 Grosseteste’s view emerges not in the paraphrase of the text, but 
in  the  philological  comment  on  the  meaning  of  ‘omne  intelligibile.’ Rather  than  merely 
providing notes on Greek language, as he usually does, he goes further by providing three 
possible meanings of the expression. The phrase omne intelligibile could, first, mean that we 
can know God as the cause of everything, and that everything leads us to the knowledge of its  
cause. Second, it could also mean what is “totally knowable” insofar as He is in Himself 
light.267 Finally, if we maintain that God is light, it is in His light that everything becomes 
intelligible.268 Grosseteste does not opt for one of them because they complement each other. 
simbola similia sed et per dissimilia et eciam per summe dissimilia obscurissime et difficillime […].”
265 Grosseteste describes the correct method of reading the Holy Scripture, here it follows the considerations  
about the New Testament, cf. DCL I, IX.4, 49: “In tercia vero sui parte signat hec sriptura ad nostram salutem 
pertinencia verbis nudis, nichil habentibus allegorici enigmatis.”
266 DN II,  M  186ra:  “Et  sic  nominatur  Deus  ignorantia quia  inaccessibilis  et  incomprehensibilis  et 
incognoscibilis quid est in se. Quia in ea que dicta est ignorantia maxime cognitus et quia cognoscitur quod 
in  hac  ignorantia  est  maxime  cognoscibilis  omne  intelligibile  [dicitur]”. When  the  intellect  stops  its 
operations, then the wisdom can receive illumination from God and thus the ignorance of the intellect is a  
requisite  for  a  deeper  theological  knowledge,  cf.  DN VII,  M  248ra:  “Cum  enim  transcenderit  mens 
operationes intellectuales  et  facta in  omnium ignorantia  suscipiens divinum radium ei  unitur.  Et  est  hec 
eminentissima nobis possibilis Dei cognitio. Et potentia ascendendi in hanc ignorantiam est in nobis virtus  
supprema quam et supra nominavimus virtutem sapientie.”
267 DN II, M 186ra: “Grecum autem pro quo dicimus «omne intelligibile» potest esse sicut dicimus due dictiones 
omne et intelligibile velut una dictio composita et secundum hoc posset interpretari ab omnibus intelligibile 
quia ab omnibus ut causatis ab ipso sursum ducimur in eius intelligentiam vel posset interpretari «omnino 
intelligibile» quod contrapositive ei quod predicitur ignorantia quia deus est lux omnium manifestissima.”
268 DN II, M 186ra: “Et sic etiam potest dici ‘omne intelligibile’ quia per ipsam [scil. lucem divinam] et in ipsam 
et propter ipsam est omne intelligibile.”
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These three interpretations make, at  one and the same time, God object and condition of 
human knowledge since He is knowable in Himself and makes every created thing knowable.
Yet what does it mean for God to be a condition of knowledge? Is it possible to know 
without the help of God? Those questions do not pertain only theological  knowledge but 
every kind of knowledge. The third meaning of  omne intelligibile clearly recalls a passage 
from another Grossetestian treatise, the De veritate, written almost twenty years earlier than 
the Commentary: “It is true, therefore, as Augustine testifies, that no truth is perceived except 
in the light of supreme truth.”269 In that treatise we find also the second meaning of  omne 
intelligibile,  namely,  that it  is possible to perceive the First  Being in everything.270 Either 
consciously, as the pure in heart, or unconsciously, as the impure in heart, every human being 
not only needs the supreme truth for reaching any certain knowledge, but he also knows God 
knowing  other  realities.271 Once  again,  we  face  Grosseteste’s  will  to  mark  a  difference 
between ordinary knowledge (that of the pure of heart) and that of the rest of humankind that 
are impure in heart. Contemporary scholars have confined the doctrine of illumination, and 
accordingly the necessity of God in the process of cognition, to a problem concerning a few 
mystics (Moses, Mary, Saint Paul) and the blessed in Heaven.272 Grosseteste’s insistence on 
this topic in many works, and in a different period and context of his life, suggests that his 
aim is wider. Moreover, as I argued, in Grosseteste’s view, the hierarchs also have this kind of 
knowledge. His will to preserve God’s transcendence does not entail that human beings are 
completely ignorant about Him. None lacks His vision and His light completely, otherwise 
they could not know anything to be true. We can compare the impure man (immundus) from 
Grosseteste’s  De veritate with the fool (insipiens) from Anselm’s  Proslogion. They both do 
not know God (or even deny His existence), but they can be guided to His knowledge by an 
argument (for Anselm) or directly by God’s illumination (for Grossetese). The peculiar feature 
of Grosseteste is to turn the cognitive deficiency into an affective deficiency, as we saw in his 
the comment on the second commandment.
In conclusion, Grosseteste’s account of these three steps is problematic. He strives to 
269 De veritate,  138: “Verum est  igitur,  sicut  testatur Augustinus,  quod nulla conspicitur  veritas nisi  in luce 
summae veritatis.” The reference is to Augustine, De libero arbitrio, II, 13, 36.
270 De veritate, 141: “Nec scitur vere aliquid creatum esse, nisi in mente videatur ab aeterno Verbo supportari. Et  
ita in omni esse, quod est adhaerere esse primo videtur aliquo modo esse primum”. See also DN V, M 238rb: 
“Omne enim ens in intelligentia vel speculatione cuiuslibet intelligentis vel speculantis sursum ducit illam in  
cause ipsius entis speculationem et intelligentiam, et in ente speculato sicut in speculo vel vestigio speculatur  
entis causam et eam ab ipso ente nominat et preentem ipsius entis causam designat.”
271 De veritate, 138: “Nemo est igitur, qui verum aliquid novit, qui non aut scienter aut ignoranter etiam ipsam 
summam  veritatem  aliquo  modo  novit.  Iam  igitur  patet,  quomodo  soli  mundicordes  summam  vident 
veritatem et quomodo nec etiam immundi penitus eius visione frustrantur.”
272 See McEvoy 1982, 326. Other scholars depend on McEvoy, see Oliver 2004, 163; Lewis 2009, 41; Van Dike 
2010, 157. 
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maintain three levels (influenced by the Scriptures that accounts for a “third heaven”), but the 
second and the third levels are not clearly distinct. This difficulty lies in understanding when 
an author tries to explain something that is beyond common experience.
II.3.1.2 Knowing God through symbols
Previously,  I demonstrated Grosseteste’s view regarding the three steps towards the 
knowledge of God: (1) knowledge of God through material things; (2) direct knowledge of 
God, without phantasm; (3) ignorance of God, in the mystical union. The further step wherein 
we know God as He knows Himself is beyond human capacity. Only (1) is the ordinary way 
to know God in via. Grosseteste’s concern is to reconcile this kind of knowledge with God’s 
transcendence. In the next chapter, we will see that the doctrine of exemplarism allows human 
intelligence to find traces of God in the universe. In this section, we will see that, although 
created realities are meaningful manifestations of the Creator, they do not permit one to grasp 
the most intimate nature of God. This incapacity of creation to render a perfect idea of the 
Creator was clearly stated in 1215 during the IV Lateran Council.273 I will argue, against the 
McEvoy, that Grosseteste prefers the use of unlike-symbols (namely, images that are taken 
from materiality),  instead  of  like-symbols  (namely images  that  manifest  more  clearly the 
spirituality of the divinity) to express God because unlike-symbols more fully express divine 
transcendence.
While  Grosseteste  reflects  upon  symbolism before  being  appointed  as  bishop,  the 
necessity of images receives particular attention in the Commentary.274 In Book II of the De 
coelesti hierarchia, Dionysius explains why the Scripture uses symbols, images to describe 
angels, who are pure spirits, and from this, he extends his discussion to the images of God. 
This point becomes an opportunity for Grosseteste to develop his doctrine about knowing and 
expressing God.  Dionysius  and Grosseteste  acknowledge the necessity of  images  for  two 
reasons: (1) to fulfil the human intellect’s infirmity of raising itself from the material to the 
intelligible world; (2) and to hide divine things from the impures of heart.275 Someone may 
273 See Denzinger 1995, n. 432:  “we [...] believe and confess with Peter (Lombard) that there is one supreme 
entity, incomprehensible and ineffable, which is truly Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, together three persons  
and each one of them singly […] between the Creator and the creature there cannot be a likeness so great that  
the unlikeness is not greater;” English translation at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/lateran4.asp. 
274 The few passages devouted to symbolism before the Commentary are gathered in McEvoy 1982, 359.
275 CH II, 34: “Est enim theologia respiciens nostrum intellectum, ut agnoscat posse ipsius, et quasi medicatrix  
infirmitatis  ipsius,  ipsum  visitans,  intendens  in  ipsum,  ipsum  perscrutans  et  explorans  ut,  agnitis  eius 
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hold that the first need is satisfied by the use of like-symbols (similia symbola), while the 
second  is  satisfied  by  unlike-symbols  (dissimilia  symbola),  and  that,  as  such,  cannot  be 
attributed  to  God.  But  Grosseteste’s  answer  is  more  nuanced,  which  shows that  the  two 
reasons offered are strictly inter-related.
With respect to the first reason, Grosseteste notes that it contrasts with the Scripture, 
for it does not use only noble images, such as ‘substance,’ ‘reason,’ or others taken from the 
most spiritual things in the material world, such as ‘life’ or ‘light’ in order to express the 
simplicity of God, but it also employs images coming from lesser noble realities, such as 
‘stone’ or ‘lion.’276 Dionysius and Grosseteste respond that God shows Himself according to 
similar or dissimilar symbols, but that none of them are perfectly suited to God. The reason is  
that every image represents something composed (of matter and form), while God is totally 
simple.277 This means that God is not properly a substance as He is not, for example, a lion.
In this context, Grosseteste prefers dissimilar symbols because they are less dangerous, 
as there is no risk for the intellect to rest on them, but they lead our intellect to something 
other than themselves. The image of light, for example, can deceive because someone could 
really think that an angel is made of light, while the image of an animal with wings shifts the 
attention immediately to something else, because clearly it cannot refer to an actual spiritual 
being.278 
When interpreting the same passage, McEvoy draws the opposite conclusion, namely, 
that  Grosseteste  accords  favour  to  the  like-symbols  rather  than  to  the  dissimilar  images. 
According  to  McEvoy,  Grosseteste  would  show  pastoral  concerns  towards  the  many 
(multitudo) and willingness to defend the liceity of the material symbols used in the Bible to 
represent the angels. He is convinced that the presence of the word ‘vestigium’ in that context 
alerts  the  reader  that  Grosseteste  moves  from  a  Dionysian  to  a  distinctly  Augustinian 
atmosphere of thought.279 In my opinion, the text does not appear as ‘diffractive’ as McEvoy 
stresses, but it is perfectly coherent with Grosseteste’s loyalty to Dionysian thinking. The like-
infirmitate et potentia, provideat ipsi familiaribus et connaturalibus symbolis, figuris et plasmationis, ipsum 
reducens et sursum ducens ad infigurabilia et intelligibilia”. CH II, 49: “Et quod decet eloquia ab inmundis et 
execratis sacra sacris velaminibus abscondet.”
276 CH II,  57:  “Eedem  etiam  mystice  traditiones  aliquando  reformant sive  replasmant,  hoc  est  figuraliter 
significant,  ipsam scilicet  thearchiam  […]  per  hec  nomina:  ratio,  intellectus,  substantia,  lumen  et  vita 
existentibus venerabilioribus […] materialibus formationibus, quales sunt cum ipsam thearchiam significant 
per leoniforme et similia.”
277 CH II, 41: “Huiusmodi quoque estimator, quia negare non potest, ut pretactum est, quin oporteat recipi in  
eloquis compositiones in designationem simplicium, propter suam simplicitatem.”
278 CH II, 65: “Per modum autem similis formationis non manifeste ostenditur quod divina non sunt illa que esse 
dicuntur, sed a multis intelliguntur esse ea et illa affirmationes proprie sumi et non symbolice tantum dici. Et  
est modus iste similis formationis propinquior, ut faciat multitudim errare circa divina quam sit modus ille 
qui fit per formationes dissimiles, ut in proximo consequenter ostendet.”
279 McEvoy 1982, 96-97.
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symbols are dangerous for faith, both according to Dionysius and to Grosseteste because, as 
said above, they attract the attention on themselves more than on the represented reality.280 
Moreover, the pastoral concern for the multitude of believers does not stand out here or in 
other  texts;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Grosseteste,  following  Dionysius,  clearly  highlights  the 
difference  between  the  members  of  the  ecclesiastical  hierarchy and  the  rest.  In  order  to 
understand Grosseteste’s position, we also need to take into account the other Commentaries. 
If we consider the  De divinis nominibus, McEvoy’s hypothesis seems to find some 
evidence. In this treatise, indeed, Grosseteste’s focus shifts from the dissimilar images to the 
similar ones. The intellectual power, Grosseteste says, is guided from sensible things to the 
intelligible realm, and in this process, it follows what can most easily manifest the spiritual 
nature of intelligible things.281 Grosseteste concludes that what is known obscurely cannot be 
represented clearly.282 However, the context makes it clear that our hypothesis is still valid. 
Indeed, Grosseteste’s discussion concerns the sacred authors (theologi), i.e., those who wrote 
the Bible, and the vocabulary they chose to talk about God. More specifically, the problem at 
stake  is  given  by  the  name  ‘love’ (eros or  amor),  which  was  traditionally  considered 
unsuitable to God, for it is intended to signify a passionate and erotic love. The Latin term that 
was traditionally used to express God’s love was dilectio  (or  caritas). Here Grosseteste and 
Dionysius clearly mark the contrast between the hierarchs (nos) and the many (multitudo).283 
The hierarchs hold that dilectio and eros are the same in God, while the multitude of believers 
are shocked by the name eros. The positivity of the use of images is limited to the early stages 
of the ascent to God, i.e., those that pertain mostly to laymen; the images are instruments that 
permit us to glimpse something, but the real ‘diffractive’ role – to use McEvoy expression – is 
that of dissimilar symbols. This datum is coherent with what we said about the hierarchs and 
their  power to see God directly without the help of phantasm. The aim of Grosseteste to 
280 Another  text  that  states  this  risk of  the  images  is  DN V,  M 239rb-va:  “Ambulans post  exempla  creata 
recordari debet scripture que precipit non ambulandum post exempla creata sed ab hiis sursum duci ad solius 
crean-  <239va> -tis speculationem et adorationem.” Grosseteste, following Dionysius and the Scriptures, 
forbids the worship of images (exempla) of God. We may infer that the higher the similitude, the higher the 
risk. 
281 DN IV, M 210vb: “Indiget tamen nostra vis intellectiva sursum moveri et ferri per sensus sensibilium ad 
speculativas intelligentias intelligibilium, et cum hac indiget delatione preciosiora sunt ei que levius eam 
sursum  movent  et  ferunt  ut  in  audibilibus  sermones  manifestiores  et  invisibilibus  clariora  et  visui 
perspicacius et certius apprehensibilia.” See also CH II, 48.
282 DN IV,  M  210vb:  “Quia  enim  obscure  et  immanifeste  susceperunt  quomodo  clare  et  manifeste 
representarent?”
283 Dionysiaca,  211f:  “Incapabile  enim  est  multitudinem  unitum  dei  et  unius  amoris.  Propter  quod,  et  ut 
difficilius nomen multis visum, in divina sapientia ordinatur, ad reductionem ipsorum  et extensionem in eius 
qui  vere amoris  cognitionem, et  ut  absolvi  ab ea quae in ipso difficultate.  In  nobis  autem rursus  ubi et 
inconveniens quid multoties intelligere terrenos, secundum visum famosius: «cecidit», quidam ait, «dilectio 
tua super me ut dilectio mulierum». In recte divina audientibus in eadem virtute ordinatur a sacris theologis 
dilectionis et amoris nomen, secundum divinas manifestationes.”
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distinguish the ways to approach God could not be clearer: on the one hand, the hierarchs can 
see God directly, and they do not need like-symbols because they are fully aware that God is 
neither of His images; on the other hand, the laymen need like-symbols, and are shocked by 
the use of names that are drawn from material realm. Grosseteste’s pastoral concern towards 
the multitude of  believers is  a  fact,  but  it  does not  entail  an egalitarian view concerning 
theological knowledge.
The second reason mentioned above – i.e., the necessity to hide divine truths from the 
impures – is strictly connected with the first reason (namely, to fulfill the human intellect’s 
infirmity). In the attempt to explain the meaning of the word  atechnoos, Grosseteste states 
that the Scripture “has used poetic sacred imageries. For it has used them not artificially, but 
wisely and in a way above art, nor has it used them deceitfully, but simply, not humbly, but 
magnificently,  not  obscurely,  but  clearly.”284 This  claim  seems  to  contrast  with  what 
Grosseteste has written some pages earlier about the necessity to veil the divine mysteries. 
The principle – mentioned above, in § I.5 – that “somehow the sacred veils  to some are 
manifestations of the things veiled under them, but to others they are concealments” helps to 
unravel the knot.285 The examples that Grosseteste puts forward to clarify his thought are 
significant. Grosseteste affirms that the image of a lion is meaningless to someone who has 
never seen a lion; it is just a mix of colours and lines, while the image refers to a real lion only 
for those who are acquainted with it.  Similarly,  the letters written in a text appear to the 
illiterate as a mere bunch of strokes, while they are meaningful to the learned man.286 This 
passage gives McEvoy the opportunity to state that Grosseteste poses a difference between 
signs and symbols: the examples of the lion and the letters belong to the first category, while  
the images used in the Scriptures to the second.287 This distinction can be traced back to one of 
Grosseteste’s favourite sources, namely, Hugh of Saint Victor, but I argue that it has very little 
284 CH II, 34.
285 CH II,  49-50:  “Quomodo  sacra  velamina  aliis  sunt  velatorum  sub  ipsis  manifestationes  aliis  vero 
absconsiones.”
286 CH II, 50: “Numquid sicut pictura leonis respicienti eam ut ymaginem et similitudiem animalis seu leonis est 
manifestatio  et  rememoratio  animalis  seu  leonis.  Respicienti  vero  eandem  picturam  solum ut  linearum 
quandam divaricatem protractionem et nullius similitudinem aut ymaginem nullius alterius est manifestatio 
seu rememoratio, sed magis vis et intentione ipsius detentis et attentis in solam ipsam linearum figurationem 
ipsa pictura est eis ipsius rei, que depingitur, absconsio; sic sacra et symbolica velamina mundis enitentibus  
per ea in visionem intelligibilium sunt manifestatio eorundem, inmundis vero et in terrena  demersis sunt 
eorundem intelligibilium absconsio.  Item laicus omnino ignorans etiam quid vel qualis est littera inveniens 
librum et inspiciens in eo, in solas litterarum varias protractiones aliud ab ipsis protractionibus ymaginans aut  
intelligens. Unde nullius rei alterius sunt ipse litterarum protractiones ei manifestatio sed magis intentio in 
illas solas est ei rerum aliarum occultatio. Sciens autem quoniam littere sunt protractiones quas videt, scit  
quod  aliud  significant;  agnoscens  vero  uniuscuiusque  littere  figuram  propriam  et  cuius  vocis  simplicis 
signum est per figuram visibilem ymaginatur elementum audibile et est figura visibilis eidem manifestatio  
audibilis elementi.”
287 McEvoy 1982, 360f.
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influence on Grosseteste.288 
A more thorough analysis of the examples indeed shows that Grosseteste’s concern is 
actually otherwise than McEvoy claims. Both examples involve three elements that express 
three degrees of knowledge. In the first example, we have (a) colors and lines, (b) the picture, 
and (c) the lion as the real animal; in the second example, we have (a) the strokes, (b) the  
word (for example ‘house’), and (c) the sound signified by the word (for example, the sound 
‘house’). Grosseteste not only affirms that someone cannot connect the word ‘house’ to its 
sound, or that someone who has never seen a lion cannot connect the picture to the animal, 
but also that there are people who do not realize that (b) is also endowed with real being (i.e.,  
being a picture, or being a word), confining themselves to the first degree (a). Thus, when 
Grosseteste concludes that a sign leads the mind to the apprehension of something else only if  
it is perceived as a sign and not as a thing per se, we must assume that he does not refer only 
to the picture and to the word, but also to the colors and lines, and to the strokes.289 
If my interpretation is correct, the opposition underscored by McEvoy vanishes, for the 
same symbol can be said to be similar and dissimilar at the same time (although with respect 
to different men). The degree (a) expresses a dissimilar image: a stroke as a symbol of a  
sound, and a color as a symbol of an animal. The degree (b) can be considered a like-symbol; 
indeed the picture of a lion is very close to the reality represented. However, both degrees (a) 
and (b) are far from the real thing they refer to, and thus, both can either reveal or conceal that 
thing.  Grosseteste’s  only concern  is  to  state  the absolute  transcendence  of  God,  which  is 
veiled by the double element (a) and (b) and by the limits of laymen to approach Him.290 
Thus, Grosseteste fully exemplifies what Brian Gaybba said about monastic theology: “In any 
system that stresses simply the transcendence, all symbols must logically be equal in their 
capacity to illuminate or veil the transcendent reality.”291 In Grosseteste’s system, for example, 
the sentences “God is not a lion” and “God is not father” seem to be of the same value.
288 Hugh of Saint Victor,  In Hierarchiam, 926: “The creator is only pointed to in the images found in natures. 
However, the images of grace [namely those found in the Scripture] display God as Present. The reason is  
that the former was made to enable us to know that God exists, whereas in the latter God is at work so that  
God’s presence may be perceived.” English translation in Gaybba 1988, 22.
289 CH II, 51: “Sic omne signum, consideratum in quantum signum, ducit intentionem considerantis in aliud 
apprehendendum; per ipsum consideratum autem, in quantum est res sola et non signum, non ducit in aliud 
apprehendendum considerantis intentionem sed magis sue apprehensioni alia interim occultat.”
290 A passage that shows that Grosseteste talks of nature and Scripture at the same time is in CH II, 60: “Non 
minus igitur sed potius forte plus laudant eloquia thearchiam ipsa abnegatione ‘rationis’ et ‘intellectus’ et  
‘substantie’ et similius ab ipsa quam cum ‘rationem’ et ‘intellectum’ et ‘substantiam’ nominant ipsam. Omnis 
autem creatura quantumque excellens […] clamat et dicit: «non sum ego deus».” A passage that shows that 
Grosseteste uses vestigium to refer both to sensible signs and to intelligent natures is in  CH II, 61: “Sed 
creature et nature immaterialiores […] expressiora et formatiora sunt conditoris vestigia […]; materiales vero 
et necessario corruptibiles minus expressa et informiora sunt creatoris vestigia.”
291 Gaybba 1982, 21.
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If  we  move,  now,  to  consider  the  De  ecclesiastica  hierarchia and  Grosseteste’s 
analysis of the sacraments and their symbols, we can find further evidence of the necessity to 
hide divine truths from the impures. In this Commentary, Grosseteste emphasizes the central 
role of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It has the duty to guide everyone to the knowledge of God, 
passing  from  the  degree  (a)  to  degree  (b),  while  the  most  secret  reality  (c)  remains  a 
prerogative of the hierarchs. It is on the basis of Revelation that human beings know God and 
the different kinds of symbols used to represent Him. Such symbols become visible during the 
celebration of the sacraments,  and it  is  in the  De ecclesiastica hierachia that Grosseteste 
explains the real significance of the prohibition to access divine realities. For each sacrament, 
Dionysius clarifies and distinguishes the elements of the rite (the symbols) and the spiritual 
meaning of them (the theoria). Commenting on Dionysius’s text, Grosseteste does not deny 
that human beings can gain access to spiritual meaning, but he establishes a hierarchy: the 
impures (execratis) do not participate in the rites at all; then, there are the cathecumens, the 
penitents, and the possessed by an evil spirit who may attend only some parts of the rite;  
finally, the believers and the clergy, which in turn is divided into sub-categories.292 Speaking 
in this way, Grosseteste reveals his pastoral role. While in Dionysius, prohibition is a matter  
of  the preservation of  a  sort  of  esoteric  knowledge of  divine realities,  in  Grosseteste,  by 
contrast, it signifies the attempt to preserve and gradually guide believers to God, just as he 
stated the necessity of images to protect weak (intellectual) eyes from the super-bright light of 
the sun, namely, God. As an example, Grosseteste presents a parallel between the light of the 
sun and the sacraments: as it is dangerous for weak eyes to stare at the sun, it is dangerous for 
impures to see sacred things.293
Grosseteste  seems  to  be  fascinated  by  the  secrets  and  the  mysteries  that  envelop 
Dionysius’s doctrine. A Dionysian passage on the “hierarchical traditions” will help us bring 
this point to light. Dionysius uses this expression repeatedly, which was common among the 
Fathers of the Church, and often it is employed without further qualification.294 Among the 
possible meanings, it can refer to Jesus’s teachings to some of his closest disciples that are not 
quoted  in  the  Gospel.295 According  to  Grosseteteste,  those  traditions  are  probably  the 
unwritten doctrines that are handed down from the first  disciples to the clergy across the 
292  In particular the chapter on the Eucharist outline this hierarchy, cf. EH III. 
293 EH II, 371. “Periculosum namque est sic imperfectis in sacra videnda intendere sicut periculosum est infirmis 
oculis inspicere contra solis radios et nocivum est eis ad superiora se conari.”
294 Another  passage  in  these  traditions  is  CH II,  56:  “Dicit  itaque  hic  eloquia  manifestativa,  […],  quorum 
traditiones sunt mystice, id est secrete vel archane.”
295 This is the interpretation of Clemens of Alexandria and it seems the same for Grosseteste. Cf. Hägg 2006,  
139 n.9. Note that Clemens also considered it necessary to hide the truth from the impures (143f).
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centuries.296  
It was probably this curiosity for the unwritten doctrines of the first Fathers of the 
Church that led Grosseteste to translate and study the sources that he believed closer to the 
time  of  the  Apostles.  This  is  the  case,  for  example,  of  the  Letters of  Saint  Ignatius,  the 
Testaments  of  the Twelve  Patriarchs, and  although  wrongly  attributed,  the  Corpus 
Dionysiacum. This is also what led Grosseteste to analyze, in the De cessatione legalium, the 
cause as to why the early Christians abandoned the law of the Old Testament. This attitude 
sharply distinguishes Grosseteste from other commentators. According to Albert the Great, for 
example, the traditiones are simply the doctrines transmitted by the Fathers, and no reference 
to  secret  knowledge is  present.297 But  Albert  was a  scholastic  teacher  at  that  time,  while 
Grosseteste was a bishop and their different interpretations of traditions shows that one of the 
reasons that compelled Grosseteste to read Dionysius was to confirm the guiding role of the 
bishops. They alone have access to a privileged source (i.e., the secret traditions); they are not 
only unpuzzled by the use of unlike-symbols, they are also the only ones that can have access 
to a direct knowledge of God like that of the angels. 
II.3.1.3 Philosophical knowledge of God
Having discussed Grosseteste’s account of the knowledge of God based on the Bible, it 
is possible to turn now to his explanation of the role and limits of the other way of knowing 
God, namely,  through philosophy.  In the  Corpus, the word  philosophia, takes on different 
meanings. On the one hand, Dionysius takes philosophy to designate a rational argument. This 
meaning emerges,  for  example,  in  the  De divinis  nominibus,  where Dionysius  rejects  the 
thought of Elymas who denied that God is omnipotent insofar as he cannot deny Himself.298 
Dionysius’s answer to this objection, Grosseteste explains, is not difficult to understand for 
those who are trained in  philosophy.  Dionysius uses an argument  known to philosophers, 
namely, that truth and being are the same in God.299 
296 EH I, 296: “Ex hierarchicis traditionibus hoc est doctrinis forte in scriptum non redactis. Agnoscunt enim viri 
ecclesiastici  multa  sancta  et  secreta  ex  misteriis  per  primos  patres  et  ierarchas  dispositis  et  eorum 
tradicionibus non scriptis.”  This exoteric interpretation of Dionysius also occurs in the mentioned passage 
from DN VII where Grosseteste considers that to be illuminated by divine wisdom is like being caught up in 
Heaven where it is possible to apprehend secrets that are unspeakable to other human beings; cf. n.77.
297 Albertus Magnus,  De ecclesiastica hierarchia, p. 5, ll.5-8: “Et haec oportet ostendere  his auditoribus,  qui  
sunt  perfecti  ex  hierarchicis  sacramentis  et  traditionibus,  idest  doctrinis,  ut  principia  et  auditores 
proportionetur rei tradite.”
298 Bar-Jesus, known also as Elymas, was a Jew who opposed the apostle Paul; see Acts of the Apostles 13.
299 DN VIII,  M252va: “Eidem autem Elyme oppositio non sit  ad solvendum difficile  maxime exercitatis  in 
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In another passage, Grosseteste interprets Dionysius’s conception of philosophia as the 
Scripture, although after a closer reading, Grosseteste seems to misinterpret Dionysius, for the 
latter understanding philosophy commonly, which refers to arguments based on reason, and 
not on the authority of the Bible.300 Generally, however, Grosseteste understands philosophia 
as referring to pagan wisdom: the philosophers endorse some unorthodox theses, such as the 
eternity of the world, and the Philosophus is, of course, Aristotle, one of the very few sources 
explicitly mentioned in the De divinis nominibus.301 
In the conclusion of the De divinis nominibus, Grosseteste mentions a different kind of 
philosopher, namely, the monk. Dionysius confesses that his attempt to praise God does not 
match that of angels, or that of the authors of the Bible and of their listeners and disciples.302 It 
is worth noting that Grosseteste translates Dionysius’s term ‘ἀςκητων’ as monachorum, while 
Eriugena  and  Sarrazin  as  translated  it  as  philosophantium.303 In  the  De  ecclesiastica  
hierarchia, Dionysius grants monks a particular status because they abandoned a divided life 
in order to reach the unitive laws of God.304 This means, according to Grosseteste, that they 
show their perfect wisdom, which consists in the passage from the multiplicity of knowledge 
coming from the world to the unity of knowledge coming from God. Grosseteste explains that 
true philosophy coincides with a love for wisdom, namely, a perfect mix of knowledge and 
love that reaches its peak in the life of monks.305 Again, the couple aspectus/affectus is the key 
to define a perfect life. 
This kind of wisdom can reach the divine truths,  while the human intellect  cannot 
attain them. Among these truths there is not the mystery of the Trinity, for it can be glimpsed 
philosophicis. Manifestat auctor brevi verbo apud philosophos noto eam solvens sic inquiens sui ipsius enim 
negatio casus a veritate est.”
300 Dionysiaca, 68: “Si quidem enim est aliquis totaliter eloquiis resistens, longe ibi omnino erit et ab ea quae  
secundum nos philosophia”.  Grosseteste paraphrases the word ‘philosophia’ as “id est a philosophia sacre 
scripture.”  In  DN III,  Dionysius  mentions a  divina philosophia,  but  Grosseteste  does not  expose it  and 
probably refers it to the Scripture. Such a phrase seems to designate the Christianity just as the phrase vera 
philosophia in Augustine. See De ordine 2.5; De civitate dei 22.22; Contra Iulianum 4.
301 On the philosophers as the advocates of the theory of the eternity of the world, see DN IX, M 258ra: “Dicitur 
a philosophis non factum et multo magis per consequens super omne quod in creaturis dicitur factum et ut 
absolute non factum quia semper sine initio ens et non ab alia causa sed per seipsum et a seipso perfectum 
ens et idem non initiabile non alterabile non terminabile.” Grosseteste mentions explicitly Aristotle in  DN 
VIII, M 255vb: “Sicut determinat Philosophus in quarto Moralium ad Nichomatum […].”
302 DN XIII, M 276rb: “[...] neque quidem derelicti solum ab hymnodia resume adhuc ipsorum theologorum 
neque ipsorum monachorum  qui videlicet vocentur ascetae  vel consecutorum hoc est imitatorum dictorum 
monachorum.”
303 Dionysiaca, 556.
304 Dionysiaca,  1392:  “Partibilium  non  solum  vitarum,  sed  quidem  et  phantasiarum,  abrenuntiatio 
perfectissimam manifestat monachorum philosophiam in scientiam unificatorum mandatorum operantem.”
305 EH VI, 804: “Philosophiam id est amorem sapiencie pro viribus in actus sapienciales prorumpentem.[...] Non 
enim est  philosophia  aut  que tepide  amat  aut  que  solum scit  et  non operatur  aut  que casu  fortuito,  aut  
ignoranter operatur. Et bene dico quod perfectissima est ordinis monachici philosophia.” Grosseteste inherits 
the  definition  of  philosophy  as  “love  for  wisdom”  from  Augustine,  De  civitate  dei 8,  1  and  Contra 
Academicos 2, 7.
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by the  intellect  to  a  certain  degree,  as  seen  above.  There  are,  however,  other  truths  that  
Grosseteste considers knowable only by faith, such as the Incarnation and the Resurrection. 
Already in  the  De cessatione  legalium, Grosseteste  stated that  nothing is  as  distant  from 
human reason as God’s plan to redeem the world through the passion of His incarnate Son.306 
In  the  De  divinis  nominibus,  the  Resurrection,  rather  than  the  Redemption,  is  at 
stake.307 Dionysius replies to the objection of Simon Magus – i.e., the resurrection of a body 
contradicts reason because it is contrary to common experience – by affirming that it is insane 
to judge the invisible Cause by means of human sense perception.308 Grosseteste comments:
Si enim aliquid apparens verum ex manifestis secundum sensum contrarietur et conpugnat  
divine  voluntati  cui  omnia sunt  possibilia  nihil  preter  naturam vel  super  nullo modo est  
sapientis  eo uti  adversus omnipotentem voluntatem vel  ut  quid esset  ei  super naturam et 
possibilitatem eo enim sic uti  est preter naturam et contra naturam. […] Non enim igitur 
preter naturam corporum resurrexio in vitam immortalem sed preter naturam est dicere eam 
esse preter naturam.309
According to Grosseteste, God’s omnipotence cannot be disputed. If something apparently 
true to the senses contradicts God’s will, this does not mean that it is against nature; on the 
contrary, it is the philosopher’s pretension to say that God is not omnipotent to be against  
nature. This passage is important. Sense perception does not warrant the acquisition of truth 
per se because truth ultimately depends on God’s will. Note, indeed, that Grosseteste qualifies 
as “apparent true” that which is manifested by the senses, but is in contradiction with the 
Revelation. 
This is a consequence of the theory of God’s necessity that Grosseteste develops in the 
De libero arbitrio, a philosophical theme that attracted the attention of many scholars.310 Let 
me summarize Grosseteste’s position in order to convey his point.  Grosseteste distinguishes 
three modal strengths: the simply contingent such as «Socrates is white», which though true 
can be false and can be true at one time and false at another; the immutable such as «The 
Antichrist is going to be» which can be false, but if true at one time, is true at every time; the  
simply necessary such as «Two and three are five» which simply cannot be false. Grosseteste 
uses this apparatus to explain how God can know what he neither knows nor will know. God’s 
306 De cessatione legalium IV, 1, 10, 159: “Nichil autem tam remotum est ab humane sapientie investigatione 
quam humani generis reparacio per Filium Dei , Deum et hominem, in crucem passum.”
307 On the incapability of heretics and pagans to understand God’s salvation, see  DN VII,  M 243rb: “Potest 
quoque  dei  sapientia  ideo  dici  stultitia  quia  hereticis  et  gentilibus  videtur  stultitia  quod  non  possunt 
sillogistice ex principiis sumptis a sensibilibus demonstrare ut est nostre redemptionis dispensatio.”
308 Dionysiaca, 376. Simon, according to Acts of the Apostles 8:9-24, after becoming a Christian, offered to 
purchase from the Apostles Peter and John the supernatural power of transmitting the Holy Spirit.
309 DN VI, M 242ra.
310 Knuuttila 1981, 206ff; Lewis 1996; Normore 2006.
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knowledge is immutable, but not simply necessary.311
Now,  the  case  of  the  resurrection  and  the  “apparent  truth”  becomes  clearer. 
Grosseteste’s criticism against those who hold that a man cannot be resurrected means that the 
purely contingent truths, like «Socrates is white», are purely contingent because both God and 
creatures have the power to make them change their truth-value from time to time. On this 
interpretation, the sentence, “A body is corruptible and it cannot live forever” is not simply 
necessary in the way that “Two and three are five” is, nor simply contingent as is “Socrates is 
white”; nonetheless, it is closer to the case of the Antichrist than that of Socrates because it is 
possible for a body to be risen,  as actually happened to Jesus.  This explains  why Simon 
Magus was wrong. Something is possible only if there is a power that can bring it about and 
this power seems to be the power of God.312
In conclusion, Grosseteste seems to think that the philosophers have two main limits 
when approaching God: the first is the ignorance of God’s omnipotence, against which logical 
arguments  fail;  the  second  is  the  lack  of  love  for  God  that  also  curbs  the  philosopher’s 
knowledge. Because of the great importance of the latter element in the commentary on the 
Corpus, it deserves to be treated separately.
II.3.2 The relationship between love and knowledge
As said above (§ II.2.2), knowledge and love, aspectus/affectus, go hand-in-hand, but 
in the  Commentary Grosseteste focuses on them separately depending on the context. The 
mystical union, the peak of knowledge (which coincides, paradoxically, with the complete 
ignorance) of God is the domain where love and knowledge comes to a new synthesis. More 
specifically, in this paragraph, I will argue that in the Commentary Grosseteste “breaks” the 
isomorphism  between  love  and  knowledge  by  arguing  that,  with  respect  to  theological 
knowledge, love is a better epistemological instrument than reason.
In the De mystica theologia, as McEvoy points out:
Dionysius offers an ascent which is essentially one of love, rising not through the levels of  
knowledge and being to their source, but in independence of all that is conceptualisable; the 
311 A more extended study of Grosseteste’s theory of necessity, see Normore 2006, 261.
312 See Normore 2006, 262.
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jumble  of  concepts  and  realities  which  are  denied  of  God  have  no  coherent  order.  […] 
Grosseteste, instead, was unshakeably convinced that the mystical union is an operation in 
which not only love or desire is involved, but also the highest cognitive power of mind.”313 
As one will recall, in the  De decem mandatis Grosseteste extended Anselm’s definition of 
love so that God is not only that than which nothing greater can be thought, but also that than 
which  nothing  greater  can  be  loved.  Commenting  on  the  De mystica  theologia,  instead, 
Grosseteste completes the ascent to God through love by the ascent through cognition. 
The relationship between love and knowledge is reconsidered in the sermon Ecclesia  
sancta  celebret,  which  dates  to the  forties  (the  same  years  of  the  Commentary),  where 
Grosseteste  speaks of love as a cognitive power.  In this  sermon, he describes the unitive 
moment in the mystic’s experience as follows: 
Cum autem non  habeat  amor  post  hunc  ascensum ubi  dilectum quaerat  et  inveniat  per 
vehementiam amoris, retrahit et quiescere facit omnes potentias inferiores iam dictas a suis 
actibus  universis,  et  nihil  apprehendens  stat  super  omnia  et  supra  se  in  caligine  actualis 
ignorantiae et  sui  et omnium; quasi  Moises in vertice montis  caliginoso,  expectans in ea  
donec  dilectus  se  manifestet  ipsi  per  speciem.  Quo  facto  iam  plene  vivit  et  virtus  est  
nobilissima  suprema  animae  potentia,  et  de  plenitudine  eius  vitae  suscipiunt  secundum 
ordinem inferiores potentiae, unaquaequae sibi competentem vitae plenitudinem.314
Grosseteste says that the ascent to God reaches a point where love has no further place than to 
seek and find the Beloved. Love apprehends nothing at all, but stands beyond all creatures and 
beyond itself in the darkness of ignorance, waiting for God to manifest Himself to it directly.  
Grosseteste compares the state of ‘love’ to Moses on the dark summit of the mountain, as 
accounted in Exodus 24. Only when God reveals Himself does the noblest power of the soul 
enjoy full life and become the noblest virtue. In this sermon, Grosseteste does not specify 
which is the noblest power that allows human being to be united with God. If we want to 
bring it  to light,  we have to turn to the  De mystica theologia.  The  affectus and whatever 
concerns the volitive part of the human soul has a privileged place in Grosseteste’s theology. 
This is evident when he paraphrases Dionysius’s description of Moses’s ascent to the Mount 
to see God face-to-face, and thus, to be united to God in his best part. Grosseteste explains the 
“best part” as referring to the will.315 As McEvoy has demonstrated, in this work, Grosseteste 
313 McEvoy 1980b, 150; 165.
314 Ecclesia sancta celebrat, § 36, 186-187.
315 MT I, 85: “[Moyses] fit, resume, nullius unitus, id est nulli creature unitus […] perfecte autem incogniti, hoc 
est secundum perfecte incogniti inoperationem, id est secundum inoperationem omnis cognitionis fit unitus 
secundum melius, id est secundum supremum virtutis desiderative et amative.” Other interpreters like Albert 
consider the intellect as “best part” where the mystical union is realized, see Albertus Magnus, De mystica  
theologia, 463, 53. Grosseteste identifies in the free will the power that God grants to humankind to become 
like Him (see § IV.3.3.2C).
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is clearly influenced by Thomas Gallus, the abbot of Vercelli, who wrote the Commentary on 
the De mystica  theologia some years  before  Grosseteste.316 Grosseteste’s  position  is  what 
McEvoy  has  called  “affective  Dionysianism.”  By  this  expression,  McEvoy  means  that 
“conceptual thought must be surpassed in the movement towards God, the attraction of love 
fills the vacuum and supplies a new ‘knowledge’, coming from direct acquaintance and being 
beyond thought and speech.”317 We can add that the predominance of love over intellect is not 
a prerogative of the mystical theology, but it also recurs in the other commentaries on the 
Corpus.
In the  De divinis nominibus, love is seen as the fulfilment of knowledge. All divine 
names signify God’s processions towards the creatures – as it will be illustrated in the next 
chapter – and the name ‘Good’ signifies all of them. Grosseteste explains Dionysius’s choice 
of  putting  the  names  ‘light’ and  ‘love’ after  ‘good’ as  follows:  “Nothing  is  better  than 
intellectual  knowledge  of  God  which  is  filled  with  His  pure  love.”318 The  name  ‘light’ 
concerns the intellectual  life,  but without  divine love it  becomes useless.  In this  text,  the 
subject is the divine love rather than human love for God. This means that there is a parallel  
between light and love: as the light of the human intellect is powerless without the supreme 
divine light, thus human love needs to be “illuminated” by God’s love.319 The aim of the entire 
treatise is to expound upon divine names. Such an exposition amounts to praising God and 
being enlightened upon seeing what God concedes to creatures to see.320 Since praising God 
means to love God, as we saw, love and vision,  aspectus and  affectus are combined once 
again.321 
The balance is, however, in favour of love, according to Grosseteste. Speaking about 
“holy minds” – probably in reference to angels – Dionysius says that they “do not seek with 
impotent presumption the Mystery beyond that heavenly revelation which is so granted as to 
fit their powers, nor yet through their lower propensity slip down the steep descent, but with 
316 McEvoy 1980b, 153: “Now there is no difference that I can see between Gallus and Gosseteste on any of  
these points, but rather an identity of thought.” It is significant that McEvoys published the Grosseteste’s 
Commentary on the De mystica theologia together with the  Commentary by Thomas Gallus (cf. McEvoy 
2003).
317 McEvoy 2003, 126.
318 DN IV, M 202vb: “Nihil est melius quam Dei intellectualis cognitio que eius amore puro necessario est 
repleta.”
319 CH IV, 181-182: “[...]  suscipientes a patre luminum  principales, hoc est primas absque medio et maxime 
reductivas  in  suam  originem,  illuminationes tam  intelligentie  oculum  illustrantes  quam  amoris  affectu 
simplificantes.”
320 DN I,  144  §  28:  “Intendit  enim  per  hanc  [scil.  enarrationem]  divinitatem  laudare  unam  et  trinam  et 
hymnologizare et illuminari, ut fas, ad visionem provisarum ab eterno operationum divinarum ad creaturas.” 
321 Another text can be added to the passages mentioned in § 2.2.2, namely Dictum 104, fol. 86vb: “Is eciam est 
finis laudis, ut ipse laudans in laudati dilectione laudando amplius inflammetur, et audientes in eiusdem rapiat 
et inflammet dilectionem.”
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unwavering  constancy press  onwards  toward  the  ray  that  casts  its  light  upon  them and, 
through the love responsive (commensurato amore)  to these gracious illuminations,  speed 
their temperate and holy flight on the wings of a godly reverence.”322 Commenting on this 
text, Grosseteste reveals some worries with equating  love to the illumination received from 
God. We can say this because, in this case, Grosseteste does not content himself with a simple 
paraphrase of the text, as he usually does, but expresses his own view on the subject. First, he 
states that the intellect/angels desire God with all their strength, and without any measure 
(sine modo et sine mensura).323 He then explains that the measure is not in the desire, but in 
the  limit  of  human faculties.  It  concerns  our  capacity  to  receive  God,  a  capacity  that  is 
donated  by God Himself  to  every rational  being.  Therefore,  our  capacity  to  love  God is 
limited and it reveres what is beyond that capacity.324 But in the next sentence, the subject is 
no longer love, but the intellect: “Due ale sunt quibus mens, […] sursum elevatur, sed non nisi 
commensuratum  nostre  virtuti  de  divino  radio.  [...]  Et  si  quis  presumeret  et  eniteretur 
totalitaem divinitatis  ut  est  in se ipsa comprehendere,  existimo quod in hoc Dei Verbo se 
parificaret et per hoc esset par Sathane.”325 Grosseteste repeats that it is not allowed to desire 
to know more than God concedes to us,  otherwise our intellect  would be like Satan who 
believed to be like God. It is significant that Grosseteste shifts from love to knowledge, but he 
considers it unnecessary to offer any explanation for that move. This text is further proof not 
only of the epistemological role of love, but also of his primacy in theological knowledge: 
love for God can be without measure, while the intellect is limited by God Himself, and must 
be content with what God concedes to reveal.
A passage from the  De ecclesiastica hierarchia may help us to make Grosseteste’s 
position clearer. Love is also the key concept to understand the Hierarchies because the aim 
of each hierarchy – Dionysius says – is love towards God and divine realities (ad deum et  
divina). Grosseteste explains that the object of love can be intended in two ways: (a) love for 
God in Himself as Unity and for the divine realities understood as the three Persons of the 
Trinity; (b) love for God as Unity in the Trinity and vice versa, and for the divine realities 
322 Dionysiaca, 15-16; English translation in Rolt 1920, 35.
323 DN I,  142  §  24:  “[...]  tales  enim  intellectus  extendit  se  per  se  bonum  in  sui  contemplationem  et  
communicationem et assimilationem eis decentissime convenientem qui totis viribus desiderant ipsum, nec 
modum nec mensuram apponunt huic desiderio, quia modus et mensura desiderandi et amandi Deum est ut 
sit sine modo et sine mensura.” This idea is stated also in the  Dictum 91, 70vb: “Sine modo enim et sine 
mensura amandum est quod sine modo et mensura bonum est.”
324 DN I,  143  §  25:  “[...]  amor  in  hoc  est  commensuratus  quod,  licet  sine  modo  et  mensura  desideret,  
commensuratum tamen proprie virtuti  de divino radio desiderat  et  sacre reverenter  quod est  supra suam 
virtutem,  amor  igitur  sibi  convenientis  de  divino  radio  et  reverentia  eius  quod  superexcedit  sue 
susceptibilitatis analogiam.”
325 DN I, 143 § 26.
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understood as divine attributes like truth and justice.326 If both interpretations are possible, the 
most problematic is (a), because it entails that by loving God we can reach God in Himself.  
Knowledge cannot drive us to Him, as demonstrated above, as it is limited to the object of 
love, which is stated in (b): to know that God is one in three Persons. Incidentally this is 
further  demonstration  that  the  knowledge  of  the  Trinity  is  a  step  lower  than  the  pure 
knowledge of God.327 For Grosseteste, love is not only what lifts cognitive powers from the 
lower, material objects to the highest truths, but it alone is capable to lead us to the core of the  
Godhead.328 There can be a unbounded love, but not an unbounded knowledge of God.329
In concluding this section, we may add a little note that may shed a new light on a 
controversial episode of Grosseteste’s life. Indeed, holding together the homological meaning 
of the verb ‘to theologize,’330 and the primacy of love over knowledge, is an interpretation that 
becomes clear in the famous letter that Grosseteste addresses to the masters of theology in 
Oxford around 1240.331 In that letter, the bishop of Lincoln warned his former colleagues to do 
all the ordinary lectures in the morning hour when commenting on the Bible. The target of his 
remarks was probably Richard Fishacre, who commented on the Sentences at Oxford in those 
years.  This  letter  must  not  be  interpreted  as  a  rejection  of  the  new methods in  theology 
because, as mentioned earlier, Grosseteste knew the Sentences, and it is very likely that some 
of his short treatises are a revision of a (partial) commentary on them. Rather, the letter shows 
that  Grosseteste  warned the masters  in  theology to devote morning lectures,  in  the hours 
reserved to ordinary or magisterial lectures, to treatments of Holy Scriptures. For Grosseteste, 
Fishacre’s  fault  was  not  to  have  commented  on  the  Sentences,  but  to  have  replaced  the 
Scripture with the Sentences.332 The letter reveals the conviction, typical for a twelfth century 
theologian, that disputing about God could make Him an object of investigation, while God is 
something that must be principally loved and admired.333
326 EH I, 336, ll.11-15: “[...]  et ad deum in seipso nude in sua substancia et unitate substanciali diligendum et  
divina hoc est ad deum trinitate personarum patrem scilicet et filium et spiritum sanctum diligendum; vel ad 
deum hoc est ad unitatem in trinitate et trinitatem in unitate et divina hoc est ea que de deo predicantur ut 
veritas, iusticia et similia.”
327 See above § II.2.1.
328 In  the sermon  Nostra conversacio in celis est (p.  141),  Grosseteste presents the angelical  hierarchy and 
explains in the following way the closest orders: “Talis autem est ordo in scendendo de angelis ad archangelis  
[…]; deinde ad cherubin, id est, cognicionem divine visionis; et tandem ad seraphin, id est, ad superfervidum 
Dei amorem pervenire.” It confirms that, in the ascent to God, knowledge is a lower degree than love.
329 Hugh of Saint Victor expressed the same idea, namely of the superiority of love over intelligence: “Si tamen  
hoc intelligi potest, quoniam dilectio supereminet scientiae, et major est intelligentia. Plus enim diligitur, 
quam intelligitur, et intrat dilectio, et appropinquat, ubi scientia foris est” In Hierarchiam, VI, 7, 1038D.
330 See above § II.2.2.
331 See McEvoy 2000, 163-165.
332 Ginther 2004, 27.
333 See Gaybba 1988, 17f.
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II.3.3 God has no name 
In the works written before the Commentary, we have seen Grosseteste holding that no 
name  is  said  univocally  of  God  and  creatures.334 However,  a  distinction  must  be  made 
between the rational being and others because the rational creatures are closer to God and 
imitate  Him better,  so they may share names with Him, though not  univocally.  Although 
Grosseteste does not define an intermediate category, he distinguishes the case of equivocal 
names that refer to a relation according to prior and posterior sense (per prius et posterius). It 
is the case, for example, of ‘being’ that is said equivocally of the First existent, to whom 
existence is substantial, and of creatures, to which it is not.
In the Commentary, Grosseteste seems to hold to a similar view, however, in a couple 
of passages, he proposes an alternative interpretation. In the Commentary, the focus is not so 
much on the couple univocity/equivocity, but rather on the affirmation and negation of divine 
attributes. Since this chapter is dedicated to God’s transcendence, we will focus on the method 
that allows human beings to express it better, i.e., the negative way (§ II.3.3.1). At the end of 
the paragraph, we can see that everything can be denied of God because of His transcendence, 
but yet Grosseteste proposes some answers to the quest for a more proper name. First, he 
considers some attributes that can be said univocally of God and the creatures, and then, he 
suggests the biblical Tetragrammaton as the most proper divine name (§ II.3.3.1).
II.3.3.1 Negations
The  paradox  concerning  the  knowledge  of  God  (ignorantia/omne  intelligibile)  is 
reflected in the language (ineffabile/multivocum).335 There are no names that signify God as 
moné because causality is  the only way we have to access to Him. There is  a privileged 
method, however, in approaching His transcendence that resumes the two ways of knowing 
God developed by Grosseteste in Book II of the De mystica theologia. In the mystical union, 
God is praised by removing from Him all attributes, while in natural conditions, when human 
beings are still on earth, He is praised by means of negations and affirmations. Grosseteste 
seems  to  prefer  the  first  way,336 i.e.,  removing divine  names  provides  the  best  means  of 
334 See § II.2.3.
335 See DN II.
336 MT II, 90: “In dicta caligine laudatur Deus per omnium ablationem modo quo predictum est, non autem per 
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expressing His transcendence. In the  De mystica theologia, Dionysius explains that such a 
process involves every divine attribute and starts from the less noble – those whose meaning 
is connected to material things – up to most noble.337
While the claim in the  De mystica theologia is reserved to negations, the  De divinis  
nominibus,  by contrast,  points  out  the  affirmations.  We will  see  that  Grosseteste  tries  to 
balance affirmations and negations in these treatises of the Corpus. It is necessary to make it 
clear, says Grosseteste in De mystica theologia, that every denial is not intended to mean that 
God lacks something, for He possesses everything in a supersubstantial way: the ascension to 
God through negations needs to be understood in the light of the principle that every negation 
presupposes a  super-affirmation in God.338 In the same way,  in the  De divinis  nominibus, 
Dionysius’s accent was put on the affirmation, while Grosseteste notes that every attribute 
affirmed of God must be denied.339 In other words, the  De divinis nominibus is a treatise 
devoted to the affirmative theology, while Grosseteste, in the commentary, emphasizes the 
role of negation in the process of naming God. The De mystica theologia is a treatise on the 
negative theology,  although there Grosseteste  holds  that  every negation  is  based upon an 
affirmation. 
In Book I, Grosseteste underscores the limits of every attempt at naming God: God as 
moné is knowable to Himself but unknowable to us.340 Human beings’ ignorance about what 
God is in Himself is reflected in the theological language, i.e., through silence.341 There is an 
important biblical text concerning the human capacity of naming God, which is recalled by 
Dionysius and commented on by Grosseteste. It is the dialogue between the father of Samson 
and the angel of God that traditionally was interpreted as a figure of God Himself. At the 
request of the man to know the name of his guest (he does not know indeed that he is the  
angel of God), the angel answers that his name was admirable (admirabile).342 Grosseteste 
positiones, quia tunc non esset in ea actualis omnis ignorantia. Extra caliginem vero laudatur per utrasque et 
principalius per ablationes, et familiarius perducit laus eius per abnegationes ad caliginem et ignorantiam que 
est in caligine.”
337 MT IV,  102:  “Hic  autem, querens ipsum  ut  intimum omnium per  abnegationes  omnium ab  ipso,  primo 
amovet ab ipso sensibilia tamquam ab ipso magis distantia, et deinde intelligibilia tamquam ipsi proximiora.”
338 MT V, 106: “Sed ne ex abnegatione omnium a Deo posset quis opinari auctorem intendere dicere Deum 
omnino non esse,  premitti  eum esse  supersubstantialiter  substantiam,  vitam rationem et  intellectum,  qui 
tamen simpliciter et essentialiter nihil est entium vel non entium.”
339 DN I,  § 68, 159: “Modus autem comprehensionis ipsis et laudis per divina nomina est per ablationem et 
remotionem omnium entium ab ipsa […] nec est nomen, vel privativum vel positivum de Deo dictum quod  
non insinuet et laudet ipsum per ablationem.”
340 DN I, § 12, 137: “Itaque nostre susceptibilitatis divinarum illuminationum modificata est nostra de divinis 
cognitio  ipsa  deitate  in  sua  immensurabilitate  manente  incognoscibili,  a  se  ipsa  sola  superessentialiter 
cognita.”
341 DN II, M 189ra: “Et ut in hac quiete et ignorantia et in hoc silentio comprehensa ineffabilis est innominabilis 
et nominatione nulla manifestabilis vel cognoscibilis”. See also DN I, § 30, 144.
342 Judges 13:8.
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raises a question about the meaning of that name ‘admirabile’. It is one of the rare digressions 
of  the  Commentary, and  even  rarer  is  the  fact  that  Grosseteste  quotes  the  interpretations 
advanced by other  commentators.343 A first  interpretation  comes  from those  who propose 
understanding the name ‘admirabile’ as the tetragrammaton (YHWH), the unpronounceable 
name of God. Other interpreters consider ‘admirabile’ itself as the name of God, and refer to 
Isaiah 9:5 as the biblical basis of this conviction. Finally, there are interpreters who hold that 
the expression nomen admirabile means that God is above every name, and therefore, has no 
name.  Grosseteste  thinks  that  the  third  option  is  probably  the  best  interpretation  of 
Dionysius’s  text.344 He  then  concludes  that  naming  God  admirably  means  to  name  the 
nobleness of  Him by removing all  nobleness  from Him (per privationem).345 In this  case 
‘admirabile’ plays  the  same  role  as  the  Anselmian  formula  id  quo  maius  …:  properly 
speaking, it is not a name of God, nor does it express something of Him, but it is a rule of 
thought that prevents us from attributing names to Him because He is above and beyond all 
names.  This  means,  for  example,  that  if  we  were  to  think  of  God  as  life,  the  adverb 
admirabile reminds us that God is not life, properly speaking, because He is beyond life, and 
therefore, He is not life. Specifically, the name ‘admirabile’ indicates the fact that God is not 
the first of a series, but He is beyond the series, for He is that than which nothing greater can 
be  thought,  and  thus,  a  single  name  to  summarize  Anselm’s  circumlocution  is  precisely 
‘admirabile’.  What  Grosseteste  probably means  is  that  Dionysius’s  negative  theology fits 
Anselm’s definition: its purpose is to preserve God’s transcendence.
In this context we have to see Grosseteste’s clarifications about Dionysius’s use of the 
prefix ‘hyper,’ which he renders as ‘super.’ Divine names such as  superbonus,  superdeus, 
supervivus and so on do not state anything of God. The prefix ‘super’ declares, at the same 
time, God’s supereminence and the negation of every attribute from Him.346 In light of this 
343 The only extentant complete Commentary on the De divinis nomnibus written before that of Grosseteste is 
that of Thomas Gallus, but we do not find those comments. Just as Grosseteste knew more translations than 
the ones extant, it is very likely that he knew more Commentaries than the ones extant as well.
344 DN I, § 74, 162: “[Admirabile] quod potest tripliciter intelligi. Intelligunt enim quidam quod nomen in quo 
nominatur  divina  essentia  in  se ipsa est  illud quod dicunt  tetragrammaton,  quod nomen est  ineffabile  a 
creatura, sicut ipsa divina essentia est incomprehensibilis, et ideo est hoc nomen admirabile, immo super 
omnem admirationem.  Alii  dicunt  quod  hoc  ipsum admirabile  est  nomen  Dei,  sicut  dicitur  in  Isaia;  et 
vocabitur admirabilis. Alii autem intelligunt hanc dictionem admirabile positum adiective ad hanc dictionem 
nomen et  intelligunt quod per hanc dictionem nomen cui addicitur admirabile superponuntur talia divina 
nomina:  super  omne  nomen,  innominatum,  supercollocatum omni  nominationi  et  similia,  et  sic  videtur 
intellexisse auctor iste.”
345 DN I, § 74, 162: “[...] vere est admirabilis nominatio que nominat nobilitatem per nobilitatis privationem.”
346 DN II,  M  184vb:  “Huiusmodi  videlicet  nomina  sunt  superexcellentis ablationis id  est  significant 
superexcellentiam  deitatis  super  omnia  que  nominari  per  nomina  quibus  compositive  praeponitur  hoc 
particula «super» et que significant ablationem deitatis ab omnibus ut predicta et ut privative de ea dicta velut 
immortalis, interminabilis, infinitus, et huiusmodi”  Such a claim, which can also be found in similar texts, 
explains why modern modern readers of Dionysius rightly prefer to translate ‘hyper’ as ‘beyond’ instead of  
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principle, we can explain the attitude of the authors of the Bible to name God with antonyms. 
For example, when they call Him ‘foolishness,’ they do not mean that God lacks wisdom, but 
that He is beyond any kind of wisdom that can be found in the created world.347 
This principle guides Grosseteste in his effort to give an order to the long, fuzzy list of 
attributes denied of God, which were introduced by Dionysius in Book IV and V of the De 
mystica theologia. The list starts, according to Grosseteste, when Dionysius states that God 
“is not a body”; he continues that God is not constituted by shape, nor form, nor quality, nor  
quantity and so on.348 Grosseteste believes that it is possible to find a hierarchical order in this 
list,  from the body as such to the body endowed with sensible powers. When Grosseteste 
realizes  that  no  reference  to  a  vegetative  nature  is  present,  he  justifies  this  omission  by 
recalling the philosophical principle that the mention of the extremes of a series implies the 
intermediate.349 Two points of the argument are worth noting. First, according to Grosseteste, 
it is impossible that Dionysius wrote something without an exact meaning or order, but his 
interpretative  efforts  sometimes  reveals  the  weakness  of  this  assumption.350 Grosseteste’s 
attempts  to  systematize  the  confused mix  of  negations  presented  in  those  Books  are  not 
always  successful,  which  confirms  that  those  negations  have  no  coherent  order  as  many 
contemporary interpreters of Dionysius hold.351 Second, on another occasion (besides those 
discussed in § II.3.1) Grosseteste recognizes that Dionysius uses a philosophical argument to 
explain the truth of God.
Passing  through  the  hierarchy  of  beings,  Grosseteste  reaches  the  peak  of  this 
ascensional path where no name is attributed, even the Trinitarian names.352 The De mystica  
theologia takes  an  even  further  step  with  respect  to  the  Theologice  subfigurationes  (the 
‘super.’ See e.g. Jones 2008, 669.
347 DN VII, M 243ra: “Theologis est consuetum abnegare, id est privato sermone dicere,  in Deo, seu de Deo, 
contraria passione ea que privationis, hoc est attribuere Deo significantia privationes. Cuiusmodi attributio 
videtur esse oppositi habitus abnegatio in designationem quod ei conveniunt superexcellenter habitus oppositi 
privationis utpote cum ei attribuitur stultitia que est privatio sapientie.”
348 See MT IV, 106-109.
349 MT IV 106.108: “Videtur autem quod auctor hic omiserit naturam vegetativam, que media est inter corpora 
penitus carentia  vita  et  corpora sensitiva.  Sed potest  dici  quod per  extrema dedit  intelligi  medium, sicut 
pluries faciunt philosophice tractantes.”
350 I developed the assumption at § I.4. Another passage where Grosseteste has difficulties to make sense  of the 
text is MT V. According to Grosseteste, a substantial step towards the mystical union is to deny what belongs 
to sensible and intelligible realities taken in common. Among those things there is “the love of good”. In the  
explanation  of  this  name,  however,  Grosseteste  discusses  names  that  pertain  to  the  intellectual  sphere 
(‘understanding,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth’ and  so  on).  A further  step  is  to  deny  what  pertains  only  to  the 
intelligible nature. It is at this point that Grosseteste finally comes to the attribute good. Grosseteste has some 
difficulties in justifying the double occurrence of the name ‘truth’ in the same Book (cf. MT V, 117.119).
351 For a bibliography on this point, cf. McEvoy 1980b, 150.
352 MT V, 118: “Neque deitas est, videlicet omnium causa, vel bonitas, et similiter intellige de ceteris nominibus 
de tota Trinitate dictis, et similiter discretive dictis de personis, unde sequitur: neque spiritus est, ut nos scire, 
id  est  ut  contigit  nos  scire  et  intelligere  spiritum,  neque  filiatio  neque paternitas.  Ultra  hec  non  restat 
abdicabile ab omnium causa specialiter.”
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Dionysian treatise on the Trinitarian names), and it reaches the highest degree of theological 
knowledge that is possible to be attained by a created mind. This confirms what I said above 
about the Trinity and its knowability for the philosophers: although this mystery cannot be 
grasped without faith and love, it is in a certain way related to the creation and for this reason,  
the non-believers can glimpse it. In the mystical union, by contrast, there is no room for this 
kind of connection, and therefore, the Trinitarian names are removed from God.
In the Commentary on the De coelesti hierarchia, Grosseteste reaffirms the primacy of 
negations, even of the most spiritual attributes of God, i.e., reason, intellect and substance. He 
claims that:
Non minus igitur sed potius forte plus laudant eloquia therchiam ipsa abnegatione rationis et 
intellectus et substantie at similius ab ipsa quam cum rationem et intellectum et substantiam 
nominant ipsam […] negationes itaque, ut pretactum est, proprie et vere possunt de deo dici, 
affirmatio autem nulla secundum propriam predicati  significationem, cum proprie aliquod 
entium citra ipsum significet, de eo vera est.353
Grosseteste’s  point  is  that  every  name  would  signify  something  less  than  Him. 
Grosseteste  holds  that  negations  can  be  properly  and  truly  spoken  of  God,  while  no 
affirmation is true in the same way concerning Him, in the proper meaning of the predicate. 
This  passage  mirrors  the  second commandment  of  the  De decem mandatis:  there,  it  was 
prohibited to think that God is something less then what He is; here the same doctrine is  
applied to language, namely, that it  is prohibited to attribute to God a name that signifies 
something less that He is in Himself. But the question is: according to Grosseteste, does such 
a name exist? 
II.3.3.2 God’s proper name
In the Commentary, there are passages where Grosseteste restates the idea held in his 
previous works, namely, that no name is said univocally of God and the creatures.354 However, 
in the Commentary on the De coelesti hierarchia, Grosseteste affirms that there is a category 
of names that is particularly suitable to God, i.e., the privative names such as the ‘invisible,’ 
‘infinite’ and  ‘incomprehensible.’ Insofar  as  they  simply  deny  something,  they  are  said 
353 CH II, 60.63.
354 E.g., DN V, M 240rb: “Et stans per immutabilitatem, et motus per rerum productionem et gubernationem in 
esse seculari vel temporali, et neque stans neque motus quia nihil dictum de creatura univoce dicitur de ipso 
sed super substantialiter et super omnem intelligentiam.”
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univocally of God and the creatures. For example, the name ‘invisible’ means “something not 
visible,”  and  it  can  be  attributed  both  to  God  and  to  the  creatures.355 Unlike  Dionysius, 
Grosseteste holds that these names do not manifest anything of God, and this explains why 
they are particularly appropriate for God.356 Finally, these names not only remove God from 
what He is not, but also suggest that God is beyond all things. The more noble and superior 
the potency or essence that is denied of Him, the more clearly the super-eminence of his 
potency and essence is manifested by that denial.357 However, the discovery of such names 
does not stop our search for a proper, “real” name of God.
Now, Grosseteste seems to think that there is a name that could play this role. In the 
Commentary on the De divinis nominibus, Grosseteste refers to some commentators who took 
the name ‘admirabile’ to refer to the tetragrammaton (YHWH), the unpronounceable name of 
God. Grosseteste, however, does not believe that they pick up on Dionysius’s view. In the 
Commentary on the De coelesti  hierarchia,  Grosseteste  expresses his  own idea about  the 
Tetragrammaton and seems to attach to it only the privilege of signifying God’s essence: 
Quapropter omne nomen, dictum de aliquo alio essentialiter in eadem significatione de ipsa 
thearchia,  non  dicitur  nec  est  nomen  aliquod  quod  ipsam  divinitatis  essentiam  primo  et 
proximo, pure et  precise significet  ut aiunt quidam, qui de divinis nominibus tractant,  nisi 
nomen quod dicitur tetragrammaton.358 
Grosseteste  explains  that,  because  God  has  nothing  essentially  in  common  with 
anything else, every name spoken of some other being is not used in the same signification of 
God Himself, nor is there any name which primarily and proximately, purely and precisely 
signifies the essence of divinity,  as certain people say who write about the divine names, 
except  the name which is  called the Tetragrammaton.  Despite  the importance of  the idea 
355 CH II,  59-60:  “[...]  tria  autem nomina quibus  exemplificat  manifestationes  dissimile,  invisibilis  scilicet,  
infinitus et incomprehensibile, secundum suam significationem primam et propriam dicunt de deo non quid 
est sed quid non est. Et est vera hec predicatio privativa de Deo; et forte huisumodi nomina privativa aliqua 
univoce dicuntur de ipso et de aliquibus creaturis, ut ‘invisibile’ de ipso et omnibus creaturis que no possunt  
visu sentiri.”  McQuade commits a mistake when translates ‘univoce’ as ‘equivocally’, but it is excusable  
because it is an unicum in the whole chapter (and, very likely, in the whole Commentary). An analysis of the 
divine attribute ‘infinite’ is in Ginther 2004, 106f. William of Auxerre also stated that a negation of a property 
can  be  said  univocally  of  everything  that  does  not  participate  in  that  property,  as  ‘not-white’ is  said  
univocally of everything that does not participate in the whiteness; see  Summa aurea, I,  vi, 2, p.83, l.58: 
“Quinta univocatio est per convenientiam in privatione vel etiam negatione, sicut non album est univocum ad 
omne quod non participat albedinem.”
356 CH II,  60:  “Non sunt  symbolice  dicta  neque manifestationes  que  grece  dicuntur  ekfantorie,  cum tamen 
secundum auctoris exemplificationem oportet ea esse symbolice et ekfantorie dicta.”
357 CH II, 60: “Nomina igitur huiusmodi in eloquis sacris dicta de deo non solum abnegant ab ipso hoc quod ipse 
non est sed et ipsa remotione cuiusque ab ipso quod ipse non est, innuunt de deo quod ipse est super omnem 
potentiam essendi illud quod ab ipso removetur  et  quod sua potentia incomparabiliter  excedit  potentiam 
essendi id quod ab ipso abnegatur et quod sua essentia similiter excedit incomparabiliter omnem essentiam 
ab ipso abdicatam.”
358 CH II, 59.
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stated above, the passage is dense, which also illustrates the limits of Grosseteste’s theological 
method, as criticized by Ginther.359 From this passage, it is not clear if Grosseteste accepts the 
exception of the Tetragrammaton, as a name that signifies God  pure et precise. But if we 
combine  this  passage with  the text  about  the name ‘admirabile’ we can  assume that,  for 
Grosseteste,  the Tetragrammaton is a particular name because it is the only name by which 
God names Himself, but it cannot be uttered (and hence understood) by men, and therefore, it  
is a proper name of God precisely because it is a no-name for men.360 
II.3.4 Conclusion
In  the  Commentary,  Grosseteste  accepts  a  paradox:  God  is  at  the  same  time 
unknowable and knowable, ineffable and many-named. These coupled terms represent two 
ways of defining God, as Grosseteste also points out in the early works: the first attribute 
expresses God’s absolute transcendence, while the second his causal proximity to creatures. 
With respect  to God’s  transcendence,  the main problem to solve,  for  Grosseteste,  is  how 
knowledge of an infinite Being by a finite intellect is possilbe. The problem of knowledge 
concerns two cases: the knowledge of man on the earth and that of blessed in Heaven. The 
first one receives particular attention by Grosseteste and it has been developed in this chapter.  
I suggested dividing  this  topic in two: the knowledge of God based on the Bible and the 
natural knowledge of God like that of the philosophers. The first kind of knowledge implies 
that every being is a similitude of God, but those created images of God are not of the same 
quality;  they  are  like  mirrors,  some  reflect  better  the  image  of  God  and  others  worst. 
Commenting on the De coelesti hierarchia, Grosseteste discusses Dionysius’s theory that God 
shows Himself according to similar or dissimilar symbols and concludes that none of them are 
appropriate to God: He is not properly substance or intelligence, nor is He a rock. In this 
work, Grosseteste gives two reasons for the utility of the dissimilar symbols: they prevent the 
impures from approaching God and the believers from confining their hearts to what is only a 
symbol.
But  the  level  of  mere  images  can  be  transcended  to  reach  a  higher  degree  of 
knowledge. The act of transcending is not properly an operation because the intellect at this 
359 Ginther 2004,109: “Grosseteste’s brevity and sometimes cursory analysis of significant theological concepts 
is disappointing.”
360 Remember that  in Grosseteste’s  time,  people did not  know that  Tetragrammaton came from the biblical 
expression “I am who I am” (Exodus 3:14). Indeed Robert Wilkinson calls the Middle-Ages “the times of 
ignorance about the tetragrammaton.” See Wilkinson 2015, 215. 
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point is only passive, its role only consists in receiving God’s illumination without any image. 
This passivity is marked by the fact that the intellect can receive only what God wants to 
reveal. The faculty that Grosseteste designates for this task is wisdom (sapientia). We argued 
that  the  possibility  of  being  illuminated  is  not  only a  privilege  of  some mystics  and the 
blessed, but it can also be experienced by the ecclesiastical hierarchs.
The philosophical knowledge of God has little room in the Commentary. Grosseteste 
believes that the process of approaching God in a purely rational way has two limits: the first  
is the ignorance of God’s omnipotence against which logical arguments fail; the second is the 
lack of love for God that also curbs the philosopher’s knowledge. It is this second point that 
Grosseteste develops more in detail. Love is more important than conceptual thought in the 
ascent  towards  God;  love  is  oriented  to  God in  Himself,  while  intellectual  knowledge is  
limited to the creatural images of God.
Indeed, there are not names that signify God’s transcendence because the only way to 
access Him is causality. There is a method, however, that is more suitable, namely, to praise 
Him by removing all names from Him. This is why privative names like ‘invisible,’ ‘infinite,’ 
and  ‘incomprehensible’  are  particularly  appropriate  to  God  because  they  simply  deny 
something.  There  is  however  a  name  that  is  supposed  to  signify  God’s  essence,  the 
Tetragrammaton, but after closer analysis we can conclude that it is not a name since it cannot 
be uttered and understood.
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CHAPTER III
Processio: A Theology of Creation
III.1 Introduction
 
In the previous chapter, we have presented two definitions of God given by Grosseteste: the 
first is that “God is the first form of everything” (Deus est prima forma omnium), the second 
is the Anselmian formula. The latter definition expresses God’s transcendence. In this chapter, 
we will analyze the first definition that indicates the proximity of God to creatures by virtue 
of His universal causality. As Richard Southern has stated, this aspect is rather important for 
Grosseteste to the point that we can consider him a theologian of creation.361 While one can 
certainly agree with this judgment, Southern himself does not advance any argument to prove 
it. Perhaps he was induced to make such a claim because in the catalogue of works attributed 
to Grosseteste the works on creation are much more numerous than the works on redemption. 
Or, perhaps Southern considered Grosseteste’s theological masterpiece, the  Hexaëmeron (a 
commentary on the  first  chapters  of  Genesis),  as  an attempt  to  introduce  his  doctrine  of 
creation.  After  all,  commentators  general  refer  to  this  book of  the  Bible  normally as  the 
occasion to say something about creation. If, however, these are the reasons that led Southern 
to that claim, they may be perceived as too superficial. If we search for a more solid ground, 
we can find it in Grosseteste’s conception of Sacred Scripture. Every text of the Scripture has, 
according to Grosseteste, the same authority as God’s Word. But there are some parts that are 
easier to be understood than others.362 Grosseteste seems to refer to those parts that deal with 
the sensible world, such as earth, creatures, and the sea. The sensible world is the starting-
point of any kind of investigation, not only in theology. This explains why the Bible begins 
with the creation and why Grosseteste meditated on it for long time. The topic of creation was 
perfectly suited to his previous studies of liberal arts, thus the book of  Genesis could have 
361
Southern 1986, 219:  “If we may make a broad distinction between two types of theology – a theology in 
which Redemption is the central theme, and a theology centred on Creation – Grosseteste is essentially a 
theologian of Creation.”
362 See  Hexaëmeron I,  i,  2,  51:  “Quapropter  hec scriptura que proponitur  simpliciter  toti  humano generi,  a 
sensibilibus  huius  mundi  secundum  quod  sub  fidem  veniunt  debet  inchoari.  Omnis  namque  doctrine 
primordia hiis quibus proponitur eadem doctrina, debet esse magis capabilia.”
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given him the occasion to apply his interest in natural phenomena to a theological matter. He 
preferred to develop the topic of creation rather than redemption, a topic that Grosseteste 
considered very distant from any human reasoning, as has been seen previously.363 Indeed, his 
treatise on redemption is dated around the forties when he became a bishop and commented 
on Dionysius.364
Grosseteste’s theology of creation would be incomprehensible without an analysis of 
the philosophical doctrines of participation and exemplarism. The definition of God as the 
form of everything is based on the metaphysical principle that every thing participates in God; 
from this it follows that every thing is an image of God and likewise modeled after Him.  
Before the  Commentary,  Grosseteste  uses  the  word ‘procession’ to  signify the Trinitarian 
relationships  or  the  religious  procession.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  idea  of 
procession  as  something  that  flows  from God downwards  cannot  be  found in  the  works 
written during his years as master of theology. 
This chapter is divided in two main parts: the first is devoted to Grosseteste’s theology 
of creation in the works written before the  Commentary (§ III.2.1-3). The second part will 
deal  with  the  idea  of  procession  in  the  Commentary  (§  III.3.1)  and its  consequences  for 
religious language (§ III.3.2).
III.2 Procession in the works before the Commentary
It could be objected that the definition of God as first form of everything is merely a marginal 
issue in Grosseteste’s thought because he only explicitly mentions it in a single letter. It will  
become clear in this chapter, however, that many works of this period deal with this topic. 
Taking into account all the writings that concern this topic, firstly, we discuss the meaning of 
form (forma); secondly, that God is the first (prima) form; and finally, that He is form of 
everything (omnium).
III.2.1 God is form (forma)
The  first  term of  the  definition  that  we  discuss  is  form.  Grosseteste  does  not  provide  a 
363 See § II.3.1.3.
364 See Ex rerum initiarum, 114.
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definition, but he illustrates three examples to describe this term (§ III.2.1.1), and develops 
two of them. The first example presents the form as a container that shapes a liquid. This 
example implies that creatures do not exist through themselves, but they completely rely upon 
God for their existence (§ III.2.1.2). The second example presents the form as a silver seal 
that impresses the wax. This example entails many degrees of similitude between the Creator 
and the creatures (§ III.2.1.3).
III.2.1.1 Three meanings of ‘form’
The study of the etymology of the Greek word for participation (μέθεξις) reveals that  “to 
speak of metaphysical participation is to say that one thing has what it is with and indeed after 
and in pursuit of, another: it has its reality, in other words, by virtue of something other than 
itself.”365 The idea of a dependence of every thing on the eternal exemplar in God’s mind is 
present in particular in Grosseteste’s De prima forma omnium, known also as De unica forma 
omnium, written at the beginning of his theological career. This brief essay, is the first part of  
the first of Grosseteste’s Letters, while the second part is devoted to angels, which is known 
as  De intelligentiis.  Between  1226  and  1231,  Grosseteste’s  pupil  Adam Rufus  asked  his 
master if God can be said to be the form of everything.366 The background of this question is 
probably owed to the recent condemnation of Eriugena; the definition of God as the first form 
of everything is formulated by Eriugena in the Periphyseon, and condemned in 1225 by pope 
Honorious III for alleged pantheism. The name of Eriugena, though, does not appear in the 
answer likely because of the aforementioned condemnation. However, Grosseteste approves 
of  Eriugena’s  thesis  that  God  is  form,  but  qualifies  it  according  to  the  authority  of 
Augustine.367
Grosseteste  analyzes  Eriugena’s  thesis  as  a  combination of  two claims:  (1) God is 
Form; (2) God is the form of everything. At first glace, claim (1) seems unproblematic to 
Grosseteste. He quotes three texts from Augustine’s works that state (1).368 Those texts affirm, 
in a nutshell,  the existence of an eternal and immutable form thanks to which contingent 
things subsist; without this form, everything would collapse into nothing.369 After the long 
365 Schindler 2005, 1.
366 For the date of this letter see McEvoy 1981b.
367 For a general discussion on the influence of Eriugena on Grosseteste, see McEvoy 1987. McEvoy pointed out  
that it is almost impossible to ascertain if Eriugena exerted some influence on Grosseteste, since both rely on  
the same sources, Augustine first, but also the Greek Fathers. See McEvoy 1987, 193-195.
368 The Augustinian texts are De libero arbitrio, II, 16-17; Confessiones XIII, 2; Ibid. XI, 30.
369 Here a relevant passage from the first text: “Si quicquid mutabile aspexeris, vel sensu corporis vel animi 
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quotations from Augustine,  Grosseteste confirms the authority with an argument from the 
nature of the form (ratione formae). A form, Grosseteste says, is that by which a thing is what 
it is (id quod est); for example, humanity is a human being’s form for it is that by which one is 
a human being; similarly, God’s divinity can be thought as that by which something is God, 
but God’s divinity is not different from God Himself, so God is what it is in virtue of Himself;  
as  a  result,  God  can  be  said  to  be  form in  virtue  of  Himself.370 Moreover,  form is  the 
perfection of a thing and God is the most perfect being that does not need anything else to be 
perfect.371
Claim  (2),  by  contrast,  raises  problems  because  it  seems  to  jeopardize  God’s 
transcendence. Grosseteste aims to give an interpretation that avoids any risk of pantheism, as 
he states that God is the form of everything not as a substantial  part of creatures or as a 
complement of matter. This difficulty spurs Grosseteste to clarify,  again, claim (1) and he 
does not find anything better than to explain his view by means of examples. He advances 
three descriptions of form. Firstly, the form can be described as an exemplar distinct from the 
copies that depend on it: for example, form is the idea to which the craftsman looks at when 
he shapes his product. Secondly, form can be intended as a model of life, such as the life of a 
righteous man that is the form of life that everyone should imitate. Third, the form can be 
described as what is impressed on a malleable matter, as the silver seal is impressed on wax.372 
The second example presents  a  kind of form that  has  only moral  relevance,  and without 
ontological content; accordingly, Grosseteste does not develop it. He dwells instead on the 
first and the third example that present two perspectives on form: the first focuses on the 
ontological  reality of  form; the third  concerns  the  relationship  between the  form and the 
matter. 
Before analyzing these two examples, we must consider a philosophical work where 
Grosseteste attempts to define ‘form’, but he admits the limits of this endeavour. In the  De 
statu causarum, Grosseteste deals with the four kinds of causes introduced by Aristotle in 
consideratione capere non poteris, nisi aliqua numerorum forma teneatur, qua detracta in nihilum recidat. […] 
Si enim omnia, quae sunt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt,” (De forma prima omnium, 107).
370 De forma prima omnium, 108: “Ex ratione quoque formae argui potest, Deum formam esse, quia forma est, 
qua res est id quod est, velut humanitas, qua homo est homo, forma hominis est. Deus autem a seipso est id  
quod est. Seipso enim Deus est, quia deitate deus est et deitas deus est. Quapropter cum id, quo res est id  
quod est, forma sit, Deus forma est.”
371 De forma prima omnium,  108: “Item: quid est  forma, nisi  completio rei  sive perfectio? Deus autem est  
completio incompletibilis, perfectio imperfectibilis, et ideo forma non formabilis, quia penitus sine defectu et  
incommutabilis.”
372 De  forma  prima  omnium,  109:  “Dicitur  itaque  forma  exemplar,  ad  quod  respicit  artifex,  ut  ad  eius 
imitationem et similitudinem formet suum artificium; sic pes ligneus, ad quem respicit sutor, ut secundum 
ipsum  formet  soleam,  dicitur  forma  soleae.  Sic  etiam  vita  bonorum,  ad  quam  respicimus,  ut  ad  eius 
similitudinem mores vitae nostrae formemus, dicitur nobis forma vivendi. Dicitur quoque forma, cui materia 
formanda applicatur, et per applicationem ad illud recipit formam ipsius, cui applicatur, imitatoriam.”
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Metaphysics Book II. At the end of the treatise, Grosseteste develops his idea of form a bit 
further. The text commented on is Aristotle’s, but the answer comes from Plato. In particular, 
when Grosseteste comes to comment on the formal cause, he explains that form can be said in 
many ways. He first distinguishes the accidental form from the substantial form, and holds 
that only the latter can be called a formal cause. Grosseteste distinguishes three meanings of 
substantial form. First (a), a substantial form can be an exemplar that, being separated from 
everything, is not that through which something exists (quo est). Second (b), it can be that 
through which something exists and is immanent to the thing. Third (c), it can be an exemplar 
that is also that through which something exists.373 The exemplar in the craftsman’s mind is 
the substantial form of the kind (a). There are several substantial forms of the kind (b), like 
the soul, the material  cause,  and the mover of celestial  bodies.  There is instead only one 
substantial  form of  the  kind (c),  that  is  God,  the  First  Form,  who is  at  the  same time a  
separated exemplar and that through which everything exists. Grosseteste acknowledges that 
it is difficult to explain how the existence of an exemplar such as (c) is possible, thus in De 
statu causarum he does not propose any solution.374 
For this reason, we turn back to the  De prima forma omnium, and in the next two 
paragraphs I will discuss the two examples illustrated in more detail. Moreover we must keep 
in  mind the  warning that  opens  and concludes  this  treatise:  human beings  are  limited  in 
dealing  with  such  matters  because  human  knowledge  and  language  are  not  sufficient  to 
represent God because of His excellence and transcendence.375
III.2.1.2 The form as a conservative principle
Grosseteste illustrates the first example about the form by means of a thought experiment:
Imaginare  itaque  in  mente  artificis  artificii  fiendi  formam,  utpote  in  mente  architectoris  
373 De statu causarum, 124: “Forma vero substantialis absolute dicta adhuc dicitur multipliciter. Dicitur enim 
uno modo exemplar separatum a re et non quo res est; et alio modo quo res est, ita quod sit coniunctum rei et  
non exemplar; tertio modo dicitur simul exemplar et quo res est. Exemplar dicitur solum forma illa, quae est  
in mente artificis, non forma illa, quae est illud, quo res est et non exemplar.”
374 De statu causarum, 125: “Forma vero, quae simul est exemplar et quo res est, non est coniuncta rei, sed 
abstracta, simplex et separata. Haec est forma prima, quae qualiter sit forma prima, difficile est explanare.”
375 De forma prima omnium, 111: “Non tamen hanc similitudinem de modo, quo Deus est forma omnium, sicut  
nec supradicta attuli sicut usquequaque congruam divinae excellentiae quia sicut creatura eius similitudinem 
etiam non potest perfecte exprimere, sic nec mens creata potest aliquid perfecte et ei ex omni parte simile 
fingere.” See also Ibid., 109: “De re enim tanta nihil verum potest esse parvum, licet pro parvitate dicentis 
possit esse non granditer dictum et pro parvitate nostri dicentis non possit esse granditer elocutum.”  The 
source of this conviction is Augustine, according to whom “even when our thought about God corrects our 
speech about God, our thought about God remains unequal to the being that God is”: cf. Teske 2008, 96.
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formam et  similitudinem domus  fabricandae,  ad  quam formam et  exemplar  solummodo 
respicit, ut ad eius imitationem domum faciat; et imaginare cum hoc per impossibile ipsius  
architectoris  volentis  domum  fabricare  voluntatem  ita  potentem,  quod  se  sola  applicet 
materiam formandam in domum formae in mente architectoris, qua applicatione figuraretur in 
domum; et imaginare cum his, quod materia domus esset fluida, nec posset permanere in 
forma recepta in se, si separaretur a forma in mente architectoris.376
We should imagine God as an unusual craftsman, says Grosseteste. God applies the form of 
house – viz., the idea of house that is present in His mind – to the matter of the house by 
means of the power of His will, hence bringing it into existence. Moreover, the matter of the 
house is fluid, without this form it will lose consistency, so that the house would actually 
disappear. This entails that if the craftsman ceases to think of the house that it would fall into 
nothing. Grosseteste explains the meaning of this example: the idea in the craftsman’s mind is 
the Word of God, which is not only the exemplar, but also the efficient and formal cause and 
conservative principle.  This explanation raises more questions than it  pretends to solve; it 
does not explain the relationship between the form in God’s mind and the form of the thing; 
second, the matter that is formed seems to be pre-existent to the form, or it is the first created  
thing; third the distinction (if any)  among the roles of the cause is not clear,  namely,  the 
efficient, formal, and conservative principles.
As has been said, Grosseteste refers to Augustine as an authority about the issue of 
God as form. One of the texts of Augustine quoted by Grosseteste affirms that God is form 
because  He  is  the  truth,  thus  the  form of  a  thing  is  God’s  truth.377 Grosseteste  actually 
considers the problem concerning the comprehension of the meaning of form equivalent to the 
problem facing the notion of truth. He realizes that this kind of comprehension is possible 
only by means of illumination because our reasoning is tied to bodily objects. Knowing what 
form is (or what truth is) does not mean to know this particular form (or truth), but knowing 
the First Form, that does not need any form, that gives form to everything.378
In the De veritate, indeed, Grosseteste presents an example similar to that shown in the 
De unica forma omnium. Grosseteste connects the characterization of God as form with the 
idea  that  God is  also the  truth  of  everything.  In  the same way the  supreme Truth is  the 
376 De forma prima omnium, 109.
377 De forma prima omnium, 108: “Item idem in undecimo de Confessione ad Patrem loquens ait: «Stabo atque 
solidabor in te, in forma mea, veritate tua».”
378 De forma prima omnium, 108-109: “Dicitur homo formosus et anima formosa et domus formosa et mundus 
formosus: formosum hoc, formosum illud. Tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum formosum, si potes. Ita Deum  
videbis non alia forma formosum, sed ipsam formositatem omnis formosi. Cum audis "Deus est forma vel 
formositas,  sicut  et  veritas," noli  quaerere,  quid sit formositas,  sicut nec quid sit veritas.  Statim enim se 
opponent caligines imaginumcorporalium, ut ait Augustinus in libro octavo de Trinitate (VIII,  2, n.3),  et  
nubila  phantasmatum et  perturbabunt  serenitatem,  quae  primo ictu  illuxit  tibi,  cum diceretur  veritas  vel  
formositas. Ecce in ipso primo ictu, quo velut corruscatione perstringeris, cum dicitur veritas vel formositas,  
mane, si potes; si non potes, relaberis in ista solita atque terrena.”
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condition for knowing every other truth, the divine Being is the condition for the existence of 
every other being, which, consequently, depends on It. Grosseteste illustrates this point with 
an example:
Potest autem quaeri, cum idem sit ueritas et esse, quid ueritas est ut dicit Augustinus «id quod 
est»,  an sicut  non uidetur aliqua ueritas,  nisi  in luce supremae ueritatis,  sic non uideatur  
aliquid esse, nisi in ente supremo? Quod uidetur exemplo tali: aqua fluida in se ex se nullam 
habet  determinatam figuram,  sed figuratur semper  figura  continentis.  [...]  Similiter  omnis 
creatura ex se, si sibi relinqueretur, sicut est ex nihilo, sic relaberetur in nihilum.379
Like the water that needs a container to have shape, otherwise it flows away, so too would the 
creatures  without  God  slip  into  nothing.  The  context  of  the  example  is  epistemological: 
Grosseteste aims to demonstrate that it is impossible to know anything without some kind of 
knowledge of the Word of God that supports every thing. The ontological consequence is that 
the Word of God is a support without which any creature that exists from nothing (ex nihilo) 
would go back to nothing. Grosseteste adds that since every creature does not exist  from 
itself, but considered in itself is liable to cease to exist, and therefore, it can be seen to be 
existing in connection with that which sustains it such that it does not collapse into nothing. 
For that reason, it seems that for a creature to exist is nothing else than being supported by the 
eternal  Word.380 I  considered  the  epistemological  side  of  the  problem  in  the  previous 
chapter.381 Here I would like to make some remarks on the ontological aspect of Grosseteste’s 
texts.
His remarks in these texts raise a certain problem, namely, that the notion of God as 
form (and accordingly the doctrine of participation) seems to deprive the finite, temporal, and 
physical world of any reality of its own. However, Grosseteste does not seem to consider this 
a problem at all: the dependence of the creature’s being on the Creator’s being is a necessary 
condition that implies the inconsistency of their existence. Neil Lewis has investigated this 
issue and presented many texts that demonstrate that, according to Grosseteste, in the wake of 
Augustine, the only true being is the First Being.382 In the De decem mandatis, for instance, 
Grosseteste writes that “when he says «I am God», the verb ‘am’ is used substantially and 
signifies that which through itself and substantially and necessarily exists and in comparison 
379 De veritate, 141. 
380 De veritate, 141: “Cum igitur non ex se sit, sed in se solum consideratum, invenitur labile in non-esse: ubi vel 
quomodo videbitur, quod sit, nisi in coaptatione ad illud, quod supportat ipsam ne fluat in non-esse et in 
conspectione, quod hoc supportatur ab illo? Hoc est igitur, ut videtur, alicui creaturae esse, quod ab aeterno  
Verbo supportari.”
381 See § II.3.1.1.
382 Lewis 2009, 26-27.
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with which other things do not exist.”383 ‘To be,’ in the fullest sense of the expression, means 
to be eternally, immutable substantially, necessarily, and per-se; all these features belong to 
one  and only being,  namely,  God.  Lewis  also  quotes  from the  De veritate text,  which  I 
discussed previously. With regard to the water and the container example, he observes that a 
creature’s existence is a purely relational feature of the creature: if we take a creature and 
consider it in itself, as unrelated to any other thing, we will not be able to attribute existence 
to it since its existence is nothing more than its being dependent on what exists in itself, i.e., 
God.384 Grosseteste does not mean that creatures depend on God for their existence in the 
sense that existence is something they receive from God. If it were the case, existence would 
be a property they possess, and so they would have existence in themselves, although God 
would still be their efficient cause. Lewis, instead, rightly points out that, for Grosseteste, in 
the case of creatures existence is a relation, and thus, to have existence means to depend on 
God.385 On this interpretation, it is possible to understand why the example of the water and 
the  container  does  not  render  completely  the  sense  of  Grosseteste’s  thought.  When  the 
container  ceases  to  exist,  the  water  loses  its  shape,  but  it  would  still  be  water  and  not 
“nothing.” In the case of God and the creatures, however, if God were not the form of the 
creature, the creature would result to nothing. On Grosseteste’s account, for example, a human 
being, without the support of God, would not become a corpse, but it would lose matter and 
form and become nothing.
The doctrine of the absolute dependence of the creatures on the First Being is also a 
consequence  of  Grosseteste’s  view  of  spirituality.  Servus  Gieben  has  noted  this  aspect, 
observing that “the profound awareness of being in God’s hand did not so much originate 
from  the  precarious  circumstances  of  medieval  living  as  from  his  strong  philosophical 
conviction that God is form and the form of everything.”386 Both cases are probably true: 
Grosseteste’s metaphysics is at the same time the basis and the consequence of his way of 
perceiving the weakness of the human condition. This means that, on the one hand, the fact 
that God is considered the form of everything reflects in the spiritual life the awareness that  
383 De decem mandatis I.21, p. 17: “Preterea, hoc verbum sum, cum dicit Ego sum Deus, ponitur substancialiter 
et  signat  quod  per  se  et  substancialiter  et  necessario  est,  cuius  comparacione  alia  non  sunt.”  English 
translation in Lewis 2009, 26.
384 Lewis 2009, 27. Lewis also points out that “Grosseteste repeats the claim that of themselves creatures do not 
exist  in  In Phys (I,  p.  8 ed. Dales),  where he writes  of what truly exists as ‘standing’.  Considering the 
Parmenidean doctrine that all things are one, he says that one correct interpretation of this doctrine is «that 
only one thing is truly and substantially an existent; the rest, as they are of themselves, flow rather than exist, 
and stand only by participating in the existence of what stands, and of themselves they would flow, even into  
nothingness».”
385 Lewis 2009, 28.
386 Gieben 2003, 222.
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the  existence  of  human  beings  depends  completely  on  God’s  will;  on  the  other  hand, 
Grosseteste realizes that creatures cannot stand on their own because of the fragility of their 
condition, and for that reason, they need God on which they can rely.387
III.2.1.3 The form and matter
Grosseteste also considers the third example of form through an example of a silver seal. The 
image of the silver seal occurs in three passages. In the first passage, Grosseteste says that the  
silver seal is the form of the wax seal, and that the clay, in which the statue is melted, is the 
form of the statue.388 This first text concerns the relationship with the matter that is formed, 
and it will be analyzed together the third occurrence. The second text, by contrast, comes 
from  the  thought  experiment  described  in  the  previous  paragraph;  as  the  idea  in  the 
craftsman’s mind is necessary to preserve the house made of liquid matter, so the silver seal is 
necessary to preserve the form of the water.389 The example is unusual because one would 
expect that a silver seal were impressed on the wax and not on the water. But here Grosseteste  
uses the image of the silver seal to repeat that the form is the conservative principle of being. 
The third text presents another thought experiment: 
[…] scio prudentiam tuam facile  percepturam,  aeternam Dei sapientiam sic esse formam 
omnium,  velut  si  imaginareris  figuram  sigilli  argentei  esse  vitam  et  intelligentiam 
intelligentem se volentemque figurare ad sui imitationem et similitudinem magis minusve 
expressam ceram fluidam non potentem per se manere in aliqua figuratione recepta, ipsaque 
hac sola voluntate informem et fluidam ceram ad se revocaret sibique applicaret et  ad se 
revocando  sibique  applicando  sua  similitudine  aliquanta  imprimeret  et  in  impressa 
similitudine servaret.390
God  is  the  form of  everything  as  the  form of  a  special  silver  seal,  provided  with  life, 
intelligence and will, and shapes the wax according to a greater or lesser degree of similitude. 
This text states again that God is the conservative cause of everything without which every 
387 It is interesting that one of the first information about Grosseteste’s activity in the diocese of Lincoln dates 
between 1186-1189, when the bishop was the Chartusian Hugh of Avalon, who was canonized in 1220. The 
motto of the Chartusian order is “The Cross is steady while the world is turning” (Stat crux dum volvitur  
orbis). It is suggestive that this motto sums up Grosseteste’s belief that the created universe is unstable and it  
can be said to flow more than exist, while God is the only true being, unchangeable and stable in His form.
388 De forma prima omnium, 109: “Dicitur quoque forma, cui materia formanda applicatur, et per applicationem 
ad illud recipit formam ipsius, cui applicatur, imitatoriam. Sic dicimus de sigillo argenteo, quod ipsum est 
forma sigilli cerei; et de argilla, in qua funditur statua, quod ipsa est forma statuae.”
389 De forma prima omnium, 109: “[…] et imaginare [...] quod materia domus esset fluida, nec posset permanere 
in forma recepta in se,  si separaretur a forma in mente architectoris, sicut  aqua figurata sigillo argenteo  
separato sigillo statim amitteret figuram receptam.”
390 De forma prima omnium, 111.
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created being would lose their form. The focus of this passage, however, is on another aspect, 
which will return in the Commentary that must be highlighted here. According to Grosseteste, 
the  dependence  of  the  creatures  on  the  First  Being  involves  an  ordering,  and  thus,  the 
creatures exist to a greater or lesser degree. We must specify that, for Grosseteste, there are 
two different kinds of being (esse). Firstly, to be means to exist and this belongs to every real 
being; thus, for example, every plant “is” in the very same way. Secondly, for something to be 
means that it fully realizes its own form; thus, for example, an object could be more or less 
plant-like depending on its conformity to the idea of plant in the divine mind.391 Only the 
second kind of being is subject to degrees.
Among the others, there are three texts of Grosseteste that directly concern the degrees 
of existence of the creatures.392 In the first text, from the Commentary on the  Physics, after 
stating the creatures’ ontological dependence on the First Being, Grosseteste concludes “that 
which adheres more closely to it (the Word) exists more and that which <adheres> less closely 
exists less.”393 In the second text, from the De libero arbitrio, recalling Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the many ways in which ‘being’ can be said, Grosseteste holds that accidents exist less than 
substances.394 Finally,  in  the  last  text,  from the  Commentary  on  the  Posterior  Analytics, 
Grosseteste asserts that a universal “will be more an existent <than a particular is> because it  
is more incorruptible than a particular, as it is farther away from the accidents of variable 
matter and nearer to the first existent (enti primo). But not any universal is more an existent 
than any particular, since the universals of natural things are existent less than each of the 
intelligences is.”395 From those passages we may infer that, according to Grosseteste, while 
the creatures are in themselves liable to flow into non-existence, some approach nearer to God 
in the sense that  their  existence is  more stable and so it  is  less liable to come back into 
nothing. For this reason, they can be said to exist more.
The doctrine of the existence of a “more and less” (maius et minus) degree of existence 
was  probably  inherited  by  the  medieval  authors  from  the  Categories of  Aristotle,  via 
Boethius, as Jean-Luc Solère has pointed out.396 Such a doctrine is not unproblematic. While it 
391 De veritate, 135: “Quapropter veritas est defectus privatio, sive essendi plenitudo; tunc enim est vera arbor, 
cum habet plenitudinem esse arboris caretque defectione esse arboris, et haec plenitudo essendi quid est nisi  
conformitas rationi arboris in Verbo aeterno? Rerum autem duplex est esse: primum et secundum; potestque 
res habere plenum esse primum et carere plenitudine esse secundi.” Grosseteste inherits this distinction from 
Augustine, who is quoted some lines before. Grosseteste refers to Augustine, Soliloquia, II, 15, n. 29.
392 These texts are illustrated in Lewis 2009, 31-32
393 InPhy I, 7. English translation in Lewis 2009, 31.
394 De libero arbitrio 16, 218: “Sed non oportet, ut sint univoca, quae comparari possunt in aliquo signato per  
consequens sive secundum prius et posterius, ut comparantur decem praedicamenta respectu eius, quod est 
ens, quia substantia magis est ens, quam quantitas.”
395 InPoAn I, 17, 245. English translation in Lewis 2009, 31.
396 See Solère 2000, 438.  Solère (pp. 462-464) lists  three positions about the increment or decrement of a 
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is easy to understand that a quantitative form can increase or decrease, since the quantity is  
divisible, and hence some parts of it can be added or subtracted, it is much more difficult to 
understand that a quality or a substantial form can increase or decrease. Grosseteste does not 
merely  say  that  there  are  several  degrees  of  goodness  among  the  creatures,  as  stated  in 
Anselm’s Monologion, for example, but he radically applies the gradation to being itself. An 
important application of this theory is Grosseteste’s cosmology. Both in the De luce and De 
operationibus solis he abolishes the difference between a higher part of the universe made of 
ether  and  the  sublunary  world  made  of  the  four  elements.397 He  replaces  the  difference 
between two types of matter with the distinction in degree of density and perfection of one 
and the same matter, i.e., light. The whole universe is made of light, the first corporeal form; 
the difference among the spheres is due only to the higher density of light in the lower part. 
This  doctrine  might  have  been  influenced  by  Dionysius.  Grosseteste,  indeed,  seems  to 
subscribe to Dionysius’s doctrine that the proximity of a being to the First Cause makes it not 
only  more  good,  but  also  more  existent.398 The  Commentary will  give  Grosseteste  the 
occasion to develop this issue.399
III.2.2 God is first (prima) form
In the De prima forma omnium, Grosseteste devotes a few words to explain that God’s form is 
the “first.” According to Grosseteste, if God is form, it is necessarily the first form because 
nothing is prior to God.400 God cannot receive a form because nothing precedes God. This 
concise account explains that being “first” form entails the presence of other forms. In other 
words, God is the only principle of creation, but are there other principles? This question 
arises  from  a  tension between  the  account  given  in  the  Commentary  on the  Posterior  
Analytics and one given in the  Hexaëmeron. In the first work, Grosseteste claims that there 
substantial  form during the Middle Ages,  but  Grosseteste  does not develop explicitly any of these three 
positions.
397 See De luce, 80-81.
398 Solère  (2000,  444  n.  29)  refers  to  following  passage  from  the  De  divinis  nominibus IV:  “Et  non  est 
universaliter malum neque bonum neque faciens bonum, sed quod magis aut minus bonum appropinquat, 
proportionaliter  erit  bonum.  […]  Et  haec  quidem  omnino  bono  participant,  illa  autem  magis  et  minus 
privantur, alia autem obscuriorem habent boni particpationem, et aliis secundum ultimam resonantiam adest 
bonum” (Dionysiaca, 246f; 248).
399 See below § III.3.1.4.
400 De forma prima omnium, 107: “Et cum sit forma, necessario est forma prima, quia ante ipsum nihil. Ipse  
enim est primus et novissimus”.
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are mediators in the work of creation (the Platonic Ideas), while in the second one he denies 
this possibility. Scholars have proposed different solutions to this ambiguity. I think that their 
attempts do not do justice to Grosseteste’s position, mostly because they limit themselves to 
these two works, which does not consider the other writings composed in the same years 
between ca. 1225 and 1235 (from the Commentaries on Aristotle until the Hexaëmeron). If we 
only take into account all the writings that concern the status of the ideas in God’s mind we 
may realize that there was an evolution in Grosseteste’s thought. Indeed the theme of the 
existence of an archetypal world in God’s mind recurs in many works of Grosseteste.
Grosseteste probably inherits doubts and positions about the nature of the archetypal 
world  from  the  twelfth  century  position.  They  are  clearly  expressed,  among  others,  by 
William of Auxerre who states: 
There are some who say that the archetypal world is identical with God; others say that the  
archetypal world and the sensible world are the same essentially, but differ by reason [...]; 
others say the the archetypal world is neither God nor the sensible world, but those ideas 
were eternally in the divine mind, which are neither God nor the sensible world, and this was 
the opinion of Plato.  Hence,  they say that  the  collection of those ideas is  the archetypal 
world.401
My interpretation is that Grosseteste passes from a “Platonic” explanation of the Ideas 
to the view according to which the archetypal world is identical with God because of some 
insurmountable  difficulties:  the  Ideas  jeopardize  God’s  simplicity  (because  they  place  a 
multiplicity in Himself),  and also God’s omnipotence (because they imply that God is not 
might enough to create alone).
III.2.2.1 A Platonic View
A text  particularly  referred  to  by  commentators  is  in  Grosseteste’s  Commentary  on  the 
Posterior Analytics. As it is well-known, Aristotle holds that universals do not exist separately 
from the individuals that instantiate them. Grosseteste does not follow Aristotle on this point. 
He is puzzled by Aristotle’s claim that every demonstration is based on what is incorruptible 
and wonders how universals are incorruptible when the individuals that instantiate them are 
corruptible. Grosseteste begins his detailed discussion of the different kinds of universals with 
401 Summa Aurea II, 1.2 (p.14, 9f). English translation in Coolman 2004, 93, n.10.
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the  claim that  universals  are  principles  of  cognizing  (principia  cognoscendi)  non-created 
reasons  that  are  eternally  in  the  First  Cause.402 Commentators  have  linked this  aspect  of 
Grosseteste’s thought to his theory of divine illumination.403 Grosseteste also claims that some 
of these universals are also principles of  being  (principia essendi), but this aspect has been 
neglected almost entirely in the literature. 
In detail, Grosseteste describes the first kind of universals as follows:
Et he sunt  quas vocavit  Plato ydeas et  mundum archetypum,  et  he sunt  secundum ipsum 
genera et species et  principia tam essendi  quam cognoscendi,  quia, cum intellectus purus 
potest in his defigere intuitum, in istis verissime et manifestissime cognoscit res creatas, et 
non solum res creatas, sed ipsam lucem primam in qua cognoscit cetera. Et planum est quod 
ista universalia omnino sunt incorruptibilia.404
For Grosseteste, universals are the Platonic Ideas that form the archetypal world, and they are 
principle of cognizing since when the pure intellect is able to fix its sight on them, it knows 
created things  and the first  light  itself  in  which it  cognizes  other  things.  Moreover  these 
universals  are  principles of being and are completely incorruptible.  This passage,  and the 
whole treatise, focuses on the cognitive role played by the universals, but it is important to  
note that, according to Grosseteste, some of the incorruptible principles are also principles of 
being and these that are identified with the Platonic Ideas. Grosseteste clarified the expression 
principia essendi some lines before when he stated the divine ideas to be the formal causes 
and the principles of creation (creatrices).
The second kinds of universals are the Intelligences that reflect the true light of God. 
As Christina Van Dike has noted, Grosseteste’s description of the nature of this irradiating 
intelligence  is  frustratingly  vague,  however,  for  he  may  refer  both  to  the  Neoplatonic 
description of the angels as intelligences and to Avicenna’s view of the agent intellect as a 
separate intelligence responsible for human knowledge.405 Whatever the case may be, we may 
leave  aside  here  the  cognitive  implications  of  Grosseteste’s  theory of  universals.  For  our 
argument,  it  suffices  to  note  that  the  cognitions  in  the  mind  of  the  intelligences  are 
paradigmatic  forms  and  causal  reasons  of  created  things;  indeed,  corporeal  species  are 
brought into being by the power of the first cause, i.e., through the mediating role (ministerio) 
402 InPoAn, I, cap. 7, 139: “Hic autem oritur questio quomodo universalia sunt incorruptibilia, cum singularia 
sint corruptibilia, et non existentibus primis inpossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere […]. Ad hoc dicendum 
quod universalia […] sunt principia cognoscendi rationes rerum increate ab eterno existentes in causa prima.”
403 For the argument of this chapter (how God proceeds towards the creatures) we have not considered the 
exemplars as principles of knowledge but only as principles of being.
404 InPoAn, I, cap. 7, 139f.
405 Van Dike 2010, 158.
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of the intelligences.406 It is worth noting that Grosseteste explicitly says that the first two kinds 
of principles have a creative power, which are considered the helper of the First Cause in the 
act of creation. It will be this position – likely influenced by the Platonic text, Timaeus, and 
Eriugena – that Grosseteste revises and then rejects some years later.
There  are  three  other  kinds  of  principles  of  cognition,  but  they  are  not  called 
universals. The third principles are as incorruptible as the first two, which are those contained 
in the celestial spheres. The fourth types of principles are the formal causes of the composite 
substances  (such as  “humanity”),  while  the  last  kind  of  principles  are  only principles  of 
cognizing  that  are  identified  with  the  accidents,  but  not  principles  of  being.  Grosseteste 
concludes  that  the last  two kinds of principles cannot  be considered incorruptible.407 This 
conception of universals is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of the degrees of existence 
illustrated above: universals have different degrees of existence, some of them exist more than 
others insofar as they are closer to the First Being. This makes every universal more than a 
mere fiction (figmentum), but rather something that is one in many (aliquid unum in multis).408 
This text quoted previously, as well as the other passages referred in this paragraph, allows 
Grosseteste to speak as a realist in the medieval debate on universals.409
III.2.2.2 The crisis
In the De libero arbitrio, there are two points that call into question the account given in the 
Commentary  on  the Posterior  Analytics.  The  first  point  (1)  is  that  Grosseteste  marks  a 
difficulty with the Platonic view, namely, the plurality of ideas in God’s mind. The second 
point (2) is that God is defined as the only creator and any kind of help in creation is explicitly 
denied.
(1) The first problem arises because it is hard to maintain the realism of the ideas in 
406 InPoAn, I, cap. 7, 139: “Item in luce creata, que est intelligentia, est cognitio et descriptio rerum creatarum 
sequentium ipsam;  et  intellectus  humanus,  qui  non  est  ad  purum defecatus  ita  ut  possit  lucem primam 
inmediate  intueri,  multotiens  recipit  irradiationem  a  luce  creata,  que  est  intelligentia,  et  in  ipsis 
descriptionibus que sunt  <in> intelligentia  cognoscit  res  posteriores,  quarum forme exemplares  sunt  ille 
descriptiones. Cognitiones enim rerum subsequentium, que cognitiones sunt in ipsa mente intelligentie, sunt  
forme exemplares et etiam rationes causales create rerum posterius fiendarum. Mediante enim ministerio 
intelligentiarum virtute  cause  prime  processerunt  in  esse  species  corporales.  He  igitur  ydee  create  sunt 
principia cognoscendi apud intellectum ab eis irradiatum et apud talem intellectum sunt genera et species; et  
manifestum est quod hec universalia sunt iterum incorruptibilia.”
407 InPoAn, I, cap. 7, 140-141.
408 See above § III.2.1.3, n.35. InPoAn, I, cap. 17, 245.
409 See de Libera 1996, 241-244. Unfortunately de Libera dwells on the forth kind of principles and gives little  
considerations to the first three kinds.
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God’s mind – as Grosseteste holds also in this treatise – and the simplicity of God. The fact 
that the ideas – like that of man, fish, plant – are eternally in God’s mind implies that they are 
immutable, immortal, stable, and incorruptible, just like the Ideas of Plato. Grosseteste traces 
this idea back to Augustine and Boethius, and remotely to Plato. He resorts to the example of  
the idea of humanity to express the thought that the idea of man is truer than the man we can  
experience on earth.410 Since truth and being are convertible, the exemplars are also more 
existent than the particulars, as has been shown.411 
At this point,  Grosseteste faces the problem of reconciling the plurality of ideas in 
God’s mind with the God’s simplicity.  This problem is a version of what Neil  Lewis has 
called “Christian dualism,” namely, “the idea that God the Creator and creatures comprise an 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive classification of the contents of reality.”412 In other words, 
whatever exists may be God or a creature, but this does not leave any room for a third realm 
of  beings.  As  Lewis  points  out,  Christian  dualism  could  be  rejected  only  proving  that 
something besides God exists without beginning. The question is if the ideas in the divine 
mind represent this third realm since they are eternal beings that are themselves not creatures, 
but rather creative.
Grosseteste holds that two problems seem to challenge the Christian dualist position: 
the kinds of propositions and relations that are eternal and without beginning, but that are not 
identical with God. Grosseteste illustrates many examples including the following:
Quod verum est, veritate verum est, et veritate quae est et quae aliquid est.  Sed quod pure 
nihil est, veritate quae est non potest informari. Ergo si informatur veritate, non pure nihil est.  
Sed ante creaturam omnem verum fuit  nullam creaturam esse. Ergo nullam creaturam esse, 
cum informabatur veritate, non fuit pure nihil; nec fuit creatura, quia nondum fuit creatura;  
nec fuit  Deus,  non enim fuit  haec vera:  ‘Deus est  nullam creaturam esse.’ Fuit  igitur,  ut 
videtur, quod nec fuit Creator nec creatura.413
410 De Libero Arbitrio II, cap. 5, 167 – 168: “Item dicit Boetius [...] Item Seneca: «Plato ideas vocat, ex quibus 
omnia, quaecumque videmus, fiunt et ad quas cuncta formantur. Hae immortales, immutabiles, invariabiles 
sunt. Quid sit idea audi! Idea eorum, quae natura fiunt, est exemplar aeternum. Talia exemplaria infinita habet 
rerum natura,  hominum,  piscium,  arborum,  ad  quae,  quodcumque  fieri  ab  illa  debet,  exprimitur.» Haec 
exemplaria rerum omnium Deus intra se habet numerosque universorum, quae agenda sunt et modos mente 
complexus est. Plenius his figuris est, quas Plato ideas vocat immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles. Itaque 
homines  quidem  pereunt,  ipsa  autem  humanitas,  ad  quam  homo  effingitur,  permanet  et  hominibus 
laborantibus et intereuntibus illa nihil patitur.”
411 See above § III.2.1.3.
412 Lewis 1998, 17.
413 De libero arbitrio II,  cap. 8, 191.18–25. Lewis (1998, 18-19) noted that this argument is also present in  
William of Auvergne’s De universo 1.3.25.
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The premise is  that  what  is  true also exists  because being and truth are  convertible.  The 
proposition “that no creature exists” was true before the existence of any creature, thus it is 
informed by truth, which means that it is not purely nothing. It cannot be identified with a 
creature because it was true before all creatures existed, but it likewise cannot correspond to 
God because the proposition “God is that not creature exists” is false. In conclusion, there is 
something that exists that is neither God nor a creature. Grosseteste illustrates other examples 
of propositions that are eternally true (and thus eternally existent, according to the premise), 
such as “Peter is going to exist,” or “seven and three are ten.”414 Grosseteste’s solution is to 
hold that in such statements as “this truth or enuntiabile is eternal,” the expression “this truth” 
or “this  enuntiabile”  is  a  designation  of  some  non-eternal  item  taken  under  an  eternal 
relation.415 
One may wonder what such an item is, a question which Grosseteste does not address. 
Lewis considers that the proposition as such is  not  eternal,  but the state  of affairs  that  it 
implies could be. In this case, Lewis notes that “this enuntiable is eternal” may be expanded 
to “this state of affairs as stated by the eternal Word is eternal.”416 On Lewis’s interpretation, 
the example stated above must be understood as follows: the expression “this truth” refers to a 
state of affairs adequate to the eternal Word. This interpretation, however, does not explain 
Grosseteste’s solution, but just pushes the question further. One could ask, indeed, what is this 
“state of affairs” or what does it imply that a thing is “stated by the eternal Word”? A possible 
explanation is that those expressions refer to reasons in God’s mind. But Grosseteste clearly 
wishes to avoid a conception of such  enuntiabilia according to which they are the eternal 
reasons of things in the divine mind – as Lewis himself admits.417 Grosseteste probably denies 
this interpretation – the identification of such statements with the reasons (rationes) – because 
it is impossible to think a reason of something not real such as “that not creature exists.” It 
would imply that privatations do exist in God, such as blindness or evil, but this compromises 
the theodicy.
Another possible interpretation of Grosseteste’s solution – “this truth” is a designation 
of some non-eternal item taken under an eternal relation – is to consider that he reduces the 
case of propositions to that of relation. Therefore, the question is what makes something non-
414 See De libero arbitrio II, cap. 8, 189.20–25 and De veritate, 140.
415 De libero arbitrio II, cap. 8, 191.24–28: “Similiter igitur, cum dicitur ‘Hoc verum aeternum aut enuntiabile 
aeternum est,’ suscipitur praedicatio haec propter formam correlativam dictioni in Verbo aeterno, propter 
quam tamen correlationem nihil exigitur extra Deum esse.”
416 Lewis 1998, 32.
417 Lewis 1998, 31 n. 33. See  De libero arbitrio II,  cap. 8, 191.29–31: “Hoc itaque modo respondebitur ad 
supradictas oppositiones, aut cogemur fateri enuntiabilia nihil aliud esse quam rationes aeternas rerum in 
mente divina.”
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eternal, such as the truths stated in the Word eternal (for example, “seven and three are ten”). 
Grosseteste explains the case of the relation of “knowing.” For example, if we define the term 
“A” to mean “Socrates known by God,” we may truly say “A is eternal”; and if we define the  
term “B” to mean “Plato known by God,” we may truly say “B is eternal,” and that A and B 
are not the same. Grosseeteste concludes that God knows Socrates (or Plato) from eternity, 
and that Socrates (or Plato) is known by God from eternity does not multiply the essences 
because it is necessary only to hold that God exists eternally but not Socrates (or Plato).418 
According to Lewis, it is Socrates  as known by God that is eternal, not Socrates as such.419 
This explanation, however, falls into the same problem concerning the statements: what is 
Socrates as known by God? If it is not a reason, what is it? Grosseteste’s solution makes sense 
if one considers that only the divine act of knowing is eternal and not the objects of God’s 
knowledge. This act supports the existence of Socrates eternally, even though Socrates is not 
eternal. This solution allows us to solve two problems: first, that there are not eternal beings 
other than God, and second, that there is not a plurality of beings in God. 
Grosseteste concludes that the plurality of relations or true propositions does not imply 
any plurality of eternal beings. He endorses his conclusion with an example: the following 
three sentences “three persons are eternal,” “notions are eternal,” and the “reasons (rationes) 
of things in God’s mind are innumerable and eternal” do not imply any plurality in God’s 
essence.420 This means that no divine Person or notion is something different (alia) from the 
divine essence. The case of reasons appears more complicated to Grosseteste since he says 
that “accordingly, perhaps (forte), no reason is different (alia).”421 The case of the reasons, in 
fact, is different because, unlike the Trinitarian relations or notions, reasons cannot be reduced 
to relations since they are exemplars and are provided with existence. As we have seen, they 
are actually more existent then the created things. Thus, the analogy between the plurality of 
418 See De libero arbitrio II, cap. 8, 191.12–24: “Praeter positionem ante factam, exemplum bonum est ad hoc, 
scilicet quod Deus scit omnia ab aeterno. Quapropter, si scit A, cuius definitio sit ‘Socrates scitus a Deo,’ et  
B, cuius definitio sit ‘Plato scitus a Deo,’ per se loquendo verum erit quod A aternaliter est et B aeternaliter 
est, et A non est B nec e contrario, et neutrum horum est Deus. Et tamen solus Deus aeternaliter est, quia cum 
dicitur  ‘A non  est  B  et  B  non  est  A et  neutrum  horum  est  Deus,’ redditur  praedicatio  pro  subiectis  
corruptibilibus. Cum vero dicitur ‘A vel B aeternaliter sunt,’ redditur praedicatio per se gratia formae a qua 
haec nomina imponuntur, quae scilicet aeterna dicitur propter scientiam Dei aeternam. Nec exigit veritas talis 
sermonis alicuius extra Deum existentiam aut coaeternitatem.” Lewis 1998, 33-37.
419 Lewis 1998, 29.
420 The divine notions, notiones, are those features by which the Persons are described and discriminated, like 
paternity attributed to the Father, filiation to Son, and spiration to the Spirit.
421 De libero arbitrio II, cap. 8, 195-196: “Et ideo haec pluralitas nullo modo infert essentiarum aeternaliter 
existentium  pluralitatem,  ut  cum  dicitur:  «tres  personae  aeternae  sunt»,  vel  «notiones  aeternae  sunt»,  
«rationes rerum in mente divina innumerabiles et aeternae sunt.» In qua tamen pluralitate non ponitur nisi  
simplex et indivisa essentia, et tamen nulla persona est alia, nulla notio est alia, nulla forte similiter ratio est  
alia, et tamen haec omnia non sunt nisi una essentia.” 
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the divine Persons and notions and that of reasons is inappropriate. If the reasons in God’s 
mind can be equated to Plato’s Ideas – and in De libero arbitrio and the Commentary on the  
Posterior Analytics this seems to be the case – then we may say that they jeopardize Christian 
dualism more than enuntiabilia and relations do. If the Ideas are thought simply as relations, 
as happens, for example, when the idea of “humanity” is described as “humanity as known in 
the Wisdom,” then they are not essences at all. But this is not possible, for, as has been seen 
above, they are more existent than the created beings. The only way to solve the paradox is to 
deny that  there  exists  a  world  of  ideas  in  the  Platonic  sense,  which  is  the  position  that 
Grosseteste adopts in his later works.
(2) The second point that represents a change in the De libero arbitrio is that the first 
principle is unique. In this work, the concept of immediate cause helps Grosseteste to state 
that God did not need any help in His work of creation. Grosseteste does not provide a proof, 
but he simply states that nothing is closer to beings than the immediate cause of their essence. 
This cause is the divine Wisdom, for in it the act of creating and the act of knowing are one 
and the same.422 This reasoning implies that beings pre-exist (as exemplars) in the Word of 
God, where they are known and created from eternity, as will become clear in the following 
section.
III.2.2.3 The absence of Plato
In the  De prima forma omnium, Grosseteste reconsiders the problem of the reasons in the 
divine mind, but there is no reference to Plato when Grosseteste discusses the divine models 
of the created reality. The only authority quoted is Augustine. In this short letter, Grosseteste 
presents a new account of the nature of exemplars. The novelty consists in the identification 
of the exemplars with God, and more precisely with the second Person of the Trinity, the 
Word, which is at the same time the exemplar, efficient, formal, and conservative cause.423 
Grosseteste provides a theological example taken from Augustine to justify that the exemplars 
are more true, good, and existent than the created beings. Augustine says that  “because the 
Wisdom of God, by way of which all things have been made, contains everything according 
422 De libero arbitrio II, 201: “Item: ut dictum est, immediatissima causa omnis conditae essentiae est Verbum 
Dei aeternum. Nihil enim potest esse tam proximum alicui essentiae conditae secundum aliquam actionem, nec 
tam propinque et intime illud attingere secundum suam actionem, quam propinque et intime aeterna sapientia 
secundum  suum  scire  attingit  omnem  essentiam,  quod  idem  ipsum  scire  est  eiusdem  essentiae  efficere 
immediatius.  Ergo cum aliquo agente et  efficiente efficit  aeterna sapientia omnem conditam essentiam. Sed 
agens immediatissimum sibi omnino sufficiens nulloque penitus egens quomodo habebit coadiutorem?”
423 De unica forma omnium, 110.
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to a design before it is made, therefore those things which are made through this design are 
not immediately life,  but whatever has been made is  life in Him.”424 This means that the 
exemplars have a superior degree of existence due to the Wisdom of God who is the only true  
being, and not because they subsist by themselves as the Platonic Ideas.
III.2.2.4 Against Plato
Grosseteste proposes an answer to the doubt concerning the plurality of reasons as essences – 
expressed by the adverb “forte” in  De libero arbitrio  –  in  the question  Tribus  modis res  
subsistere habent and, then, in his theological masterpiece, the  Hexaëmeron. The first work 
probably belongs to his early scholastic activity at Oxford and could be a part of the greater 
project of a Summa theologiae.425 In that work, Grosseteste illustrates three modes in which a 
thing can subsist: (i) actually and in itself; (ii) in an intellect; (iii) in the divine mind. Created 
things do not subsist in themselves because they are transitory; they can subsist in the human 
intellect, but they are mutable, while in the angelic intellect they subsist in a sempiternal way;  
in the divine mind, by contrast, they subsist without any mutability.426 After a brief discussion, 
Grosseteste concludes that things exist in God as universals.427 At the same time, Grosseteste 
warns that since things subsist in so many ways, and that different properties can be attributed 
to them according to their different subsistence, a certain confusion could arise. One must 
examine the issue closely, with lynx eyes, to see that we do not inadvertently confuse this 
different being with its properties. Less than careful distinction of these has been the root of 
manifold  errors,  such  as  that  of  the  Platonic  ideas,  since  people  attribute  to  things  in 
themselves what they should attribute to things as they exist in the divine mind.428 This short 
question shows that, for Grosseteste, every created thing, if not supported by the divine Word, 
424 Augustine, Tractatus in Johannem I, 17: “Sic ergo, fratres carissimi, quia Sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt 
omnia,  secundum artem continet omnia,  antequam fabricet  omnia; hinc quae fiunt per ipsam artem, non 
continuo  vita  sunt,  sed  quidquid  factum  est,  vita  in  illo  est.”  English  translation  available  at: 
<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1701001.htm>.
425 Lewry 1983, 2; 13.
426 Tribus modis res subsistere habent, 19, 3-9: “Tribus modis res subsistere habent: in actu sive in se ipis, in  
intellectu, in mente divina. In se ipsis sine subsistencia transeunt; in intellectu hominis subsistunt quidem, set  
tamen inmutabiles non sunt; in intellectu angelico et si subsistere ceperint, in eo tamen subsistunt sine termini 
prefinicione; in mente vero divina subsistunt sine omni mutabilitate incepcionis aut desicionis, cum divina 
saapiencia terminum utrumque sit certissimum religari.”
427 Tribus modis res subsistere habent, 20, 38.
428 Tribus  modis  res  subsistere  habent,  20,  56  –  21,  62:  “Cum ergo  res  totis  modis  habeant  subsistere,  et 
secundum esse diversum diversa conveniat rebus assignari, linceis oculis contemplandum est reor ne ista esse 
diversa cum suis proprietatibus inperspecte confundamus. Horum enim minus diligenter perspecta distinctio 
multiplicis erroris apud veteres radix existit et origo. Hinc enim ille platonice ydee sumpserunt exordium: 
rebus enim secundum quod in se ipsis sunt tribuebat quod eis convenit secundum quod sunt in mente divina.”
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has an ontological weakness. This work may also be considered the first explicit rejection of 
Plato’s doctrine of Ideas. Grosseteste’s conclusion closes the door to the realism of ideas: a 
reason such as “humanity” cannot be a principle of being in itself.
In the  Hexaëmeron, Grosseteste’s theological thought reaches its maturity. There he 
once again returns to the Platonic view on the exemplars. Commenting on the first words of 
Genesis, “In principium,” Grosseteste stresses two features of the process of creation: (1) first, 
God is the only Creator, and accordingly, He does not need any help; (2) second, the world 
was made at the beginning of time, which goes against the theory of the eternity of the world. 
With regard to the first issue, he targets two specific groups in his criticism, namely, the pagan 
philosophers (1.a) and the heretics (1.b).
(1.a) Grosseteste recalls the history of the philosophical error that consists in posing 
more than one principle (principia), which runs up against the Bible that states that there is 
only one beginning (principium). On the authority of Ambrose and Augustine,  Grosseteste 
describes and condemns the theories of Plato and Aristotle, Thales of Miletus, Anaximander, 
Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, and Archelaus.429 
The  specific  object  of  Grosseteste’s  criticism is  the  position  of  Plato.  Grosseteste 
reaffirms  the  idea  that  the  archetypal  world  is  the  begotten  Wisdom  of  the  Father.430 
Grosseteste explicitly rejects the conception of Ideas as exemplars distinct from God, as that 
to which God looks when He creates the world. He quotes Ambrose, who criticized Plato for 
having supposed three origins of things, namely, God, the exemplar, and matter. Grosseteste 
recognizes that some texts of Plato could induce one to think that the Ideas are only the 
concepts  of  things  in  the  divine  mind,  but  at  the  end  he  confesses  that  Plato  has  been 
inconsistent  on  this  matter.431 After  a  brief  illustration  of  the  position  of  the  other 
philosophers,  Grosseteste  concludes  that  “all  of  these,  then,  claimed that  there  was some 
origin, other than God, which had no beginning. And since God is an origin of this kind, they 
claimed, by consequence, that there are many origins – even those who apparently claim that 
there is only one.”432 The position of the philosophers is highly problematic for Grosseteste 
429 See Hexaëmeron I, ix, 1-3, 62-64. Grosseteste’s sources are Ambrose, Hexaëmeron I, 1,1 (CSEL, XXXII.1,3) 
and Augustine, De civitate dei, VII.2. 
430 Hexaëmeron I, iii, 3, 52: “Mundus namque archetipus, id est sapiencia Patris genita.”
431 See Hexaëmeron I, ix, 2, 63: “Plato quoque erravit in idee posicione ex ea parte qua asseruit ydeam exemplar  
extra  Deum,  ad  quod intendens  Deus  fecit  mundum.  […]  Aliqui  hominum presumptorum tria  principia 
constituerunt omnium, deum et exemplar et materia, sicut Plato discipulique eius. […]  Plato alicubi videatur  
sensisse non aliud esse ideam quam raciones rerum in mente divina. Puto autem quod Plato in hac posicione 
videatur sibi ipsi sensisse contraria.” Grosseteste quotes Ambrose, Hexaëmeron, I, 1,1 (CSEL, XXXII.1,3).
432 Hexaëmeron, I, ix,3, 62: “Hii igitur omnes aliquid aliud quam Deum posuerunt principium non iniciatum, et  
ita,  cum Deus sit  tale  principium, posuerunt per  consequens principia plura,  eciam illi  qui  non videntur 
ponere nisi principium unum.”
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because it regards God as one principle among others, and not the unique principle of reality, 
which undermines one’s faith in the omnipotence of God.  Grosseteste instead holds that no 
other principle than God can be given because He is the first mover and the efficient cause of 
every thing, and thus, all meanings of the word ‘principium’ (beginning in time, in the order 
of numbers, in mass and size, in change, and so on) are gathered together in the first sentence 
of the Bible “in the ‘principium’ God made heaven and earth.”433
Grosseteste again tackles the topic of the archetypal world when he investigates the 
biblical  words,  “heaven and earth” (Genesis 1:1).  After  the explanation of  the literal  and 
allegorical  meaning,  Grosseteste  notes  that  the  anagogical  sense  of  this  expression  could 
consist  in  a  reference  to  the  archetypal  world  as  Basil  does  in  the  first  homily  on  the 
Hexaëmeron.434 In that homily, Basil expresses the belief in the existence of a world before 
this  world,  a  world  that  our  intellect  can  contemplate.435 At  the  end  of  the  quotation, 
Grosseteste confesses that he has no idea how he is to interpret this exegesis of Basil, an 
exegesis that moves from created things to the uncreated ideas in the mind of God.436 The 
silence of Grosseteste facing Basil’s belief in the archetypal world, associated with explicit 
criticism of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas, considered as something different from the Creator, and 
together  with the previous  affirmation that  the world of  Ideas  is  reduced to  the Wisdom, 
shows that Grosseteste has realized that it is impossible to endorse the Platonic doctrine and 
state, at the same time, the identity of the Ideas with the second Person of the Trinity. In the 
Hexaëmeron, Grosseteste does not hold that the Ideas exist through themselves, but they are 
concepts of things in the divine mind, which do not exist apart from God’s existence.
(1.b) There is another doctrine that poses more than one principle of creation, namely, 
the Manichean heresy, a doctrine that originated, according to Basil, from a misunderstanding 
of the biblical verse, “darkness was upon the face of the deep” (Genesis 1:2). According to 
Manicheans, the “darkness” mentioned in the Bible is not shadowy air, but an evil power, 
rather  evil  itself,  which  has  its  own origin  and is  opposed to  the  goodness  of  God.  The 
Manicheans  say  that  darkness  is  coeternal  with  God,  and  not  created,  since  there  is  no 
mention of its creation in the Bible. Since darkness does not come from God, it exists of its  
433 Hexaëmeron I, x,1, 64-65: “Nomen autem principii multiplicem habet intellectum. Dicitur enim principium 
in successione temporis et principium in ordine nemerali, et principium in mole et magnitudine, principium 
quoque in mocione. […] Simpliciter autem principium omnium dicitur divina virtus ut primum movens et  
efficiens omnia. Omnes autem hii dicti intellectus principii coacervantur in hoc nomine ‘principium’, cum 
dicitur: In principio fecit Deus celum et terram.”
434 See Hexaëmeron I, xii,4, 64-65.
435 Grosseteste refers to Basil, Hexaëmeron, I, 5, 1-3.
436 Hexaëmeron I,  xii,4,  65:  “Huius igitur  anagogiam, que ex rebus creatis sursum ducit  in  raciones earum 
increatas  eternas  in  mente  divina,  interpretari  omitto  quia  interpretari  nescio.  Circa  alias  namque 
interpretaciones puer sum et non nisi balbuciendo loqui scio; quanto magis circa istam omnino loqui nescio.”
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own, it has no beginning, and thus, it is a principium. Insofar as it is a principle, it must be 
coeternal with God. As a consequence, the Manicheans hold that there is a kind of darkness to 
which bodies and souls belong. Grosseteste objects that their arguments would follow only if 
darkness were something real, but since darkness is merely the privation of light, and not a 
positive essence, their position must be rejected.437 Specifically, Grosseteste dismisses their 
arguments by resorting to Augustine’s authority.438 
The condemnation of the heresy ends the first part of the Hexaëmeron. In the second 
part,  Grosseteste  continues  the  investigation  on  the  uniqueness  of  the  creative  principle. 
Grosseteste proposes  to  prove  that  God’s  perfection  would  be  diminished  not  only  if  a 
material principle, or even an evil principle, was posed alongside Him (as the philosophers 
and the Manicheans respectively held), but also if any other kinds of helper were supposed. 
The further position that  Grosseteste discusses is that of the philosophers who believe that 
God  first  created  the  angel,  and  then  the  created  angel  formed  the  bodies  through  the 
intellectual word that was in it. These philosophers think that God is the ultimate creator of 
the world, but they admit that God created through the angel.439 The editor does not identify 
the reference of this criticism, but one may suppose that Grosseteste was thinking of Avicenna 
who considered the tenth Intelligence, identified with the place of intelligible forms, and the 
Quranic angel Gabriel, responsible of the emanation of the sublunary world.440 Grosseteste 
rejects this position because “God, solely by the Word which is co-eternal with Him, and 
without the service of any creature, made the works of the six days at the beginning of the 
world.”441 According to Grosseteste, the role of the angels is to serve in the government and 
propagation of the created world, a service that manifests the greatness of God’s power and 
the generosity of His goodness.
(2) The second point that needs to be discussed is a consequence of the doctrine of 
participation and is  a tricky matter  for Grosseteste:  it  is  the creation in  time. Grosseteste 
writes  extensively  on  this  topic,  which  has  led  several  commentators  to  pay  particular 
attention to it.442 For our purposes in this chapter, only one problem is important and may be 
stated in Grosseteste’s own words: “Since, then, this Word is eternal, why is that which is 
437 Hexaëmeron I, xxiii, 1-2, 82-83.
438 Hexaëmeron I, xxiv, 1-2 83-84.
439 Hexaëmeron II, i,1, 85.
440 See Corbin 1993, 172. See Avicenna, Book of Healing, IX, 3, 3-4; IX 4, 4; IX, 5,1. 
441 Hexaëmeron II, i,1, 84.
442 See Dales1986, 547: “[…] within a few years after 1230 he composed two separate though similar treatises 
warning against the errors of Aristotle and his followers and asserting the finitude of time and the world. One  
of these was incorporated into his Hexaëmeron, and the other, Definitate motus et temporis, which circulated 
separately in two redactions, was also incorporated into his commentary on the Physics.” 
122
made by this Word not co-eternal with him?”443 In the Word, the second Person of the Trinity, 
the forms of all the things are contained, and therefore, the creation should be eternal with the 
Word in which it is formally contained. Grosseteste’s efforts are directed to demonstrate that  
the world is not co-eternal with God. He never answers, however, this question in an explicit  
way,  so  it  remains  undecided why the  creation  happened in  a  particular  time.  But  if  we 
consider Grosseteste’s argument closer, it  appears clear that our doubt can be allayed. His 
argument is indeed common in the Patristic tradition and  be summarized as follows: “the 
pagans, whose gaze was bound up in transitory things, could only think of eternity by an 
analogy with temporal things – that is, one space after another or one time before another to 
infinity  –  whereas  the  true  situation  is  that  the  eternal  is  simple,  enjoying  the  full  and 
complete possession of limitless life all at once.”444 Grosseteste acknowledges the limit of 
human  reason,  which  cannot  transcend  the  data  of  the  senses,  and  thus,  cannot  imagine 
eternity.
This argument, combined with the existence of exemplars in the Word, serves to solve 
some problems generated by the doctrine of the creation in time, in particular the “why not 
sooner”  and the  “idleness” arguments.445 The  first  argument  states  that  if  the  world were 
created in time, we could not explain why it was created exactly in that time and not sooner. 
Here  Grosseteste  echoes  Augustine:  the  argument  makes  no  sense,  because  time  was 
“created” together with creation, there was not a “before” prior to the actual creation.446 The 
“idleness” argument asserts that God before creation was idle. Against this argument, which 
was very popular among the philosophers from Plato to Averroes, Grosseteste follows a long 
tradition that culminates with Augustine and affirms that out of time, aeternaliter, God begot 
the World of Ideas, the intelligible world. 
In conclusion, we can reconsider the secondary literature on the topic of the ideas in 
Grosseteste. McEvoy and other interpreters noted the tension between the account given in 
the  Commentary on the  Posterior Analytics and the one given in the  Hexaëmeron.447 In the 
former work, Grosseteste accepts the existence of Platonic ideas that have a creative power; 
while  in  the  latter,  he  explicitly  denies  this  possibility.  Scholars  have  taken  interest  in 
443 Hexaëmeron II, iii, 2, 86.
444 Dales 1986, 554.
445 The terminology and the argument themselves are drawn from Sorabji 1983, 232-252.
446 Hexaëmeron I, viii, 6, 62: “ Deus autem eternus causa est mundi temporalis et temporis, nec precedit ista  
tempore sed simplici eternitate.” For Augustine as Grosseteste’s source, see Augustine, Confessiones, XI, 13; 
De genesi contra Manicheos I,2,3; De civitate Dei XI, 5-6.
447 Cf. McEvoy 1982, 64-65.
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understanding  Grosseteste’s  position  regarding  the  possible  pantheistic  implication  of 
emanation. McEvoy, for example, denies that Grosseteste ever admitted co-operators in God’s 
act  of  creation of the world,  and assumes that  the two accounts  can be reconciled if  we 
consider their context. According to McEvoy, Grosseteste was not interested in the creation in 
itself in the Aristotelian Commentary, but in the process of illumination of the created minds, 
and for this reason, he privileged the consideration of ideas as principles of knowledge. In the 
divine mind, the ideas are also principles of being, but this identification does not hold in the 
case of angels. McEvoy suggests interpreting the passage on the Platonic Ideas contained in 
the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics in light of Augustine’s doctrine of illumination.448 
This  interpretation shows that  McEvoy focuses on illumination,  but  does  not  consider  its 
metaphysical presupposition. Although McEvoy’s interpretation is correct as to what concerns 
the angelic mediation in the doctrine of the illumination, it  does not solve the role of the 
Platonic  Ideas  in  Grosseteste’s  account  for  two  reasons.  First,  McEvoy  suggests  that 
Augustine is not mentioned in the  Commentary on the Posterior Analytics because it is a 
philosophical. McEvoy’s hypothesis does not stand because Grossetestes quotes Augustine, 
together with Plato, in a passage on the Ideas in his Commentary on the Physics.449 Second, 
Grosseteste explicitly holds that the Ideas, not the intelligences, are creative and mediating 
between God and the world. The only way to make sense of the tensions and contradictions 
among Grosseteste’s works is to acknowledge an evolution in his thought, even if it occurred 
in  a  short  span  of  time.  The  act  of  creation  is  not  a  spontaneous  overflowing  from an 
indeterminate source, it is not a sort of emanation, but it is a creatio ex nihilo whereby only 
one absolute principle – God by His Word – could have accomplished this task. Any other 
hypothesis, for Grosseteste, undermines this first and fundamental Christian truth. 
III.2.3 Form of everything (omnium)
Grosseteste  perceives  clearly  that  the  definition  of  God  as  form  of  everything  can  be 
interpreted as a form of pantheism. His answer is clear:  God is not the sort of form that 
completes matter and transforms it into a composed thing; He is not part of a thing, but He is 
its support.450 As we have seen, Grosseteste explains the relationship between God (the form) 
448 Cf. McEvoy 1982, 67.
449 In Libros Physicorum, III, 54, 61.
450 De unica forma omnium, 109: “Ut autem aliquo modo clarescat, quomodo ipse sit forma creaturarum non 
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and the creatures (the formed) by means of examples. Grosseteste does not usually discuss the 
relationship between the reason in God’s mind and the form imprinted in the matter in detail. 
He rather prefers to tackle another consequence of the definition of God as the first form of 
everything, namely, that God is present in every thing. Grosseteste’s concern, therefore, is to 
explain the ubiquity of the First  Principle in everything,  a  topic that  indeed arises  in the 
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, but is more fully developed in his theological works 
(§  III.2.3.1).  The  ubiquity  of  God entails  that  He  present  –  essentially,  presentially,  and 
potentially  –  in  everything,  but  also  that  He  imprinted  His  form  in  everything.  More 
specifically, it means that there is a trace of the Trinity in every single being, even in a fleck of 
dust (§ III.2.3.2).
III.2.3.1 Ubiquity of the first form
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Grosseteste presents four kinds of universals, 
as we have seen previously. The first three kinds of universals have some common features: 
they are incorruptible, eternal, and are also present everywhere (ubique). In this part of the 
Commentary, Grosseteste is fully aware of the opposition between Aristotle and Plato. He 
nevertheless proves that both recognize the ubiquity of universals. If universals are considered 
in  the  way Aristotle  understands them, namely,  as  forms abstracted  from the  extramental 
particulars, then universals can be said to be everywhere in the sense that they are where the 
particulars are or in the sense that they are in the intellects that cognize them.451 Even if 
universals  are  considered  in  the  Platonic  way,  namely,  as  ideas  in  God’s  mind,  the 
characteristic  of  ubiquity  can  be  preserved.  In  this  case,  universals  can  be  said  to  be 
everywhere in the sense that God, as the first cause of everything, is everywhere. Finally, 
universals can be considered as the powers (virtutes) of the celestial bodies and even in this 
case they are everywhere since the powers are everywhere.452 
enim sic est  earum forma velut  pars  earum substantialis  completiva,  ex qua et  materia  fit  aliquid unum 
significationes huius nominis ‘forma’ aliquatenus sunt explicandae.”
451 InPoAn, I, cap. 18, 266-267: “Quomodo universale semper sit satis expositum est supra, ubi fiebat sermo de 
perpetuitate  universalium.  Si  autem  intelligimus  universalia  per  modum  Aristotelis  formas  repertas  in  
quidditate particularium, a quibus sunt res particulares id quod sunt, tunc universale esse ubique nichil aliud 
est  quam universale esse in quolibet  suorum singularium. Ubique enim esse est  esse in quolibet  suorum 
locorum, loca autem universalium sunt ipsa singularia in quibus sunt universalia, nisi forte dicamus quod 
universale ubique est quia intellectus est locus universalium, et universale ubique esse est ipsum in intellectu 
esse, qui intellectus quodammodo ubique est, quia intellectus per modum spiritualem ibi est ubi est illud quod 
intelligitur, sicut amans ibi est ubi est illud quod amatur.”
452 Ibidem: “Si autem universalia sunt ydee in mente divina, tunc universalia ubique sunt per modum quo causa  
prima ubique est. Si vero universalia sunt rationes rerum causales create, que sunt virtutes site in corporibus  
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Grosseteste, however, acknowledges that he cannot explain how the First Cause or the 
celestial powers are everywhere or how what is intellected is where the intellect is.453 To find 
this claim in a philosophical work is a bit unexpected, but, as mentioned above, Grosseteste 
proposes to explain the ubiquitous presence of the First Cause in the later theological works. 
Such a claim means that, for Grosseteste, human reason is not sufficient to understand and 
explain a reality that is acquired through faith, as Grosseteste maintains that two two domains 
are separated.
At  the  beginning  of  his  theological  career,  Grosseteste  writes  a  long  letter  to  his 
disciple,  Adam of  Marsh.  The  first  part  of  this  letter  is  also  known as  De prima forma 
omnium. The second part is dedicated to the place of the angels. Those two writings circulated 
separately, but their themes are more connected than previously thought. The examples from 
the  De prima forma omnium (and the  De veritate) that we discussed above emphasize that 
God is not of the same genre of all the other beings; He is portrayed as the container rather 
than as the contained water.454 In the second part of the letter, this topic is further developed. 
The question that Adam raised is about the place of the angels, but Grosseteste places the 
question  within  the  broader  issue  of  the  place  of  spiritual  substances.  The  scheme  of 
Grosseteste’s  answer  to  this  question  is  similar  to  the  previous  one:  first,  he  states  his  
doctrine;  second,  he  endorses  his  statement  with  the  authority  of  Augustine;  third,  he 
recognizes that what he says is far from the truth, because God exceeds every representation 
of Him. Grosseteste notes that only God is entirely in every place at the same time.455 He then 
quotes  Augustine’s  De  Trinitate where  the  bishop  of  Hippo  affirms  that  God,  in His 
wholeness, is everywhere yet without place;456 finally, he concludes that Augustine’s words 
only help us to understand how God is everywhere up to a certain point, but this truth is 
actually beyond human reason.457 Grosseteste dwells in particular on a comparison between 
celestibus, tunc etiam ipse ubique sunt, quia virtutes corporum celestium ubique reperiuntur.”
453 Ibidem:  “Quomodo autem causa prima ubique sit et quomodo virtutes corporum celestium ubique sint et 
quomodo intellectus sit  ibi  ubi est  illud quod intelligitur et  amans ubi est  illud quod amatur,  altioris est 
negotii  et  non  est  nostre  possibilitatis  explanare.  Verumtamen  quod  ita  sit  scimus,  modum  autem 
comprehendere non sufficimus.”
454 The image of the container also plays a central role in his biblical commentaries. In the Commentary on the 
Psalm, for example, Grosseteste explains that being the essential cause of a thing does not imply being an 
essential part of it; God “gives form to his creature by recalling and adhering it to Himself, as a vessel shapes  
the water that, without the vessel’s support would not maintain its proper figure and form.” Commentarius in  
Psalmos, in Bologna, Biblioteca dell’Archiginnasio, MS A.983, fol 43ra. English translation is in Gieben 
2003, 223.
455 De intelligentiis, 112: “In primis respondeo, quod solus Deus totus ubique simul est.”
456 Augustine, De Trinitate, V, 1, n.2. He quotes also Epistle 187.
457 De intelligentiis,  114:  “Ex  his  verbis  Augustini,  ut  supra  dixi,  aliquatenus  iuvatur  noster  intellectus  ad  
comprehendendum, licet velut de longe in nubilo, quomodo Deus ubique est, quia plene comprehendere, 
quomodo ipse ubique est, supra viventis hominis capacitatem est.”
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God’s presence in the universe and the soul’s presence in the body, a comparison set forth by 
Ambrose  and  Augustine.  This  comparison  is  very  tricky  and  the  risk  of  a  pantheistic 
interpretation is high. A reader of Grosseteste’s time could be induced to think that God is the 
soul  of the world (anima mundi),  as William of Conches affirmed in his  first  writings.458 
Grosseteste does not share this interpretation because he clearly argues for God’s absolute 
transcendence, as we saw in the previous chapter. Grosseteste does not feel the need to specify 
his authorities, but after quoting from their texts he concludes that as the soul is essentially in 
every part of the body, God is essentially (essentialiter) in every part of the universe that He 
rules.459 Those  words  do  not  fully  clarify  the  implication  of  the  comparison.  However, 
Grosseteste’s conclusion – in particular, the reference to the essential presence of God and His 
rule – will be developed in another work, the Summa theologiae. 
In the fourth question of the Summa theologiae, Grosseteste aims to demonstrate that 
the Creator is present everywhere (ubique).460 Grosseteste provides an original interpretation 
of Peter Lombard’s answer that God is everywhere with His power, presence and essence 
(potentialiter,  presentialiter,  essentialiter).  First,  Grosseteste  focuses  on  the  adverb 
“essentially,” which he explains by way of the following syllogism: “Nothing can lack its 
essential cause; but God is the essential cause of every thing; then God is everywhere.”461 The 
hidden premise of this argument is that every second cause participates in the first cause, 
which is, accordingly, implied and present in every caused. Grosseteste illustrates this point 
with an example: when the light of the sun passes through a colored window and shines on the 
opposite wall, both the first cause (i.e., the light of the sun) and the second cause (i.e., the  
colored window) are present in the colored wall.462 Second, Grosseteste explains the adverb 
“potentially.” God is potentially present everywhere because His power is exercised on every 
thing, but not as a human king, Grosseteste observes, who, despite his power reaches every 
corner of the reign,  he is  not actually present everywhere.  In virtue of this way of being 
present, Grosseteste employs the third adverb to argue that God is said to be “presentially” 
458 Gregory 1955, 125.
459 De intelligentiis, 114: “Ecce ex his verbis aperte habes, quod anima tota essentialiter ubique est in corpore,  
quod vivificat, sicut Deus ubique totus essentialiter est in universo, quod regit.”
460 As mentioned above (§ I Introduction), the authenticity of the Summa is disputed. Daniel Callus, the editor of 
the Summa, gives many arguments in favour of the authenticity. McEvoy (2000, 111) and Southern (1986, 
29-31), for example, consider them unconvincing, while Goering (1995, 25 n.26) defends the authorship of 
Grosseteste. There is not room here to take a stance in this debate. For my argument it suffices to note that  
the content of the Summa is very close to that of other works of Grosseteste, so that there is no evidence that 
the author of the Summa would depart from Grosseteste’s doctrines.
461 Summa IV 205, ll.  3-5:  “Nulli rei  dum est  potest deesse sua causa essentialis; sed essentialissima causa 
uniuscuiusque Deus; ergo Deus est ubique.”
462 Summa IV, 205, ll. 5-10: “Assumptum patet, quia nulla est rei causa nisi participatione cause prime; unde et  
ipsa causa prima immediatissima est omnium causarum ad unumquodque causatum, sicut lux pertransiens  
vitrum coloratum colorat parietem obiectum, et immediatus splendet in pariete quam color vitri.”
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everywhere.463 Grosseteste  had implicitly clarified this  adverb some lines  before when he 
quoted a sentence attributed to Augustine: “God is not enclosed in the world, nor excluded 
from the world, nor elevated over the world, nor weighed down in the world.”464 Grosseteste 
quotes this text to support the idea that the presence of God must not be intended as the  
relation between a place and the object in that place because He is not an object among the 
others, but is a sort of “container” of the objects. To be outside the world, for God, does not 
mean  that  He  is  in  a  real  place,  but  simply that  He infinitely exceeds  every creature.465 
Grosseteste concludes that if God were said to be only “potentially” and “presentially” near to 
the creatures, this could induce one to think that He is only the efficient cause of reality; but  
since He is also their formal cause, the adverb “essentially” is needed.466 For Grosseteste, it is 
not  enough  to  say  that  God  is  present  everywhere,  but  he  also  affirms  that  He  forms 
everything because where God is, He acts. 
 
III.2.3.2 Trinitarian exemplarism
The  doctrine  of  God  as  form of  everything  does  not  only  imply  that  He  is  essentially, 
presentially,  and  potentially  present  in  everything,  but  also  that  He  imprinted  the  forms 
contained in His ideas in everything, and therefore, “every kind of creature is an example [...] 
of something true in the divine ideas.”467 The metaphysical dependence on the first Being,  or, 
better yet, on God’s ideas, gives the basis for the doctrine of exemplarism.468 This idea was 
463 Summa IV 206, ll. 26-31: “Potentialiter, quia illa virtus, ut dictum est, ad omnia se extendit; sed quia posset 
de eo credi, sicut de rege mortali, licet eius virtus sit in regno toto, non tamen ipse in propria presentia ubique 
est, quia non est ipse idem quod sua virtus, ideo additur quod non solum potentialiter sed etiam presentialiter 
est Deus ubique.” The editor notes that the source of this example is William of Auxerre, Summa aurea I, 16.
464 Summa IV, 206, ll. 15-16: “Deus est in mundo non inclusus, extra mundum nec exclusus, supra mundum non 
elevatus, infra mundum non depressus.”  As the editor points out, this statement is  a conflation of many 
authorities and sometimes was attributed to Gregory the Great.  The statement, as quoted by Grosseteste,  
occurs in the Summa aurea by William of Auxerre, who is also the source of the just mentioned example of 
the king’s power (cf. Callus 1958, 194).
465 Summa IV 206 ll. 13-14; 17-22: “Sed notandum quod cum comparatur Deus ad hoc nullo modo comparatur 
locatum ad locum […]. Si est ibi aliqua proprietas et comparatio loci ad locatum, eo enim indigent omnia 
sicut proprio locante, ipse autem nullo indiget. Unde cum dicitur esse ‘extra mundum’, non dicitur hoc quia  
ibi  sit  creatura  vel  locus  qui  ibi  divine  presentie  subsistat,  sed  quia  in  se  est  qui  in  infinitum omnem  
creaturam excedit.”
466 This doctrine also recurs in another treatise, the De statu causarum. There Grosseteste proves that in God the 
efficient and the formal causes must be substantially one and the same. See De statu causarum, 122.
467 Sermo 19, in  Gieben  1964,  144.  In  Grosseteste,  the  relationship  about  the  exemplar  and  the  example 
generates a lot of metaphors and most of them present the creatures as words or letters that announce the  
mystery (or ideas) of God. See e.g. De operationibus solis; Dictum 19. For texts and translations, see Gieben 
1964, 145.
468 This  was  a  very  common  doctrine  among  medieval  thinkers,  inherited  from  Plato  via  Augustine,  as 
Grosseteste himself acknowledges: “Plato vero et Augustinus, qui consideraverunt quod in mente divina est 
sapiencia infinita et raciones rerum eterne infinite, posuerunt numerum infinitum abstractum a sensibilibus et  
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developed in particular by the Franciscans, and Grosseteste, the first theology master of the 
Franciscan School in Oxford, was strongly influenced by it.469 
The doctrine of exemplarism is not a novel argument for a Christian thinker. The world 
of Ideas is the Platonic legacy to medieval thought via Augustine in particular. What makes 
the exemplarism a Christian doctrine is its Trinitarian application. The created world is not 
simply the image of an abstract First Principle, but it has the imprints of the Trinity. In the 
wake of Augustine’s  De Trinitate,  Grosseteste recognizes that the creatures must reveal the 
Trinitarian  nature  of  their  Creator  in  some  way.  Grosseteste develops  this  topic  in  the 
Hexaëmeron and in the Dictum 60. 
In the Hexaëmeron, Grosseteste mentions many classical examples of the imprints of 
Trinity in the created world. The first illustration is the triad “matter, form and the composite 
of them;” the second is “size, shape and order;” the third is “number, weight and measure,” 
but the closest illustration of the Trinity is the Augustinian triad “memory, understanding and 
love.” Among bodily things, the clearest illustration of the Trinity is fire or light because it  
begets its splendour from itself and fire and splendour reflect mutual warmth on each other.470 
Although Grosseteste calls these “examples” images of the Trinity in the world, he actually 
considers them real arguments to demonstrate the Trinity. However, in the  Hexaëmeron, he 
does not develop this argument any further.471
Servus Gieben has shown that in the  Dictum  60, Grosseteste elaborates one of the 
proofs that Grosseteste was thinking about in the Hexaëmeron.472 The argument is a thought 
experiment. Let us suppose, Grosseteste says, that there are only two creatures: a rational one 
and a corporeal one. As an example of the latter, let us choose one as insignificant as possible: 
a particle of dust (atomus).  However minimal the particle of dust’s being is, its existence 
presupposes a  creator  of infinite power since the act of passing from nothing to being is 
infinite, and consequently, requires an infinite efficient power. Now, since the particle of dust 
is a body, it must be three-dimensional. But in every three-dimensional body it is possible to 
describe a sphere, and in that sphere, infinite circles, and in every circle, infinite figures. And 
since a demonstrative science of each one of these infinite figures can be given, an infinite 
science concerns that particle of dust. Yet, this science would remain possible only if there 
ipsum esse principium omnium et exemplar” (In Libros Physicorum, III, 0, 61).
469 For the history of this doctrine and its influence on Grosseteste, the study of Gieben (1964) is fundamental.
470 See Hexaëmeron VIII, iv, 3-12, 222-224.
471 See Hexaëmeron VIII, iv, 2, 222: “Exempla igitur summe Trinitatis que solent afferri sunt talia; et non solum 
sunt exempla, sed evidenter summe Trinitati collata sunt argumenta ipsam Trinitatem efficaciter probancia. 
Non  tamen  propter  vitandam  prolixitatem  afferimus  illa  nunc  sicut  argumenta  sed  sicut  exempla 
imaginacionem iuvantia.”
472 Gieben 1964, 149.
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were not an infinite wisdom. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the particle of dust has 
been created by an infinite power through an infinite wisdom. This conclusion is certainly a 
great acquisition of the rational being considered in this example. Thus, by creating the dust,  
the Creator made a very useful thing for that mind. Furthermore, since the mind itself is not 
responsible for this good, the creator must be a good Creator. In this way, starting from a 
particle  of  dust,  Grosseteste  argued  for  the  infinite  power,  infinite  wisdom,  and  infinite 
goodness  of  the Creator.473 This argument  proves that  even the tiniest  creature shows the 
imprints of the Trinity.
What we said in this part allows us to specify McEvoy’s claim that Grosseteste is not 
interested  in  the  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God.474 This  claim is  essentially  true 
because Grosseteste’s problem is not An Deus sit, but An Trinitas sit. The above argument, and 
the other examples, do not say anything about the nature of the Trinity, and Grosseteste never 
thinks to reach such an understanding because all  the possible analogies, he knows, have 
some point of dissimilarity.475 The aim of his arguments become clear in the Corpus where he 
concludes  that,  thanks  to  those  examples,  it  is  possible  to  comprehend  the  Trinity,  not 
however as It is in Itself, but as cause and principle of all the triads in the created world.476 
Because God is not only the efficient cause of the world, but also its final cause, the triadic 
“footprints” in the creatures will become more evident in the process of deification, which 
describes the process of the assimilation of creation to the “form” of the Creator.
III.2.4 Conclusion
The definition of God as first form of everything is not marginal in Grosseteste’s thought, 
despite the fact that it appears to be an hapax in his writings. If we consider the writings of the 
first period of Grosseteste’s life, before the episcopacy, we realize that many of them concern 
this topic. We have analyzed each element of the definition of God: “form,” “first,” and “of 
everything.” 
According  to  Grosseteste,  God  is  “form”  in  the  sense  that  He  is  the eternal  and 
immutable  support  thanks  to  which  contingent  things  subsist;  without  this  “container,” 
everything would collapse into nothing. The consequence is the complete dependence of the 
473 For a more detailed discussion of the example, see Gieben 1964, 149-150. 
474 See § II.3.1.1.
475 See Hexaëmeron VIII, iv, 12, 224.
476 See DN I, § 45, 151.
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creature’s being on the Creator’s being as a necessary condition that implies the inconsistency 
of their existence. To be a “form,” for God, means also to leave His imprint on creation, as the 
silver seal shapes the wax. However there is an order among the creatures due to their degree 
of receptivity. While all the creatures are in themselves liable to flow into non-existence, some 
approach nearer to God in the sense that their existence is more stable, and thus, they are less 
liable to come back into nothing. 
That  God is  “first”  form means essentially that  He cannot  receive a  form because 
nothing precedes God, that He is the only principle of creation, and He does not need any help 
in this work. This is against what Grosseteste held in a previous work, the Commentary on the 
Posterior  Analytics.  In  this  Commentary,  he  holds  the  existence  of  the  Platonic  Ideas 
considered not only as the principle of cognizing, but also as principles of being, namely, that 
they are the formal causes and principles of creation. My interpretation is that Grosseteste 
passes  from  a  “Platonic”  explanation  of  the  Ideas  to  the  view  according  to  which  the 
archetypal world is identical with God because of some insurmountable difficulties associated 
with the former: the Ideas jeopardize God’s simplicity and God’s omnipotence. 
Finally we see that Grosseteste perceives clearly that the definition of God as form of 
“everything” can be interpreted as a form of pantheism. His answer is that God is not the sort 
of form that completes matter and transforms it into a composed thing, but He is its support.  
The ubiquity of God entails that He is essentially, presentially, and potentially in everything, 
but also that He imprinted His form in everything. More specifically, it means that there is a  
trace of the Trinity in every single being.
Grosseteste will reconsider three of his topics in the second period of his life, which 
takes place during his episcopacy: the uniqueness of God as creator, the function of the divine 
reasons, and the many degrees of a creature’s receptivity of the divine form.
III.3 Procession in the Corpus
God as form of everything is the second perspective of Grosseteste’s doctrine of God after the 
consideration of His transcendence. Grosseteste revises the results of the early works during 
his years as bishop when the influence of the Corpus becomes more important. We could use 
the image of God as a vessel to connect the two phases of Grosseteste’s production.477 In the 
first part of this dissertation, I often said that without the vessel’s support, water would not 
477 Servus Gieben found that Grosseteste used the image of vessel in the Commentary on the Psalms (see n. 94),  
and again in the Commentary on the De divinis nominibus; see Gieben 2003, 223-224.
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maintain its shape (cf. § III.2.1.2A).  This metaphor shows that without the support of their 
First Cause the creatures flow into nothing. Grosseteste uses this image in the Commentary on 
the De divinis nominibus where the accent is put on the participation of all existent things to 
the Being and Good in themselves. 
The  themes  of  the  first  section  of  this  chapter  again  recur  in  Grosseteste’s 
Commentary. Many aspects will be reaffirmed, while some other, in particular the doctrine of 
eternal  reasons,  will  display a  further  evolution.  The  focus  of  the  second section  of  this 
chapter is Grosseteste’s account of God’s universal causality and the possibility that human 
beings have to name Him in force of this causality. Grosseteste’s concern is to prove that 
creation is not the result of an evil Maker, but that God created with purpose and in time 
(III.3.1.1). In the  Commentary, Grosseteste again speculates as to whether God is the only 
creator,  or if  the eternal reasons have a creative role (III.3.1.2).  Grosseteste identifies the 
reasons with the Word, but he does not deny the existence of exemplars that have their own 
consistency, and this permits him to explain the difference among the creatures, although God 
is  simple  (III.3.1.3).  Since  God  is  the  cause  of  every  creature,  He  has  many  names. 
Grosseteste gives a causal explanation of divine names, namely, they signify that God is the 
cause of that attribute in the created universe (III.3.2.1). This explanation, however does not 
exclude the fact that some names can be substantially attributed to God. In particular, I will 
argue that Grosseteste considers the name “Good” as the most appropriate divine name, and 
this  choice places other names such as “Being” and “Light” at  a second level (III.3.2.2). 
Finally, I will show that the Trinitarian names are also considered inappropriate for naming 
God (III.3.2.3).
III.3.1 Everything proceeds from God
III.3.1.1 Why did God Create? 
In the  Commentary, Grosseteste’s answer to this question is a common Christian doctrine: 
God created because He is  good. The answer is  quite  expected,  but Grosseteste does not 
always put the accent on God’s goodness.  In the  Hexaëmeron, for instance, he stresses that 
God was the  only Creator  and that  He did not  need any helper.  The words,  bonitas and 
bonum, appear only five times, and they are not employed to designate the reason for creation. 
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In the  Commentary, by contrast, he places the emphasis on goodness, which coincides with 
the overabundant occurrences of it in Dionysius’s text.
Grosseteste reaffirms this common Christian doctrine on many occasions in order to 
corroborate other less evident Christian truths, in particular (A) that creation is not the result 
of an evil Maker (against the Manicheans), or  (B) that God created on purpose and in time 
(against the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the world). Grosseteste does not attack his 
opponents directly, but his insistence on some issues serves this critical function.
(A) Divine Goodness is the only reason to create, as Grosseteste affirms in the  De 
ecclesiastica hierarchia:
Non enim propter aliud a non esse in esse ducit et in esse conservat et existenti bene esse  
tribuit  nisi  propter  propriam bonitatem.  Posset  eciam intelligi  per  hunc  sermonem quod 
omnium causa  trinitatis  tribuit  esse  et  bene  esse  existentibus  propter  bonitatem ipsorum 
videlicet hoc est ut ipsa sint bona.478
God,  qua Goodness, is the cause of everything. There is no reason to create, preserve the 
cosmos,  and attribute  goodness  to  beings  other  than  His  own goodness.  Grosseteste  also 
mentions a different interpretation of the doctrine of creation through God’s goodness: God 
created in order to make good things, both in their singularity and in their genera. It is evident 
that these interpretations are not in opposition, but that the second is a consequence of the 
first: God created because of His goodness, and therefore, He created good things. 
Grosseteste’s insistence on the uniqueness of God as the Creator of the world becomes 
clearer in the  Commentary on the De divinis nominibus. In this commentary, Grosseteste’s 
concern is to reaffirm that there is no cause other than God in the process of creation. When 
Dionysius writes that God, qua the Good and the Beautiful, is the cause of all goodness and 
beauty, Grosseteste explains that what Dionysius means is that God does not need any con-
cause  in  the  act  of  creating.479 A few pages  later,  the  reason for  this  insistence  becomes 
manifest, as Grosseteste explicitly charges pagans and heretics with having posed a plurality 
of  first  causes  of  creation.480 He  probably  has  Plato  and  Aristotle,  Thales  of  Miletus, 
Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, and Archelaus in mind when he refers to 
the pagans, as it their errors that were confuted in the  Hexaëmeron.481 His mention of the 
478 EH I, 333, 15 – 334, 1.
479 See Dionysiaca, 186. DN IV, M 205rb: “Non enim indiget alia concausa vel alio in producendo omnia pulcra 
a non esse in esse.” See also DN IV, M 202ra: “Per se bonum enim est causa omnium non indigens adiutorio 
vel adiunculo extrinseco.”
480 DN V,  M 232 vb:  “[...]  neque aiunt  eloquia resume  multas  causas primas videlicet  et  alias  deitates ita 
videlicet quod has superexcellentes et has subiectas adductivas in esse videlicet aliorum causatorum scilicet 
ut aiunt multi gentiles et heretici.”
481 See above § III.2.2.4.
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heretics very likely refers to the Cathars who believed that an evil principle was the first cause 
of  the  matter.  Accordingly,  the  reaffirmation  of  the  doctrine  of  creation  through  God’s 
goodness is significant, which allows us to see it as further evidence for the thesis that the 
Commentary was written for pastoral purposes, such as refuting the arguments raised by the 
heretics.  In the  Commentary, Grosseteste does not limit himself to reaffirm that God is the 
only principle of creation, but he also emphasizes the goodness of this principle.
(B) The goodness of the First Principle is often connected with another feature, i.e., 
His freedom:
Quia omne genus principii rerum est per se bonum et pulcrum non ex factorum meritis sed 
sui ipsius gratia et libera voluntate nec propter aliquid extra se sed propter ipsum, quoniam 
bonum et pulcrum, nec in alio ut coadiutore quo indigeat est aliquid huius principiationis sed 
solum in ipso.482
God,  who  is  good  and  beautiful  per  se,  creates  because  of  His  Grace,  which  can  be 
paraphrased as free will; i.e., creation is an act of God’s freedom. This point is not obvious in 
Dionysius’s text. Dionysius’s description of God as productive Love has raised the question as 
to whether, for Dionysius, God creates all things freely or by necessity. Eric Perl has recently 
reconsidered this issue, which has often been misunderstood. Interpreters normally assume 
that to say that God creates freely means that He chooses between creating and not creating,  
while  to  say that  God “cannot” not create  means that  He is  subject  to  some necessity.483 
Actually, Perl maintains that the fact that God “cannot not create” is not a limitation of God, 
but a consequence of His transcendence. Given that God is the Good, he cannot not create; 
however, the “cannot” does not refer to an impossibility for God, but designates a constriction 
that lies purely in Himself: insofar as God is Love, He is compelled to create the world, but 
such a  constriction is  not  imposed on Him from the outside.484 In  other  words,  as Philip 
Sherrard noted, “God qua God is Creator and Creator qua Creator is God.”485
Grosseteste proposes an accurate reading of Dionysius’s text. In Book IV of the  De 
divinis nominibus, which is devoted to “Goodness,” Dionysius writes that the authors of the 
Bible  preferred  to  name God  “Good”  because  it  manifests  God’s  spontaneous  expansion 
towards the created world.486 The Areopagite illustrates this doctrine through an example. He 
482 DN IV, M 204va.
483 Perl 2007, 49.
484 Perl 2007, 52.
485 Sherrard 1992, 157.
486 See  Dionysiaca 145.  DN IV, M 198ra: “In hoc [i.e. boni nominatione] enim manifestatur spontanea ipsius 
expansio in omnium utilitates que vere bonitas est.”
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wrote that as the sun gives light to all things not through an act of choice or deliberation, but 
by the very fact that it  exists, similarly, the Good effuses on all things, according to their 
receptive powers,  the rays  of its  undivided Goodness.487 Grosseteste hastens to avoid any 
interpretation of the example that can raise the doubt of heresy. The similarity between the sun 
and God, Grosseteste glosses, is not introduced to underscore a lack of reason and freedom in 
God,  but  the fact  that  both God and the sun act  according to their  own substance.488 On 
Grosseteste’s  interpretation,  Dionysius  illustrates  this  example  simply  to  state  that  God 
bestows His gifts because He is substantially good just like the sun enlightens because it is 
substantially luminous. Grosseteste notes that the expansion of God towards the creatures is 
voluntary  (spontanea),  an  adjective  that  neutralizes  the  problematic  example  given  by 
Dionysius. 
Grosseteste returns to this topic some pages later where Dionysius writes that Love 
does not allow God to stay unproductive, but it compels Him to create.489 This text may cause 
us to think that God is not free, but is necessitated to create. Grosseteste comments that love 
prevents God from being idle, so God overflows in a good act towards His beloved creatures 
on purpose (ex intentione), namely, love compels God to create from nothing.490 Grosseteste 
perceives  the  ambiguity  of  Dionysius’s  texts,  and  by  combining  the  expressions  libera 
voluntate,  spontanea, and  ex intentione he establishes an interpretation of Dionysius’s texts 
that avoids attaching necessity to God’s act of creation.
III.3.1.2 Rationes
Divine Goodness explains the reason for creation and that God’s act was free. As it occurred 
in  the  works  written  before  the  episcopacy,  Grosseteste  also  asks  whether  God  is  solely 
responsible for creation or if there are other principles at work, such as the Platonic Ideas. The 
Corpus is one of the major sources of the medieval doctrine of divine ideas, and therefore, in 
the  Commentary Grosseteste reconsiders this topic. In this paragraph, I will explain what a 
reason is, while in the next paragraph I will consider the relationship between the reasons and 
487 See Dionysiaca, 146.
488 DN IV, M 198rb: “Nec intelligat quis per hic dictum sic plenam ut pretactum est similitudinem ut videlicet 
Deus sit sicut est sol sine ratione et non agens arbitri libertate sed in tantum extendat similitudinem quod  
sicut sol substantiale lumen ipso esse lumen illuminat hec mundana, sic Deus substantiale bonum influit de 
sue bonitatis plenitudine in omnia.”
489 See Dionysiaca, 201-202. 
490 DN IV, M 209va: “Amor enim est benevolentia non remissa nec otiosa sed ex intentione prorumpens in 
actum beneficum amati propter amati boni qui super excellenter preexistens in Deo movit ipsum ex nihilo 
creationem et generationem et sic fecundavit in omnem parvitatem.”
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the creation.
Generally, Grosseteste accounts for the exemplars as “principles of cognition” rather 
than as “principles of beings,” i.e., he focuses on their role in theological knowledge. He does 
not develop any distinction or digression on the matter,  but  limits  himself  to endorse the 
common doctrine that everything is an image and similitude of God’s reasons (rationes). For 
example, in Book VII of the  De divinis nominibus, Dionysius affirms that it is possible to 
know God from the created beings that manifest a certain similarity with the exemplars.491 
Grosseteste explains that those exemplars are the divine reasons in God’s mind, and thanks to 
the  similitude  between the  creatures  and those  reasons,  it  is  possible  to  ascend from the 
creatures to reasons.492 This is the doctrine stated many times in his previous works, De prima 
forma omnium and De veritate, namely, that the imprint that God leaves in creation through 
His form is what allows us to have theological knowledge.
There are, however, texts where Grosseteste considers the nature of the divine reasons. 
According to Grosseteste, the exemplars must be identified with the Word, the second person 
of the Trinity, and not as creative principles of the universe. This doctrine allows Grosseteste 
to maintain the simplicity of God and the multiplicity of reasons in His mind. Now I will 
analyze some texts that account for this interpretation.
The first text concerning the reasons is in Book II of the De divinis nominibus where 
Dionysius  reports  what  his  master  Hierotheus  wrote  about  Jesus  in  his  The  Elements  of  
Theology. In this Christological hymn, Jesus is said to be “whole and part” of the universe 
because he contains in his all-embracing unity both the parts and the whole. He is the cause of 
the harmony among the parts in the whole, but is also transcendent and antecedent to both 
parts and the whole.493 Grosseteste comments as follows:
Ipse est  et totum et pars utpote  suscipens in seipsa id est eternaliter in se ipsa habens in 
eternis videlicet rationibus creaturis et partem omnem et totum omne et non solum habens sed 
et superexcellenter habens quia omnia in hiis suis eternis rationibus excellentius sunt et verius 
quam in seipsis quia et non viventia in ipsis sunt vita et corruptibilia in ipsis sunt incorrupta 
et temporalia in ipsis sunt eterna. Et sic ipsa est prehabens omnia antequam sunt in seipsis.
Grosseteste explains that not only are the created things contained in the Word as eternal 
491 See Dionysiaca 403. 
492 DN VII, M 247v: “Sed ex omnium entium ordinatione, ut proposita, hoc est ut in esse posita, ex ipso et nobis 
ostensa  et habente imagines quasdam et similitudines divinorum exemplorum,  id est idearum et rationum 
eternarum, ipsius, Dei videlicet. Omnis enim natura imago est et similitudo eterne rationis in mente divina ad 
cuius  exemplum est  formata  et  ex  ipsa  tamquam ex  imagine  et  similitudine  ascendi potest  in  divinam 
rationem que ipsius est exemplum prout possibile speculandam.”
493 See Dionysiaca, 106.
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reasons, but they also exist in It in a more excellent way: what is non-living, temporal, and 
corruptible is in the reasons, living, eternal, and incorruptible. Accordingly, everything exists, 
first as a ratio, and second as a creature.494 This doctrine echoes that of Augustine, quoted by 
Grosseteste in the De prima forma omnium: what exists in God is the living exemplar that is 
immutable and eternal, while the thing that exists on earth is corruptible.495 It is worth noting 
that  Grosseteste  introduces  his  thought  on  exemplars  in  a  passage  about  Christ,  which 
confirms that Grosseteste understands the second Person of the Trinity as the “place” of the 
reasons, but in this passage he does not yet consider them identical. The fact that the ideas are 
eternal, living, and incorruptible does not necessarily imply a Platonic view, nor does it argue 
the subsistence of the reasons in themselves. Grosseteste’s position can be understood in an 
Augustinian way: for Grosseteste, the reasons belong to the Son in the sense that the Son is 
the  “bearer”  of  them.  As  it  will  become clear  below,  Grosseteste  finally  proves  that  the 
reasons  are  really  identical  with  the  Son.  Before  coming  to  this  conclusion,  Grosseteste 
considers also the possibility to identify the reasons in God’s mind with the Platonic Ideas.
There is only one text where Grosseteste seems to identify the rationes in God’s mind 
with  the  Ideas  of  the  philosophers.  It  occurs  in  Book  IV  of  the  De  divinis  nominibus. 
Dionysius states that everything is contained in God, and Grosseteste paraphrases that God 
possesses the  rationes of everything eternally, and these reasons are what the philosophers 
call  Ideas.496 Plato is  not  explicitly mentioned, but  if  the reasons are to be understood as 
Platonic Ideas, the problems discussed in the previous paragraph reappear. This brief passage 
can simply mean that what he calls “reasons” correspond to what philosophers call “ideas.” In 
order  to  clarify  Grosseteste’s  thought,  we  need  to  consider  Book  V  of  the  De  divinis  
nominibus, which is devoted to “Being” and the paradigms (another term used by Dionysius 
to signify the eternal reasons). 
According to Dionysius, the eternal reasons are identical with the super-simple and 
super-one  Intelligence  of  God.  However,  due to  the  multiplicity of  beings  known in this 
Intelligence, reasons are also multiple.497 Dionysius also presents a second view on the topic, 
494 DN II, M 191ra.
495 De prima forma omnium, 110: “Item Augustinus super Joh. homil. prima: "Faber cum facit arcam, primo 
habet in arte arcam.[...]  Nam potest illa arca putrescere et  iterum ex illa,  quae in arte est, alia fabricari.  
Attendite ergo arcam in arte et arcam in opere! Arca in opere non est vita; arca in arte vita est, quia vivit  
anima artificis, ubi sunt ista omnia antequam proferantur.”
496 See Dionysiaca 197. DN IV, M 208va: “Per se bonum quoque et pulcrum ut sepe dictum est eternaliter habet 
rationes omnium exemplares et causales quas philosophi vocant ydeas et eterna exemplaria omium in mente  
divina.”
497 DN V, M 239 ra: “Quia autem mentionem fecit de exemplis presubsistentibus in causa omnium, de quibus 
diversi diversimode senserunt, explanat  hic suum intellectum  de illis  exemplis dicens ea esse eternaliter 
preexistentes  rationes  et  bonas  voluntates  divinas,  id  est  intelligentias  Dei  benivolas  omnium 
predeterminativas et secundum predeterminationem in esse adductivas et ad se et in se unitivas. Que rationes 
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namely, that of Clemens the philosopher, identified by the  scholia with Clemens bishop of 
Rome. According to Clemens, the exemplars are the first creatures in every category of bein, 
or, in Grosseteste’s own words, they are created causes that pre-contain what is caused.498 This 
alternative perspective on the reasons gives Grosseteste the occasion to explain the different 
meanings  of  the  word  ‘example’ (exemplum),  and  also  to  abandon,  for  a  moment,  the 
paraphrase of the littera. 
Primo  enim  et  principaliter  et  propriissime  dicuntur  exempla,  ut  predictum est,  idee  et 
rationes  eterne rerum omnium ad earum imitationes  fiendarum.  Secundo autem et  minus 
proprie possunt dici exempla causae create rerum ab ipsis causatarum imitationem quandam 
causas habentium.  Tertio autem dicitur  exemplum res causata inquantum est  vestigium et 
imago causantis reducens cognitionem in speculationem causantis. Dicitur etiam exemplum 
quodlibet inductum ad manifestandum aliud per aliquam sui similitudinem ad illud.499
The first (1) and most proper sense of the word  exemplum is the idea in God’s mind, the 
model of a created thing; in  a loose sense (2), the  exemplum  is the created cause of those 
things that have a certain resemblance with it. The third meaning (3) is that of “caused thing,” 
as it is an image and similitude of the cause that leads one to know the cause. Finally (4), 
exemplum is whatever manifests something else in virtue of a similarity. Thus, Grosseteste 
uses  the word ‘exemplum’ to  designate the exemplar  (meanings  1 and 2),  as  well  as  the 
exampled (meanings 3 and 4). Grosseteste is interested in clarifying the relationship between 
the first and the second sense of exemplum. He adopts Dionysius’s view by considering the 
reasons in God’s mind as the exemplars (1), but by contrast, he places Clemens’s view (2) in 
the background. However, he does not deny that the created causes of things exist, which can 
be called exempla, as Clemens asserted. The distinction between the first and the second kind 
of exemplars is that the first  (1) may be worshiped because it  is nothing other than God 
Himself, while the second kind (2), that of the “first in their own genre,” is made up only of  
creatures, and thus, it does not deserve to be worshiped; their only purpose is to lift the mind 
to speculate and worship the Creator, as the Scripture advises.500
benivole cum non sint nisi supersimplex et superuna sui bonivola intelligentia, propter multitudinem tamen 
entium in illa sui intelligentia intellectorum dicuntur plures rationes et voluntates.”
498 DN V, M 239 ra: “Determinato qualiter intelligenda sunt exempla ad que fiunt entia – quia beatus Clemens, 
Rome  episcopus,  usus  est  nomine  exempli  non  secundum  eundem  intellectum,  sed  dicens  exempla 
similitudines  sumptas  ex rebus creatis vel  causas  creatas  in se causaliter  prehabentes ea que efficiunt in 
causatis [...].”
499 DN V, M 239 rb.
500 DN V, M 239rb-va: “Si itaque quis dicat recte, dici exemplum secundum quod eo nomine usus est beatus 
Clemens, et post exempla propriissime dicta sit omnino ambulandum, et cum non sint aliud ab ipso Deo ipsa  
sint adoranda. Post exempla autem, alia et aliter dicta, non sit ambulandum nec sint adoranda ne per nominis 
idenptitatem  decipiatur.  Ambulans  post  exempla  creata  recordari  debet  scripture  que  precipit  non 
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Accordingly,  for  Grosseteste,  the  reasons,  taken  in  the  most  proper  sense,  are  not 
something separated or different from God. For Grosseteste, indeed, God does not participate 
in His own attributes, but He simply possesses them, or to put it plainly, He is His attributes. 
Attributes  such  as  truth,  justice,  and  goodness  are  something  in  which  the  creatures 
participate, but they are not something prior to God since they are identical with God.501 Some 
pages later, Grosseteste reaffirms this truth, but his vocabulary becomes more accurate. His 
intention is to refute the opinion that the First Good bestows the gifts He possesses to the 
creatures univocally, although He participates in such gifts more intensively than the created 
beings,  as  the  fire  participates  in  the  heat  more  intensively  than  the  heated  things.502 
Grosseteste replies to this false opinion that the First Good does not correspond to the gifts he 
bestows, which is why all the divine names must be negated from it. Grosseteste agrees that 
God possesses everything in Himself, but He does it in an excellent way, for He contains all  
the things in the eternal rationes, which are not univocal with the created beings. From there, 
Grosseteste concludes that the First Good is not a form, properly speaking, because He is 
above  every  form;  however,  He  forms  everything  through  His  eternal  rationes,  but  not 
through  something  other  than  Himself.503 Identifying  the  reasons  with  God,  Grosseteste 
preserves the uniqueness of God as creator of the universe.
In order to clarify the metaphysical status of exemplars, the discussion of the second 
meaning of ‘example’ becomes significant. In particular, it is worth noting what Grosseteste 
says  in  Book  XI  of  his  Commentary  on  De divinis  nominibus,  which  is  devoted  to  the 
theonym ‘Peace’ and to the meaning of expressions such as “being in itself,” “life in itself,” 
and so on. The explanation of these kinds of expressions allows Grosseteste to further specify 
his position on the status of the exemplars (2). As Jean-Michel Counet has pointed out,  the 
exemplars can subsist  only in God’s essence: “nevertheless,  as they are processional gifts 
issuing from God towards creatures,  they may be considered apart  from their  ontological 
ambulandum post exempla creata sed ab hiis sursum duci ad solius creantis speculationem et adorationem.”
501 DN II,  M 191va: “Quod enim de deitate dicitur ut veritas, iustitia, bonitas et huiusmodi, supernaturale et  
supersubstantiale  est  omne naturale  et  substantiale  in  infinitum excedens  et  non  participat  hiis  ita  quod 
diversum sit participans a participato sicut est in naturalibus et substantiabile sed sicut indifferens et penitus 
idem quod est supernaturaliter et supersubstantialiter participare et habere.”
502 DN IV, M 199va: “Cum itaque donans et influens non videatur dare vel influere nisi quod habet, posset ex 
hoc videri ea que primum bonum largitur creatis univoce licet forte excellentius et intensius participare cum 
ipsis sicut ignis calefaciens sibi in approximantia univoce cum illis licet intensius participat calore.”
503 DN IV, M 199va-b: “Hanc autem fantasticam opinionem volens auctor intervenire astruit ipsum primum 
bonum nullum eorum esse que tribuit sed ab omnium eorum ablatione nominari et per hoc insunuari ipsum 
incomparabiliter excellere omnia quorum ablatione nominatur et habere ea in se superexcellenter eternaliter 
et cauative in eternis rationibus nullo modo univocatis cum hiis quorum sunt eterne rationes. Primum bonum 
neque formas  sed  super  forma  neque formatum existens  format  omne formatum et  unicuique  propriam 
formam largitur. Non aliunde eam accipiens et imprimens formato sed in eterna sua ratione eam eternaliter  
prehabens.”
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subject  and  therefore  as  intelligible  forms  in  se,  offered  for  participation  to  manifold 
participating  creatures,  but  logically  prior  to  these  creatures  themselves.”504 Grosseteste 
speaks  explicitly  of  “life  in  se”  in  terms  of  vivification,  or  of  “deity  in  se”  in  terms  of 
deification  and  so  on,  which  suggests  that  exemplars  are  creative.505 Grosseteste  follows 
Dionysius by attacking those (i.e., the Platonists) who thought that the forms are independent 
principles that can be assimilated to gods or angels. Grosseteste replies that the expression, 
per  se,  when  referred  to  the  creatures,  does  not  mean that  they do not  originate  from a 
principle (ab alio), but only that they do not subsist in something else (in altero) like the 
accidents in the subject.506 Once again, Grosseteste does not reject the idea of a creative cause 
of reality; what he instead emphasizes is the created nature of those principles.
As a conclusion,  we can evaluate Grosseteste’s evolution regarding the doctrine of 
eternal reasons by taking his sources into account. In the Commentary, Grosseteste mentions 
no authority but the Bible  as his  only source.  Despite the lack of explicit  references,  we 
realize that Grosseteste’s background is still Augustinian, although revised under the influence 
of the Greek masters. D’Onofrio has observed that, unlike the Augustinian view, according to 
which the eternal reasons (rationes aeterne) are only the models of reality, Eriugena inherited 
from Maximus  the  Confessor  the  idea  that  the  primordial  causes  perform a  creative  and 
mediating  role  insofar  as  they  are  consubstantial  with  the  divine  Intellect.507 Grosseteste 
appears to adopt this view, which is not a surprise considering that he translated Maximus’s 
scholia on the Corpus. One may be tempted to read behind the two kinds of exemplars (1 and 
2) the first two divisions of nature according to Eriugena’s  Periphyseon. The first kind of 
exemplar is God considered with respect to His universal causality, as the nature that creates 
and is  not created; the second kind of exemplars are instead the primordial  causes of the 
504 Counet 2012, 76.
505 Counet refers to the following passage, which I have slightly emended against the other manuscripts DN IV, 
M 270rb: “Et quod <‘quidem’ Counet> ipse (i.e. Deus) est illa (i.e. esse per se, vita per se, etc.) non sicut 
predicatur de creaturis sed superessentialiter et super principaliter. Et quod ipse est illae <non sicut...illae om. 
Counet> causative  quia  causa  horum secundum quod dicuntur  <‘deum’ Counet> de  creatis,  sic  inquam 
dicimus  ‘per  se’ principialiter  divinae  et  causative;  participative  autem dicimus  per  se  suple  virtutes  
provisivas editas ex deo imparticipabili, per se substantationem, per se vivificationem, per se deificationem, 
quibus  entia participantia  proprie  sibi  ipsis, id  est  secundum  analogiam  suarum  dignitatum  et 
susceptibilitatum,  et sunt et dicuntur  <‘deum’ Counet>  et entia et viventia et divina et alia similiter […]. 
Virtutes editae a dei providentia suscipiunt adiectionem huius particule ‘per se’ et sicut participantia illis 
virtutibus nude in se consideratis denominantur ab illis nude utpote a vivificatione viventia et similiter de 
aliis. Sic participantia eisdem virtutibus consideratis secundum quod participant primo et per se, et ex hac  
participatione dictis per se talibus denominantur per se talia.”
506 DN XI,  M 269va: “Haec enim particula ‘per se’ cum addicitur creatis non privat  esse ab alio sicut  cum 
attribuitur in creato. Sed quandoque privat esse in altero ut accidens in subiecto.”
507 See D’Onofrio 1996, 253-254. 
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singulars,  as the nature that is  created and creates.508 Grosseteste’s texts,  however,  do not 
permit us to further examine this analogy. The admonition of McEvoy on this point is always 
there:  the  similarity  between  Grosseteste  and  Eriugena  –  without  the  support  of  textual 
evidence – may be due to the use of the same sources.509
III.3.1.3 The Many Degrees of Creatures’ Receptivity
Grosseteste doctrine of exemplars has consequences for the relationship between the eternal 
reasons and the created world: (1) the plurality of the reasons does not entail a plurality in 
God, but rather, it is the cause of the plurality in reality; (2) the plurality of reasons explains 
the difference among the creatures; (3) created beings depend completely on the exemplars 
because, in itself, the created world has not subsistence. 
(1) Grosseteste knows that the plurality of reasons in God’s mind could compromise 
God’s simplicity, and therefore, every time Dionysius’s text provides him the occasion, he 
reaffirms that every thing that is good and beautiful is eternally present in the causal rationes 
that derive from the simple divine nature.510 This argument is especially present in Book V of 
the  De divinis  nominibus where Dionysius treats the issue of the plurality of the reasons. 
Dionysius affirms that the first participation that proceeds from God is “being,” and that  all 
the  beings  and  principles  of  the  world derive  from God  and  are  in  God.511 Grosseteste 
comments as follows:
Ipsa  enim  per  se  superbonitas,  continens  in  se  eternaliter  omnia  in  eorum  rationibus 
exemplaribus, sic continet ea in se quod etiam ea producit in esse seculare vel temporale in se 
ipsis ab esse quod eternaliter habent in ipsa. Et sic continet ea irretentive quia provisive in  
eorum proprium esse in ipsa quorum per se superbonitate sunt omnia simul et sic convolute et  
ex ipsa et in ipsa sunt omnia unitive, quia ex parte ipsius causantis et continentis nulla est  
multitudo  vel  diversitas  essentialis.  Intelligens  enim  se,  in  essentia  simplicissimam  et  
superunitam,  intelligit  omnia  et  sic  diligens  se  diligit  omnia.  Et  intellectus  diligens,  seu 
dilectio intelligens, in sui simplicitate omnia est rationes exemplares et causales omnium, 
licet in se diversorum, unitorum tamen in superbonitatis simplicitate.512
508 See Periphyseon I, 441B.
509 McEvoy 1987, 223.
510 See  Dionysiaca,  183.  DN IV,  M  204va:  “Simplici  enim  et  supernaturali  natura  tototrum  pulcrorum  , 
preexistit secundum  causam uniformiter  omnis  pulcritudo  et  omne  pulcrum.  Per  se  bonum  enim  et 
supesubstantiale  pulcrum  preextitit  eternaliter  uniformiter  et  invariabiliter  secundum  rationes  causales 
eternas. Omnis pulcritudo et omne pulcrum et universa pulcra in ipsis eorum eternis rationibus exstiterunt  
simplici et supernaturali natura.”
511 Dionysiaca, 342-343.
512 DN V, M 235vb-236ra.
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Grosseteste observes that a created thing can exist in God in the form of an eternal exemplar, 
and by means of this exemplar, God creates everything either according to the time of the 
Intelligences (seculare), or according to the other beings (temporale). Grosseteste explains 
that  if  we  consider  the  process  of  creation  from the  perspective  of  the  First  Cause,  no 
multiplicity must be posited; it depends on the creatures, not on God. In God, a thing exists as 
though  it  is  one  with  God  (unitive),  but  also  in  a  convoluted  way (convolute).  What  is 
confusedly present in God becomes actually multiple when God creates the world. It is the act 
of  creation  that  generates  multiplicity,  the  unfolding  and  beginning  of  time.  Since  every 
creature pre-exists in God’s mind, when God knows Himself, He at the same time knows 
every creature; likewise, when God loves Himself, He at the same time loves every creature. 
God’s loving Intellect, or intellective Love, is the eternal rationes, while their multiplicity and 
diversity is reduced to the simplicity of God’s Goodness.  This text is important, for many 
reasons. First, Grosseteste distinguishes three kinds of time, which shows that only in God is 
there  eternity,  and that  the reasons belong to His  realm and not  to  that  of  the  creatures.  
Second, Grosseteste makes it  clear that the plurality of exemplars does not argue for any 
plurality in God. Multiplicity is a consequence of the act of creation that depends on the 
creatures, and not on the First Cause. Third, Grosseteste holds that God knows everything by 
means of the reasons, and since the reasons are nothing other than God’s thoughts, God’s act 
of knowledge is immanent.513 Grosseteste’s conclusion is that the archetypal world must be 
identified with God’s Intellect, that is, the Son, as Grosseteste stated in the theological works 
preceding the Commentary. 
In the same Book, Dionysius gives three examples to illustrate how the multiplicity of 
the reasons can be harmonized with God’s simplicity. First, Dionysius refers to the image of 
the number one. Every number pre-exists indivisibly in the number one such that this number 
contains in itself all the numbers under the form of unity. Only when a number goes forth 
from the one does it become differentiated and multiplied. Second, Dionysius resorts to the 
image of the centre of a circle. All the rays of a circle are concentrated in a single point, in the 
centre,  and this point contains all the straight lines that depart  from it.  Finally,  Dionysius 
mentions the soul in which the different faculties are united as one.514 Grosseteste does not 
discuss  these  examples,  but  limits  himself  to  report  on  Dionysius’s  words  without  any 
significant addition. At this stage, Grosseteste probably does not see a problem concerning the 
multiplicity of reasons because they are identified with the Word.
513 This kind of solution will be adopted also by Aquinas, De divinis nominibus, ed. Mondin, n. 665, p. 65.
514 See Dionysiaca 343-346.
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(2) For Grosseteste, God is not diminished, nor changed when the creatures participate 
in His existence.515 The differences among the creatures depend on the creatures themselves, 
and particularly on their capacity to receive the processions of God.516 Grosseteste tackles the 
issue of the dissimilarity present in the created world in two places, namely, in Book II and IV 
of the  Commentary on De divinis nominibus. In Book II, Dionysius describes, by means of 
two  examples  –  i.e.,  the  center  of  a  circle  and  the  seal  and  its  imprints  –  how God  is  
participated in by the creatures without being divided, and without entering into composition 
with  anything.  Grosseteste  has  a  different  priority,  which  is  to  explain  how  to  hold  the 
absolute  unity  of  God  together  with  the  multiplicity  of  His  effects.  He  first  turns  to  an 
example that was not taken from Dionysius. The example is that of the sunbeam. A ray of 
sunshine is one, he says, but has two opposite effects: on the one hand, it hardens the mud, but 
on the other hand, it melts the wax. These different consequences are due to the different 
receivers.517
Book  II  presents  yet  another  point  that  has  to  be  highlighted.  In  a  few  lines  of 
Dionysius’s  text,  there  are  two  occurrences  of  ‘archetype.’ Grosseteste  paraphrases  it  as 
“principally shaped.”518 It may be inferred that the image of the seal refers not to the exemplar 
of the first kind seen above (i.e., the one identified with the Word). It refers, instead, to the 
second kind (proposed by Clemens) of the exemplar because it gives form, but it is also the 
first being formed by God in His mind. Its creative role does not compromise its creatural 
being. It gives Grosseteste’s answer to the idleness problem: before creation, God generated 
the exemplars.
Grosseteste’s explanation of the divine processions shows that there are differences 
among creatures, despite the fact that God’s overflowing is uniform, but it does not account 
for the hierarchical order among them. The example of the sunbeam, for instance, does not 
say if the most proper effect of a ray of sunshine is to harden or to melt. The example of the  
seal, however, is closer to what Dionysius and Grosseteste actually assert, namely, that the 
most immaterial and incorruptible creatures are clearer signs of the Creator than the material 
515 DN II, M 187ra: “Pater autem dicitur fons supersubstantialis deitatis quia impartibiliter et indiminute manens 
in propria totalitate eternaliter.”
516 EH I, 320, 10-11: “Participatio ex parte participati uniformis est, ex parte autem participantium est secundum 
uniuscuiusque participationis mensuram.”
517 DN II, M 187va: “Radius in se unus et superunitus in effectibus plurificatur et multiplicatur quemadmodum a 
Deum radiis solis huius visibilis in se unus et idem lutum indurat et ceram emollit non secundum varietatem 
sui in se sed secundum differentias suscipientium eius actionem.”
518 DN II, M 187vb: “et quemadmodum multe expressiones [...] sigilli participant principali seu archetypo id est 
principaliter figurato sigillo [...]”; DN II, M 188 ra: “diversa autem participantium facit efformata ab una et  
tota et eadem archetypia id est principali figuratione.”
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and corruptible ones.519 This consideration must be related to the metaphysical doctrine of the 
degrees of existence discussed above. Grosseteste interprets the examples of the seal and the 
sunbeam as follows:
Ut enim patet in suprapositis exemplis ex parte donantis est unitas et singularitas et nulla ab  
unitate egressio, ex parte autem participantium discretio pluralitas et multiplicatio; quedam 
enim participantia participant donis diversorum generum; quedam autem donis unius generis; 
sed hoc quidem illorum participant eis secundum prius hoc vero secundum posterius et hoc 
quidem magis hoc vero minus. Et forte hos tres modos varietatis participationum insinuavit 
per tria verba: discernitur, plurificatur, multiplicatur.520
Grosseteste  reiterates  that  the  multiplicity of  reality depends on the  creatures,  while  God 
remains one and simple, never expanding or exiting apart from Himself. Grosseteste also adds 
that there are things that participate in many kinds of gifts, while some other things participate 
in only one kind. Among them, some things participate before, some others later; some things 
participate more, some others less. Grosseteste appears uncertain about the exact meaning of 
Dionysius’s text. He says that maybe (forte) Dionysius meant to refer to such different kinds 
of participations with the words “discernitur, plurificatur multiplicatur.” This text is not so 
easy to understand. The sense was not even clear to Grosseteste, as the adverb ‘forte’ seems to 
suggest. Grosseteste does not give any example that may help us to single out the creatures 
that participate in many gifts or in only one kind of gift. We can suppose that, for example, 
Grosseteste thought that some beings participate in “humanity,” while some other beings in 
“horseness.” This is the meaning that Grosseteste attaches to the verb, discernitur. Moreover, 
humanity can be participated in  by many individuals.  We might  suppose that  Grosseteste 
thinks that Dionysius expressed this kind of participation by the verb, plurificatur. Finally, an 
individual thing can participate in this form according to different degrees. For example, a 
human being can be said to be more or less human. Grosseteste might suppose that this kind 
of participation is expressed by the verb, multiplicatur.
This interpretation  is  consistent  with  Grosseteste’s  comments  in  Book  IV  of  the 
Commentary on the De divinis nominibus.  Grosseteste notes that, for Dionysiu, God is the 
cause  of  the  similarities  and  dissimilarities  existing  among  things.521 By  “similarity” 
Grosseteste intends to describe participation in the same form according to the same intensity, 
519 CH II,  61:  “Sed  creature  et  naturae  immaterialiores,  vel  simpliciter  immateriales  et  bonitate  creatoris 
incorruptibiles, expressiora et formatiora sunt conditoris vestigia et intelligentibus ea ipsum expressius et 
manifestius  ostendentia;  materiales  vero  et  necessario  corruptibiles  minus  expressa  et  informiora  sunt 
creatoris vestigia, minus expresse et inmanifestius ipsum demonstrantia.”
520 DN II, M 192va.
521 See Dionysiaca 186-187.
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while by “dissimilarity,” he means participation in different kinds of form or in the same 
form, but with different degrees.522 Grosseteste explains this with an example. According to 
the participation in the form of light, celestial bodies are similar, but since their participation 
can be more or less intense, they are dissimilar.523 Grosseteste concludes that it is possible to 
participate in many ways:  immediately or mediately,  before or after,  more or less.524 It  is 
undisputed that, for Grosseteste, a form may be more or less intense, but he does not specify 
whether it also involves the substantial forms, as I suggested with the example of “humanity.” 
From the texts alone, we can only speculate as to his original intention.525
(3) In the De coelesti hierarchia, Grosseteste underscores a final aspect of his theory of 
exemplars,  namely,  the  total  dependence  of  creatures  on  the  exemplars.  Grosseteste’s 
comments on this subject are explicit:
Omnis autem creatura quantumque excellens in auribus habentium aures audiendi evidentia 
possibilitatis sue quantum est de se redeundi in nichilum, sicut ex nichilo facta est, fortiter  
clamat et dicit: non sum ego deus, non sum ego id quod per se est et per se necesse esse, a  
quo omne esse, non sum ‘ego qui sum’ sed qui ab alio sum.526
The image used by Grosseteste is vivid: every creature by evidence of its own possibility, 
insofar as it is in itself, of returning to nothing, just as it was made from nothing, cries out 
strongly and says «I am not God, I am not that which exists per se». Only true being is what 
exists per se, which is consequently a necessary being that does not rely on anything else to 
exist.  This being is the same who speaks in  Exodus 3:14, the great “I am.” Creatures, by 
contrast, receive their being, but in themselves they are liable to collapse into nothing. As seen 
above, this doctrine plays an important role in Grosseteste’s thought during his teaching of 
theology at Oxford. In the Commentary, he stresses the dependence of the created beings. No 
matter how close a creature could be to the Creator,  or how clearly it  could manifest the 
Creator’s  imprints,  the  doctrine  of  participation  implies,  according  to  Grosseteste,  that 
522 DN IV, M 205rb: “[ex eodem] similitudines et per participationes formarum earumdem secundum speciem et 
equaliter  intensarum, et  dissimilitudines per  participationes  formarum secundum speciem diversarum aut 
earumdem secundum speciem inequaliter intensarum.”
523 DN IV, M 205rb: “Sunt insuper alia similia et dissimilia unita incommixte utpote lumina celestium corporum 
inquantum lumina similia sunt et inquantum quedam aliis intensiora et quedam remissiora ab aliis et aliis  
celestibus corporibus diffusa sunt dissimilia.”
524 DN IV, M 205 va: “Quedam enim participant predictis immediate et quedam per medium et que secundum 
prius et quedam secundum posterius et quedam secundum magis et quedam secundum minus.”
525 Almost a century later, an author deeply influenced by Grosseteste and his Commentary on the De divinis  
nominibus, John of Ripa, has drawn a theory of latitudo formarum whose complexity is far from the original, 
simple Grossetestian idea, but nonetheless is in debt with it; see Nannini 2014.
526 CH II, 60-61.
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everything has a complete dependence on the First Cause.  This lack of a proper foundation, 
i.e.,  the fact that beings actually are “beings from another” provides Grosseteste with the 
metaphysical basis for to make the epistemological claim that “every creature brings to mind 
his eternal reason in the divine mind, according to which it was made.”527 The reasons sustain, 
form,  and  conserve  the  created  particulars,  and  are  thus  the  signs  of  God’s  ubiquitous 
presence in the world.
III.3.2 God has many names 
In the second chapter, we introduced the paradox in  Grosseteste’s theology  concerning the 
knowledge  of  God  (ignorantia/omne  intelligibile)  and  its  reflection  on  language 
(ineffabile/multivocum). I limited the examination to first members of the dichotomy, namely, 
God’s unknowability and ineffability. It has been shown that, for Grosseteste, there is no name 
that expresses God’s transcendence because God’s causality is the only way that we have to 
access to Him. In this part, I will discuss the semantic implications of the paradox when God 
is considered under the aspect of procession. In this case, God has many names since He is the 
cause of every creature. Such a multiplicity of names does not mean that all the divine names 
have the same significance and importance in theology. There are some names that express 
God in a better way just like, at the ontological level, there are some beings that participate 
more intensively in God’s eternal reasons. No matter how suitable a divine name may be, 
Grosseteste  reiterates  that  they signify only that  God is  the  cause of  that  attribute  in  the 
created universe, and not God in Himself (§ III.3.2.1). Among the divine names, I will argue 
that Grosseteste considers the name “Good” the most appropriate, which places other names 
such as “Being” and “Light” at  a  second level  (§ III.3.2.2).  Finally,  I  will  show that  the 
Trinitarian names are also considered inappropriate to God (§ III.3.2.3).
III.3.2.1 A causal explanation of divine names
Grosseteste is clear that the divine names manifest God’s beneficent gifts towards beings. 
527 CH II,  61:  “Omnis  creatura  rationem suam eternam in  mente  divina,  ad  cuius  exemplar  facta  est,  aut  
operationem aliquam divinitatis insinuat.”
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Grosseteste provides a causal explanation of the divine names:
Deus  enim trinitas  nunc  dictus  substantia  propter  substantificationem,  nunc  vita  propter 
vivificationem, nunc sapientia propter sapientificationem et sic dictus quevis alia propter alias 
sui donationes imparticipabiliter.528
For example, the name ‘substance’ is attributed to God because He is considered the cause of 
the “substantification” of beings; similarly, the name ‘life’ is attributed to Him because He is 
considered  the  cause  of  vivification,  and  so  on.529 Even  the  names  that  are  commonly 
considered more appropriate to God, such as ‘being’ and ‘goodness,’ manifest only the fact 
that God is the giver of those gifts.530 As noted in the previous chapter, Grosseteste also gives 
the Biblical name Ego sum qui sum, a causal explanation. This name actually accomplishes a 
dual purpose for Grosseteste: on the one hand, it is the name that God attributed to Himself; 
on the other  hand,  it  expresses only what  human beings  can understand of God’s nature. 
Grosseteste affirms that Dionysius’s intent was only to praise God as ‘being’ to the extent to  
which we can understand Him and not to explain how God understands Himself.531
A causal  explanation of  theological  language does,  however,  encounter  a  problem: 
since God is the cause of every thing, He can, therefore, be named by every name – even 
those names that refer to material and imperfect beings.532 Grosseteste does not seem to take 
issue with this problem, as in Book V of the  Commentary on the De divinis nominibus he 
refers to divine names such as ‘fire’ and ‘stone’ along with ‘being.’ 
 
Ab  ente  igitur  laudamus  Deum  cum  nomine  entis,  eum  nominamus  designantes  eius 
substantificum processum in entia sive secularia sive temporalia. Et iterum cum nominamus 
eum a necessario convenientibus ad esse sive superseculare sive seculare sive temporale. Et 
iterum cum nominamus ipsum nominibus creaturarum ut cum dicimus ipsum esse ignem vel 
lapidem vel huiusmodi. Non enim intendimus dicere ipsum esse hec, sed ipsum eternaliter  
prehabere hec in se in eternis eorum rationibus et ipsa in illis eternis rationibus eternaliter 
preextitisse et ab illis processisse in esse in se ipsis.533
Grosseteste, however, gives us a false impression, as he puts some constraints on the names 
528 DN II, M 187va.
529 See also text at § III.2.1.2 n. 145.
530 DN V, M 232ra: “Nomen enim entis dictum de Deo, prout intellegi potest a nobis, significat processum id est  
operationem divinam qua adducit in esse omnia entia. Quod autem et nomen boni de quo predictum est et  
nomen entis de quo nunc dicitur et nomen vite et nomen sapientie de quibus sapienter dicit, dicta de Deo 
significant nobis divinos processus.”
531 See § II.3.3.1. 
532 This problem has been clearly expressed by Thomas Aquinas, see Summa Thelogiae I, q.13, a.2.
533 DN V, M 234rb.
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that can be attributed to God.  In fact, the sense of the passage is that the theonym ‘Being’ 
refers to God’s activity of bringing every kind of essence into existence, i.e., both those that  
pertain  to  the  seculum,  like  the  angels,  and those that  live in  time.  The second category 
contains all the material creatures like fire and stone, from which we can move to name God. 
Grosseteste makes it clear that when such names are applied to God, they do not signify the 
nature of God, but they refer to the fact that God possesses in Himself the eternal reasons of 
such things. According to Grosseteste, the names taken from the creatures – i.e., from ‘angel’ 
until ‘worm’ – must be intended in a spiritual way. So, when the name ‘stone’ is attributed to  
God, it does not signify something corporeal, but only spiritual (intelligibilis). The spiritual 
use of the name refers to the causal reason of the stone that exists in God’s mind, and thus, it  
allows us to elevate our minds by disregarding the mere materiality of the stone.534
The causal explanation of theological language, however paradoxical it may be, does 
not prevent Dionysius and Grosseteste from claiming that one can name God substantially. As 
it  will  be shown below, God is good (and being, life and wisdom) by virtue of His own 
substance,  but  not  via  participation.  Grosseteste’s  conviction  that  we  can name  God 
substantially seems to contain a complication. Grosseteste frequently affirms the impossibility 
for human beings to name God as He is in Himself, but he also holds that some of the names 
that  we  derive  from  the  creatures  can  be  attributed  to  God  substantially  and  not 
metaphorically. This presupposes that there is a strict relationship between what is God in 
Himself and what He causes, between God’s ineffability and the possibility to attach a name 
to  God.  In  order  to  better  understand  this  relationship,  it  is  necessary  to  explain  that, 
according to Dionysius, the moments of remaining (moné) and procession (próodos) of the 
First Principle are strictly related. This point has been clearly illustrated by Eric Perl:
The production of the effect is not an activity on the part of the cause, distinct from the cause 
itself. The cause does not first exist as itself and then also appear or unfold itself and in that  
sense produce its effects. Rather, the cause is nothing but that which is appearing, nothing but 
the unity, the enfolding, of the effects.535 
Dionysius describes the process of creation from the point of view of creatures. From this 
perspective, procession turns out to be the manifestation of the cause itself, that is, the Unity 
534 DN II, M 186ra: “[Deus dicitur] omne intelligibile quia ipse ut pretactum est omnibus nomnibus nominatur et 
dicitur omne ut angelus, celum, sol, leo, vermis et similia non tamen dicitur aliquid omnium hoc quod illud  
est in se sed dicitur illud intelligibile utpote dicitur lapis non quod sit corporeus sed intelligibilis quia eterna 
vita et vivens et causalis ratio lapidis ad quam sursum ducimur ex natura corporei lapidis ut invisibile dei per  
id quod factum est intelligibiliter conspiciatur.”
535 See Perl 2007, 26.
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itself unfolded. This is why some scholars speak of a paradoxical “dynamic steadying.”536 For 
Dionysius,  God’s  remaining  in  itself  is  twofold: in  one  respect,  God never  modifies  His 
unchangeable unity, thus from eternity God remains exactly as He is. Yet in another respect,  
there is a dynamic remaining that coincides with the creational, ad extra, process of God. In 
the following paragraphs, I will argue that the name ‘good’ especially can be substantially 
attributed to God because it manifests God’s procession towards the creatures and His nature 
that is to be Creator. 
III.3.2.2 The primacy of Goodness
In the Commentary, the theonym ‘Good’ replaces the primacy of ‘Being’ that was featured in 
the Hexaëmeron. In many passages from Book IV of  De divinis nominibus  dedicated to the 
name  ‘good,’ Grosseteste  states  that  ‘good’ is  the  first  divine  name  because  it  not  only 
designates a procession, namely, something that proceeds from God to the creatures, but also 
it  comprehends any other  procession.537 Goodness  precedes  being  because  goodness  also 
extends itself to non-beings by bringing them into existence.538 Grosseteste recalls this point 
in the Commentary on the De mystica theologia where he states that whatever can be said of 
God can be comprehended in one single, positive word, which is to say the name ‘good.’ If 
we compare this text with a passage from the  Hexaëmeron that argues for the primacy of 
being, we may suppose that Grosseteste revised his position: 
Quicquid  enim  alio  nomine 
significatum  de  Deo  dixeris,  in  hoc 
nomine  quod  est  essencia  instauratur 
(Hexaëmeron, VIII, vii, 2, 229).539
[…]  unico  verbo  positivo,  utpote 
nomine bonitatis, potest comprehendi 
quicquid  de  eo  positive  dicitur  (De 
mystica theologia I, 76).
 
536 See Schäfer 2006, 90.
537 See DN IV, M 198ra: “Accedens ad specialiter tractandum de illis et primo de bono quia, ut supra tactum est,  
ipsa boninominatio comprehendit in se omnes alias nominationes beneficos divine providentie processus ad 
creaturas significantes.”
538 See DN V, M 232rb: “Boni enim nominatio comprehendit et manifestat generaliter omnes et totos processus 
id est operationes deitatis omnia causantis in omnia et tota causata et etiam in non entia, ea in entia vocando 
et producendo et in sui designationem ea ordinando et omnia mala que in quantum mala non entia sunt.”
539 Another passage form the same work is quite similar as it shows that, in this context, essence and being are  
synonyms, according to Grosseteste: “[...] quicquid enim nominando de Dio dixeris in hoc verbo quod est 
esse instauratur” (IV, i, 1, 121).
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Another argument that proves that Grosseteste changed his mind about ‘being’ as the first 
divine name is that he acknowledges some difficulty in interpreting Dionysius, who, quite 
clearly, endorses the primacy of Goodness over Being. This emerges from the way in which 
Grosseteste attempts to explain the order of the divine names in Book I of the Commentary on 
De  divinis  nominibus.  I  say,  “attempts,”  because  Grosseteste proposes  more  than  one 
explanation for the order, but in the end he considers all of them unsatisfactory.  First,  he 
deduces  the order  of  the divine names as follows:  ‘being’ is  the most  fundamental  name 
because  it  contains  every  other  name,  although,  for  some  special  reason,  in  De divinis  
nominibus, God is praised as goodness prior to being.540 Grosseteste does not say what this 
“special reason” amounts to, but we may argue that it concerns the fact that, as noted above, 
Goodness also extends itself to non-beings in order to bring them into existence. From there, 
Grosseteste divides being into “being in virtue of itself” and “being in virtue of something 
else.” Being in virtue of something else does not, of course, pertain to God. God is thus being 
in virtue of Himself. Being in virtue of itself is further divided into body and non-body. Since 
God is not a body, He has the property of being non-body. But only life is the only being that 
is being in virtue of itself and does not have a body. Thus, according to Grosseteste, God is 
necessarily life. Life can be rational or non-rational. Rational life is characterized by light.  
The life illuminated by the light of knowledge is called theos, and if theos is the everlasting 
intellectual vision, then God is Truth as well.541 
A few lines later, Grosseteste provides an alternative explanation. It is not based on the 
properties  that  God  has  in  Himself,  but  rather  on  his  beneficial  processions  towards  the 
creatures. If we consider the gifts that God bestows on creatures, we realize that the first is  
being. Once put into being, the creatures can be ordered according to their ends, by specific 
acts and operations, and thus they can be called good. God also takes care that they do not 
hinder each other, but act in accordance with themselves. When they act in this way, they can 
be called beautiful. A beautiful universe implies the wisdom of its creator, thus God must be 
540 DN I, § 80, 165f: “[...] primo dicitur ens, quia ante hanc nominationem generaliter omnia continentem non 
potest esse altera prior, licet ob specialem rationem prius laudet deitatem inferius per nominationem boni 
quam per nominationem entis.”
541 See DN I, § 80, 166: “Posset quoque forte quis assignare rationem ordinis nominum hic positorum de Deo 
dictorum, utpote quod primo dicitur ens, qui ante hanc nominationem generaliter omnia continentem non 
potest esse altera prior, licet ob specialem rationem prius laudet deitatem inferius per nominationem boni 
quam per nominationem entis. Huius prima divisio: ens in altero et ens non in altero. Ens autem in altero 
nullo modo convenit Deo. Unde ens dictum de Deo necessario suscipit hanc differentiam: non in altero. Ens 
non in altero autem prima divisione dividitur in corpus et non corpus. Corpus autem non convenit Deo; ens 
autem non in altero, non corpus necessario est vita. Unde post ens dictum de Deo immediate sequitur vita.  
Vita autem omnis aut cognoscitiva aut non cognoscitiva; cogniscitiva autem lux spiritualis est. Vitae igitur de 
Deo dictae necessario adiungitur lux, seu lumen.” For more on this argument, see Counet 2012, 68.
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considered wise, and so on.542 Jean-Michel Counet has rightly observed that “ultimately these 
attempts are not terribly convincing: Dionysius’s order is not delineated with precision, and 
only the first names are explicitly considered.”543 Grosseteste is well aware of this fact. He 
therefore adds that as far as he is concerned, the task is beyond his human weakness.544
After this admission, Grosseteste presents a third explanation of the order of divine 
names, which seems to represent his position on the subject. Grosseteste observes that God is 
admirably  named.  On  Grosseteste’s  interpretation, Dionysius  means  that  God  cannot  be 
named for He is beyond every name. After stating this principle, Grosseteste begins to remove 
names from God: first, the common abstract names, then the names taken from the beneficial 
processions,  and  both  those  that  directly  refer  to  God  and  those  that  refer  to  Him only 
indirectly.  Jean-Michel  Counet  convincingly identifies  the abstract  names with the  names 
discussed  in  Book  IV  (‘good,’  ‘beauty,’’  ‘light’),  the  names  taken  from  the  beneficial 
processions,  and  that  directly  refer  to  God  with  ‘being,’ life,’ and  ‘wisdom’ discussed 
respectively in  Books V, VI,  and VII.545 The names  that  only indirectly refer  to  God are 
instead treated from Book VIII onwards, which are ‘justice,’ ‘great and small,’ and so forth. 
There is, finally, a last category of names. They are the metaphoric names such as ‘stone’ and 
‘fire,’ but, according to Dionysius and Grosseste, they pertain to symbolic theology rather 
than to the theology of divine names.546
The primacy of ‘good’ also places the name ‘light’ at a second level. The metaphysics 
of  light  is  a  central  theme  in  Grosseteste’s  works.  This  is  a  well-known  feature  of 
Grosseteste’s philosophy on which it  is  not necessary to dwell  here.  What is less known, 
however, is that his metaphysics of light implies a “theology of light.” Since the early part of 
his career, when he was an Arts master, Grosseteste held that every thing comes from God’s 
light, and hence, that everything is light. This thesis will receive a theological foundation in 
his  later  works.547 In  the  De dotibus,  for  example,  which  dates  to  the  last  period  of  his 
542 See  DN I,  §  81,  166:  Posset  quoque forte  aliquo consimili  modo assignari  ordo  nominum ex  beneficis 
processibus ad creaturas Deum laudantium, utpote quod eius primus benefices processus est a non esse in 
esse adductio, et haec est causatio et creatio. Secundus est quod omnia ordinat ad actus naturales unicuique 
directissime convenientes.  Unde et  bona sunt.  [...]  Tertius  processus  est  quod omnia  in  suis  naturalibus 
actibus non errantia fecit ad invicem concordia,  et  ita ad bonum immediate sequitur pulchrum. Ex bono 
autem et pulchro universi necessario sequitur infinita sapientia artificis.” See Counet 2012, 69.
543  Counet 2012, 69-70. 
544  DN I, § 82, 166-167: “Si quis autem hoc modo vel meliori, subtiliori et sapientiori nominum hic positorum 
hic assignaverit ordinis rationem, ei in Domino congaudemus et ducentem libenter sequimur. Labor enim iste 
excedit nostre mbecillitatis.”
545  Counet 2012, 70; cf. Cf. DN I, § 82, 167.
546 See Dionisyaca, 162 and DN IV, M 202vb.
547 See De luce, 76;  Commentarius in libros Physicorum I, p. 12 n. 41. Cecilia Panti (2011, 27-34) has justly 
pointed out that the ontology and the cosmology of the De luce are abandoned in Grosseteste’s theological 
works  like  the  De unica  forma  omnium and  the  Hexaëmeron.  Despite  those  fundamental  differences  a 
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theological teaching, Grosseteste endorses Augustine’s doctrine that Christ is said to be ‘light’ 
in a proper way, while He is said to be ‘stone’ only metaphorically.548 In the same period, in 
the  Hexaëmeron, he establishes “that the fact that God is existing in three persons follows 
from the  fact  that  God is  light,  not  corporeal  light  but  incorporeal,  or  better  superior  to 
both.”549 In the Commentary, Grosseteste relegates the name ‘light’ to a secondary role. This is 
probably because Dionysius treats the name ‘light’ as the most appropriate name of God only 
after the name ‘Good.’ Grosseteste explains that the name ‘light’ is derived from the created 
world and is attributed to God in an absolute way; since in the  Commentary  Grosseteste’s 
focus is on goodness, Grosseteste also explains that light is only the manifestation of this 
Goodness. If in the early writing Grosseteste identifies God with light, in the  Commentary, 
under the influence of Dionysius, he identifies God with goodness and considers light only an 
image of goodness. Accordingly, he uses the example of the sunlight as a pale and corporeal 
image of divine Goodness.550 We can conclude that the primacy of ‘goodness’ in theological 
language is a consequence of Grosseteste’s fundamental idea of God as Creator. Grosseteste 
follows Dionysius rather closely by assuming that God qua God is Creator and to be a Creator 
means to be good, as Grosseteste argues consistently going back the Hexaëmeron. The other 
names manifest only a particular aspect of this truth, as they specifically refer to a single  
procession.  ‘good,’ by contrast,  expresses  not  simply that  created  things  are  good,  but  it 
unifies all the gifts that proceeds from God, which also reveals the reason for creation.  
III.3.2.3 Trinitarian names
The last  category of  names  that  deserves  attention  belongs  to  the  Trinitarian  names.  The 
peculiarity of those names,  such as the ‘Father,’ ‘Son,’ and ‘Holy Spirit,’ is  that  they are 
derived from the Scripture and not from the creatures. Dionysius clearly opposes the divine 
names, which are the topic of the De divinis nominibus, to the Trinitarian names, which are 
common feature still remains, namely the universality of light.
548 See De Dotibus, 105. The reference is to Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, 4.28 (CSEL 28/3.2) 126-127.
549 Hexaëmeron, VII, xiv, 9, 220. For the explanation of Grosseteste’s argument, see Gieben 2003, 231.
550  E.g.  DN IV, M 201rb: “Ipse solaris radius in se ipso consideratus primo hoc quod inter ceteras creaturas 
lumen est evidentissima ymago per se bonitatis”;  DN IV, M 202rb: “[Lumen solaris] quod est manifesta 
ymago  per  se  bonitatis  habens  non  equaliter  sed  a  multum  longe  imitativas  proprietates  per  se  boni.” 
Throughout the  Commentary, Grosseteste associates the expression  per se with light only one time, while 
there are many occurrences of “per se bonum” or “per se pulchrum” to indicate the fact that we can name 
God substantially; cf.  DN IV, M 209rb: “[Auctor] adicit de amore divino quem vocat hoc nomine eroos et 
convenienter quia enim per se bonum et lumen et pulcrum.”
152
instead taken up in the  Theologicis subfigurationibus.551 Divine names come from the gifts 
that God bestows to the creatures, such as ‘substance,’ ‘life,’ ‘wisdom,’ and so on. Grosseteste 
acknowledges this difference and states that from the divine Father comes any other kind of 
fatherhood, just as from the Son comes sonship, and finally, from the Spirit comes the union 
with God and deification.552 This explanation inverts the causal explanation given for the other 
divine names. The name ‘life,’ for example, is attributed to God after the human intellect  
realizes that God is cause of life, and infers that there is life in God. The trinitarian name 
‘Father,’ by contrast, derives from the authority of the Bible and the Tradition, but only then is 
it attached to human fatherhood. 
On the one hand, the different origin of the Trinitarian names places them on a higher 
level, on the other hand, they belong to the realm of the symbolic language to a greater degree 
than  the  other  divine  names.  The  Trinitarian  relations  are  beyond  the  human  beings’ 
possibility of understanding, Dionysius says, and thus, all the examples we can propose to 
describe them appear inadequate. Consequently, Dionysius speaks of the Father as a source, 
while Jesus and the Spirit are like blossoms.553 According to Grosseteste, Dionyisius’s use of 
images  implies  that  we  can  express  the  Trinitarian  relations  only  through  a  figurative 
language. From this, he concludes:
Qualiter  autem hec fontana fusio et  divina generatio et germinatio et  florum parturitio et 
luminum de lumine egressio sunt in se nec omnia potest dici nude absque figurativo sermone 
et symbolico nec intelligi nude absque imaginibus; sed ad hoc attingit noster intellectus quod 
omnis paternitas et filiatio ex principali paternitate et ex principali filiatione donatur et est et  
nominatur et omnis unio cum deo a spiritu sancto.554
In this  regard,  Grosseteste  says  that  the human mind and human language cannot  extend 
beyond the biblical datum that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Any comparison of the 
Trinity with other realities, such as light, plant, or even the act of generating, does not lead us  
to a real comprehension of the divine nature. What is interesting here is that Grosseteste uses 
the word,  generatio,  on the same level  of  Dionysius’s  examples.  The word,  generatio,  is 
technical to the point that it requires a dogmatic explanation in order to describe the relation 
between the Father and the Son, but here it is intermingled with other expressions that are no 
551 Although this treatise is not extant, we are able to glean its content from Dionysius’s descriptions of it in his  
other works. He seems to have devoted himself to names for the Trinity. 
552 DN II, M 189va: “[Auctor adicit] quod sicut a patre secundum apostolum omnis paternitas in celo et in terra  
est et nominatur sic et a filio omnis filiatio et spiritu sancto omnis unio cum deo et deificatio.”
553 See Dionysiaca, 96.
554 DN II, M 189va. 
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more than symbolic images. The context may shed some light on the meaning of this choice. 
Some lines before, Grosseteste discussed the disagreement among Greeks and Latins on the 
notion  of  Filioque (§  I.5).  Grosseteste  tried  to  resolve  the  issue  by considering  that  the 
difference that opposes them represents only a verbal,  and not a real, disagreement.  After 
closer  analysis  of  the  expressions  involved,  it  appears  that  the  two  seemingly  disparate 
doctrines  are  the  same.  It  is  very likely that  the  idea  in  the  background is  that  even the 
dogmatic formulas (generatio, Filioque) are just attempts to approach God, but they follows 
the limits of our understanding and language. This entails that they do not express the nature 
of God, and like all the other divine names, say more of the creatures than of the Creator. 
III.3.3 Conclusion
In the  Commentary, Grosseteste states that God’s procession towards creature is connected 
with a  specific  divine attribute,  i.e.,  goodness.  This  datum is  not  trivial,  especially if  we 
compare the overabundant occurrences of the words bonitas  and bonum in the Commentary 
with the fact that they are almost entirely absent in the Hexaëmeron. Grosseteste reaffirms this 
common Christian doctrine that God creates because of his goodness in order to corroborate 
the thesis that creation is not the result of an evil Maker and that God created according to a 
purpose and in time.
I have shown that the critical point of Grosseteste’s theory of divine procession concerns the 
status  of  the  eternal  reasons  in  God’s  mind.  The  themes  exposed  by  Grosseteste  in  his 
previous  works  also  returns  in  the  Commentary.  I  have  underscored  the  evolution  of  his 
concept of “reason.” In the first period of his production, before the episcopacy, Grosseteste 
passes  from  a  Platonic  view  of  the  exemplars  (universals  are  independent  and  creative 
principles of being) to the identification of the exemplar with the second Person of the Trinity. 
In  the  Commentary,  Grosseteste’s  thought  evolves  further.  The discussion  of  the  Platonic 
concept of Ideas, the digression on Clemens’s discussion of the notion of exemplum and the 
analysis  of  the  expression  per  se when  it  is  referred  to  divine  names  show  that,  for 
Grosseteste, there is room for a loose conception of the exemplars.  Grosseteste thinks that 
they cannot be considered subsistent in themselves, but that they depend on God’s Wisdom, 
although they maintain a creative and active power that is proportional to their proximity to 
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the First Cause.
In the  Commentary on the De divinis  nominibus,  Grosseteste  abstains  from saying 
what God is in Himself, and prefers instead to focus on the gifts that God gives to creatures. 
However, Grosseteste reserves some space to discuss the existence of substantial names. God 
has many names because He is the cause of everything, namely,  He possesses the causal 
exemplars  of  everything eternally.  In  this  sense,  every name,  even the  Trinitarian names, 
expresses only the beneficent processions. Among those names, however, the name, “good,” 
can be considered a substantial name because it gathers all the other names and manifests the 




Reversio: Through human nature towards God
IV.1 Introduction
After considering God as He is in Himself and as the cause of the created world, in this 
chapter we shall reconstruct Grosseteste’s position on God considered as the ultimate goal of 
creation. This is the third part of theology as described in the Hexaëmeron and Deus est, but it 
is developed particularly in the  Commentary. This is a crucial theme in Grosseteste which, 
however, has only been partially explored in the literature. McEvoy, for example, focused 
especially on Grosseteste’s doctrine of beatific vision, since Grosseteste elaborated a position 
opposite to that of Dionysius.555 Beatific vision, though, is only a part of the general topic of 
the return of creation to the Creator. James Ginther entitles a chapter of his monograph “The 
Church,  Pastoral  Care  and  the  Deification  of  Humanity”,  but  only  a  short  paragraph  is 
devoted to deification. In part, this is due to the fact that Ginther considers only the works 
belonging to the period before the Commentary, in which the theme of deification is not yet 
developed. Grosseteste begins to study deification in more depth only when he deals with 
beatific vision, but this issue, as Ginther opportunely points out, is fully considered only from 
the Commentary on the De coelesti hierarchia onwards.556
Grosseteste presents theology as the study of creation as flowing from God, the One, 
and as returning to Him. The moment of “return” is necessary to have a comprehensive view 
of his theology. Grosseteste’s conception of epistrophé is strictly connected with the place in 
the cosmos that he attributes to man. It is through humanity that the created world can return 
to God, for the human being is the summary of creation. Grosseteste, however, enriches this 
conception with an element that he receives from Dionysius and the Greek Fathers, namely 
the  doctrine  of  deification.  The  doctrine  of  the  deification  of  man  has  influenced  many 
Eastern Fathers, but it does not have many followers in the Latin Church. Grosseteste is an 
exception and his interest in deification – as Southern has noted – may explain an important 
555
McEvoy 1982, 93-95 and 248-256 and its bibliography.
556 Ginther 2004, 108. Ginther was interested in the ecclesiastical  aspect  of deification but, due to its strict 
theological relevance, I leave it aside.
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lack in Grosseteste’s theology, namely reference to Christ’s human life and his sufferings.557 
The present chapter is divided into two parts. For Grosseteste, the return of the creation 
to  God  is  possible  if  two  assumptions  are  admitted:  the  first  is  that  everything  is 
comprehended, in some way, in human nature, since the human soul partakes in the spiritual 
nature, as the angels do, while the human body partakes in matter, such as the other bodily 
creatures (§ IV.2.1); the second is that the Incarnation of the Son completed the universe and 
united the nature of the Creator with that of the creatures, for He is God and man at the same 
time (§ IV.2.2). We shall see that Grosseteste shows a special interest in the return of human 
beings to God. This return begins in this life, by living a virtuous life, but the complete return 
will occurr at the resurrection. Grosseteste’s doctrine of resurrection, however, leaves open a 
problem. It is not always clear in his texts if the resurrection means a return to the blessed 
state of the prelapsarian Adam or to a better  condition (§ IV.3.1). Only when Grosseteste 
absorbs the  doctrine of deification, in particular through the  Corpus,  will  it  be clear that 
human beings are called to be in a more blessed condition than was Adam in Eden, namely to 
be deified  (§ IV.3.2).
IV. 2 The conditions for the return of the Universe
Christian eschatology admits of two events at the end of time, namely the resurrection 
of the dead along with their  bodies,  and the consummation of this  world.558 I  argue that, 
according to Grosseteste, these events are strictly connected as a result of the doctrine of 
microcosmism. This states that the return of human beings to God (at the resurrection) reflects 
the return of all creation (consummation of the world) in a smaller scale. Human nature is a 
sort  of  summary  of  all  creation,  and  for  this  reason  the  redemption  of  human  beings 
comprehends the redemption of all the creatures. For the same reason, the Son assumed the 
human, and not the angelical, nature. Microcosmism, McEvoy says, was very common in the 
twelfth century, and has so many nuances that it is hard to define. The core, however, is clear: 
“the same order can be affirmed of two terms, a great and a small, where the small is human 
nature or one of its aspects.”559 In other words, the human beings contain on a smaller scale, 
as  a  minor  mundus,  the  totality  of  creation.  In  Grosseteste’s  words,  the  human  being  is 
quodammodo omnia. In the following paragraphs I will analyze each aspect of the following 
557 Southern 1986, 217. However,  Southern’s  statement  has to be mitigated,  because Grosseteste deals with 
Jesus’ sufferings in the sermons, such as  Ex rerum initiarum (pp. 132-133), and in the poem  Le Château 
d’Amour (p. 172-173).
558 The Nicean Creed states: “We look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.”
559 On Grosseteste’s doctrine of microcosmism see McEvoy 1982, 369-401 and its bibliography.
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conditions for the return: the position of human beings in  the middle of the hierarchy of 
beings (§ IV.2.1), and the Incarnation of the Word in human nature (IV.2.2).
IV.2.1 Homo in medio collocatus
Grosseteste thinks that human beings are in a middle position between God and the 
rest of creation. We, therefore, have to consider humans’ relationships with both, for a human 
being is, at the same time,  imago dei et imago mundi. This position allows man to be the 
joining link of creation: he participates both in the attributes of God, and in those of creatures. 
Grosseteste discusses extensively these relationships – so that one between God and human 
beings on one side, and that one between human beings and the rest of the creation on the 
other in Hexaëmeron, Part VIII, commenting on the verse “Let us make man to our image and 
likeness” (Genesis 1:26).
(A) With respect to the Creator, a human being is an image (imago) and a likeness 
(similitudo):
Imago autem […] est summa similitudo. Similitudo autem dupliciter est: aut equalitatis et 
paritatis, aut imparitatis et imitacionis. Quapropter imago dupliciter est, aut summa videlicet  
similitudo secundum paritatem,  aut  summa similitudo secundum imitacionem.  Secundum 
pripam accepcionem ymaginis, solus Filius est imago Dei Patris. […] Homo vero similitudo 
est Dei Trinitatis per imitacionem.560
An image is the highest of likenesses, for there are two kinds of likeness as there are 
two kinds of image. Grosseteste focuses on the meaning of image. Only the Son is a perfect 
image of the Father, for they are equal in substance. The author of the Bible, indeed, writes 
that a human being is made “to the image” and not that he is “the image” of God, because the 
only true image is the Son.561 A creature,  however, cannot be equal to God, but can only 
resemble Him. Because God has put His likeness in the creation, all the creatures can be 
called similitudines of God, but only human beings can be called image, namely the closest 
similitude possible.562 This text raises a question about the difference between an image and a 
likeness. After the presentation of the examples that illustrates a trace of the Trinity in every 
560 Hexaëmeron, VIII, I, 1, 217.
561 Hexaëmeron, VIII, ix, 1, 231: “Et considerandum quod Scriptura dicit hominem factum ad imaginem, ut per 
preposicionem insinuet subiectam imitatcionem, et distinctionem modi quo Filius est imago ad modum quo 
homo est imago.”
562 On the meaning of image see also § II.3.1.2.
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thing, Grosseteste explains the difference between human beings and the rest of creation.563 
According to Grosseteste, only human beings resemble God in all things that belong to Him. 
This  means  that  what  is  said  of  God  can  also  be  said  of  human  beings,  although  not 
univocally.564 According to Grosseteste, the objection that some attributes pertain only to God 
does not stand, because even “being a creator,” or “being eternal” can be said, in a broader 
sense,  of  human  beings.  Indeed,  by Grace,  they participate  in  eternity  and  in  the  act  of 
creation more than do the other beings lacking of reason, and can be considered co-workers of 
God.565
One could ask if Grosseteste considers only the human soul as the image of God. For 
this matter, the account of Creation given by Grosseteste in the vernacular poem, Le Château 
d’Amour, is significant. In that work,  Grosseteste  affirms that when God created the world, 
“right at last he created Adam, making him from earth in his own likeness (semblance) […] 
Afterwards, the Holy Trinity created his soul.”566 This means that God’s likeness was present 
in Adam’s body, before the creation of his soul. The connection of this text with the Dictum 
60 is evident: if even a piece of dust has a certain imprint of the Trinity – as stated in the  
Dictum – how far greater could be the likeness between the Trinity and the human body.567 In 
the Hexaëmeron Grosseteste is more specific. He believes not only that the body is a likeness 
(similitudo) of God, but also that it is an image (imago) in virtue of its unity with the soul. 
Aligning with his authorities,568 Grosseteste believes that the image of God is impressed upon 
and sealed in the supreme aspect of human mind, i.e., reason, without any medium coming 
between them. Through the mediation of reason, the sealing of likeness is passed on to the 
whole of the human being, and the whole human being becomes theimage of the supreme 
Trinity.569 This means that the highest part of the soul – reason – is properly speaking the 
563 On the examples see § III.2.3.2.
564 On the lack of univocity between God’s attributes and human beings’ attributes, see § II.2.3. 
565 Hexaëmeron, VIII, xvii, 4, 242: “Omnis namque creatura habet in se aliquam imitatoriam Dei similitudinem, 
sed non in omnibus que Dei sunt, neque secundum propinquissimum vestigium imitatur irracionalis aliqua 
creatura Deum. Licet enim multa predicentur de Deo que non predicantur de homine, utpote quod creator est,  
quod eternus est et huiusmodi, tamen homo participat eternitate et creandi quadam imitacione vicinius et 
similius omni creatura carenti racione. Cum enim gracie Dei inspiracione efficimur nova creatura, cum simus  
in hoc Dei coadiutores et cooperatores, sumus quoddam huius creacionis inicium, et operacionis que creacio  
est gerimus manifestissimum imitatorium vestigium. Similiter et ceterorum omnium que de Deo predicantur  
gerit homo manifestissimum et proprinquissimum imitatorium vesitigium, licet quedam predicentur de Deo,  
que non possunt predicari de homine sub eadem nominacione.”
566 Le château d’amour, 161.
567 Dictum 60 has been discussed above, see § III.2.2.2. 
568 Augustine, De genesi ad litteram, III, 20 (CSEL 28 3/2, p. 86) and Basil, Hexaëmeron, X, 6-7 (eds. Smet and 
van Estbroeck, 178-182). Grosseteste refers to those texts in his Hexaëmeron, VIII, v, 5-6, 226. 
569 See Hexaëmeron, VIII, v, 4, 226: “Isto quoque modo est in suprema facie racionis humane mentis expressa et 
signata, nullo interposito medio, Dei Trinitatis summa imitatoria similitudo, id est imago. Et per huius partis  
mediacionem transfunditur hec similitudinis signacio in totum hominem, et fit totus integer homo summe 
Trinitatis imago.”
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image of God, while in a broader sense, the complete human nature – body and soul – is an 
image of the Trinity.570
(B) If, with respect to the Creator, the human being is His image, then with respect to 
creation, the human being is in some way all things (quodammodo omnia); he is also the last 
(ultimus)  created  creature.  In  the  Hexaëmeron Grossetsete  explains  that  human  beings 
resemble  God more  accurately than  do the  other  creatures  because human beings  unfold 
everything that the Trinity has in Itself. As God is all things in all things, so human beings, in 
so  far  as  they  are  the  image  of  God,  are  also,  in  some  way,  all  things.571 In  Deus  est, 
Grosseteste illustrates a similar analogy between God and a human being, considered as His 
image. Speaking of the latter, Grosseteste illustrates why he can be called minor mundus:
Secundum  corpus  ergo  vilissimo  simile  est  sicut  imperfectissimum,  secundum  animam 
aequale optimae creaturae et ita nobilissimum, secundum vero se totum omium creaturarum 
dignissimum. Haec inquam creatura inter ceeteras creaturas creatori est simillima, quia sicut 
in Deo omnia stant per causam, sic in homine relucent universa per effectum.572
 
A human being is the exemplar of everything because his body is equal to the lowest  
things,  and  his  soul  to  the  most  noble.  Human  beings,  considered  in  their  integrity,  are 
therefore the most worthy of creatures, because they are most similar to the Creator. In other 
words,  as in God all  things stand as in their  cause,  so the whole universe of creatures is 
mirrored in the human beings, like their effect. According to Grosseteste, then, everything can 
be found – as an exemplar – both in God, and in the human being.
The  presence  of  everything  in  human  nature  is  explained  by  another  human 
570 McEvoy (1982, 400) believes that Grosseteste goes beyond his authorities because he consider the totality of 
man, and not only reason, as an image of God. Although the text quoted in the previous footnote may lead to  
this conclusion, the following sentence confirms that Grosseteste does not distance himself from Augustine: 
“Circumscripta tamen suprema facie racionis, non posset in residuo hominis remanere racio ymaginis; hac 
tamen parte sola posita, posset in ea racio imaginis esse perfecta.” Augustine, indeed, in De Trinitate XII, 4,4 
writes: “Sed in tota natura mentis ita trinitatem reperiri opus est, ut si desit actio temporalium, cui operi  
necessarium sit adiutorium propter quod ad haec inferiora administranda derivetur aliquid mentis, in una 
nusquam  dispertita  mente  trinitas  inveniatur;  et  facta  iam  ista  distributione,  in  eo  solo  quod  ad 
contemplationem pertinet aeternorum, non solum trinitas, sed etiam imago Dei; in hoc autem quod derivatum 
est in actione temporalium, etiamsi trinitas possit, non tamen  imago Dei  possit inveniri.” This means that 
only the upper part of the soul, the one that contemplates God, is the true image. The lower faculties instead  
receive  the  imprint  of  God through the  mediation  of  reason.  We can  justify McEvoy’s  statement  if  we 
consider that Grosseteste is an author who strongly emphasized the souls’ natural desire to be united with the  
body (see Dales 1995, 42-45).
571 Hexaëmeron, VIII, I, 2, 217f: “[...] explicacio huius verbi [i.e. “homo est imago Dei] exigeret ut evolverentur 
omnia que habet in se Trinitas Deus, et singulis que sunt in Deo invenierentur singula imitatorie aptata in 
homine. Deus autem est omnia in omnibus, viventium vita, formosorum forma, speciosorum species […]. 
Quapropter et homo, in hoc quod ipse est imago Dei, est quodammodo omnia.”
572 Deus est, 241.
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characteristic,  namely,  being  the  last  (ultimus)  creature.  A human being is  the  last  being 
created because God’s work during the first five days was targeted at constituting the human 
nature, in which all other things are found to a certain degree. Grosseteste introduces this view 
in a short essay, entitled Quod homo sit minor mundus. In this text Grosseteste holds that the 
human body is composed of the four elements, because it contains a portion of fire, air, water 
and earth. The nature of earth is in its flesh, that of water in its blood, that of air in its breath, 
and that of fire in its vital heat.  Grosseteste holds the parallelism between human being and 
the elements of the universe until  he reduces the physical  aspects of human nature to an 
allegorical symbolism, in  alignement with other authors of the twelfth century.573 From this 
first  rough account,  Grosseteste  moves to  a  more elaborate  explanation of  human nature. 
Grosseteste considers not only the body, but also the soul, as a summary of the universe: the 
human soul  shares  functions  with  the  animal  and vegetable  realms;  but,  considered  with 
respect to his spiritual part, a human being shares the nature of the angels, the only difference 
being  that the human soul desires union with the body.574
As McEvoy has opportunely pointed out, if a human being is the last of the creatures, 
it is so because he was the first in the order of divine intention; he is therefore the goal (finalis  
causa) of God’s act of creation.575 In this anthropocentric system, the other creatures have an 
instrumental value: they are means of which the human being can freely make use, and this is 
possible because the other creatures are not created by God immediately for Himself, as are 
human beings,  but only to give to human beings the occasion and the means to return to 
Him.576 McEvoy concludes that “man, the end and unity of creation in the order of exitus, is in 
the reditus the means of return of all things to the one source”.577 This centrality of man also 
had,  according  to  Grosseteste,  a  negative  consequence:  Adam’s  fall  affected  the  whole 
creation. This is why God chose to assume the human nature in order to restore the universe. 
IV.2.2 Incarnation
Man occupies an intermediate position in the created order, for he is a link between 
573 Quod  homo  sit  minor  mundus,  59.  McEvoy  (1982,  372)  shows,  in  particular,  the  proximity  between 
Grosseteste and Honorius of Autun.
574 CH V, 241: “Ad hec rationalis anima non videtur diferre ab aliqua celesti sibstantia alia specifica differentia,  
quam potentia et appetitu naturali unionis cum corpore organico in personalem unitatem.” Cf. De cessatione 
legalium, I,2, 15, 14.
575 McEvoy 1982, 393. He refers to Deus est, 241.
576 Cf.  De cessatione legalium I,  9,1, 47: “Christ autem incarnationem a rerum natura testificatam esse, inde 
patere postest quod omnis creatura huius mundi sensibilis propter hominem facta est. Quapropter maximo 
ministerio et utilissimo quo potest homini ministrare, congruit ut homini serviat.” See also III, 2,2.133.
577 McEvoy 1982, 397.
162
God and the rest of the creatures. In order to be connected with all of the universe, the Creator 
has  rightly  chosen  to  assume  the  human  nature.  Grosseteste  extensively  deals  with  the 
Incarnation  in  De  cessatione  legalium,  but  he  returns  to  this  topic  also  on  some  other 
occasions. Some studies have demonstrated the originality of Grosseteste’s Christology. In 
this paragraph we dwell on a specific aspect of this, namely that microcosmism explains why 
the Son took the human nature. Indeed, the Word assumed the human, and not the angelic, 
nature  because  only  the  first  has  something  in  common  with  all  the  other  creatures.578 
Grosseteste maintains the necessity of God’s Incarnation in his thesis that the Son of God 
would have become incarnate even if Adam had not sinned.579 This means that the Incarnation 
happened not to redeem humanity, but to perfect creation: 
Et ita in Christo, Deo et homine, sunt omnia recollecta et commodata ad unitatem; nec esset 
ista consummacio in rerum naturis, nisi Deus esset homo.580
In Christ, who is both God and man, all things are gathered together and brought into 
unity. This completion in nature would not have happened if God had not become a human 
being. What about the unity of creation in the human nature? As we have seen, Grosseteste 
admits that, even before the Incarnation, all the creatures had a certain unity in human nature,  
and the reason is that human nature keeps together, in the union of body and soul, both the 
physical and spiritual natures. With the Incarnation, however, the creatures are brought into 
full communication and personal union with the Creator. Grosseteste resorts to the image of a 
circle to express the recapitulation of all the creatures in the human nature of Christ. In the 
Christmas  homily,  Exiit  edictum a  Cesare  Augusto,  Grosseteste  states  that  “the  circle  of 
creatures  is  most  strongly bound to  the Creator,  when the  Creator  himself  […] has  been 
inserted in the same circle.”581 Grosseteste is even more explicit in the  quaestio called  De 
universi complecione, which belongs to the episcopal period. He imagines the temporal order 
of creation as constituting a straight line, from God to man. When the Creator became man in 
578  De cessatione legalium III, 1, 25, 129: “Hoc igitur principales unienes non potest esse nisi homo-Deus. Non 
angelus-Deus, quia omnes alie nature habent aliquid in commune cum homine et non cum angelo. Propter  
hoc magis possunt uniri in homine quam in angelo.”
579 This thesis had great fortune. For an extensive bibliography, see Goering – Mantello 1991, 95, n. 26 and 99,  
n. 44.
580 Hexaëmeron IX, viii, 3,276. See also De cessatione legalium III, 1, 25-29, 129-132.
581 The last part of this homily has been printed by Unger 1956, 18-23: “Nondum <Creator et creaturae> sic  
uniuntur sed cum assumit humanam naturam in unitatem personae, tunc est circulus creaturarum firmissime 
Creatori coniunctus, cum ipse Creator per unitatem personalem assumpto homine in unitatem personae, sit 
eidem circulo insertus, factusque décor et honor huius circuli tamquam gemma aurei annuli.” The English 
translation is taken from Goering Mantello 1991, 98.
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the Incarnation, the line of creation was bent back to form a circle that completed creation.582 
Grosseteste also uses the image of the circle in commenting on the first words of the  De 
coelesti hierarchia. Dionysius says: “For from Him all things come and to Him they go” and 
Grosseteste comments that in “this circular arrangement whereby we come from the same to 
the same, he [i.e. Dionysius] proves from the words of the Apostle and say «for from Him 
etc.»”583 The image of the circle recalls that Christ is the Alpha and the Omega, and implies 
not only that God assumed human nature, but also that man assumed the divine nature, as will 
be clear in the next part of this chapter. 
Grosseteste’s soteriology – expressed by the image of the circle – seems to entail that  
the Incarnation completely erases the consequences of original sin because it allows the union 
of  human  beings  with  God.  But  in  some  other  passages  Grosseteste  attributes  more 
importance to the passion than to the incarnation in order to re-form God’s image in human 
nature.584 Finally,  there  are  texts  where  Grosseteste  considers  the  entire  life  of  Christ  as 
salvific.585 Emphasizing the centrality of the Incarnation or of the passion in the economy of 
human beings’ salvation has different theological consequences that cannot be tackled here. 
We can note that this difference of opinion reflects the interplay between Greek and Latin 
authorities in Grosseteste’s work. It is common knowledge that the Greek Fathers underscored 
the role of Incarnation in the economy of salvation,  while the soteriology of the Western 
Church  privileged  the  moment  of  the  passion.586 As  the  following  paragraph  on  the 
resurrection  will  show,  Grosseteste  does  not  want  to  merge  his  sources  into  a  new 
comprehensive doctrine, but maintains both of them in his writings.
The incarnation and the privileged position of human beings in the cosmos are strictly 
related since the creation. The return of human beings to God, through the mediation of the 
Incarnate Word, was established at the beginning of the world, according to Grosseteste. In 
582 De universi completione, 122: “Nam intellige in capite linee recte creatorem, deinde creaturas ordine suo – 
angelum, celum, […], et hominem, qui ultimo creatus est. Ideo cum principium huius linee sit creator et finis 
homo, coniunge hec extrema et rectam flecte lineam in circulum, quod factum est cum verbum caro factum 
est; […] et sic in ista unione Dei et hominis in una persona universum completum est.”
583 CH I, 5: “Hanc autem recirculationem ab eodem in idem probat ex verbis apostoli subiungens: «Etenim ex 
ipso et cetera».”
584 Sermo 41, 272: “Ymago licet in primo patre nostro per peccatum fuit deformata, per passionem filii Dei fuit 
reformata.”
585 Deus est, 287-8: “Reformatione, quia per peccatum primi parentis deformatum fuit genus humanum, quod 
ipse sua mirabili incarnatione, passione, resurrectione ad formam reduxit.” See also De cessatione legalium I, 
3, 3, 16.
586 Cf. Jossua 1968, 38. As in the case of every common opinion, even this interpretation has been challenged by 
many theologians. See e.g. Balthasar 2000. The Corpus Dionysiacum is the peak of Greek theology: almost 
no space is reserved for the passion, while all concerns are about the theological problem of the unity of the  
divine  and  human  natures  in  the  incarnate  Word.  Regarding  Dionysius’s  Christology,  the  most  recent 
contribution is Perczel 2004; but see also Curiello 2013, 112-114. 
164
the  Hexaëmeron, in commenting on the biblical verse “Let us make man to our image and 
likeness” (Genesis 1:26), Grosseteste considers the consultative manner of speaking. For all 
created things it is written that God spoke,  and that they were then made; in the case of  the  
human being, however, the expression “let us make” seems to suggest the presence of more 
than one person discussing the creation. Grosseteste explains that it is not a consultation in the 
strict  sense of the word, because consultation implies ignorance.  This consultation can be 
interpreted in several ways: as Grosseteste notes, it suggests the privilege of dignity of the 
creation of human beings; it also suggests the special care that God has for human beings with 
respect  to  the  other  creatures;  finally,  it  suggests  the  incomprehensible  secret  of  God’s 
providence, with regards to the manner of reparation of the human race by the Incarnation, 
and the renewal of the human mind in the image of the Creator.587 This means that when God 
created a human being He already envisaged the Incarnation as the final goal: everything was 
made for the sake of human beings in view of the assumption of human nature by Christ. 
In conclusion, we may discuss how James McEvoy summarizes the principal points of 
Grosseteste’s Christology. There are four: (i) the elaboration of a cosmic, rather than of a 
primarily soteriological, Christology; (ii) the absorption of Greek theology; (iii) the exaltation 
of  human  nature  as  dignissima  creaturarum;  and  (iv)  the  unity of  all  things:  they  stand 
together in the Word before the creation, and the unity of their origin is also the unity of their 
return, as mediated by the Word incarnate. This returns, in a circlular manner, all the creatures 
back to their primal origin, and makes human nature one with the divine (deificatio).588 The 
texts discussed in these paragraphs confirm the centrality of these four points. Grosseteste 
considers the event of the incarnation as determinant for the return of created world to the 
Creator, and dedicates less space to the Passion as a salvific moment (i).  The predominance 
of the Incarnation over the Passion is a sign, one among many, that Grosseteste was deeply 
influenced by the Greek Fathers (ii). The Word assumed the human nature because it is the 
summary, the exemplar of everything, and thus in the unity of body and soul, the human being 
is the most worthy of creatures (iii). Thanks to the Incarnation and through the mediation of 
human nature, the whole universe is called to be united with God. In the following paragraphs 
we will discuss that this return, in the case of human beings, is called ‘deification’ (iv). What 
McEvoy and other scholars omit to note is that the return of humanity to God, expressed by 
the concept of deification, recurs in Grosseteste’s works only after the Commentary, and this 
confirms that  Grosseteste  takes this idea from Dionysius.589 Another point of McEvoy’s list 
587 Hexaëmeron VIII, xi, 4-6, 238f.
588 McEvoy 1987, 220-221. McEvoy shows that these principles trace back to Eriugena.
589 The  website  www.grosseteste.com,  which  contains  fifty  authentic  texts  of  Robert  Grosseteste,  records 
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that calls for clarification concerns God considered as the primal origin and ultimate end of 
creation. Grosseteste is uncertain about the state of creation at the end of time: it is not clear if 
the return of creation to the Creator will be a simple restoration of the harmony lost by Adam, 
or if the universe will live in a better condition than that experienced in the Eden. The image 
of the circle seems to lead us to the first interpretation, but there are other texts that clearly 
support the second interpretation. We therefore need to investigate  Grosseteste’s account of 
resurrection to understand the return of human beings.
IV.3 The return of human beings
For Grosseteste, the centrality of the human being in the created order is beyond dispute, and 
the amount of texts he devoted to the matter is greater than that concerning the restoration of 
the universe in general. This topic is of such important for Grosseteste that he writes a poem 
in the vernacular about the loss and restoration of man, known as Le château d’amour, which 
was widely and rapidly disseminated.590 However, it is a text whose literal value is of more 
importance than its theological or philosophical one, thus we need to consider it with caution 
by referring to other treatises. The return of human beings to God begins in this life, or what  
Grosseteste calls the “first life” or “life of grace,” which consists in the practice of virtues.  
The “second life” is that of glory, the blessed experience after the resurrection (§ IV.3.1). The 
return of humanity means that the union between the Creator and the creature will be fully 
realized, and thus, the human being will participate, as much as he can, in divinity  (§ IV.3.2). 
IV.3.1 The resurrection
In  the  writings  that  predate  his  episcopal  period,  the  topic  of  resurrection  is  not  among 
Grosseteste’s first interests. He had the occasion to tackle this theme in several sermons and 
twenty-five occurrences of “deif*”. If we leave aside the Letters and the Dicta (eleven occurrences), which 
are not easy to be dated, the other works belong to the episcopal period. The website does not include one of  
the longest works of Grosseteste, that is, the Hexaëmeron, but the analytical index of this treatise shows that 
Grosseteste prefers the word ‘deiformitas’ to ‘deification’. To confirm this datum, we can also observe that 
the word ‘participatio’ more frequently occurs in works belonging to the episcopal period. The doctrine of 
participation, as we shall see, is crucial for explaining deification.
590 On the great fortune of this poem, see Taylor 2003. 
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treatises, but he preferred to focus on the sacrament of confession, considered as the way to 
return to God in this life (§ IV.3.1.1).591 This means that in this period Grosseteste was more 
interested in the “first life” and in the “first death” (that caused by sin) than in the afterlife and 
the second death (the eternal damnation). In the Commentary, by contrast, Grosseteste devotes 
more attention to the discussion of resurrection, and he shows that he is aware of the debate 
surrounding  the  unorthodox  doctrine  of  it.  Grosseteste,  in  particular,  focuses  on  the 
resurrection  of  the  body.  He  suggests  an  original  way  of  distinguishing  between  the 
resurrection of rational and irrational animals: human beings will rise with their own body, 
while the beasts will rise by species and not by number (§ IV.3.1.2). Grosseteste is uncertain, 
however, if the return of the human being to the Creator will be a return to Eden, or if he will  
live in a better condition; this problem implies yet another one, namely, whether human nature 
was perfect in Adam, or whether it is perfected by the redemption. In Grosseteste’s writings, 
those two ideas remain in tension (§ IV.3.1.3). 
IV.3.1.1 Before the Commentary: a theme in the background
In the texts belonging to the pre-episcopacy period Grosseteste does not show great interest in 
the topic of resurrection. There are sermons that could have given him the occasion to deepen 
the topic, but he did not take the opportunity.  In  Sermo 75, for example, preached on All 
Saints’ Day, Grosseteste mentions the prize that saints will receive in Heaven, but the account 
is very concise. He limits himself to quoting two biblical texts that state that the prize consists 
in sitting beside God, but he does not add anything else, because it is impossible to specify in 
what this prize consists.592 The impossibility of describing the future glory reflects the real 
incapacity of our mind to describe something that goes beyond it, such as the union of God 
with human beings; however, it is possible to discuss what the Bible says on this matter. In the 
poem,  Le  château  d’amour,  written  in  the  same  years  as  Sermo 75,  Grosseteste  collects 
biblical passages about the return of Christ in the glory and final judgement.593 It is significant 
that the righteous men are said to be “glorified in body, and in soul. They will be as bright as 
591 He may have developed his doctrine on the resurrection in a treatise called De resurrectione, whose subject 
may be connected to Book IV of Lombard’s Sentences. This treatise, however, did not survive; on this, see 
Callus 1958, 192.
592 Sermo 75, 392:  “Premium autem uictorie ostendit Dominus in Apocalipsi dicens:  Qui uicerit faciam eum 
sedere mecum in trono meo sicut et ego uici et sedi cum patre meo in trono eius  (Apoc. 3,21). De isto premio 
dicit apostolus ad Chorinthios: Oculus non uidit nec auris audiuit nec in cor hominis ascendit que preparauit  
Deus diligentibus se (I Cor 2:9).” 
593 Both Sermons (those contained in the manuscript  Durham Dean and Chapter Library MS A.III.12) and Le 
Château d’Amour, were written between 1230-1232; cf. Paul 2002, 140 and Murray 1918, 64.
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the sun.”594 These two elements – the accent on the glorification of the body and the image of 
light used to describe the glory – are typical of Grosseteste’s account of resurrection, and will 
be  regularly  affirmed  across  his  career.595 No  original  perspective  is  present  even  in  the 
Hexaëmeron,  where  Grosseteste  contents  himself  with  quoting  Augustine  without  further 
discussion.596 The same happens in the De decem mandatis. The occasion for discussing the 
theme is given by the third commandment, which orders the sanctification of the Lord’s Day, 
i.e.,  the day of Jesus’ resurrection.  Grosseteste limits  himself  to quoting a long text from 
Augustine about the relationship between the resurrection of Jesus and that of human beings 
without any further explanation.597 
Why are these accounts so concise? An answer can be found in the Sermo 41.598 This 
sermon should be about the Biblical verse, “The victor shall not be harmed by the second 
death” (Revelation 2:11), but actually the second death is a pretext to discussing a related 
topic. Grosseteste dedicates the first part of this sermon to the theme of the first and second 
death, and of the first and second life.  In the wake of Augustine, Grosseteste distinguishes 
between the “first death” of human beings, which happens in this life and which consists in 
their  separation  from  God  because  of  sin,  and  the  “second  death,”  namely,  eternal 
damnation.599 In the sermon,  Grosseteste  focuses only on the first death that is caused by 
mortal  sin,  and  on  its  remedy,  i.e.,  the  sacrament  of  Confession,  a  privileged  theme  in 
Grosseteste’s writings.600 Grosseteste, therefore, considers preaching on penance a priority in 
his pastoral work, while other topics appear only in the background: his main concern is to 
preserve his flock from sin. He devotes a few words to describing the second life: in that life, 
both the body and soul, like a bride, will receive a dower (dos) from Christ, who is the groom; 
the  soul’s  gifts  are  knowledge,  fruition  and charity;  the  body’s  gifts  are  agility,  subtlety, 
clarity,  and impassibility.  Around 1230, Grosseteste  develops  this  theme in  De dotibus,  a 
treatise  that  belongs to  a literary genre very popular  in  the twelfth  century.601 This work, 
however, does not help us to reconstruct Grosseteste’s position because it is incomplete, since 
594 Le château d’amour, 177.
595 E.g. De Dotibus, 104: “Seminatur in ignobilitatem, scilicet deiformitatis et humanitatis,  surget in gloria, id 
est claritate: ad Phi 3°, Qui reformabit corpus humilitatis nostre configuratum corpori claritatis sue, et ab hac 
dote dicuntur corpora glorificata;” Dictum 2, 3ra : “Ipse te vestiet in anima claritate vultus sui et in corpore 
resurrectione lumine sicut solari.” See also Dictum 137, 112va; DN IX, M 259ra.
596 In this work, the accent is on the parallel between the general resurrection (when the souls will receive the  
glorified bodies) and the renewal of the universe expressed by the biblical expression, “new heaven and new 
earth” (Revelation 21,1). See Hexaëmeron I, xiii,1, 68 and IV, xii,3 138.
597 De decem mandatis, 37-38, cf. Augustine, Epistulae, 55, 9-13.
598 Sermo 41, 271-278.
599 E.g: Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 13,1-3. The theme of a first and second death is in Revelation 20, 5ff.
600 As stated above (§ 0.1.2) Grosseteste wrote many essays on Confession both before and after his appointment 
as a bishop. 
601 For  this genre and further bibliographical references , see Goering 1982.
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it deals only with the glorified body and not in any specific detail.602
This  period  of  Grosseteste’s  reflection  on  resurrection  is  characterized  by  a  strict 
fidelity to Augustine, and by a lack of any personal analysis. Another aspect to be noted is the 
lack in the early works of any reference to the deification of human beings. Grosseteste will 
become sensitive to these doctrines only after the encounter with the Corpus.
IV.3.1.2 The resurrection of the body
In the Commentary, Grosseteste shows a renewed interest in the topic of resurrection. It will 
be in the commentary on Book VI of the  De divinis  nominibus,  devoted to  the theonym 
“Life,”  that  Grosseteste  will  present  his  own  view.  But  throughout  the  Commentary, 
Grosseteste takes the occasion to gloss and integrate the concise Dionysian text. Grosseteste’s 
peculiar interest is in the emphasis on the place of the body in resurrection. As it appears from 
the first pages of his Commentary on the De divinis nominibus:
Ita,  inquam,  edocti  sumus  nunc  deifica  lumina,  tunc  autem  quando  incorruptibiles  et 
immortales  efficiemur,  in  gloria  videlicet  resurrectionis  et  consequemur  christiformem et 
beatissimam quietem, fulgentes videlicet  sicut  ipse sol,  et  pacificato et  obediente corpore 
omni  motui  voluntatis,  semper  cum domino,  Iesu  videlicet,  secundum eloquium,  erimus 
etiam  per  corporalem  presentiam,  nos  dico  repleti  quidem  visibili  ipsius  theophania  in 
omnino castis speculationibus, quia visu corporeo omnino ordinato et perfecto contuebimur  
ipsum hominem glorificatum.603
Dionysius  states  that  the  writers  of  the  Bible  used  symbols  to  describe  what  cannot  be 
described, but on the day when we will be united to God, that is, when we will reach a blessed 
peace (quietem) like that of Christ, we will see His manifestation (theophania) clearly as it 
happened to the Apostles during the episode of Christ’s Transfiguration. In the glory of the 
resurrection, Grosseteste explains, the human body will be in peace and obedient to every 
motion of the will. The “quiet” is also the  quiescere of the human mind in God, the quiet 
reached  once  the  human  intellect  has  climbed  the  epistemological  steps  toward  God.604 
Grosseteste also adds that “being always with the Lord” implies being bodily present.605 It is 
clear that Grosseteste’s accent is on the corporeal aspect of resurrected life, so he offers an 
interpretation that goes beyond the literal meaning of Dionysius’s text, who does not mention 
602 See Goering 1982. 94-95 and 101.
603 DN I, § 54, 154.
604 For a discussion on the steps towards God, see above § II.3.1.1.
605 In the Hexaëmeron, Grosseteste also relates “being with the Lord” to the body, because the body will occur in 
the general resurrection, when saints and blessed will “wear” new and glorified bodies. See Hexaëmeron VI, 
xii, 8, 195.
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the body. The impression is that in this place, once again, it is the bishop  Grosseteste who 
speaks  for  reaffirming  the  truth  established  in  the  fourth  Lateran  Council.  Grosseteste’s 
emphasis on resurrection and on the continuity between this life and the next one – which 
Grosseteste expresses by repeating many times phrases such as hac vita, hic participavit, and 
hic existit – depends, very likely, on the canon of the Lateran Council that required that the 
Cathars and other heretics assent to the proposition “all rise with their own individual bodies, 
that is, the bodies which they now wear.”606 
A proof  that heresy  could  be  the  background  of  Grosseteste’s  insistence  on  the 
resurrection of the body may come from the Commentary on the De ecclesiastica hierarchia. 
In the last  Book of this  treatise,  Dionysius hints  at  some unorthodox positions  about  the 
resurrection of the soul and the body.607 Grosseteste develops some comments on Dionysius’s 
text,  but  a  closer  look  shows  that  Grosseteste  is  merely  reporting  a  marginal  scholium. 
Grosseteste exposes four opinions. The most irrational is to consider the soul mortal; a more 
rational  opinion is  to  consider  the soul  immortal,  but  the body as  not  rising  from death; 
someone else holds that in resurrection the soul will be united to an ethereal body; finally, 
someone who holds  that  both  body and soul  are  immortal,  but  the  life  to  come will  be 
comparable to this life, with food and other goods.608 No argument is proposed to confute 
those positions except the authority of Dionysius. Grosseteste’s choice to insert this scholium 
in the main text of the Commentary, which can be read as his acknowledgement of heresies 
that concern the resurrection of the body and his will to reaffirm the orthodox doctrine.
The role  of body in the resurrection allows Grosseteste  to  distinguish between the 
rational  and irrational  animals  in the return to  God.  Commenting on Book VI of  the  De 
divinis nominibus, Grosseteste holds that God is the true life, and is the cause of every kind of 
life, from the highest rung of imperishable angels and human souls to the perishable ones 
belonging  to  animals  and  plants,  which  are  the  beings  furthest  from God.609 In  a  short 
digression on Dionysius’s text, Grosseteste clarifies the difference between these two kinds of 
606 Denzinger 1957, 200, n.216.
607 Cf. Dionysiaca, 1413-1416.
608 EH VII,  837,  ll.  1-16:  “Dicto  in  quibus  est  sanctorum  virorum  dormicio  subiungit  execratorum  id  est 
infidelium  diversas  de  mortuis  opiniones  quorum  quidam  ceteris  irracionabiliores  dicunt  animam  esse 
mortalem  et  dissolvi  quemadmodum  et  corpus  et  post  mortem  non  amplius  existere.  Alii  autem  velut 
racionabiliores dicunt animam esse immortalem sed corpus post mortem non amplius fore humanum corpus 
nec resurrecturum nec uniendum iterum anime cui in hac vita erat unitum quia indignum esse dicunt quod 
materiale sit coeternum anime inmateriali […]. Alii vero dicentes animas esse immortales attribuunt illis post  
mortem corpora etherea vel aerea […]. Alii autem dicentes animas esse immortales corporum resurreccionem 
futuram confitentur sed vitam illam post resurrectionem futuram dicunt fore huic nostre vite similem.”
609 DN VI, M 240vb-241ra: “Unde sequitur ex supra divina videlicet vita et anime habent indestructibile hoc est 
vitam immortalem et animalia omnia et plante secundum extremam resonationem vite vel secundum aliud 
exemplar secundum extremam resonationem anime id est secundum obscuriorem participationem vite vel 
anime habent vivere.”
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life in what concerns death and resurrection. The occasion for the digression is given by an 
allusion of Dionysius to the biblical verse: “take back their breath and they die and return to 
dust. Send out your Spirit, they are created, and you renew the face of the ground” (Psalms 
103:29f ).  Grosseteste notes that Dionysius connects the psalm to animals and plants, but 
following the interpretation of the scholium,  Grosseteste suggests that it is better to connect 
the psalm to all the bodily creatures, human beings included. According to Grosseteste, the 
meaning of the text is that every kind of life, from angels to plants, comes from God and 
without Him there is no life at all.610 Clearly, differences are present. Life can be interrupted 
either because the soul departs from the body while continuing to exist in separation from it,  
as occurs in the case of human beings, or because life abandons the body, as occurs in the case 
of animals and plants.611 
Animals and plants, therefore, die because of the loss of bodily equilibrium (defectio  
complexionis et armonie apte ad vite participationem), but when the harmony of the body is 
re-established by God at the resurrection, they will come back to life.612 After the paraphrase, 
Grosseteste departs from the text to explain in what consists the “return to life” of animals, 
and thus develops his position concerning resurrection. He states:
Est  autem  quod  hic  dicitur  “rursus  conversa  rursus  animalia  fiunt”  commune  ad  non 
eadem numero sed eadem specie ut accidet in generali  resurrectione, quod eadem materia 
corporalis numero que fuit cuiusdam hominis in hac vita, et que deficit a participatione vite 
per  infirmitatem  vite  ad  participandum  ipsa  tunc  convertetur  in  armoniam  aptam  ad 
susceptionem in unitatem personalem eiusdem anime qua hic sic participavit  et  fiet  idem 
homo numero qui hic extitit.613
According to Grosseteste, animals will be resurrected in species, while human beings will be 
so in their  own number, and with their  own flesh,  in order to form a personal unity.  The 
human soul in resurrection will receive the same body according to the number, and then the 
unity of human nature will be re-established. We have already seen what happens to human 
beings  at  resurrection;  what  is  new in  this  text,  however,  is  Grosseteste’s  remark  on the 
610 DN VI, M 241ra: “Et quod illud intelligit Dionisius in animalibus irrationalibus et plantis solum manifeste  
dicit  scolium maxime  generale  ex  greco  sumptum potest  tamen  quod hic  dici  et  predictum psalmicum 
generaliter  comprehendere  omnia  corporalia  viventia  inter  que  comprehenditur  et  homo.  Et  potest  esse  
auctoris intentio manifestare quod omne vivere creatum seu primum seu renovatum seu incorporalium ut  
angelorum et animarum seu corporalium ut hominum et irrationalium sensibilium et plantarum est a divina  
vita.”
611 DN VI,  M 241ra:  “Qua vita  videlicet  animalium et  plantarum  interempta vel  per  separationem anime a 
corpore ut in hominibus, superstite anima et vivente post separationem; vel interempta per vite  vivificantis 
corpus defictionem ut in irrationalibus et plantis.”
612 DN VI, M 241rb: “Illa inquam sic deficientia rursus conversa in complexionem videlicet et harmoniam aptam 
participationem vite rursus sunt animalia et similiter subintellige de plantis.”
613 DN VI, M 241rb.
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resurrection  of  animals.  It  is  an  important  remark  of  Grosseteste’s  to  note  because,  in 
commenting on the verse of the psalm mentioned above, he repeats four times that animals 
will  be  resurrected  in  species,  while  human  beings  will  be  resurrected  in  number. 
Grosseteste’s view appears original and stimulating, but as often happens, it is not supported 
by any actual argument. Admitting resurrection for animals is probably a consequence of their 
privileged origin.  In the  Hexaëmeron, Grosseteste discusses the creation of animals in the 
Particula VII where he comments on the verse, “Let the earth bring forth all kinds of living 
creatures” (Genesis 1:24). He writes:
Deus  enim,  sicut  nos  credimus,  animas  eciam brutorum creat  ex  nichilo  et  infundit  eas 
corporibus organicis aptatis earum recepcioni.614
Grosseteste holds that animal souls are created by God from nothing and infused into organic 
bodies that are adapted to receive them. Adopting this view, Grosseteste rejects other theories 
about the origin of non-human souls: they are not the realization of some bodily matter, which 
passes from potency to act, because from matter comes only matter; nor do they come from a 
non-bodily spiritual matter.615 This implies that the souls of animals have a spiritual being, 
which is beyond matter.616 Given this premise, Grosseteste is inconsistent when he concludes 
that  the  souls  of  irrational  animals  do  not  remain  after  the  dissolution  of  the  body,  an 
argument that follows the authority of Basil.617 This means that a spiritual being created by 
God is annihilated, but I do not think that Grosseteste would hold to this doctrine. Perhaps the  
Commentary displays a progression in his thought, namely,  his realization that the correct 
conclusion of his reasoning is that an incorporeal form, like the soul of animals, cannot be 
corrupted when the body is corrupted. However, it remains difficult to explain the resurrection 
of animals as a resurrection secundum speciem. It could be a way of saying that the species of 
an animal will be last despite the death of the individual animals, as the species is a divine  
ratio. But the spare remarks of Grosseteste allow us only to make conjectures, but not with 
any definitive stance concerning his doctrine. 
Grosseteste does not draw any philosophical consequence from his view. For example, 
614 Hexaëmeron VII, i, 2, 200.
615 Hexaëmeron VII, i, 2, 200: “Neque enim ex traduce credimus esa esse, neque eductas de potencia in actum ex 
aliqua materia corporali. De corporali enim materia non fit nisi corporeu […]. nec eciam de matria incorporea 
spiritali credimus as fieri.”
616 Hexaëmeron VII, xiii, 1, 207-208: “Omne namque animans animam habet viventem, hoc est, substanciam 
incorpoream vegetativam et sentientem.”
617 Hexaëmeron VII, xiv, 2, 211: “Habent eciam omnia irracionalia hoc commune, quod vita eorum non precedit  
corpus eorum, nec mane dissoluta a corpore. Unde Basilius ait: «Non opineris pecorum animam antiquiorem 
esse substancia corporali  illorum, neque permanentem post  carnis dissolucionem».” Grosseteste refers to 
Basil, Hexaëmeron, VIII, 2,3.
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he does not raise questions about the principle of individuation of animals or human beings. 
Nor does he discuss the problem of the continuity between the body in via and in patria. The 
editors of both the Latin and English editions have not found a specific source for his doctrine 
of  the  resurrection  of  animals.  Even  referring  to  Augustine  in  this  case  does  not  help. 
Augustine  in  fact  never  considers  animals  in  themselves,  but  he  refers  to  them only  to 
establish the dominion of human beings over them.618 We must acknowledge that the topic of 
the resurrection of animals has been neglected by the scholarship.619 The authors that  are 
usually  considered  are  the  aforementioned  Augustine  and  Thomas  Aquinas,  according  to 
whom there is no resurrection for animals and plants, neither in number, nor in species.620 A 
remote source of Grosseteste could be Plato’s Timaeus, but the translation of the Platonic idea 
of the origin of animal souls into Grosseteste’s position requires a detailed inspection of the 
different mediations that goes beyond the scope of the present work.621
 
IV.3.1.3 Back to Adam and beyond
The resurrection of the soul and the body is the human way to return to God. Speaking of 
“return” entails  a discussion about the destination,  namely,  to what exactly human beings 
return. The first answer, the one given up until this point, is that it is a return to God, who is  
also the source of everything.622 Everything comes back to God with the difference, stated 
above, that only human beings return with their bodies. The case of human beings is particular 
because the first parents, Adam and Eve, were already with God in Eden. Does the “return” 
mean to come back to the conditions of the first parents? This question implies a discussion 
618 Cf. Howell 2006, 950.
619 Even Caroline Walker Bynum (1995), in her important monograph on the resurrection of the body, does not 
develop this issue. Despite the abundant bibliography on Heaven and animals, no study seems to consider our 
topic. Non-scientific bibliography on the destiny of animals is available, but it does not touch the Middle 
Ages.  Scientific  monographs  on  Heaven  in  general,  or  especially  in  the  Middle  Ages,  do  not  take  in  
consideration animals. See e.g. Wright 2000; Emerson – Feiss 2000, McDannell – Lang 2001; Muessing – 
Putter 2007. A philosophical analysis of animals is given in Steel – Guldentops – Beuellens 1999. Another 
philosophical inquiry on animals with some historical digressions is expected in the forthcoming volume 
Adamson – Edwards 2016. A short reflection on this issue from the perspective of the intellectual history is in 
Salisbury  2014.  Unfortunately,  the  title  of  Salisbury’s  article  –  “Do  Animal  Go  to  Heaven?  Medieval  
Philosophers  Contemplate  Heavenly  Human  Exceptionalism”  –  is   quite  misleading  since  the  article 
examines only a couple of quotations from Augustine and Aquinas. 
620 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 5, a. 9. 
621 It is interesting to note that, also according to Lorenzo Valla, the animal soul is created by God. Lodi Nauta  
(2008, 378 n.35) writes that, for Valla,  the soul is “a substance, which implies that it  is «created out of 
nothing, with divine aid», rather than from «the potency of matter» (65:3-16, a section added only in the third 
version of the Repastinatio). The idea that a soul (of whatever type) would depend on or arise out of material  
body was an anathema for Valla.”
622  CH III, 113: “Opinamur quod […] sacrum significat directionem in deum tanquam in finem ultimum et  
optimum qui sicut est omnium principium ea inesse producendo sic est omnium consummatio et perfectio 
cum ad ipsum pro suo possibilitate reducuntur et revertuntur.”
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about the state of Adam in Eden, and its relationship with the Redemption. In other words, the 
problem is whether or not Adam’s union with God was perfect: in the first case, “return” 
means to come back to Adam’s condition; in the second case, it means that only after the 
Redemption is it possible to have a perfect union with God, and consequently, “return” means 
to  reach  a  better  condition  than  even  Adam experienced.  I  will  analyze  some texts  that 
advocate one view or the other. My interpretation is that Grosseteste’s hesitation to stand for 
one  position  is  due  to  his  doctrine  of  human  nature.  In  Adam,  human  nature  had  the 
potentiality to become perfect, but sin interrupted its progress. When Grosseteste speaks of 
“return” to Adam means a return to what Adam was destined to become, namely to be deified. 
Thus the return implies to overcome what Adam was in order to reach what Adam was called 
to be.
The return of human beings to God has received two interpretations across the history 
of Christianity. The first interpretation, held by the first Greek Fathers, holds that the purpose 
of the Christian life was the recovery of the immortality lost by Adam after sin.623 From the 
time of Irenaeus, a second interpretation became predominant, namely, the Fathers considered 
the promise to become like God (Psalms 82) had not been realized in the first parents because 
God  wanted  immortality  and  non-corruption  for  Adam,  but  he  failed  to  attain  them. 
Incarnation, therefore, took place in order not only to recover what Adam had lost, but also to 
complete humanity’s growth to full maturity.624 The Cappadocian Fathers, who were well-
known by Grosseteste as he read some of their works in the original Greek, explicitly held 
that human destiny is not simply a return to the original beatitude, but something greater: the 
human being, as image of God, is not only restored, but in attaining the goal for which Adam 
has been created, he becomes deified.625 
Grosseteste  also  finds  these  two  interpretations  in  the  Scripture.  If  one  looks  at 
Grosseteste’s  Tabula we find  a  sub-distinction  entitled, quod homo resurgit  a  peccato  in  
eodem vel meliori statu quam fuit ante lapsum.626 Grosseteste cites two biblical passages to 
introduce those points of views: the first is Haggai 2:9 (“The glory of this new Temple will 
surpass that of the old, says Yahweh”); the second is  Zechariah 10:6 (“I shall restore them, 
because I have take pity on them, and they shall be as though I had not cast them off”). The 
former presents the return as a move to a better condition than that of Adam, while the latter  
describes it as a coming back to the previous state. 
623 This position was expressly held by Justin and Tatian. See Russell 2004, 98-108.
624 Russell 2004, 108-110.
625 Russell 2004, 221.
626 Tabula, 282.
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In the Commentary these two views persist. Commenting on Book II of the De divinis  
nominibus, in a section about Christology, Grosseteste asserts that the incarnate Word repairs 
fallen humankind and all the universe and restores it to its original state.627 The original state 
is,  very  likely,  that  in  which  Adam  was  before  committing  sin.  This  interpretation  is 
confirmed by another passage, from the Commentary on the De ecclesiastica hierarchia: 
Ympnizacionis  enim  in  divinis  teletis  negocium  considerans  nostram  a  divinis  donis 
desolacionem intendit  revocare  nos per  divinorum bonorum perfectam participationem ad 
antiquum statum a  quo  in  primo  parente  decidimus;  et  ideo  assumit  que  nostra  hoc  est  
sensibilia utpote audibilem modulacionem ut per hanc communicacionem tradat nobis que 
sua id est divina et faciat nos dei et divinorum pro nostra susceptibilitate communicatores.628
Grosseteste  repeats  Dionysius  when  he  claims  that  the  participation  in  the  sacraments 
(especially in the Eucharist) allows participation in the state of our first parents. Through the 
sacraments, which are a prolongation of God’s salvific action realized by the incarnate Word, 
God bends Himself towards human misery and recalls every man to the dignity lost after 
Adam’s fall.629 But there is also the promise to receive something more than that, namely, to 
become like God, which is possible thanks to the Incarnation.
To  resolve  this  issue  and  decide  whether  or  not  human  beings  can  return  to  the 
condition  of  Adam,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  what  the  state  of  Adam was  in  Eden. 
Grosseteste does not say much, but from his scattered remarks we may argue that in Adam 
there was the full potentiality of human nature, but it was not actualized because of sin. Two 
elements in particular reveal Adam’s condition: the necessity to eat food (i),  and being an 
image of God (ii). According to Grosseteste, (i) the resurrected body will be different from the 
mortal one, given that it will not need food, but this does not mean that this state is beyond 
nature, for it is not beyond divine nature.630 Grosseteste’s point is that resurrection and other 
miraculous events must be considered not from the human point of view, but from God’s, and 
that  an  immortal  body  that  does  not  need  food  is  not  against  God’s  omnipotence.  The 
reference to food is not casual. It recalls Augustine’s position, according to which the need to 
eat is the proof of our destructive mutability, while in Heaven, the redeemed will not need to 
627 DN II,  M 191va:  “Dominus  Iesus  itaque  [...]  quoque  deus  et  homo  secundum theandricas  operationes 
reparans  genus  humanum  lapsum  et  rerum  universitatem  in  hominis  lapsu  deterioratam  ad  antiquam 
dignitatem in hac et ex hac omnium reparatione et reductione in suum bene esse non immerito dici potest 
omnium causa.”
628 EH III, 542, 2-8.
629 Cf. Ex rerum initiarum, 134 and Deus est, 244.
630 DN VI, M 241vb: “Mihi autem et tibi o thimothee veritati rem visam resume et divinam et super naturam. 
Excedit enim hec res nunc consuetum nature cursum, continuantis vitam per nutrimentum perpetuare autem 
non potentis, sed non excedit divinam naturam et potentiam.”
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eat. In his writings, Augustine repeatedly equates living with eating; yet he sees redemption as 
the triumph over digestion and nutrition. Eating is a sign of weakness, an act of a limited 
nature that does not possess in itself the source of life.631 Food is present at the beginning of 
creation (Genesis 2:9.16), and it will be at the end of time (Revelation 2:7). The need to eat is 
a  sign,  Grosseteste  says,  that  Adam was not  immortal,  but  that  he  was  not  even mortal,  
otherwise  God would not  have  threatened him with  becoming mortal  (e.g.,  Genesis 2:17 
states: “in the day that you eat from it you will surely die”).632 It is not clear in what consists 
Adam’s condition of being in the middle between mortality and immortality. Very likely, this 
idea comes from Augustine and Hugh of  St.  Victor  who held that  if  Adam and Eve had 
remained obedient in Eden, they would have come to immortality through eating from the 
Tree of Life.633 This idea implies a progression of Adam’s condition, and that Adam’s body 
had the potential to become incorruptible, but that it did not attain incorruptibility because of 
sin.634 
If the first point, namely, the necessity to eat in Eden, clearly presents the resurrected 
body in a better condition than that of Adam, then second point presents the contrary. The 
second  point  (ii)  again  shows  Grosseteste’s  hesitation  about  Adam’s  condition,  namely, 
whether or not he was perfect in Eden. The second element that characterizes Adam before sin 
is to be an image of God. In Sermon 41, Grosseteste affirms that the second life, that of glory, 
is infinitely more precious than the life in via. Someone could ask as to what this superiority 
consists given that already in this life, on earth, human beings are the image of their Creator. 
Grosseteste’s answer is that in the second life human beings will receive the seven dotes so 
that our body and soul will be glorified.635 To prove that this  improvement obtains in the 
afterlife, Grosseteste quotes the Pseudo-Augustine’s De spiritu et anima where it is said that 
what was created in Adam has been reformed in a more admirable way in Christ.636 In the 
Hexaëmeron, however, Grosseteste proposes another interpretation. Grosseteste explains that 
a man’s being image of God can be understood in three ways:
631 Walker Bynum 1995, 102. 
632 Deus est, 243.
633 Walker Bynum 1995, 96-125. 
634 In  the poem on the restoration of creation, Grosseteste explains that  thanks to the Incarnation, not only 
human nature, but all the universe was perfected and reached a better condition than that lived before the  
Fall: “Nature was greatly enhanced when God joined with nature so that Nature was perfected. Then was 
Nature made a hundred times more pure than ever it had been before Adam erred” (Le Château d’Amour, 
169).
635 Sermo 42, 273.
636 Pseudo-Augustine (Alcherus Clarauallensis),  De spiritu et anima, 35 (PL 40,806): “Vt quando apparuerit 
qualis  sit,  tunc  ei  similis  appareat,  qui  se  mirabiliter  ad  similitudinem  suam  in  primo  Adam  condidit, 
mirabiliusque in secundo Adam reformauit.”
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Potest  enim considerari  in substantia boni  naturalis  quod recepit a naturali  condicione; et 
potest considerari secundum quod elevatur supra bonum condicionis sue in deiformitatem per 
conversionem ad Creatoris fruicionem, qua conversione spiritu mentis innovatur et decoratur; 
potest quoque considerari a summo bono aversa et ad inferiora conversa, et si deformata.637
(a) The image of God in human beings can be considered in the substance of the natural good, 
which human beings receive from their natural condition at the moment of creation. (b) It can 
be considered according to the way human beings are raised above the good of their creation 
and are turned back to the enjoyment of their Creator, and are thus deified. (c) Finally it can 
be considered as being turned away from the highest good and turned to lower things, and are 
thus deformed. Grosseteste stresses that, despite original sin, human beings do not lose their 
natural image of God, (a) but only the renewed one (b), and that the deformed image (c) can 
be restored by the grace of the Spirit.638 Therefore, Adam, and humankind after him, conserves 
the essential feature of being the image of God, as Grosseteste affirms on the authority of 
Jerome.639 Sermon 41 and  Hexaëmeron reveal  that  there is  something that  is  beyond and 
higher than the natural state that Adam lived in Eden or the life of grace we live here on earth. 
Both texts state that the human being is destined to be renewed, but while the first text clearly 
attributes the renewed image to Christ and to the resurrected bodies, and not to Adam, the 
second text extends the renewed image also to Adam, who is said to have lost the renewed 
image but not the natural one; it thus implies that Adam was perfect before sin. 
Besides the hesitation between the hypothesis that God impressed His image in human 
beings already at the creation of Adam, or if he was called to reach this image, but he failed,  
the central point is that this image needs to be restored. The process of restoration is what 
Grosseteste, in the wake of Dionysus, calls deification.
IV.3.2 Deification and Hierarchy
According to  Grosseteste, the second life, the life of glory begins already while the human 
637 Hexaëmeron VIII, vi, 1, 227.
638 Cf. Hexaëmeron VIII, vi, 1, 227: “Naturalis itaqu imago numquam amittitur; renovata vero imago amittitur 
per peccatum; deformata vero tollitur per Spiritus Sancti graciam.” 
639 Hexaëmeron VIII, vi, 2, 228: “Quod enim naturalis imago semper maneat, docet Ieronimus sic dicens contra  
Origenem: «Inter multa mala eciam illud ausus est dicere perdidisse ymaginem Dei Adam, cum hoc in nullo  
penitus loco Scriptura significet. Si  enim ita esset,  numquam omnia que in mundo sunt servirent semini  
Adam […].»”  Grosseteste refers to Jerome, Letters, LI, 6.
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being is  on earth and it  will  be fully realized at the resurrection.  This  second life  is  the 
recovery of the image of God that human nature lost because of original sin. This process of 
recovery  means  to  participate  in  divinity  and  thus  become  deified.  First,  I  will  present 
Grosseteste’s definition of deification and how he connects it with the aim of the hierarchy 
(IV.3.2.1); second, I will explain the formal definition of hierarchy that concerns its scope 
(IV.3.2.2);  finally,  I  will  argue  that  deification  implies  an  improvement  of  human nature, 
knowledge, and will (IV.3.2.3).
IV.3.2.1 Grosseteste’s definition of hierarchia
Dionysius defines deification as follows: “theosis is the attaining of likeness to God and union 
with him so far as possible.”640 When he discusses the definition he equates deification with 
imitating God, of participating in Him, and of becoming good.641 Norman Russell explains 
that  deification means participation in the divine attribute of deity. Russell also underlines the 
idea that the concept of deification is not restricted to a Platonic attainment of a likeness to 
God,  but  in  fact  it  is  used most  frequently in  relation to  the sacraments.642 In  Dionysius, 
Russell concludes, the two meanings of deification – to imitate God and to participate in God 
– reach a synthesis.643 Grosseteste connects Dionysius’s definition of deification given in the 
De  ecclesisastica  hierarchia with  the  definition  of  hierarchy  given  in  the  De  coelesti  
hierarchia. The reason for this connection is that deification is the goal of hierarchy.
Dionysius defines hierarchy as follows:
Est quidem hierarchia, secundum me, ordinatio sacra et scientia et operatio, ad Deiforme, ut 
possibile, assimulata et ad inditas ipsi divinitus illuminationes analogice ad dei imitativum 
reducta.644
According  to  Grosseteste,  Dionysius  presents  both  a  material  and  a  formal  definition  of 
hierarchy.645 The material definition of a thing specifies how it must be constructed so as to 
640 Dionysiaca, 1090; English translation in Russell 2004, 248. For an extensive study of Dionysius’s doctrine of 
deification, see De Andia 1996.
641 See in particular Dionysiaca, 608-610; for more details see Russell 2004, 249.
642 Russell 2004, 249-50.
643 The first texts of Christianity, such as the letters of Ignatius of Antioch, that were translated by Grosseteste,  
underscores the necessity to become like God by imitating Him. Ingnatius attaches to imitation a moral value, 
namely, imitating God mean a true sequela Christi in all the aspects of Christ’s life including the martyrdom; 
see Russell  2004,  91.  Towards the end  of  the second century deification assumes a more  philosophical  
nuance and begins to be connected with the Platonic goal of attaining likeness to God; see Russell 2004, 85.
644 Dionysiaca, 785f.
645 CH III,  113: “Determinat itaque in primis ierarchiam enumerans partes ierarchiam constituens adicens et 
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perform that function, that is,  to be an efficient cause of certain effects, while the formal 
definition specifies its function, which involves a final cause. Three elements compose the 
material definition of hierarchy, namely, order, knowledge, and love.646 The formal definition 
of hierarchy coincides with the definition of  deification,  i.e.,  assimilation and union with 
God.647 First, I will discuss the formal definition before describing the material one because 
the goal  of a  hierarchy,  i.e.,  deification,  enlightens the three elements  that  compound the 
hierarchy.
IV.3.2.2 Deification and vision: the goals of the hierarchy
In  the  Commentary  on  the  De  coelesti  hierarchia,  Grosseteste  explains  that  assimilation 
means to resemble God, but he specifies that it is an imitative likeness and not a likeness of  
equality.648 Indeed, as he said in the  Hexaëmeron,  only the Son is  a perfect image of the 
Father, while human beings can only imitate God. Grosseteste is also cautious about the term 
“union.” It is love that permits human beings to be united with God, but he immediately 
specifies that to be one with God does not mean to have the same substance of God; the 
biblical  verse,  “whoever  joined to  the Lord becomes one spirit  with him” (1  Corinthians 
6:17), means that there is a sort of uniformity with God.649 He does not explain what he means 
by “uniformity” with any precision; it is a way to express the ontological difference between 
God and the creatures.
In the De ecclesiastica hierarchia, Dionysius proposes another goal for the hierarchy, 
which develops  the one given in  the  De coelesti  hierarchia.  The  purpose  of  a  hierarchy, 
Grosseteste states following Dionysius, is to enable human beings to reach five goals that can 
be considered as  one:  the  love  (dilectio)  of  God;  the cognition of  God derived from the 
knowledge of the creatures; the speculation of divine truth in things; the participation in His 
formalem ipsius  rationem et  est  hec  prima quam ponit  ierarchie  diffinitio  velut  ex  materiali  et  formali 
compacta”. 
646 EH I,  293, 2-5: “Descripsit autem in precedenti libro [i.e.  De coelesti hierarchia] simpliciter hierarchiam 
primo descripcione coniuncta ex materiali et formali, ex parte materialitatis ponens tria scilicet ordinem et 
scienciam et operacionem.”
647 CH III, 121: “Infert itaque nunc ipsam diffinitionem formalem simpliciter formaliter propositam dicens quod 
intentio ierarchie est hec videlicet assimulatio ad deum ut possibile. […] sequitur quod ierarchie intentio sit 
etiam ad deum ut possibile  unio.” EH I, 293, 2-5: “[...] ex parte formalitatis posuit assimulacionem prout 
possibile ad deum et eius imitacionem.”
648 CH III,  121:  “Non enim ut  in  superioribus  diximus est  aliquid simile  deo similitudine  equiparantie  sed  
similitudine 
solum imitativa.” On the difference between these two kinds of similitude see § IV.2.1.
649 CH III, 121-122: “Cum autem hec assimulatio sit in amore potestativo, scientia et operatione, amore autem 
unificet amantem cum amato, sequitur quod ierarchie intentio sit etiam ad deum ut possibile  unio. Amore 
namque puro sic adheret spiritus rationalis deo, quod testante domino «unus spiritus est» non per unitatem 
substantie, sed per uniformitatem, ut possibile est, ad ipsum.”
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perfections; and the pure and direct vision (visio) of Him.650 This is the order of the five goals 
given  by  Grosseteste.  But  if  we  look  at  Dionysius’s  text,  we  find  a  different  order. 
Immediately  after  love,  Dionysius  places  the  “receding  from  the  opposites”  (recessio  a  
contrariis), and then, he lists cognition, vision, and participation.651 Yet Grosseteste holds that 
the “receding from the opposites” aspect,  which he interprets  as a  receding from what  is 
opposed to God, only as a preliminary step, and not as an essential aspect of the hierarchy.652 
My interpretation is that Grosseteste changes the order of the goals in order to show more 
clearly that it  mirrors the elements of the material definition of hierarchy. Indeed, we can 
divide these five goals into three categories:  love pertains  to human will;  participation to 
being; cognition and speculation to knowledge. Vision recapitulates and perfects all the other 
goals. The two orders have in common the idea that love is the first goal of the hierarchy. 
To make sense of the order proposed by Grosseteste, I argue that it is given according 
to the cognitive aspect of the process of deification: after love, it  is what moves a human 
being  towards  God,  the  first  goal  is  the  general  cognition  of  beings;  the  second  goal  is  
speculation, understood as the human ability to ascend from the material beings to the highest  
truths;  finally,  the last  goal  is  vision,  the pure and direct cognition of God. Vision is  the 
highest level of knowledge in Grosseteste’s order. It is last on the list, thus it encapsulates 
even the participation in God’s perfections and connects the cognitive side to the appetitive 
one: the vision of God fulfils not only human knowledge, but also his will. 
The cognitive aspect of deification prevails in another text. When Grosseteste must 
explain the meaning of the expression, “assimilation to the deiform as far as possible,” he 
considers the idea that deiforme can signify two things: God Himself, who is in Himself, the 
divine form (but this aspect is not developed); or, it refers to a renewal of the rational spirit. 653 
This  conception  of  deification,  as  the  enlightenment  of  the  intelligence,  is  a  legacy  of 
Augustine.654 My interpretation of the order of the goals of deification clarifies the fact that 
Grosseteste  wants  to  keep  two  purposes  of  deification  together,  namely,  participation  in 
650 EH I,  339, 2-6: “Finis itaque ierachie est  hec quinque simul agregate videlicet: dei  et divinorum summa 
dileccio;  incorruptibiliter  ei  sacrifica  encium  cognicio,  summe  veritatis  in  entibus  speculacio,  ex  hiis 
perfeccionis participacio, dei in se nuda et pura visio, que est superperfecio summum sacians appetitutm et  
appetentem sustentans et deificans.”
651 Dionysiaca, 1091-1092.
652 EH I, 339, 6-9: “Recessio namque contrariis connumeratur cum predictis ut pars termini hierarchie eo quod 
ipsa est necessaria preparacio ad predicta que vere et essencialiter sunt terminus hierachie.”
653 CH III, 116: “ Potest autem deiforme dici ipse Deus qui est in se decor, pulcritudo, form, […]. Dicitur etiam  
deiforme, renovatio spiritus rationalis.”
654 According to Augustine indeed, says Russell (2004, 330),“imitation and deification are two aspects of the 
same process. The reward for those who imitate God is that like the spirits they come to be penetrated by  
intelligible light and enjoy perfect happiness in the participation of God.” See Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 19. 
23. 4.
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divinity,  and  the  direct  knowledge  of  God  (beatific  vision).  These  two  goals  are  both 
considered  by  Dionysius  and  Augustine,  but  the  former  emphasizes  the  aspect  of 
participation, the latter that of knowledge. These aspects need further analysis. 
IV.3.2.3 Deification as human goal and perfection
At the beginning of the De ecclesiastica hierarchia, Grossetete affirms that deification is the 
perfection of rational  creatures.655 As noted above, the five goals of the hierarchy can be 
related to the three elements of the material definition of hierarchy, namely, order, knowledge, 
and love. Now that we have explained what deification amounts to for Grosseteste, we can 
now consider the consequences of deification in each aspect of human life: being, knowledge, 
and will. 
A) Deification and Being
The first element of the definition of hierarchy is order: “order is the disposing of equal and 
unequal things, allotting to each its place [...] and this disposing becomes sacred then when it 
is directed and directs to understanding and enjoying God.”656 Deification refers to the process 
of  a  human  being’s  becoming like  God.  The  Bible  also  refers  to  human  beings  as  gods 
(Psalms 82:6). To avoid any form of pantheism, Grosseteste explains deification through the 
notion of participation. This notion allows him to maintain that human beings take part in the 
divine  nature,  while  preserving  God’s  transcendence.  At  the  same  time,  the  notion  of 
participation allows him to establish a difference and gradation amongst human beings who 
become deified. In the  Commentary on the De divinis nominibus, Grosseteste discusses the 
question of the relationship between God and human beings considered as gods. Grosseteste 
makes it clear that human beings can receive God’s being, and therefore, they can be called 
“gods.”  But  with  respect  to  them,  God  must  be  called  archideus,  namely,  the  source  of 
divinity, and superdeus, as exceeding any other god. The difference is that God has the power 
655 EH I, 294, 14.
656 CH III, 113-114: “Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique tribuens loca dispositio […] dispositio  
tunc sacra est cum dirigitur et dirigit in deum comprehendendum, et eo fruendum.”  I leave aside the other 
meaning of order, namely “a power given by God with a view to the sacred government of all who are 
subject  to  the  power”,  because  it  is  more  related  with  the  ecclesiastical  order  which  is  not  taken  in 
consideration in this chapter because of the strictly theological dimension of this idea.
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to  create  ex  nihilo,  while  the  supposed  “gods”  cannot.657 As every  kind  of  participation, 
deification does not imply that everyone participates in divinity to the same degree. God is  
uniform in giving, but each being can receive God’s form in different ways and in different 
degrees.658 Significantly, Grosseteste uses the plural “deifications,” to mark this difference. He 
makes reference to a verse from St. Paul (1 Corinthians 15:41) to corroborate his view.659
According to  Grosseteste, deification means to take part in the entire Trinity, but it 
means especially to participate in the Holy Spirit. In emphasizing the role of the Holy Spirit, 
Grosseteste goes beyond the text of Dionysius, and directly connects it with the Cappadocian 
Fathers.660 Dionysius limits himself to underscoring the role of God the Father who recalls 
everything to Him, and that of Jesus Christ through whom the return is possible. Grosseteste  
follows Dionysius, but observes that the role of the Holy Spirit, which is that of reducing the 
multiplicity to unity, must be added.661 In another text Grosseteste is more explicit: the Father 
is the source of all fatherhood, the Son of all sonship, while the Holy Spirit is the source of all  
unity  with  God  and  deification.662 If  the  Son  was  the  source  of  procession  towards  the 
creatures, for in the Word there are the exemplars of the created world, the Holy Spirit is the 
first responsible for the process of the return.
B) Deification and knowledge
The  second  element  of  the  definition  of  hierarchy  is  knowledge,  “namely  the 
understanding of truth, which is sacred when in things which have been truly understood, 
such as the vestiges and mirrors of the creator, it sees the Threefold and One itself, and the  
invisible things of the Divinity […] or understands the incarnate Word, through which alone 
657 DN II, M 191ra: “ Iesu ut astruit est omnium causa omnia ex nihilo in esse adducens quod facere non potest 
deitas a deiformitate dicta sicut dicuntur dii multi sed solummodo deitas eterna eadem patris et filii et spiritus  
sancti  indivisa trinitatis  operatione et  eadem dominum Iesu deitas  est  repletiva omnium omnia videlicet 
inesse adducta promovens consummans et conservans […] Est autem nihilominus archideus id est in se ipso 
verus  deus  id  est  principium  omnium  et  princeps  factorum  dictorum  et  superdeos id  est  omnes  deos 
excedens.”
658 EH I, 322, 1-3: “Reducimur ad deificationem hoc est dei per gratiam participationem,  uniformem ex parte 
participati ex parte autem nostra existentem in commensuracionem que secundum nos”. 
659 DN IX, M 258vb: “Deificationes enim conversorum diversorum alterae sunt et diverse ab in vicem sicut  
«altera est claritas solis et altera lunae et altera stellarum»”.
660 Among the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil employs the language of participation to state that we are sanctified 
by participation in the holiness of the Spirit, but the emphasis is on imitation, which is fulfilled through the 
practice of virtue. However, Basil holds that deification cannot be reached only through human efforts, but 
that the role of the Holy Spirit is needed; see Russell 2004, 211.
661 DN II, M 193ra: “Deus qui supersbstantialiter est deus, pater videlicet  ex quo omnia et nos in ipsum ut in 
finem videlicet supremum reducimur et unus dominus Iesus Christus ipse per quem omnia et nos per ipsum 
et subintellige et spiritus sanctus in quo omnia unus.”
662 DN II, M 189va: “Sicut a patre secundum apostolum omnis paternitas in celo et in terra est et nominatur sic 
et a filio omnis filiatio et spiritu sancto omnis unio cum deo et deificatio.”
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there is reraising (reductio) and recall (revocatio) to the Father.”663 If participation is a feature 
that concerns every being, knowledge concerns only the rational souls. Saints and the blessed 
are destined to see God. The content and the modalities of this knowledge are known as the 
topic of “beatific vision.”Grosseteste takes this topic seriously to the point that he dedicates 
one  of  the  rare  excursus  in  the  Commentary to  discussing  beatific  vision.664 Grosseteste 
correctly interprets Dionysius as identifying the object of the heavenly vision with a created 
theophany emanating from the divine essence. Grosseteste does not attack Dionysius directly, 
nor does he try to reconcile Dionysius’s doctrine with the Latin doctrine, according to which 
the blessed will see God as He is, without any medium.665 Grosseteste takes the side of the 
Latin view because in the paraphrase he does not mention the theophany, but he identifies the 
Dionysian theophany with the glorified humanity of Christ.666 That human beings will see 
God face-to-face is an inheritance from Augustine, which is a pillar doctrine that Grosseteste 
knew and endorsed long before the  Commentary.667 The authority of Dionysius simply does 
not influence Grosseteste on this point.
C) Deification and will
Finally  Grosseteste  explains  the  third  element  of  hierarchy  and  says  that  it  “is  sacred 
operation, directed to God or directing other things to Him. And because love is a gravitation 
and placing of rational essence, not only placing the one who loves, but also the things loved 
by him […] we think in the term ‘order’ the author wished love to be included. […] But there  
is  nothing  else  but  love,  and  especially  love  which  is  endued  with  power,  knowing  and 
working.”668 Grosseteste identifies operation with love, but love is not only the third element 
that compounds the material definition of hierarchy, but it is also what gathers the other two 
elements, order and knowledge, and perfects them. 
We already underscored the pivotal role of love in Grosseteste’s theology, but in this 
context  I  want  to  underline  a  new  aspect,  namely,  the  place  of  love  in  the  process  of  
663 CH III, 114: “Altera pars est scientia, comprehensio videlicet veritatis que tunc sacra est cum in rebus vere 
comprehensis sicut in creatoris vestigiis et speculis, ipsum trinum et unum et invisibilia divinitatis […] aut 
verbum incarnatum per quod solum est reductio et revocatio ad patrem.”
664 The detachment of Grosseteste from Dionysius is noted by McEvoy  (1982, 93-95; 248-256).
665 See  DN I,  §51, 153: “sine velaminibus omnia nude conspiciemus.” Grosseteste uses also the expressions 
“sine fantasmatibus” (EH II, 405, 6) and “sine imaginibus” (DN VII, M 247,va).
666 Ruello 1959, appendix 2, 171.
667 Le Château d’amour, 179: “When we are glorified, we will plainly see how he is three in trinity, one God 
alone in unity, of whom, by whom, at in whom are all things that are found in heaven.”
668 CH III, 115: “Tertio vero pars est operatio sacra in deum videlicet directa seu dirigens in ipsum et alia. Et  
quia amor  est  pondus et  collocatio  rationalis  essentie  non solum ipsum amantem, sed  et  amata  ab ipso  
[...]existimamus quod in nomine ordinis voluit auctor amorem comprehendi […]. Non est autem aliud quam 
amor ex maxime potestativus sciens et operans.”
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deification.669 Grosseteste  describes  love  as  “the  form  which  perfects  hierarchy,  namely 
assimilation  to the deiform as far as possible,  which form is reraising or upraising to the 
imitation of God, imitating Him in proportion to the divine enlightenments given to it.”670 
According to the Greek and the Latin Fathers, the imitation of God and the participation in 
His  divinity  are  equally  important,  but  they  stressed  either  one  or  the  other  aspect.671 
Grosseteste tries to hold the two aspects together, and thus resorts to the concept of imitation 
in order to counter-balance Dionysius’s preference for participation. This is a case that clearly 
illustrates Grosseteste’s technique of commenting on texts: Grosseteste paraphrases the text of 
Dionysius, but also adds elements that are derived from other sources with no effort to make a 
synthesis. Let us consider more closely the text quoted from Grosseteste’s  Commentary on 
the De coelesti hierarchia. 
The word “union,” which appears in Dionysius’s definition of deification, does not 
recur  in  Grosseteste’s  paraphrase,  and  is  substituted  by  the  word  “imitation.”  The  same 
happens in a passage from the  Commentary on the De ecclesiastica hierarchia, and in the 
same  context,  namely,  that  of  the  definition  of  hierarchy.  There  Grosseteste  explains 
assimilation  in  terms  of  imitation,  but  no  mention  of  union  is  given.672 The  fact  that 
Grosseteste uses the word “imitation” instead of “union” can be the result of a problem of 
translation. In a passage from his Commentary on the De mystica theologia, Albert the Great, 
for example, observes that Dionysius invites his friend Timothy to strive upwards towards 
imitation of God, but he points out that there is another translation that substitutes “union” in 
place of “imitation.”673 It is very likely that the word, “union,” comes from another version of 
Sarrazin’s  translation  of  the  Corpus since  it  is  not  present  in  the  common  version.674 
Grosseteste reads correctly “union” in that instance,  but Albert’s remark may suggest that 
there  was  a  manuscript  tradition  where  the  word  “union”  was  replaced  with  the  word 
“imitation,” perhaps to neutralize Eriugena’s translation that used “unity” (unitas) to translate 
henosis, which would provide a “dangerous” description of the relation between the deified 
669 See § II.3.2.
670 CH III, 115: “[...] forma que perficit ierarchiam scilicet assimulatio ad deiforme prout possibile que forma est 
reductio  seu  sursum ductio  ad  dei  imitationem imitantem eum proportionaliter  ad  inditas  ipsi  divinitus 
illuminationes.”
671 See Russell 2004, 83-85.
672 EH I, 294, 16 – 295, 4: “Auctor […] ex parte formalitatis posuit assimulacionem prout possibile ad deum et  
eius imitacionem […] Dei enim pro possibilitate [in operibus imitacio, imitante deificat in qualitatibus], pro 
possibilitate assimulatio divinum constituit et direccio et intencio in deum que est sacracitas in deo maentem 
facit”. The sentence between brackets is not in Hogan edition, but is in  Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 
1620, 116a, l.28. This case of homeoteleuton, along with some other errors, shows how a critical edition of 
all Grosseteste’ commentaries on the Corpus is needed. 
673 Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysii De mystica theologia et epistulas, I, 456, 52.
674 See Dionysiaca, 568.
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man and God.
It  is,  however,  probable  that  Grosseteste’s  use  of  imitation  in  the  paraphrase  is  a 
deliberate choice. In the quoted text from the Commentary on the De coelesti hierarchia about 
love  and  imitation,  an  element  worth  noting,  is  that  Grosseteste  endows  imitation  with 
cognitive value such that there is no room in him for devotional implications. To imitate God 
exclusively means to receive His light. Grosseteste does not mention imitating Jesus’ life, 
deeds, or words. This kind of texts may confirm Southern’s interpretation that Jesus’ life and 
sufferings are absent in Grosseteste’s theology.675 However, Grosseteste is aware that imitation 
also has a volitional aspect because every human being must conform his own life to that of 
Jesus. The topic of free will, which was central in the first phase of Grosseteste’s production, 
also left a mark on Grosseteste’s interpretation of Dionysius. Grosseteste conceives of free 
will as the power that God confers to humankind to become like Him.676 The return to God is 
not possible without a free decision, and this is why even the detachment from God is due to a 
voluntary action and not only because of the weak human condition.677
Grosseteste’s  emphasis on  imitation  and free  will  prevents  him from reducing the 
process  of  deification  to  the  metaphysical  (partaking  in  divine  nature)  or  cognitive 
(enlightening) aspects that are nevertheless predominant. To become like God requires the 
exercise  of  the  virtues  noted  by  Basil.678 This  leads  us  to  another  point:  virtue  is  a 
characteristic of the life of grace lived in via. Deification is a process that begins in this life 
and culminates in the afterlife. The practice of virtues and the exercise of love, therefore, is 
the line that connects the two kinds of life, in via and in patria, and this explains why the soul 
and  body  will  be  completely  transformed  in  the  glorious  life  together  with  the  other 
theological virtues (faith and hope). Love, by contrast, will not be transformed, but merely 
perfected.679
675 See Southern 1986, 217.
676 DN VIII,  M  252ra:  “Et  dat  ipsam  deificationem rationales  videlicet  creaturas  ad  sui  conformitatem 
reducendo. Ipsa dico divina virtus  tribuens deificatis virtutem seu potentiam in hoc seu ad hoc ut videlicet 
deificentia.  Tribuit  enim divina  virtus  rationalibus  arbitri  libertatem quae  potentes  sunt  in  praesente  ens 
divino lumine in dei conformitatem confingere.”
677 EH II, 419, 11-17: “Deus qui omnia bene ordinat facit angelos primo sui cognitores […]; sic et in hominibus 
facit eos naturali appetitu reverti supra seipsos ut propria agnoscant naturam in quo et frequenter occurrit eis  
quam  infirmi  sunt  non  solum  ex  condicione  nature  sed  ex  propria  accione  et  defectu  et  a  vero  bono 
elongacione.”
678  On Basil’s doctrine of deification, see Russell 2004, 208-213.
679 Sermo 42, 272. It becomes more comprehensible that a few years after the  Commentary, Grosseteste was 
more interested in ethics and devoted his efforts to the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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IV.4 Conclusion
This chapter shows that the unity between the Creator and the creatures is a theme that is  
central in Grosseteste, but he develops it more thoroughly during his episcopacy. In human 
beings, the creation is unified, according to the doctrine of microcosmism, but only when the 
Creator and the creatures are united in incarnation, an event which, for Grosseteste, assumes a 
cosmic significance: the unity of the universe becomes complete. If Jesus died for human 
salvation,  He assumed flesh to  restore the  whole  universe.  Human beings’ return  to  God 
begins in this life by living a virtuous life and participating in sacraments, and culminates at 
the time of resurrection. Grosseteste is not always consistent about the conditions of human 
beings in the afterlife: he is uncertain if the return of the human being to the Creator will be a 
return to Eden, or if he will live in a better condition. The first Latin Fathers believed that the 
life  of  the  resurrected  is  strictly  connected  with  the  present  life.  Grosseteste  shares  their 
optimism by adopting their views about the goodness of creation: in Adam, human nature had 
the  potential  to  become perfect,  but  sin  interrupted  the  progress,  thus  returning to  Adam 
means  to  return  to  what  Adam  was  destined  to  become,  namely,  to  be  deified.  The 
Commentary inaugurates  a  new period  of  Grosseteste’s  reflection  on  this  topic  with  the 
introduction the doctrine of deification derived from Dionysius and other Greek sources along 
with  Augustine.  Deification  implies  that  every  aspect  of  the  human  being  is  modeled 
according  to  the  image  of  God:  being  (partaking  of  divinity,  through  the  Holy  Spirit), 
knowledge  (seeing  God  directly,  without  any  medium,  against  Dionyius’s  doctrine  of 
theophania), and will (perfecting love). Deification is the goal of hierarchy, and this also leads 
Grosseteste to attack the ecclesiastical corruption: the lives of the hierarchs must witness the 
assimilation and union with God, as their sin is not only a simple moral defection, but also 
undermines the very foundation of the Church.680
680  Robert Grosseteste at the Papal Curia, 382-385.
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CONCLUSION 
In 1235, Robert Grosseteste, a teacher of theology at the Franciscan school of Oxford, 
was elected bishop of Lincoln, the largest diocese of England at that time. His pastoral duty 
required that he quit the teaching that he began only few years before (1229/30). During his 
regency  as  master  of  theology,  Grosseteste  wrote  theological  essays  and  biblical 
commentaries, but not a comprehensive work, a summa. It is likely that he was preparing a 
commentary  on  the  Sentences of  Peter  Lombard,  which  testifies  to  Grosseteste’s  will  to 
organize his theological teaching in a systematic form.
Even  after  his  appointment  as  bishop,  Grosseteste  did  not  abandon  the  idea  of  a 
creating a systematic work in theology. Yet as he was no longer a teacher, but a pastor, the 
project of writing a summa for his students was abandoned. In the short years following his 
election as bishop, Grosseteste bought Greek manuscripts of the Corpus Dionysiacum, a work 
that he had know for some time, as I have demonstrated. I have shown that Grosseteste’s work 
as translator and commentator of the Corpus is immense: his knowledge of the previous Latin 
versions of the Corpus is evident, and even more so when he confronts those texts with the 
original Greek writings. His method of translating allows the Greek to shine through his use 
of Latin, but he does not bewilder the reader with abstruse Latin, but he labors to convey the  
original meaning of the text through commentaries of his translations. Moreover Grosseteste 
translates the scholia, attributed to Maximus the Confessor, which contain not only linguistic, 
but also historical notes that may help the reader approach the text with a Greek mind.
The question that spurred my research on has been: what was it that moved Grosseteste 
to  so great  an undertaking at  a time when his life  was already filled with every kind of 
vexation  and  administrative  drudgery?  There  are  many  possible  answers.  In  the  present 
dissertation I have demonstrated that Grosseteste used the Commentary to elaborate a sort of 
summary  of  theology.  This  summary  is  based  on  the  three  moments  of  the  First  Cause 
indicated  in  the  prologue  of  the  Hexaëmeron and  the  Deus  est. It  refers to  the  triadic 
movement  of  the  First  Principle  (remaining-procession-return).  In  Grosseteste’s  eyes,  the 
Corpus develops this triad that was central to his theology, but that he was not able to deepen 
during his teaching. According to this triad, God can be considered as He is in Himself, in his 
absolute transcendence (in particular in  De mystica theologia and De divinis nominibus), as 
the principle of the creation from which everything flows, and that leaves His similitude and 
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image on it (in particular in De divinis nominibus and De coelesti hierarchia); as the ultimate 
goal of creation to whom everything tends and desires to return. In this scheme is possible to  
inscribe the whole theological production of Grosseteste  (in particular in  De ecclesiastica  
hierarchia and in De coelesti hierarchia). At the end of my analysis, it is possible to retain the 
following points  as  determinant  for  Grosseteste’s  theological  evolution  from the  teaching 
period to the episcopacy years.
(1) The first moment of the triad is that of remaining (manentia), namely, to consider 
God  qua God in His absolute transcendence.  I argued that,  during his years as master of 
theology,  Grosseteste  refers  to  God’s  transcendence  by  the  Anselmian  formula  id  quo 
maius... .  Grosseteste applies Anselm’s definition of God both to intellect and will such that 
God works out to be not only that than which nothing greater can be thought, but also that 
than which nothing greater can be loved. There is a direct proportionality between knowledge 
and love: the more ordered the mind’s desires are to God’s will, the more opportunity a person 
has to gain certain knowledge of God. This does not imply, however, that even if a human 
being had the  right  degree  of  love  and faith  that  it  would  be  possible  for  him to  know 
everything about God. Despite all the efforts that one could make in investigating God, there 
will be always something hidden from his sight. Not only does intellectual knowledge alone 
prove to be insufficient in theology, but language also shows its limits if it is not supported by 
faith. The fundamental problem of theological language is how we can speak about God that 
is totally transcendent, and at the same time, to describe how, and if, it is possible to speak 
meaningfully of Him. Before the Commentary, Grosseteste incidentally encounters this issue. 
Grosseteste explicitly denies that attributes such as “free” or “being” are said univocally of 
God and creatures, but they are not completely equivocal names. More specifically,  those 
attributes are said in a prior and a posterior sense.
In  the  Commentary, Grosseteste  reflects  more  extensively  on  God’s  absolute 
transcendence.  His  way  of  expressing  God’s  remaining  in  Himself  is  to  define  Him  as 
unknowable and ineffable. As it happened in the previous writings, both the side of cognition 
and that of language are involved in the task of approaching the One. Grosseteste presents 
many steps to ascend to God: knowledge of God through material things; direct knowledge of 
God  without  phantasm;  and  ignorance  of  God  in  the  mystical  union. I argued  that  the 
possibility of being illuminated is not only a privilege of some mystics and the blessed, as is 
commonly held, but it can also be experienced by the ecclesiastical hierarchs. For Grosseteste, 
God is called “ignorance” no matter how clear and direct human knowledge could become 
because He is incomprehensible to us. If our theological knowledge is limited, however, love 
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alone is capable to lead us to the core of the Godhead; there can be an unbounded love, but 
not an unbounded knowledge of God. 
Grosseteste develops his doctrine of theological predication in the Commentary more 
than in any other work. He affirms that there are not names that signify God’s transcendence 
because the only way to access Him is causality. There is a method, however, that is more 
suitable,  namely,  to  praise  Him by  removing  all  names  from  Him.  Passing  through  the 
hierarchy of beings, Grosseteste reaches the peak of this ascensional path where no name is 
attributed, even the Trinitarian names. This is why privative names like “invisible,” “infinite,” 
and  “incomprehensible”  are  particularly  appropriate  to  God  because  they  simply  deny 
something.  There  is,  however,  a  name  that  is  supposed  to  signify  God’s  essence,  the 
Tetragrammaton, but after closer analysis I can conclude that it is not a name since it cannot 
be uttered and understood.
(2) God as cause, or as Creator, was certainly the main topic of Grosseteste’s early 
writings.  I  discussed  the  moment  of  procession  (processio)  by  analyzing  Grosseteste’s 
definition, “God is the first form of everything.” This definition, used in the works written 
before the Commentary, indicates the proximity of God to creatures by virtue of His universal 
causality.  Grosseteste aims to give an interpretation of this definition that avoids any risk of 
pantheism, thus he states that God is the form of everything, but not as a substantial part of 
creatures  or  as  a  complement  of  matter.  Grosseteste  intends  to  use the  term form as  the 
condition  for  the  existence  of  every  other  being,  which,  consequently,  depends  on  It. 
According to Grosseteste, if God is form, it is necessarily the first form because nothing is  
prior  to  God.  I  noticed  a  tension between  the  account  given  in  the  Commentary  on the 
Posterior Analytics and that given in the  Hexaëmeron: in the first work, Grosseteste claims 
that there are mediators in the work of creation (the Platonic Ideas), while in the latter, he 
denies  this  possibility.  My  interpretation  is  that  Grosseteste  passes  from  a  “Platonic” 
explanation of the Ideas to the view according to which the archetypal world is identical with 
the Verbum because of some insurmountable difficulties the Ideas jeopardize God’s simplicity 
(because they put a multiplicity in Himself) and God’s omnipotence (because they imply that 
God is not mighty enough to create alone). The doctrine of God as form of everything does 
not only imply that He is present – essentially, presentially, and potentially – in everything, 
but also that He imprinted the forms contained in His ideas in everything.
In the  Commentary,  Grosseteste again tackles the issue of divine ideas and tries to 
affirm  the  view  that  he  held  in  his  previous  writings.  Grosseteste  adopts  the  view  of 
Dionysius, according to whom the ideas in God’s mind are the model of a created thing, and 
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they are worthy to be worshiped because they are nothing other than God Himself. However, 
Grosseteste, unlike Dionysius, does not reject the idea of some created and creative cause of 
reality that can be called exemplar; what he instead emphasizes is the created nature of those 
principles. Grosseteste’s doctrine of exemplars has consequences for the relationship between 
the eternal reasons and the created world.  The first is that the plurality of the reasons does not 
entail a plurality in God, but that it is the cause of the plurality in the reality; the second is that 
the plurality of reasons explains the difference among the creatures; the third is that created 
beings depend completely on the exemplars because, in itself, the created world does not have 
subsistence. 
Grosseteste’s consideration of God proceeding towards the creatures has a deep impact 
on his doctrine of theological language. God has many names since He is the cause of every 
creature. Such a multiplicity of names does not mean that all the divine names have the same 
significance and importance in theology. There are some names that express God in a better 
way just like, at the ontological level, there are some beings that participate more intensively 
in God’s eternal reasons.  In the  Commentary, the theonym “Good” replaces the primacy of 
“Being” stated in the Hexaëmeron: “Good” is the first divine name because not only does it 
designate a procession, namely, something that proceeds from God to the creatures (such as 
being, life, wisdom and so on), but it also comprehends any other procession.
(3) After considering God as He is in Himself, and as the cause of the created world, in 
the last chapter I examined Grosseteste’s position on God considered as the ultimate goal of 
creation  (reversio).  For  Grosseteste,  the  return  of  the  creation  to  God is  possible  if  two 
assumptions are admitted: the first is that everything is comprehended in some way in human 
nature since the human soul partakes in the spiritual nature, as the angels do, while the human 
body partakes in matter, such as the other bodily creatures. With respect to the Creator, a 
human being is an image and a likeness; with respect to creation, the human being is in some 
way all  things.  The  second  assumption  is  that  the  Incarnation  of  the  Son completed  the 
universe and united the nature of Creator with that of the creatures, for He is God and man at 
the same time. The return of human beings to God begins in this life, or what Grosseteste calls 
the “life of grace,” which consists in the practice of virtues. Grosseteste develops this aspect  
in connection with the sacrament of confession. The “second life” is that of glory, the blessed 
experience after the resurrection, and this has been the focus of my research. In the writings 
that date before his episcopal period, the topic of resurrection is not among Grosseteste’s first 
interests.
In  the  Commentary,  Grosseteste’s  emphasizes  the  presence  of  the  body  in  the 
190
resurrection, which allows him to distinguish between the rational and irrational animals in 
the return to God. Speaking of “return” entails a discussion about the destination, namely, to 
what exactly human beings are said to return. In some texts, Grosseteste interprets “return” as 
coming back to Adam’s condition; in other texts, it means that only after the redemption is 
possible can a perfect union with God be possible, and consequently, “return” means to reach 
a better condition than Adam experienced. This tension can be resolved if we consider that,  
according  to  Grosseteste,  human  nature  had  the  potential  to  become  perfect,  but  Adam 
interrupted the progress. When Grosseteste speaks of the “return” to Adam, he means a return 
to what Adam was destined to become, namely, to be deified. The concept of deification is 
strictly  connected  with  that  of  hierarchy.  According  to  Grosseteste,  Dionysius  presents  a 
material and a formal definition of hierarchy. Three elements compose the material definition 
of hierarchy, namely, order, knowledge, and love. The formal definition of hierarchy coincides 
with  the  definition  of  deification,  i.e.,  assimilation  and  union  with  God.  In  his  account, 
Grosseteste  holds to  two aspects  of deification at  the same time,  namely,  participation in 
divinity  (derived from Dionysius),  and the  direct  knowledge  of  God (derived  from from 
Augustine). Deification has consequences in each aspect of human life: being, knowledge, 
and will. More specifically, deification means to take part, according to different degrees, in 
the divine nature; it means also to see God as He is without any medium; finally, it means that 
love, which is the line that connects the life in via and in patria, will be perfected.
As I announced in the Introduction, my dissertation is only a first step in filling the 
blank sector in Grosseteste’s scholarship because further investigation is needed to provide a 
comprehensive account. To be more specific, two issues need to be analysed. The first is the 
problem of evil. From the Christian perspective, the Fall of the first parents is placed between 
Creation  and  Redemption.  The  relevance  of  this  problem  in  the  medieval  debate  is 
undisputed, and Dionysius, together with Augustine, is one of the authorities on that matter. 
Grosseteste’s scholars have not paid attention to that issue because it is treated quickly in 
other works. The Preamble of Deus est shows that it is a central topic of his theology, but as it 
happened for other issues, he had no time to develop it during his teaching of theology. The 
edition and the study of the Commentary on the De divinis nominibus will show that it was 
not secondary at all in Grosseteste’s mind, but that he developed his theodicy in the second 
part of Book IV. The second point that needs further investigation is Grosseteste’s relationship 
with other Dionysian commentators. This point can be divided in two. First, it is important to 
confront Grosseteste with possible sources such as Eriugena and Hugh of St. Victor for the 
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Commentary on the De coelesti hierarchia, and Thomas Gallus for the entire Corpus. James 
McEvoy has written about Grosseteste and Thomas Gallus and their Commentaries on the De 
mystica  theologia,  but  more  analyses  are  necessary  to  have  a  complete  view  of  the 
relationship between these authors. Second, the influence of Grosseteste’s Commentary upon 
succeeding Dionysian commentators should also be taken into account.
The purpose of my dissertation has been to create an unedited understanding of the 
influence of the Corpus on Grosseteste’s theology. At the end of this work, I realize that my 
scope in the background was more ambitious, namely, to present the essential structure of 
Grosseteste’s  theology  as  such  by  taking  his  entire  oeuvre  into  account.  I  conclude  my 
analysis  with  the  same  caution  that  characterized  Grosseteste  in  interpreting  Dionysius 
because I am aware that this work goes beyond my weakness: Labor enim iste vires excedit  
nostre imbecillitatis.681
681
DN I, § 82, 167.
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APPENDIX 
Roberti Grosseteste Commentarium super De divinis nominibus
The following text is a provisional edition of Grosseteste’s Commentary on the De  
divinis nominibus  Book V and Book VII. This edition is based on the transcription of ms. 
Oxford, Merton College 86 (M), one of the oldest and more reliable manuscripts: Book V is at 
fols. 231vb – 240rb, Book VII at fols. 242vb – 249va. The transcription has been checked 
against  the  mss.  Paris,  Bibliothèque  Nationale,  lat.  1620  (L),  and  Paris,  Bibliothèque 
Mazarine, A v. 129 (Mz), only in the cases of ms. M does not make sense of Grosseteste’s text 
or it contains an omission.682
Dionysius’s text has been italicized to distinguish it from Grosseteste’s commentary. 
Grosseteste’s translation of the Corpus Dionysiacum, based on L, has been edited by Philippe 
Chevallier in Dionysiaca. Where necessary, I also checked the transcription of Dionysiaca and 
corrected  against  M.  The  ms.  Mz,  instead,  contains  only  the  commentary.  I  have  not 
transcribed the numerous scholia that appear in mss. M and L.
Regarding the  sources,  in  the  notes, I  only  identified  explicit  sources,  biblical 
references and the other extant Latin translations (Hilduin, Eriugena, Sarrazin), referred to by 
Grosseteste as ‘alia lectura’ or ‘aliud exemplar’.  I  also note the occurrences of the other 
translations that are not present in Dionysiaca.
I employed the system of modern punctuation. Grosseteste’s style is characterized by 
long, involved periods of a page or more, interrupted by a complex parenthetical expression. I 
used upper-case letters at the beginning of a sentence, and for the first letter of a title, a proper 
name,  and  the  divine  names  Deus,  Pater,  Filius and  Spiritus  Sanctus.  I  followed  the 
orthography of M.
682
For a description of these mss. see Thomson 1940, 57.
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Capitulum Quintum: De ente, in quo et de exemplis
(Dionysiaca 321-327) <231vb> Transeundum autem nunc ad vere exsistentem ad vere  
entis  theologicam  substantiae  nominationem.  Tantum  autem  subrememorabimus  quam683 
sermoni intentio non  super substantialem substantiam, secundum quod supersubstantialis,  
manifestare  ineffabile  enim  hoc  et  incognitum   est  et  omnino immanifestabile  et  ipsam 
superexcellens unionem, sed substantificum in entia omnia thearchice usiarchie processum  
laudare. Etenim per-se-boni divina nominatio totos omnium causae processus  manifestans, et  
in entia et in non entia extenditur et super entia et super non entia est. 
Quae autem entis in omnia entia extenditur et super omnia entia est. Quae autem vite  
in  omnia  viventia  extenditur  et  super  viventia  est.  Quae  autem   sapientiae  in  omnia  
intellectualia et rationalia684 et sensitiva extenditur et super omnia haec est. Has igitur sermo  
laudare  desiderat  providentiae  manifestativas  divinas  nominationes;  non  enim  enarrare  
ipsius  supersubstantialem  bonitatem  et  substantiam  et  vitam  et  sapientiam  ipsius  
supersubstantialis deitatis repromittit, super omnem bonitatem et deitatem et substantiam et  
vitam  in  absconditis,  ut  eloquia  aiunt,  supercollocatam,  sed  expressam  bonificam 
providentiam superexcellenter bonitatem, et omnium bonorum causam laudat et ens et vitam  
et sapientiam, substantificam et vivificam et sapientiae datricem685 causam substantia et vita  
et intellectu et ratione et sensu participantium.
Non aliud autem esse per se bonum aiunt, et aliud ens et aliud vitam aut sapientiam,  
neque multas causas et aliorum alias adductivas deitates, superexcellentes et subiectas, sed  
unius Dei totos bonos processus, et a nobis laudatas divinas nominationes; et hanc quidem  
esse  omnino  perfecte  unius  dei  providentie  manifestativam,  has  autem  universaliorum  
eiusdem et particulariorum.
Licet videri posset quod Deus esset primo laudandus per nominationem686 entis quia 
ens  est  primum  et  generalissimum  nominum  tamen,  propter  superius  <232ra> tactas  et 
inferius  tangendas  rationes,  preposuit  auctor  dicere  laudem  deitatis  ex  nomine  bonitatis. 
Laudato itaque primo Deo ut per se bono et deinceps ut lumine, pulcro et ut aliis per se bono, 
consequenter necessario ad iungendis transit ad laudem ipsius ex nominatione entis dicens 
transeundum  autem  nunc  ad  vere  existentem  seu  vere  entem  theologicam substantie seu 
683 quam] quia Dyonisiaca
684 rationalia] rationabilia Dionysiaca
685 datricem] datione Dionysiaca
686 nominationem] ordinationem M
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essentie nominationem vere entis id est Dei qui solus vere et per se est nullo modo ab alio ens. 
Theologia enim nominat  Deum nomine entis  cum introducit  ipsum  dicentem ad Moysen: 
“Ego sum ens”,687 pro quo latini interpretes dicunt: “Ego sum qui sum”. Et est hec nominatio 
theologica vere existens substantie nominatio vere entis cum hanc nominationem sibi attribuit 
qui vere est, qui solus sui substantiam et essentiam que et quid et ut est in seipsa vere et 
perfecte intelligit. In sermone autem humano non manifestat ipsam substantiam divinam que 
et  quid  et  ut  est  in  se,  sed  manifestat  eius  bonificum  processum  ad  entia  ab  ipso 
supersubstantialiter ente. Volens igitur auctor laudare Deum per nomen entis, secundum quod 
illud intelligit dictum de Deo humanus intellectus et non secundum quod illud intelligit ipse 
Deus hoc nomine se nominans, (quia sic est ineffabile et incomprehensibile), commonefacit in 
primis super hac intentione sua auditorem dicens: Tantum autem  subrememorabimus id est in 
memoriam  auditorum  constituemus  quam sermoni  nostro videlicet  presenti  intentio est 
videlicet  non manifestare per  nomen  entis  videlicet  substantiam supersubstantialem 
secundum  quod  supersubstantialis id  est  substantiam  divinam  secundum  quod in  seipsa 
incomparabiliter  excedit  omnem substantiam.  Hoc enim id  est  quid  est  supersubstantialis 
substantia secundum quod talis est  ineffabile et incognitum et omnimode inmanifestabile et  
superexcellens ipsam  unionem id  est  ipsam  mentis  et  intelligentiae  revocationem  et 
abstractionem ab omni eo quod est et recollectionem sui in se et unitam intentionem in ipsum 
qui  est  super  omnem  unitatem.  Ita  inquam  non  est  nostro sermoni intentio  manifestare 
divinam substantiam in se,  quia hoc est  super sermonem et cognitionem et  intelligentiam 
quantumcumque688 unitam, sed intentio est, resume, laudare per entis videlicet nominationem 
substantificum id  est  substantie  factivum  processum  thearchice  usiarchie id  est  divine 
principalis causae omnis substantie in omnia entia.
Nomen enim entis dictum de Deo, prout intelligi potest a nobis, significat processum id 
est operationem divinam qua adducit in esse omnia entia. Quod autem et nomen boni de quo 
predictum est, et nomen entis de quo nunc dicit, et nomen vite, et nomen sapientie de quibus 
subsequenter689 dicit,  dicta  de  Deo  significant  nobis  divinos  processus  et  quos  divinos 
processus <232rb> manifestat consequenter. Boni enim nominatio comprehendit et manifestat 
generaliter omnes et totos processus id est operationes deitatis omnia causantis in omnia et 
tota causata, et etiam in non entia, ea in entia vocando et producendo et in sui designationem 
ea ordinando, et omnia mala, que in quantum mala non entia sunt, intuitu suo dissipando. Et 
687  Exodus 3:14.
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propter hanc generalem manifestationem merito preponitur690 laus divina per nominationem 
bonitatis  ei  que  fit  per  nominationem entis691 vel  alias  nominationes;  ea  enim que  entis 
nominatio extendit  se in  omnia entia  secundum quod entia  sunt,  et  ea que vite  in  omnia 
viventia in quantum talia, et ea que sapientie in omnia apprehensiva. Et si enim omnia in 
sapientia fecerit  Deus in  apprehensivis tamen potentiis  plus refulget divina sapientia  et ei 
vicinius appropinquant.  Quasi igitur diceret  bene intendit  sermo  laudare processus deitatis 
inquantum causantis  substantias  et  essentias per  nomen entis  et  non divinam substantiam 
secundum quod est in se.  Subiungit:  Etenim divina nominatio per se boni manifestans totos  
processus cause omnium extenditur per significationem videlicet totorum processuum  et in  
entia  et  in  non  entia et est  in  se  videlicet  super  entia  et  super  non  entia.  Sive  enim 
intelligantur  per692 ‘non  entia’  ea  que  pure  sunt  non  entia,  sive  materialia,  inquantum 
materialia et quodammodo entia et quodammodo vero non entia, sive corporalia, que respectu 
incorporalium quasi  non  sunt693,  sive  mala  que inquantum talia  non694 sunt,  et  per  entia 
intelligantur695 hiis  opposita,  bonitatis  processus  se  extendunt  ad  utraque  omnia  et  super 
utraque est in seipsa bonitas divina.  Que autem entis,  nominatio696 videlicet,  extenditur in  
omnia  entia,  in  quantum videlicet  entia  sunt,  et  est  super  omnia  entia.  Que autem vite, 
nominatio videlicet extenditur  in omnia viventia et est super  viventia.  Que autem sapientie 
nominatio scilicet extenditur in omnia intellectualia id est in omnes angelos qui licet respectu 
nostri sint intelligibiles, respectu tamen Dei sunt intellectuales,  et rationalia,  id est humanas 
animas,  et  sensitiva,  id  est irrationalia  sensibus  utentia,  et  est  super  omnia  hec id  est 
intellectualia, rationalia et sensitiva. 
Hos itaque beneficos processus significant hec praedicte nominationes ita quod simul 
insinuant et  significant  super  excellentiam  divinitatis  ad  ea  ad  que  se  extendunt  iidem 
processus.  Intentio  igitur  sui  sermonis  est  laudare  divinas  nominationes  inquantum  sunt 
manifestative ipsius providentie extendentis se ad creaturas et non inquantum manifestative 
ipsius supersubstantialis essentie ut est in se. Quod planius recolligit dicens has igitur divinas  
nominationes  manifestativas  providentie  desiderat  sermo  laudare;  non   enim  repromittit 
sermo  videlicet   noster   enarrare  ipsius   supersubstantialem  <232va>  bonitatem  seu 
secundum  aliam  lecturam  “per  se  supersubstantialem  bonitatem”697,  et  substantiam seu 
690 preponitur] proponitur M, Mz
691 entis om. M, Mz
692 per] quod M
693 incorporalium ... sunt om. M
694 non om. M
695 intelligantur om. M
696 nominatio] nomina M
697 seu ... bonitatem om. M, non legitur in Dionysiaca (p. 324).
196
essentiam, et vitam et sapientiam supersubstantiales videlicet ipsius supersubtantialis deitatis, 
seu  secundum aliam lecturam698 “per  se  supersubstantialis  deitatis”. Bonitatem inquam et 
substantiam et vitam et sapientiam supersubstantialem supercollocatam seu superfirmatam in  
absconditis ut eloquia aiunt id est in luce inaccessibili que propter inacessibilitatem etiam 
quandoque  tenebra  dicitur,  super  omnem  bonitatem et  deitatem angelorum  videlicet  et 
hominum  iustorum,  et  substantiam  et  vitam.  Sed laudat sermo  videlicet  noster per 
nominationem  boni  providentiam expressam bonificam id  est  inquantum expressa  est  et 
manifestata per bonificentias in creaturas.  Providentiam dico  bonitatem superexcellenter et  
omnium bonorum causam hoc est inquantum ipsa providentia699 est bonitas superexcellenter et 
omnium bonorum  causa.  Nomine  enim  boni  laudatur  divina  providentia,  ut  in  se 
superexcellens omnem bonitatem, bonitas et  omnium bonorum causa. Laudat eam, resume, 
entem700 et vitam et sapientiam id est laudat eam per has tres nominationes:  substantificam 
causam per  nomen entis  videlicet,  et vivificam per  nomen vite,  et  sapientie  datricem per 
nomen  videlicet  sapientie.  Causam  inquam  substantificam  participantium  substantia et 
vivificam  participantium  vita et  causam  sapientie  datricem  participantium intellectu  et  
ratione et sensu. Habent enim etiam sensitiva naturalem providentiam701 que nomine sapientie 
non  incongrue potest comprehendi.
Aliqua  autem  translatio  adiungit adiectivum  ‘supercollocationis’702 ad  hoc 
substantivum ‘deitas’ propter  articulum  subiunctivum in greco  genitive positum relatum ad 
hoc nomen ‘deitatis’ qui articulus703 si transferatur in latinum et dictum adiectivum ponatur704 
accusative sicut est in greco non videbatur sermo  servare congruitatem latinam. Erit  enim 
sermo talis “non enim enarrare per se supersubstantialem bonitatem et substantiam et vitam et 
sapientiam per se supersubstantialis deitatis  repromittit eius que super omnem bonitatem et 
deitatem et substantiam et vitam in absconditis, ut eloquia aiunt,  supercollocatam”. Sed si pro 
‘supercollocatam’ ponatur nominative ‘supercollocata’ vel verbaliter ‘supercollocatur’ erit et 
sensus verus et sermo latinus congruus. Sed quia dictum adiectivum in greco adicitur sicut nos 
illud superius adiectivus ut latine loqueremur dimisimus translationem  articuli subiunctivi, 
que dimissio nihil impedit sensum nec ordinationem ut sunt in greco. In greco autem satis 
congrue  diceretur  “sermo  non  enarrat  bonitatem  deitatis  eius  que  habet  ipsam 
698 Eriugena, Sarrazin (see Dionysiaca, 324).
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supercollocatam”. 
Quia autem dixit secundum eloquia divinas nominationes predictas significare varios 
et diversos processus in creaturas et posset <232vb> aliquis  minus sapiens ex hoc conicere 
diversitatem substantialem ex parte processivi, removet hoc auctor dicens  non autem aiunt 
eloquia videlicet esse aliud per se bonum et aliud ens et aliud vitam vel sapientiam seu quam 
sapientiam.  Omnino enim sunt  hec idem ex parte   nominati, neque aiunt  eloquia resume 
multas causas primas videlicet et alias deitates ita videlicet quod has superexcellentes et has 
subiectas adductivas in esse videlicet aliorum causatorum scilicet  ut aiunt multi  gentiles et 
heretici.  Sed aiunt, repete,  totos bonos processus et  divinas nominationes laudatas a nobis 
unius Dei, et  hanc quidem nominationem videlicet  esse  manifestativam omnino perfecte 
providentiae unius dei, has autem nominationes videlicet divinas esse supple manifestativas 
universaliorum eiusdem unius videlicet Dei et particulariorum providentiarum videlicet. Boni 
enim  nominatio,  ut  supra  tactum  est,  comprehendit  totaliter  et  manifestat  omnis  divine 
providentie processus ad omnes creaturas que et simul et divisim bone sunt et propter Dei 
bonitatem adducte  in  esse.  Alie  autem nominationes  significant  divinos  processus  non ita 
generaliter sed particularius, inter quas tamen quedam significant universaliores et quedam 
particulariores.  Nominatio  enim  vite  significat  divinum  processum  in  omnia  viventia 
secundum  quod  viventia,  et  est  nominatio  universalior  quia  comprehendit  et  plantas; 
nominatio vero sapientie non attingit ad illas et ideo est nominatio particularior; et providentie 
particularioris.  Sunt  autem  substantie  nominationem,  divina  nominatio,  per  se 
supersubstantialem, sapientie datricem, singule dictiones in greco composite.
(Dionysiaca 327-331) Et quidem dicat quis: pro quo, ente vitam et vita705 sapientiam 
superextenta entibus quidem viventia, his autem quecumque vivunt sensitiva, his rationalia, et  
rationalibus  intellectus  superexcellunt,  et  circa  deum  sunt  et  magis  ipsi  approximant;  et  
quidem  oportebat  maioribus  ex  deo  donis  participantia706 et  meliora  esse  et  reliquis  
superexcellere?
Sed si quidem sine substantia et sine vita quis supponeret intellectualia, bene utique  
haberet ratio.  Si  autem et sunt divini intellectus super re-  <233ra> -liqua entia,  et  vivunt  
super alia viventia, et intelligunt et cognoscunt super sensum et rationem et praeter omnia  
entia  pulchrum  et  bonum  appetunt  et  participant,  ipsi  magis  sunt  circa  per  se  bonum,  
705 vitam et vita] vite et vitam Dionysiaca
706 participantia]  participantium Dionysiaca
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abundantius ipsis participantes, et plures707 et maiores ex ipso Deo donationes accipientes.
Quemadmodum  rationalia  sensitivis708 superexcellunt,  plenius  ditata  
superabundantia709 rationis, et haec sensu et alia vita. Et est, ut existimo, hoc verum quod710 
magis  uno  et  infinito  datore  Deo  participantia,  magis  sunt  ipsi  proximiora  et  diviniora  
residuis711.
Quia auctor  tangens  quasdam  divinas  nominationes  de  quibus  consequenter  post 
nominationem boni intendit tractare, primo inter eas nominat ens et deinde vitam et tertio 
sapientiam. Et ex ordine nominum videtur insinuare ordinem creaturarum in712 quas proprie 
extenduntur divini processus signati per ipsas nominationes. In ordine autem creaturarum sunt 
priores et digniores que Deo proximiores ut intelligencie.
Posset alicui videri quod auctor ex ordine nominum inconvenienter preferret in ordine 
rerum solum entia viventibus et solum viventia sapientibus, cum e contrario se habeat ordo 
rerum  quod  utentes  intelligentia  sunt  superiores  rationalibus  et  rationales  sensientibus  et 
sensientes  viventibus  et  viventes  entibus.  Introducit  igitur  auctor  primo sic  dubitantem et 
opponentem, consequenter subiungens solutionem713. Et ait:  et quidem dicat  quis pro quo 
ente vitam et vita sapientiam superextenta714, hoc est pro quo ente super extento vitam id est 
extento super vitam et pro qua vita super extenta sapientiam id est extenta super sapientiam. 
Or- <233rb> -dinas715 tu, Dionisi, subintelligere sic sermonem superiorem dicens “et ens et  
vitam  et  sapientiam  et  cetera”  que  sequntur  usque  ad  sensum  participantium.  Si  enim 
convenienter ordinas sermonem, ordini rerum correspondet ordo nominum, sed e contrario se 
habet  ordo rerum.  Unde sequitur:  Entibus  quidem viventia, hiis  autem quecumque vivunt  
sensitiva et  hiis id  est  sensitivis  rationalia  et  rationalibus  intellectus id  est  angeli 
superexcellunt, et  circa  deum  sunt inmediatius  videlicet  ceteris  nominatis,  et  magis  
approximant ipsi id est Deo vel secundum aliam lecturam “magis approximant (Deo videlicet) 
ipsis”716 id est ceteris nominatis. Et bene secundum dictum ordinem superexcellunt. Et quidem 
oportebat participantia maioribus donis ex Deo, et meliora esse  et reliquis id est hiis qui 
participant  donis  minoribus  superexcellere.  Angeli  autem,  qui sunt  intellectus, participant 
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donis maioribus quam rationalia et alia prenominata et sic secundum ordinem posterius hic 
nominata participant maioribus donis quam ea que prius eis hic nominantur. 
Hac717 itaque dubitatione et oppositione posita subiungit auctor solutionem. Ad cuius 
evidentiam  considerandum  quod  sic  dubitans  et  opponens  intelligit  per  nomen  entis  ut 
preinsinuatum est  solum entia  carentia  vita,  sensu,  ratione  et  intellectu  ut  sunt  lapides  et 
huiusmodi;  et  per  nomen  vite  solum viventia  carentia  sensu,  ratione  et  intellectu  ut  sunt 
plante; secundum quem intellectum dictorum nominum angeli carent essentia et vita.  Et hoc 
supposito  firma esset predicta oppositio cum nullum sit solum ens precellit viventi nec sit 
solum  vivens  sapienti.  Auctor  vero intelligit  per  nomen  entis  universaliter omne  ens  in 
quantum  ens718,  et  per  nomen  vite  omnem  vitam  tam  plantativam  quam  sensitivam  et 
rationalem  et  intellectivam.  Et  cum  superiores  participent  inferiorum  proprietatibus 
excellentius  illis,  ut  in  ‘Angelica  hierarchia’ pretactum  est,   angeli  excellentius  sunt  et 
excellentius  vivunt  omni  alio  ente  et   vivente  et  prius  naturaliter sunt,  deinde  vivunt  et 
consequenter  intelligunt  et  excellentius  ratione  et  sensu  cognoscunt.  Itaque  propter  hanc 
naturalem superextensionem entis ad vitam, et esse ad vivere et vite, et vivere ad sapientiam 
et  sapere,  et  propter  naturalem  superextensionem  intellectus  ad  rationem,  et  rationis  ad 
sensum que tria hic comprehenduntur sub nomine sapientie. Ordinavit auctor predicto modo 
convenienter valde suum sermonem superiorem.
Oppositionem igitur  sui  sermonis  oppugnativam  solvit  breviter insinuans  se  aliter 
intelligere predicta nomina entis et vite quam ea intellexerit opponens. Sic inquiens  sed si  
quidem sine  substantia seu  sine  essentia  et  sine  vita quis  supponeret  intellectualia,  sicut 
supponit predicto modo opponens, bene utique haberet ratio. Sic videlicet opponentis auctor 
autem non sic sup- <233va> -ponit sed, ut pretactum est, intellectualia maxime participare 
essentia et vita concordans cum adversario de preminentia intellectualium ad ceteras creaturas 
et de eorum approximatione ad Deum. Unde subdit  si autem et divini intellectus sunt super  
reliqua entia et vivunt super alia viventia habentes videlicet essentiam et vitam aliis entibus et 
viventibus excellencius, et intelligunt veritatem videlicet absque discursu et super discursum 
rationis a cognitis ad incognita;  et cognoscunt super sensum et rationem  id est cognitione 
nobiliori  quam sit  sensitiva  et  rationalis  cognoscunt  sensibilia  et  ratione  perceptibilia;  et  
appetunt pulchrum et bonum et participant pulchro videlicet et bono; preter omnia entia id est 
excellentius omnibus aliis entibus. Si inquam ita est ipsi divini videlicet intellectus magis sunt  
circa per  se  bonum, participantes per  se  bono videlicet  habundantius  ipsis id  est  ceteris 
717 Hac] hic M
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creaturis,  et  accipientes  plures  et  maiores  donationes  ex  ipso per  se  bono  videlicet, 
quemadmodum et rationalia sensitivis superexcellunt  plenius  ditata id  est  per  hoc  quod 
ditantur plenius super habundantia rationis. Et hec id est sensitiva ditata resume sensu, et alia 
id est plante ditata resume vita vegetali videlicet sola sine sensu et ratione superexcellunt sese 
videlicet  secundum ordinem.  Divini  igitur  intellectus  preminent  rationalibus  et  Deo  sunt 
proximiores, et illa sensibilibus et illa  sola vita vegetabili participantibus et illa solummodo 
entibus. Et non solum in hoc concordat auctor cum predicto opponente sed et in hoc quod 
consequenter  adiunxit:  oportere  maioribus  donis  participantia  reliquis  esse  meliora  et 
excellentiora. Unde subiungit et est ut existimo hoc verum  quam magis participantia Deo uno 
et infinito datore, magis sunt ipsi proximiora et diviniora residuis. Sed de hiis excellentiis 
divinorum intellectuum plenius dictum est in “Angelica hierarchia”. 
Quod autem diximus sine substantia, sine vita, plenius ditata, infinito datore, dictum 
est  in  greco  per  singulas  dictiones  compositas  velut  si  latine  diceretur  ‘insubstantialia’, 
‘invitalia’, ‘pleniditata’, ‘infiniti datore’.
(Dionysiaca 331-335) Quia et de his diximus, age per se bonum ut bene ens et entium  
omnium  substantificum  laudemus.  Quod  est  totius  esse  secundum  virtutem  
supersubstantialem  est  substantificatrix  causa,  et  conditrix  entis  ex-  <233vb> -sistentiae  
hypostasis,  substantie,  nature,  principium  et  mensura  seculorum  et  temporum  entitas,  et  
seculum  entium,  tempus  factorum,  esse  qualitercumque  exsistentibus,  generatio  
qualitercumque  factis.  Ex  ente  seculum719 et  substantia  et  ens,  et  tempus  et  generatio  et  
factum, in exsistentibus entia, et qualiter exsistentia et subsistentia.
Etenim Deus non aliqualiter est ens, sed simpliciter et incircumdeterminate, totum in  
se ipso esse coaccipiens et praeaccipiens. Propter quod et rex dicitur seculorum, ut in ipso et  
circa ipsum omni esse et ente et subsistente. Et neque erat neque erit, neque factus est neque  
fit neque fiet, magis autem neque est, sed ipse est esse existentibus et non entia solum sed et720 
ipsum esse entium ex praeseculariter ente. Ipse enim est seculum seculorum existens ante  
secula.
Ostenso qualiter sumendum ens et vitam et sapientiam in laudem divinam, et soluta 
oppositione contra ordinem sui sermonis et solutionis, occasione tacto parumper de  angelicis 
719 seculum om. Dionysiaca
720 et om. Dionysiaca
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excellenciis, quia721 de hiis alias plenius dixit hiis, hic omissis, transit ad propositum id est ad 
laudandum Deum ex entis  nominatione.  Et ait  quia diximus et  de hiis id  est  de angelicis 
excellentiis alias videlicet  age laudemus  per se bonum ut bene ens et  substantificum, seu si 
latine diceretur essentificum, omnium entium. Nomen enim entis, secundum quod per722 ipsum 
a nobis laudatur Deus, significat bonificum eius processum essentie factivum insinuans simul 
ipsum vere ens, hoc est non ab alio ens723, super omnem essentiam et substantiam. 
Hoc autem plenius explanans, subiungit:  Qui est seu ens masculine dictum in greco 
supersubstantiale seu superessentiale, id est superexcedens omnem essentiam et substantiam, 
est causa substantificatrix id est essentie factrix. Nomen enim usie, id est substantie, sumptum 
est in greco a  verbo essendi.  Hic autem genitivus  totius esse potest  adiungi  huic dictioni 
supersubstantiale qui diceretur ens super- <234ra> -substantiale totius esse id est essentiale 
super  omne  esse,  vel  potest  adiungi  huic  dictioni  substantificatrix ‘totius  esse’724 quasi 
diceretur:  ens  est  causa substantificatrix  totius  esse.  Similiter  hec  determinatio  secundum 
virtutem,  id  est  secundum  potentiam,  potest  adiungi  vel  ad  supersubstantiale vel  ad 
substantificatrix causa.  Et  est  utroque  modo  sensus  competens  cum  ens,  qui  est  Deus, 
secundum  propriam  virtutem  sit  supersubstantiale  et  secundum  propriam  virtutem  causa 
substantificatrix. Et adverte quod nomini entis masculine sumpto adiungit supersubstantiale 
neutraliter dictum, forte per hoc insinuans divine essentie superexcellentiam et abstractionem 
ab omni accidentali vel aliud  aliquid quod nos latet. 
Sequitur  et  conditrix  entis.  Hoc  est  ‘qui  est’,  seu  ens  supersubstantiale,  est causa 
substantificatrix totius esse et conditrix entis. Vel distinguatur sic sermo ‘qui est’ est causa 
substantificatrix et conditrix totius videlicet esse et  quinque genitivi sequentes adiungantur 
huic nomini  principium sic  entis,  existentie, hypostasis,  substantie seu  essentie,  nature.  
Principium est videlicet ‘qui est’ inquantum enim ens est sui extensivus et processivus725 in 
creaturas  inquantum  sunt  entes.  Et  per  se  accidentibus enti  participantes  ad  ens  autem 
necessario  consequitur  actus  existendi  qui  est  existentia,  et  hypostasis  id  est  individuum 
subsistans, et permanentia in essendo que dicitur substantia vel essentia, et nasci vel natum 
esse id est a non esse adduci in esse que adductio seu natio et res inquantum nata a nascendo 
dicitur natura. Ad esse quoque sequitur mensura. Mensura autem carens termino, inquantum 
huiusmodi apud grecos dicitur  ‘aioon’ quasi  semper ens,  pro  quo nos dicimus ‘seculum’. 
Privatio autem termini in essendo aut est privatio utriusque termini, id est principii et finis, aut 
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privatio finis solum, quia in rerum natura non est habens finem et carens principio licet hoc sit 
falso imaginabile. Carens autem principio et fine necessario omnia habet simul, nec transit 
aliquo modo a fuisse in esse vel ab esse  in fore, quia nihil ab ipso secedit  nec aliquid ei 
advenit, sed totum simul possidet, et hec similitas ut ita dicam essendi et omnia possidendi 
carens principio et fine. Et eo quod est, fuisse et fore, est seculum principale quod nos dicimus 
eternitatem. Nec est aliud secundum hunc modum seculum et quod ipso mensuratur sed illud 
est ipsum seculum. Posset autem  imaginari  falsa fictio carens principio et  fine non tamen 
habens totum simul sicut imaginati sunt qui posuerunt mundum sempiternum principio et fine 
carentem. 
Quod  autem  caret  fine  et  non  principio  potest  intelligi  totum  possidere  simul  a 
principio essendi, ut forte est angelis aut omnis aut aliquis.  Et huiusmodi mensura secundo 
dicitur seculum ut potest intelligi non totum possidere simul sed habere esse successivum ut 
habent  demones  et  mundus  sensibilis  quorum  mensura  tertio  etiam  dicitur  seculum. 
Convenienter  itaque  intentioni  nominis  greci  <234rb>  hiis  modis  dicitur  seculum  licet 
inveniatur aliqui  dictum pro determinata mensura. Mensura autem  successivorum et carens 
fine  et  terminata  fine726 apud  nos  dicitur  communiter  tempus,  licet  in  greco  sint  diversa 
nomina  has  diversitates  mensure  successive  determinantia.  Seculum itaque,  tertio  modo 
dictum, et tempus inquantum carens termino  idem sunt. Hec itaque mensure consequentes 
seculum primo  modo727 dictum  id  est  eternitatem,  proprie  procedunt  a  seculo  primo et 
eternitate sicut ab ipso primo esse ipsa creata esse, hiis sequentibus mensuris mensurata. 
Laudans  itaque  per  se  bonum  ab  ente  et  per  se  consequentibus  esse,  adiungit  et 
mensura  seculorum.  Ens  enim,  seu  ‘qui  est’ inquantum ens,  est  seculum id  est  eternitas 
mensura seculorum tam secundo quam tertio modo dictorum. Et  entitas temporum quia ab 
eius  entitate  eterna  dependet  entitas  successiva  et  ipse  est  per  efficientiam  videlicet  et 
continentiam in esse.  Seculum entium que inquantum entia non habent terminum cum entia 
inquantum  entia  non  transeunt  in  non  entia.  Tempus factorum id  est  habentium  esse 
successivum et terminabile;  esse qualitercumque existentibus sive videlicet semper existant 
sive non semper; generatio qualitercumque factis. Ex ente id est ex preiacente aliquo seculum 
et substantia et  ens et tempus et  generatio et  factum entia in existentibus et existentia et  
subsistentia qualitercumque.  Deus  enim (aliud  exemplar ‘eternarum  rationum’728)  faciens 
omnia causaliter et effective et conservative et superexcellenter est illa, ut secularium seculum 
superseculariter,  et  substantiarum  substantia  supersubstantialiter,  et  ens  entium 
726 et terminata fine om. M
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superessentialiter,  et  tempus  temporalium  supertemporaliter,  et  generatio  generabilium 
ingenite  et  supergenerationem, et  factum factorum super  factionem et  sic  consequenter  in 
singulis existentibus. Ipse est ipsa essentia supereminenter et ipsa existentia sive existant per 
se sive in altero et subsistentia tam superioribus in ordine nature quam accidentibus. Et forte 
intelligit hic per entia que sunt supra successionem et per existentia que sunt sub successione 
et per subsistentia in utrisque  subordinata. 
Ab ente igitur laudamus Deum cum nomine entis, eum nominamus designantes eius 
substantificum processum in entia sive secularia sive temporalia. Et iterum cum nominamus 
eum a necessario convenientibus ad esse sive superseculare sive seculare sive temporale. Et 
iterum cum nominamus ipsum nominibus creaturarum ut cum dicimus ipsum esse ignem vel 
lapidem vel huiusmodi. Non enim intendimus dicere ipsum esse729 hec, sed ipsum eternaliter 
prehabere hec in se in eternis eorum rationibus et ipsa in730 illis eternis rationibus eternaliter 
preextitisse et ab illis processisse in esse in se ipsis. Cum igitur dicimus  ipsum esse aliquid 
entium substantificum eius proces- <234va> -sum in esse731,  illius entis insinuamus. Quod 
manifestans subiungit Etenim Deus non aliqualiter est ens, ut videlicet sit hoc vel illud ens,732 
sed simpliciter et incircumdeterminate, quia sicut ipse est733 per-se-bonum et non hoc vel illud 
bonum sed ipsum bonum et ipsa bonitas, nullo alio circumdeterminata, sic ipse est per-se-ens 
et non hoc vel illud ens sed ipsum ens, nullo alio circumdeterminatum. Deus dico coaccipiens  
et preaccipiens totum esse in seipso in eternis videlicet rationibus simul eternaliter habens et, 
antequam in seipsis sint, omnia totum esse omnium habens, inde producens esse eorum in 
seipsis. Propter quod, id est propter hoc quod predictum est, et rex dicitur seculorum, ut omni 
esse  et  ente et  subsistente  in  ipso in  eternis  videlicet  rationibus  et  circa  ipsum per734 
processum  videlicet  ab  ipsis  in  proprium  esse.  Et  neque  erat  neque  erit,  quia  nihil  ei 
preteritum nec futurum, neque factus est neque fit neque fiet licet dicatur generatio et tempus 
et factum sed solum est eternaliter. Magis autem neque est quia super omne esse est sed ipse 
est esse existentibus id est causans et conservans esse omnibus existentibus ac per hoc super 
omne esse. 
Et  quod  causative  intelligendum sit  quod  ipse  est  esse  existentibus, explanat 
consequenter dicens Et non solum entia sed et ipsum esse entium ex ente preseculariter id est 
ex Deo qui est eternaliter. Quod autem bene dixit preseculariter manifestat adiungens:  Ipse 
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enim Deus videlicet  est seculum seculorum, id est eternitas ex qua sunt secula et tempora, 
existens ante secula. Bonifici  itaque processus divine providentie in entia secundum quod 
entia et in esse entium laudantur, et per ens et esse simpliciter absque determinatione, et per 
ens  et  esse  particulariter  cum appositione,  et  per  necessario  consequentia  ad  ens  et  esse 
inquantum  ens et esse. Vel preseculare vel seculare vel temporale dicta de Deo per bonum 
autem  dictum  de  Deo  laudantur  iidem  bonifici  processus,  et  in  similis  omnes  bonifici 
processus in quascumque creaturas secundum ipsas, utpote in angelum secundum angelicam 
naturam et in hominem secundum humanitatem et in leonem secundum leonitatem et sic de 
aliis cum extensione huius nominationis et in non entia ut supra dictum est.
(Dionysiaca  335-338)  Resumentes  igitur  dicamus  quia735 omnibus  existentibus  et  
seculis esse a praeexistente et omne quidem seculum et tempus ex ipso. Omnis autem et seculi  
et temporis et omnis qualitercumque entis, qui praeest principium et causa.
Et omnia ipso participant et a nullo entium recedit. Et ipse est ante omnia et omnia in  
ipso constiterunt. Et simpliciter si quid qualitercumque est, in preexistente et est et intelligitur  
et salvatur. Et ante alia ipso participantia esse propositum est, et est ipsum secundum ipsum  
esse antiquius eo quod per se vitam esse, et per se sapientiam esse, et per se similitudinem  
divinam esse, et alia quibuscumque entia participantia, ante omnia ipsa ipso esse participant.  
Magis autem et ipsa participant secundum ipsa omnia, quibus entia participant, eo quod est  
secundum quod ipsum esse participant. Et nihil est ens cuius non est substantia et seculum  
per se esse.
<234vb> Resumens proximo dicta et si non eodem verborum scemate eodem  tamen 
sensu secundum rem adicit de prioritate essendi ut per hoc sit evidens ordinis congruentia 
inferre tractandi. Ait itaque resumentes igitur proximo dicta videlicet dicamus quam omnibus 
existentibus seu entibus et seculis est suple esse a preexistente seu a preente id est a Deo sine 
principio ente, dante esse omnibus principiatis et essendi mensuris. Et omne quidem seculum 
et  tempus ex  ipso preexistente  videlicet.  Omnis  autem  et  seculi  et  temporis et  omnis 
qualitercumque entis qui preest seu preens principium et causa. Et omnia participant ipso id 
est  preente  cuius  videlicet  participatione  sunt,  et  a  nullo  entium recedit ut  eius  videlicet 
presentia permaneant in esse quantum eis convenit. Et ipse est ante omnia prioritate eternitatis 
sine principio et omnia constituerunt in ipso, in eternis videlicet rationibus sine principio. Et 
735 quia] quam Dionysiaca
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simpliciter, si  quid qualitercumque est,  in preexistente seu preente,  et est  et intelligitur et  
salvatur. In eternis enim rationibus, in preexistente Deo, omne qualitercumque in seipso ens 
eternaliter  est,  et  inde  habet  suum esse  sive  seculare  sive  temporale  et  in  illis  rationibus 
intelligitur eternaliter ab ipso preente. Et a defecatis intelligentiis creatis intelligitur purius in 
illis  eternis  rationibus  quam  in  se  ipso,  et  ipsius  preentis  visio  per  eternas  rationes  et 
refulgentia super illud est eius speculo. 
In hiis autem verbis prepositis posset videri eiusdem inutilis repetitio. In quo enim est 
aliud alicui  esse a preexistente  et  illud esse ex ipso preexistente  et  illud preexistens  esse 
principium <235ra> et causam illius, item quid aliud est omnibus preexistere et ante omnia 
esse. In operibus tamen  artificii et nature possumus videre horum diversitatem statue enim 
inquantum statue est736 esse a statuifare. Statua tamen unde lignum vel lapis non est ex737 ipso 
sed ex opere, nec lignum autem vel lapis, licet sit ex natura ipsa, tamen natura non principiat 
et  causat  illud  ex  nihilo.  A Deo autem,  cuius  nomen  est  ens  et  preens,  est  esse  formale 
omnibus et ex ipso est omnibus esse materiale et ipse omnia principiavit et causavit ex nihilo 
quod longe est a potentia artificis et nature. ‘Preesse’ autem communiter accipitur ad omne 
genus prioritatis; ‘esse’ autem ante omnia specialiter accipitur pro738 preexistentia eternitatis. 
Hiis itaque resumptis, adicit de prioritate esse dicens ‘ipsum esse’. Esse prius et antiquius 
secundum quod prius et antiquius est a quo non convertitur consequencia omnibus aliis Deo 
participantibus  utpote  eo  quod  est vivere et  eo  quod  est  sapere  et  eo  quod  est  Dei 
similitudinem esse et  ceteris.  Si  enim vivit,  est  et  non convertitur; et  si  sapit,  est  et  non 
convertitur et sic de ceteris a Deo productis et ipso739 participantibus.  Unde sequitur et ante  
alia participantia ipso, id est Deo, esse propositum est quod aliquid videlicet proponitur quod 
sequitur et a quo non convertitur consequencia, et ipsum esse videlicet secundum ipsum esse  
est antiquius predicto  videlicet  modo  antiquitatis  eo quod  per  se  vitam  esse et  per  se  
sapientiam  esse et  per  se  similitudinem  divinam  esse hoc  est  esse  secundum  seipsum 
consideratum antiquius est vita et sapientia et Dei similitudine secundum seipsas consideratis. 
Et alia entia a tribus  predictis videlicet  participantia quibuscumque utpote celum et 
celestia participantia motu circulari et figura spherica et aliis convenientibus ipsis, et elementa 
participantia ponderositate vel levitate et commiscibilitate et aliis sibi propriis, et elementata 
participantia singula singulis sibi naturaliter convenientibus. 
Alia inquam entia sic quibuscumque naturaliter sibi convenientibus participantia ante 
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omnia ipsa sic videlicet participata  participant ipso esse et non solum participatur esse ab 
omnibus  ante  omnia  alia  participata  sed  et  magis  ab  omnibus740 participatur  aliis;  enim, 
omnibus ablatis, ipsum esse remanet. Unde sequitur Magis autem et cetera, et est constructio 
sic ordinanda et ipsa omnia, id est vita, sapientia, similitudo divina et alia entia, participant  
secundum se  ipsa quibus  entia  participant hoc  est  quibus  ipsa  singula  secundum  quod 
determinata entia sunt participant. Magis autem participant eo quod est ipsum esse secundum 
ipsum. Et nihil est ens, cuius per se esse seu ipsum esse  non est substantia seu essentia  et  
seculum ac per hoc magis participans eo quod est esse omnibus aliis participatis. Omnis enim 
entis esse,741 inquantum esse consideratum, necessario conservat enti substantiam et essentiam 
et essendi mensuram et quasi earum conservativo ei quod est esse attribuuntur.
(Dionysiaca 338-343) Omnibus igitur convenienter aliis principalius <235rb>, ut ens,  
deus  ex  antiquiore  aliarum  ipsius  donationum742 laudatur.  Etenim  preesse  prehabens  et  
superhabens esse omnia ipsum743, aio secundum ipsum esse, presubstitit, et esse ipsi omne  
qualitercumque ens substituit.
Et quidem principia entium omnia, ipso esse participantia,  sunt et principia sunt et  
primum744 sunt deinde principia sunt. Et si vult745 viventium ut viventium, principium dicere  
per-se-vitam; et similium ut similium, per-se-similitudinem; et unitorum ut unitorum, per-se-
unionem; et ordinatorum ut ordinatorum, per-se-ordinationem; et aliorum quaecumque hec  
aliquo aut hoc aliquo aut utrisque aut multis participantia hec aliquid vel hoc aliquid vel  
utraque vel multa per se participationes invenies ipso esse primum ipsas participantes. Et  
esse primum quid existentes, deinde huius alicuius746 vel huius alicuius747 principia existentes  
et participare esse et existentes et participatas.
Si  autem   hec  participatione  esse  sunt,  multo  quidem  magis  ipsis  participantia.  
Primam igitur per se esse donationem per-se-superbonitas748 proponens749, antiquiore prima 
participationum laudatur. Et est ex ipsa et in ipsa et ipsum esse, et entium principia et entia  
omnia et qualitercumque esse continentia et haec irretentive et convolute et unitive.
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Ostensa prioritate eius quod est esse ad alia participata,  concludit  ex ea quod con- 
<235va> -venienter laudatur Deus prius ut ens quam ut vita vel sapientia vel ut aliquid aliud 
consequentium750 divinorum nominum, cum esse sit ipsius donatio aliis ipsius donationibus 
antiquior et prior. Unde ait  omnibus igitur aliis quibus videlicet laudatur Deus convenienter 
principalius seu  antiquius  id  est  prius,  est  hoc  videlicet  quod  Deus laudatur ut  ens  ex  
antiquiore aliarum ipsius  donationum.  Cum enim in humana laude Dei  dicitur  Deus,  ens 
attribuitur ei processus in largitionem esse quod, ut preostensum est, prius est omnibus aliis 
predicabilibus de creaturis. 
Considerans  autem  latinum  sermonem  tantum  acciperet  de  facili  hanc  dictionem 
‘principalius’ adverbialiter, cum tamen sit in greco nomen, unde oportet facere suppletionem 
ut fecimus; vel quod nos transtulimus751 in ‘ut’ transferre in ‘quod’ et erit planius sermo: hoc 
enim est ‘principalius’ quod Deus laudatur ens ex antiquiore aliarum donationum ipsius. Et 
bene dicitur esse antiquior ipsius donatio. 
Et enim prehabens Deus videlicet  preesse, id est esse ante omnia sine principio,  et  
super habens esse omnia vel secundum aliud exemplar ‘esse omne’752, super habens dico753 in 
eternis omnium rationibus; presubstituit, id est ante alia statuit754 ipsum esse secundum ipsum 
aio, hoc est ipsum esse non in quantum hoc vel illud esse, sed in quantum esse abstractum ab 
omni  particulari  esse.  Et  substituit ipsi  esse hoc  est  statuit  post  ipsum  esse  omne 
qualitercumque ens prius  enim,  ut  preostensum  est,  non  tempore  sed  prioritate  non 
convertendi convenientiam. Est ipsum esse secundum se consideratum a preente de755 Deo, et 
consequenter est ens particulatum. Aliqua differentia utpote ea quod est non in altero ens vel 
in altero ens, vel eo quod est vivere vel non vivere, vel non quod esse vel ens sit genus, cum 
de diversis dictum non omnino univoce sed omonime dicatur. 
Ad  declarationem  autem  maiorem,  quod  esse,  inquantum  esse,  sit  antiquior 
donationum Dei, adiungit principia entium. Qualitercumque dicta principia sive ut prima inter 
entia sunt, sive ut quatuor causae, dicuntur principia participare esse et prius participare esse 
quam participatione. Si enim principia entium, prius omnibus participatis, participant esse, 
multo fortius etiam que sunt post principia. Unde sequitur: Et quidem principia entium omnia 
ipso esse participantia et sunt, et principia sunt,756 et primum sunt deinde principia sunt. Et si 
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quis vult dicere abstracta et in se considerata, principia concretorum inveniet ipsa abstracta 
prius participantia esse et deinde esse principia concretorum. Utpote si quis dicat vitam in se 
consideratam esse principium viventium inquantum viventium, inveniet  ipsam vitam prius 
participantem  esse  et  deinde  esse  principium  viventium  et  sic  de  consimilibus.  Unde 
subiungit:  Et  si  vult aliquis  videlicet  dicere per  se  vitam,  id  est  vitam inquantum vitam, 
principium  viventium ut  viventium,  id  est  inquantum  viventium,  et  per  se  similitudinem 
similium ut similium et per se unionem unitorum ut unitorum et per se ordinem ordinatorum  
ut  ordinatorum. Vult dicere  videlicet <235vb>  singulum  horum  singulorum  ab  hiis 
denominatorum inquantum talium esse  principium et  'hoc aliquid'  vel  'hoc aliquid'  utpote 
albedinem  vel  nigredinem  vel  utraque id  est  duo  aliqua  simul,  vel  multa per  se  
participationes id est abstracta in se considerata participata a concretis et denominatis ab ipsis 
abstractis que abstracta, hic vocat per se757 participationes et adiungit appositive ad predicta 
neutraliter. Et si inquam vult aliud758 aliquis huius per se participationes unam vel aliam vel 
duas vel multas dicere esse principia aliorum quecumque sunt suple participantia hec aliquo 
vel hoc aliquo utpote albedine vel nigredine vel utrisque vel multis huius invenies ipsas, id est 
per se participationes, participantes primum ipso esse, et existentes seu entes primum quidem 
esse id  est  suscipientes  primum predicationem essendi.  Deinde existentes  principia huius  
alicuius vel huius alicuius759 utpote albi vel nigri  vel alicuius  huius et participare esse et  
existentes secundum seipsas videlicet in abstractione consideratas  et  participatas id est  in 
subiectis existentes et ea denominantes. Tam enim albedo quam album primo omni participat 
esse et sic de similibus et ipsa  principia prius participant principiatis.  Si autem haec id est 
abstracta, que hic vocat principia, sunt participatione esse, multo quidem magis participantia  
ipsis id est concreta participantia abstractis sunt videlicet participatione esse. Participant enim 
et esse principiorum, id est abstractorum, et esse subiecti et esse resultante ex concretione 
forme cum subiecto et ipsa principiata, quia elongatiora sunt a primo ente et primo esse quam 
principia, minus possent dici esse quam principia nisi participarent ipso esse. 
Ostensa  itaque  clarius  prioritate  eius  quod  est  esse  secundum  se, repetit  iterato 
concludens convenienter Deum laudari primo a prima eius donatione dicens  primam igitur 
donationem per se esse id est eius quod est esse secundum se consideratum. Proponens per se 
superbonitas hoc est quia hanc donationem proponit primam laudatur prima participationum 
antiquiore ceteris videlicet participationibus, id est donationibus participatis a creaturis. 
Et est ex ipsa per se superbonitate videlicet, et in ipsa in eternis videlicet rationibus 
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exemplaribus,  et  ipsum  esse  et  entium  principia et  entia  omnia et  continentia  esse  
qualitercumque id est ea de quibus predicatur esse qualitercumque; et hoc id est esse ex ipsa 
et in ipsa est irretentive et convolute et unitive. Ipsa enim per se superbonitas, continens in se 
eternaliter  omnia  in  eorum rationibus  exemplaribus,  sic  continet  ea  in  se  quod  etiam ea 
producit in esse seculare vel temporale in se ipsis ab esse quod eternaliter habent in ipsa. Et 
sic  continet  ea  irretentive  quia  provisive  in  eorum proprium esse  in  ipsa  quorum per  se 
superbonitate sunt omnia simul et sic convolute et ex ipsa et in ipsa <236ra> sunt omnia 
unitive,  quia  ex  parte  ipsius  causantis  et  continentis  nulla  est  multitudo  vel  diversitas 
essentialis. Intelligens enim se, in essentia simplicissimam et superunitam, intelligit omnia et 
sic diligens se diligit omnia. Et intellectus diligens, seu dilectio intelligens, in sui simplicitate 
omnia est rationes exemplares et causales omnium, licet in se diversorum, unitorum tamen in 
superbonitatis simplicitate.
 Dictiones autem quibus in hac particula preponitur ‘per se’ sunt in greco composite 
cum eo quod transferimus in ‘per se’ quod sonat in greco ‘ipsum’ ut si diceremus  pro per se 
esse ipsum esse.
(Dionysiaca  343-346)  Etenim in  monade  omnis  numerus  uniformiter  preexistit,  et  
omnem habet numerum monas in se ipsa universaliter. Et omnis numerus unitur quidem in760 
monade;  secundum  quantum  autem  ab  unitate  procedit,  secundum  tantum  discernitur  et  
multiplicatur.  Et  in  centro  omnes  circuli  lineae  secundum  unam  unionem  coextiterunt  et  
omnes  habet  signum  in  se  ipso  rectas  uniformiter  unitas  et  ad  se  invicem  et  ad  unum  
principium a quo processerunt.
Et in ipso quidem centro omnino perfecte uniuntur, brevi autem ab ipso distantes, brevi  
et  discernuntur,  magis  autem  recedentes,  magis  et  simpliciter  secundum  quantum  centro  
propinquiores sunt, secundum tantum et ipsi et ad invicem uniuntur, secundum quantum ab  
ipso, secundum tantum ab invicem destiterunt.
Sed  et  in  tota  totorum  natura  omnes  eius  quae  secundum  unumquodque  naturae  
rationes convolutae sunt secundum unam inconfusam unionem et in anima uniformiter eorum  
quae secundum partem omnium provi- <236rb> -sive totius corporis virtutes.
Dicto quod omnia sunt ex per se superbonitate et in ipsa irretentive  convolute761 et 
760 in om. Dionysiaca
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unitive, explanat  hoc per  exempla unitatis  et  centri  et  nature generaliter  divise  in  multas 
particulares et virtutis unius diversa individuis762 operantis. Sic inquiens Etenim in monade id 
est  unitate  preexistit  omnis numerus uniformiter.  Omnis  enim numerus  est  uniformiter  ex 
unitatis  replicatione  et  in  unitate  equipotenter  preextitit.  Unde sequitur  et habet  omnem 
numerum  monas in  se  ipsa universaliter et  omnis  numerus  unitur quidem in  monade 
secundum quantum autem procedit ab unitate secundum tantum discernitur et multiplicatur. 
Et in centro omnis circuli linee id est diametri coextiterunt secundum unam unionem omnes763 
enim diametros uniformiter et indifferenter counit in se centrum. Et signum id est centrum 
habet omnes rectas unitas uniformiter in se ipso et ad se invicem  et ad unum principium a  
quo  processunt.  In  centro  enim  omnis  diametri  uniuntur  tam ad  invicem in  centro  sese 
intersecantes quam ad centrum a quo uniformiter procedunt. Et in ipso quidem centro omnino 
prefecte uniuntur omnes videlicet diametri, quia in ipso centro non sunt nisi ipsum centrum 
distantes autem diametri videlicet brevi ab ipso id est centro et discernuntur brevi, quia parum 
differunt  secundum  situm  localem;  magis  autem  recedentes a  centro  videlicet  magis 
discernuntur.  Resume764 et  simpliciter secundum765 quantum  centro  propinquiores  sunt, 
secundum  tantum uniuntur locali  videlicet  situ  approximando  et  ipsi id  est  centro  et  
adinvicem ut  videlicet  in  centro  omnino  sint  in  discreta  et  unita  et  secundum  quantum 
destiterunt ab ipso secundum tantum et ab invicem destiterunt videlicet. 
Quemadmodum  autem  numeri   in  se  diversi  ab  unitate  et  linee  in  se  diverse 
universaliter et equipotenter a centro procedunt, et universaliter et equipotenter recolliguntur 
et  uniuntur  in  unitate  et  centro,  sic  dividentia  unam  naturam  generalem  in  se  diversa 
procedunt universaliter et equipotenter a natura generali potentia autem habente eorum que 
sub ipsa differentias et universaliter et equipotenter participatione generalis nature sunt unum. 
Unde  sequitur  sed  et  in  tota natura  totorum hoc  est  in  generali  natura  omnium sub  se 
contentorum, utpote in substantia que est generalis natura omnium per se et  non in altero 
entium,  sunt  convolute  secundum  unam  inconfusam unionem hoc  est  simul  habite 
equipotenter et unite et in progressu a potentia in actum distincte et  inconfuse. 
Omnes rationes eius nature que  secundum unumquodque hoc est  omnes differentie 
assumptibiles in diffinitione nature particularis et substantie generali nature. Similiter virtus 
anime vivifica, in se considerata,766 uniformiter est in se et tamen diversa inconfuse operatur 
<236va> in corpore vivificato, illud nutriens et augens et generandum aptans; similiter virtus 
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sensitiva in se unita per diversas corporis partes diversa operatur et sic est de aliis virtutibus 
secundum  quas  anima  providet  corpori.  Unde  subiungitur:  Sed in  anima sunt  suple 
uniformiter provisive virtutes seu potentie  totius corporis. Virtutes dico seu potentie  eorum 
omnium que secundum partem id est que particulariter et differenter proaguntur videlicet a 
potentiis in se unite existentibus.
(Dionysiaca 346-352)  Nihil igitur inconveniens, ex obscuris imaginibus ad omnium  
causam  ascendentes,  supermundanis  oculis  contemplari  omnia  in  omnium  causa  et  sibi  
invicem contraria, uniformiter et unite.
Principium enim est entium, a quo et ipsum esse et omnia qualitercumque entia: omne  
principium, omnis terminus, omnis vita,  omnis immortalitas,  omnis sapientia, omnis ordo,  
omnis  harmonia,  omnis  virtus,  omnis  custodia,  omnis  firmitas,  omnis  distributio,  omnis  
intelligentia767, omnis ratio, omnis sensus, omnis habitus, omnis statio, omnis motio, omnis  
unio, omnis completio, omnis amicitia, omnis concordatio, omnis discretio, omnis definitio et  
alia quecumque, ipso esse entia, entia omnia characterizant768.
Et  ex  eadem  omnium  causa  intelligibiles  et  intellectuales  deiformium  angelorum  
substantiae et animarum et omnis mundi naturae et qualitercumque aut in alteris existere aut  
secundum intelligentiam esse dicta.
Et quidem omnino sancte et provectissime virtutes <236vb>, vere existentes, et velut in  
vestibulis supersubstantialis trinitatis collocatae, ab ipsa et in ipsa et esse et deiformiter esse  
habent.
Et post illas subiectae, subiecte et extremae, extremae769 sicut ad angelos, ut ad nos  
autem supermundane. Et animae et alia omnia entia, secundum eamdem rationem, et esse et  
bene esse habent. Et sunt et bene sunt ex770 praeexistente esse et bene esse habentia, et in ipso  
et entia et bene entia et ex ipso inchoata et in ipso custodita et in ipsum terminata.
Expositis  exemplis  in  quibus  perspicuum  est  multa  et  diversa   uniri in  uno  et 
uniformiter esse in illo, concludit ex illis, licet obscuris ad manifestationem divinorum, quod 
non est inconveniens si omnia in se ipsis diversa et etiam que sibi invicem sunt contraria sint 
in Deo causa omnium, et videantur in ipso771 supermundanis oculis uniformiter et unite. Et 
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dicit nihil igitur inconveniens ascendentes ex imaginibus obscuris ad manifestandum videlicet 
divina licet in se perspicuis. Cum omnes imagines, create a vera divinorum similitudine, sint 
multum elongate, ascendentes inquam ex hiis ad omnium causam contemplari supermundanis  
oculis id est a fantasmatibus materialium et mundanorum defecatis omnia uniformiter et unite 
in causa omnium et id est etiam sibi invicem contraria in seipso videlicet. Quidem autem hoc 
non sit inconveniens sed conveniens valde manifestat adhuc per hoc quod ipse Deus in se 
superunus et simplicissimus est omnium principium et causa et causative omnium.
Unde sequitur  principium enim est entium utpote eternaliter prehabens ea in eternis 
rationibus et ad exemplum earum educens ea ab omnino non esse in seipsis ad esse in se 
ipsis772. Unde subiungit a quo et ipsum esse et omnia qualitercumque entia sive videlicet per 
se,  sive  in  altero,  sive  generaliter,  sive  particulariter,  sive  quocumque  alio  modo.  A quo 
resume omne principium principiatum videlicet quocumque modo dictum principium omnis 
terminus quocumque  modo  terminans,  omnis  vita,  omnis  immortalitas, omnis  sapientia,  
omnis  ordo,  omnis  armonia,  omnis  virtus seu  potentia,  omnis  custodia,  omnis  firmitas773 
omnis distributio, omnis intelligentia, omnis ratio omnis sensus, omnis habitus, omnis statio,  
omnis motio, omnis unio, omnis complexio, vel secundum aliud exemplar ‘omne iudicium’774, 
omnis amicitia, omnis concordatio, omnis discretio, omnis diffinitio et alia quecumque entia  
ipso esse caractherizat omnia entia utpote consimilia predictis consimiliter abstractive dicta 
que sic considerata dicuntur entia participa- <237ra> -tione ipsius esse tantum et nondum ab 
esse subiectorum sine quibus tamen actu non possunt existere. Vita enim vel immortalitas vel 
amicitia vel aliquod predictorum vel color vel figura vel aliquod similium non existit actu nisi 
in subiecto quod ipso caracterizatur et denominatur. Caracterizata itaque subiecta. hic dicit 
simpliciter  entia  ipsa vero  caracterizantia,  hic  dicit  ipso esse  entia.  Sequitur  et  ex eadem 
omnium causa intelligibiles et intellectuales substantie deiformium angelorum et animarum et  
nature omnis mundi et dicta esse qualitercumque vel in alteris existere vel existendo in alteris 
vel secundum intelligentiam. Differentia autem intelligibils et intellectualis sepe superius dicta 
est esse autem secundum intelligentiam dicuntur que sola intelligentia comprehenduntur ut 
immaterialia et incorporalia.
Sermo itaque iste quo ad seriem constructionis planissimus est, sed quo ad rationem 
ordinis verborum in eo positorum dilucide assignandam non sic, neque enim verisimile est 
quod tantus pater casu et irrationabiliter verba hic posita collocaverit. Posset autem quis circa 
ordinis rationem studiosus forte sic vel aliter melius dicere. 
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Primus  processus  providentie  Dei  ad  creaturas  est  earum principiatio et  ex  nihilo 
creatio, et primum ab ea largitum est ipsum esse quod ad omnia sequitur etiam ad materiam 
informem, que licet secundum quod talis quodammodo non sit, non tamen simpliciter non est. 
A participatione autem ipsius esse consequenter sunt et  dicuntur entia  in quantum entia. Ad 
esse autem et ens creatum sequitur primo inchoatio essendi et principium aut seculariter aut 
temporaliter. Et quia huiusmodi principio opponitur terminus, qui est defictio aut defictionis 
privatio,  et  oppositorum  coniuncta  est  scientia,  convenienter  post775 essendi  principium 
adiunxit terminum. Et quia sub nomine principii comprehenduntur et primo entia et quattuor 
causae,  efficiens  videlicet,  materialis,  formalis  et  finalis,  que  precedunt  omnis  entis 
complementum, ut quod potest fieri uno non fiat pluribus, sub nomine principii comprehendit 
convenienter hoc genera principiora.  Primum autem participans esse et  entitate et  essendi 
mensura est vita  creature supermundane et immaterialis,  id est  creature spiritalis  que vita 
necessario est immortalis. Unde et huic vite convenienter coniungitur immortalitas, vita autem 
immortalis. Unde talis apta nata est cognoscere Deum et divina et in Deo omnia. Unde ad 
vitam immortalem naturaliter  et  ut  oportet  se  habentem immediate  consequitur  sapientia. 
Sapientia autem non solum comprehendit  res scitas sed et  ipsarum ordinem, et  magis est 
sapientia ab ordinis rerum cognitione quam ab ipsarum rerum comprehensione, et propter hoc 
sapientie  bene  adnectitur  ordo.  Ordo  autem,  qui  est  dispositio  tribuens  cuique  quod  sibi 
congruit,  ipsorum  ordinatorum  generat  ad  invicem  armoniam  et  comproportionalitatem 
consonam.  Quod  autem  incomproportionaliter  est,  impotens  est  ad  ordinatos  actus 
producendos. Ex quo patet quod solum harmonice se habens, potens est ad ordinatos actus et 
quod <237rb> ad armoniam sequitur  potentia  et  virtus  recte  et  ordinate  agendi.  Armonia 
quoque est  conservativa et  custoditiva armonice compositorum et ad invicem armonice se 
habentium ac per hoc eorum firmitas et firmamentum. Soluta enim armonia pereunt. Iustitia 
quoque  distributiva  per  geometricam  dirigitur  proportionalitatem.  Ad  armoniam  igitur 
ordinate consequitur virtus, custodia, firmitas et distributio.
Positis  itaque  immediate  post  sapientiam  que  secundum  ordinem  immediate 
consequuntur ad ipsam et quasi locantur in ipsa, redit ad ordinem virtutum et potentiarum 
speculativarum quarum suprema et prima est sapientia, et post illam est intelligentia, que est 
virtus  comprehensiva  principiorum immediatorum;  quam consequitur  ratio,  que  est  virtus 
progressiva a principiis immediatis in conclusiones sive scientifice seu probabiliter, ac per hoc 
comprehendens  virtutem scientie  et  virtutem artis,  postquam sequitur  sensus.  Per  sensum 
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enim hic  credo776 comprehendi  virtutes  apprehensivas  quas  habet  animal;  unde  animal  et 
sensibile est que cum in homine diriguntur ratione. Virtute prudentie adornatur homo, que 
virtus  quia  media  est  inter  pure  speculativas  et  activas,  quandoque  cum  speculativis 
quandoque cum activis conversatur. Post virtutes autem speculativas sequuntur virtutes active, 
que proveniunt ex frequenti bene agere, et que maxime et principaliter dicuntur habitus. Quia 
a nulla vi possunt moveri et auferri777, ab hiis virtutibus activis, directis per speculativas, est 
ordinata  quies;  ab  inordinata  actione  et  motione  et  ordinata  motio  et  actio,  ab  hiis  est 
animorum unio ut ipsum sentiant et dicant omnes; ab hiis est animorum in adinvicem incessio 
et  contemperantia   et  spiritalis  complexio;  ab  hiis  est  idem  velle  et  idem  nolle 
impermutabiliter in rebus honestis quod est firma amicitia; ab hiis est in actibus uniformitas et 
concordatio et in actibus differentia et discretio. Non enim omnibus conveniunt per omnem 
modum essendi actiones. Ab hiis tandem est778 omnium agendorum et omittendorum diffinitio 
et determinatio. 
Hoc  itaque  modo  vel  a  melius  intelligente  modo  meliori  potest  ordinis  verborum 
auctoris779 ratio assignari. In predictis tamen verbis non comprehendit solum sensus eorum 
que  nos  tetigimus,  sed  in  quolibet  verbo  comprehendit  totalitatem  rerum  eodem  verba 
comprehensibilem ne, ut prediximus, faciat pluribus quod potest congrue fieri paucioribus. 
Nec  forte querenda est ratio ordinis verborum hic positorum secundum omnis sensus quos 
habent  singula  verba  hic  posita  sed  secundum sensus  eorum principaliores  et  de  quibus 
principaliter intendit auctor. 
Enuntiatis  itaque  secundum  ordinem  predictis  <237va>  cararcterizantibus  et 
comprehensis  generaliter  per hanc particulam  et  alia  quecumque  ipso esse essentia,  entia  
omnia chararterizantur omnibus aliis caracterizantibus a Deo ut a causa in se simplicissima et 
omnia  in  se  eternaliter  prehabente  existentibus;  consequenter  adiungit  breviter  ex  eadem 
omnium causa caracterizata que sunt  substantie angelicae et substantie animarum et nature 
huiusmodi mundi sensibilis et quecumque sunt vel in alteris entia vel secundum intelligentiam 
comprehensibilia. 
Si  autem in  hac  generali  comprehensione  caracterizatorum videantur  comprehendi 
omnia  et  sic  ipsa  characterizantia  non  est  inconveniens,  quia  nihil  impedit  idem  esse 
caracterizans unum et caracterizatum ab alio, vel forte duo esse sese reciproce caracterizantia, 
ut  intelligentiam et dilectionem (intelligentia enim est  diligens et  dilectio intelligens), non 
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solum autem ex ipso et  in  ipso Deo est  omnium esse sed et  eorumdem bene esse.  Unde 
sequitur  Et quidem omnino sanctae et  provectissime  seu antiquissime seu honarabilissime 
virtutes id est supremi angeli vere existentes quia incorruptibilissime et immortalissime sunt, 
etiam secundum existentiam naturalem.  Et  velut collocate  in  vestibulis supersubstantialis 
trinitatis,  id est ei secundum naturam proxime habent,  ab ipsa et in ipsa, omnium videlicet 
causa, et esse et deiformiter esse, quod est illis bene esse. Et subiecte virtutes videlicet post  
illas provectissimas videlicet virtutes habent, resume, et esse et deiformiter esse;  subiecte et 
extreme virtutes scilicet extreme habent videlicet et esse et deiformiter esse. Extreme inquam 
ut  ad  angelos, ut  ad  nos  autem supermundane.  Infimus  enim  ordo  angelicus  respectu 
superiorum ordinum angelicorum habet  esse  et  deiformiter  esse,  infime  et  extreme  inter 
ordines angelicos; respectu autem nostri habet utrumque esse excellenter et supermundane id 
est omnino immaterialiter. Et anime et alia omnia entia habent et esse et bene esse secundum 
eandem rationem, id est sic quod suprema supreme et subiecta subiecte et extrema extreme. 
Et habentia esse et bene esse ex preexistente Deo videlicet sunt et bene sunt et in ipso ut in 
causa videlicet prehabente et inesse adducente et conservante sunt suple et entia et bene entia. 
Et ex ipso incohata et in ipso custodita in essendi videlicet permanentia  et in ipsum ut in 
finem  quem  appetunt  omnia  et pro  sue  susceptibilitatis  mensura  participantia  bene  sunt 
terminata.   Quod autem ex ipso est  et  esse et  bene esse omnium laudantium est benefici 
processus ipius inquantum entis in entia et bene entia.
(Dionysiaca  352-357)  Et  honorabilissima  quidem  eius  quod  est780 esse  tribuit  
melioribus substantiis781, quas et sempiternas vo- <237vb> -cant eloquia. Esse autem ipsum 
entium omnium neque aliquando782 deficit. Sed et ipsum esse ex praeexistente, et ipsius est  
esse et non ipse ipsius esse, et in ipso est esse et non ipse in esse, et ipsum habet esse et non  
ipse habet esse. Et ipse est ipsius esse saeculum  et principium et mensura, ante substantiam  
ens, et ante ens et saeculum et omnium783 substantificum principium et mediatio et finis. Et  
propter  hoc  ab  eloquiis  qui  vere  praeest  secundum  omnem  entium  intelligentiam  
multiplicatur. Et erat in ipso et est et erit et factum est  et fit et fiet proprie laudatur. Haec  
enim  omnia  deodecenter  laudantibus  secundum  omnem  intelligentiam  ipsum  
supersubstantialiter  esse  significant,  et  ubique  entium  causam.  Etenim  non  hoc  aliquid  
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quidem est hoc aliquid autem non est; neque quo quidem est, quo autem non est; sed omnia  
est,  ut  omnium  causa  et  in  ipso  omnia  principia,  omnes  conclusiones,  omnium  totorum  
comprehendens  et  praehabens,  et  super  omnia  est  ut  ante  omnia  supersubstantialiter  
superens. 
Propter quod et omnia de ipso et simul praedicantur, et nihil  est  omnium; omnino  
defiguratus omnis formis, sine forma, sine pulchritudine. Principia et media et fines entium  
irretentive  et  segregatim  in  ipso  praeaccipiens,  et  omnibus  esse  secundum  unam  et  
superunitam causam immaculate superfulgens.
<238ra>Procedens ad laudandum per  se  bonitatem ex bonificis  eius  processibus in 
entia secundum quod entia, laudat ipsum ab ordinata et commensurata distributione eius quod 
est esse entibus; quia melioribus et dignioribus substantiis tribuit esse melius et dignius ex 
quo innuitur quod inferioribus substantiis tribuit  esse inferius et  indignius.  Supremis enim 
substantiis tribuit esse immateriale et incorruptibile; substantiis vero in mundo hoc sensibili 
superioribus  quidem  tribuit  esse  materiale  et  incorruptibile  inferioribus  vero  tribuit  esse 
materiale et corruptibile. Hec igitur insinuans ait: Et honorabilissima quidem seu dignissima 
eius quod est esse tribuit melioribus substantiis, quas et sempiternas seu seculares  vocant  
eloquia. 
Quia autem posset quis, ex iam dicto et insinuatis per iam dictam, putare quod auctor 
insinuaret  ipsum  esse  simpliciter  corrumpi  corrupto  aliquo  entium,  cum  tamen,  ut 
preostensum est, corrupto aliquo ente et eius particulari esse, ipsum esse non corrumpitur sed 
manet784 in ente in quod secedit illud quod785 corrumpitur. Occurit hinc auctor dicens:  Esse 
autem  ipsum  entium  omnium sive  incorruptibilium  videlicet  sive  corruptibilium  neque 
aliquando deficit.  Aliqui autem transtulerunt hunc genitivum in greco ‘entium omnium’ in 
ablativum cum prepositione, sic “esse autem ipsum ab entibus omnibus, neque  aliquando 
deficit”  seu  derelinquitur.  Et  si  enim  corrumpantur  entia  inferiora  ut  hec  elementa  et 
elementata, quia tamen non secedit aliquod eorum in simpliciter non ens sed in aliud ens vel  
alia  entia,  ipsum simpliciter  esse  aliquorum  corruptione  non  deficit  nec  ab  aliquo quod 
corrumpitur ipsum esse derelinquitur. In hoc itaque non modicum laudatur ipse nominatus ens 
in scriptura quod simpliciter esse ab eo largitum non deficit nec derelinquitur umquam ab 
aliquo cui semel est largitum. 
Accedit quoque ad ipsius entis laudem, quod esse largitum ab ipso preente est ipsius ut 
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habentis ipsum in se eternaliter in eterna ratione, et ut causae producentis ipsum et efficientis 
et  ut  causae  conservantis  et  finalis  ipse  vero  nominatus  ens.  Non  est  ipsius  esse  vel  ut 
continentis ipsum vel ut causantis vel ut conservantis, cum ipse sic sit ens quod superens et  
ante esse. Et hoc est quod sequitur Sed et  ipsum esse ex preexistente seu preente ut predictum 
est. Repetitur tamen, ut decenter inducantur subsequentia, ipsum inquam esse ex praeente et  
est esse ipsius preentis videlicet modis predictis essendi hoc huiusmodi  et non ipse preens 
scilicet est resume ipsius esse. 
Et quia obscurum est quomodo esse est ipsius preentis et non ipse preens est ipsius 
esse, declarans subiungit et in ipso ut in prehabente in eterna ratione et ut in conservante et ut 
in fine est esse et non ipse aliquo dictorum modorum in esse et esse habet786 <238rb> ipsum 
prehabentem videlicet subsistandi causam et efficientem et non ipse preens videlicet  habet  
esse subsistandi  adhuc causam. Ipse enim nullo modo causatur et, quia esse787 causatum et 
conservatum a  preente  et  mensuratur  seculo,  et  ipsum seculum est  ipsius  tribus  pretactis 
modis, convenienter  attribuit auctor ipsi preenti esse seculum, ipsius esse, et principium et 
mensuram. 
Insinuans per huius directam attributionem non quod ipse est  aliquod creatum, sed 
quod  ipse  prehabens  in  eterna  ratione  omne  creatum  cum  cuiuslibet  adductivum  et 
conservativum et finis. Unde subiungit  et ipse preens788 videlicet  est seculum ipsius esse et  
principium et mensura. Seculum enim est quodam principium conservativum in esse seculari 
secularium quemadmodum, et tempus potest dici principium conservativum inesse temporali 
temporalium. Et licet hec tria nomina hic significent idem subiecto, habent tamen diversitates 
secundum rationem. Seculum enim ut pretactum est dicit essendi sempiternitatem, principium 
autem essendi causationem, mensura vero adequationem cum mensurato. 
Quod autem esse sit ipsius preentis et non e converso, declarat adhuc per subsequentia 
dicens ante substantiam seu essentiam ens et ante ens et seculum hoc est ante seculum. Ipse 
enim preens eternitate precedit essentiam et ens et mensuram essendi.  Et est suple  omnium 
substantificum principium et mediatio seu medietas et finis seu consummatio.
Et propter hoc quod videlicet ipse sic est omnia omnium et in omnibus qui vere preest 
seu vere preens  multiplicatur id est multipliciter significatur  ab eloquiis secundum omnem 
intelligentiam entium. Omne enim ens in intelligentia vel speculatione cuiuslibet intelligentis 
vel speculantis sursum ducit illam in cause ipsius entis speculationem et intelligentiam, et in 
ente  speculato  sicut  in  speculo  vel  vestigio  speculatur  entis  causam et  eam ab  ipso  ente 
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nominat et preentem ipsius entis causam designat.
Sequitur  et  erat  et  est  et  erit  et  factum  est et  fit  et  fiet  proprie seu  principaliter 
laudantur in ipso id est in Deo ut in causa eorum. Licet enim in ipso non sit erat vel erit, quia 
nihil  preteritum nihil futurum, nec factum est nec fit nec fiet cum ipse nec sit creatus nec 
conditus, ipse tamen principaliter est horum causa et ab hiis, sicut a causatis, laudatur. Et per 
hoc que evidenter non cadunt in ipsum satis convenienter manifestatur quod alia ei attributa 
attribuuntur  ipsi  non  sicut  participanti  sed  sicut  prehabenti  et  causanti.  Quod manifestat 
subiungens: hec enim omnia predicta videlicet et eis consimilia attributa deo, vel dicta esse in 
ipso, significant laudantibus vel secundum aliud exemplar789 “intelligentibus” deum videlicet 
Deo  decenter ipsum esse  supersubstantialiter, secundum  omnem  intelligentiam entium  et  
ubique790 causam.  Omne  enim  attributum  ipsi nihil  dictum   esse  <238va> in  ipso  cum 
intelligitur a laudantibus Deum sicut decet ipsos Deum laudare. Sursum ducit, ut pretactum 
est,  eorum  intelligentiam  ad  intelligendum  ipsum  supersubstantialiter  esse  super  omne 
causatum et  causam entium,  sive  in  celis  sive  in  terra.  Et  bene  non  intelligitur  a  digne 
laudantibus ipsum esse ea que ei attribuuntur. Etenim non est hoc aliquid quidem hoc aliquid  
autem non est, neque quo quidem est quo autem non est;  sed omnia est ut omnium causa 
comprehendens et prehabens in ipso seu in seipso in eternis videlicet rationibus exemplaribus 
et causabilibus  omnia principia, omnes conclusiones, omnium totorum vel secundum aliud 
exemplar ‘omnium entium’791 et super omnia est ut superens supersubstantialiter ante omnia 
anterioritate videlicet proritatis eternitatis et privationis principii. 
Propter quod,  id est propter hoc quod ipse prehabet omnia superens ante omnia et 
causans,  omnia et  de  ipso simul  predicantur omnia.  Hoc  est  in  ipso  predictis  modis 
intelliguntur  omnia  et  ei  vocaliter  in  huiusmodi  designationem  assignantur.  Et  nihil  est  
omnium ut  sepe  pretactum  est.  Ipse  dico  omnino  defiguratus, omnis  formis secundum 
scripture videlicet assignationem quia omnis figura et omnis forma predictis modis in ipso est. 
Sine  forma quia  non  est  formabilis  sed  super  forma;  sine pulchritudine quia  non  est 
pulchrificabilis sed super pulchritudo. Ipse dico preaccipiens in seipso principia et media et  
fines entium irretentive  ut preexpositum est,  et segregatim id est excellenter et excellentius 
quam possint esse in seipsis. 
Et superfulgens immaculate secundum unam et superunitam causam esse omnibus. Et 
si enim diversificata et diversa sint esse omnibus diversis entibus a divini radii superfulgentia 
789 Hilduin, Eriugena et Sarrazin (see Dionysiaca, 354)
790 et ubique om. M
791 omnium entium: non legitur in Dionysiaca (p. 356).
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largita, ex parte tamen ipsius radii792 refulgentis et causantis est omnimoda superunita unitas, 
ut sepe tactum est, et omnimoda immaculatio non solum ex parte causantis, sed et ex parte 
causatorum in quantum  causatorum. 
Ubi nos posuimus huic verbo ‘esse’ ‘eius quod est’ vel ‘ipsius’ in greco non ponitur 
nisi  articulis  genitivis, ad  designandum ipsum verbum ibi  sumi nominaliter  et  genitive in 
cuius  designationiem  nos  posuimus  ‘eius  quod  est’ vel  ‘ipsius’. hec  autem  ‘omnimode 
figuratus’, ‘omni formis’, ‘sine forma’, ‘sine pulchritudine’ sunt in greco singule dictiones 
composite.
(Dionysiaca  357-361)  Si  enim  qui  secundum  nos  sol  sensibilium  substantias  et  
qualitates,  quamvis  multas  et  differentes  existentes,  tamen  ipse  unus  ens  et  uniforme  
superfulgens lumen renovat et nutrit et custodit et perficit et discernit et unit et refovet et  
germinabilia esse facit et auget et commutat et collocat et naturalia perficere facit et auget et  
remo-  <238vb> -vet et vivificat omnia, et totorum unumquodque proprie sibi ipsi eodem et  
uno  sole  participat  et  multorum  participantium  habens793 unus  sol  causas  in  seipso  
uniformiter  praehabet,  multo  quidem  magis  in  ea  quae  et  ipsius  et  omnium  causa  
presubsistere  omnium  entium  exemplaria  secundum  unam  supersubstantiam794 unionem,  
concedendum, quia et substantias adducit secundum eam que a substantia egressionem.
Exemplaria  quidem dicimus  esse  eas  que  in  Deo entium substantificas  et  unitivas  
presubsistentes  rationes,  quas  theologia  predeterminationes  vocat,  et  divinas  et  bonas  
voluntates  entium discretivas  et  factivas,  secundum quas  qui795 supersubstantialis796 entia  
omnia et predeterminavit797 et adduxit.
Hoc quod proximo dixit primum secundum entem “superfulgere immaculate omnibus 
esse secundum unam et superunitam causam”, explanat per exemplum huius solis visibilis 
qui, cum sit unus in se et uniforme lumen superrefulgens diversitates, tamen in hoc inferiori 
mundo et differentias perficit universas. Ait itaque si enim sol qui secundum nos substantias 
sensibilium et qualitates quamvis existentes multas  et  differentes tamen ipse ens unus et 
superefulgens uniforme lumen renovat per generationem videlicet et seminum productionem 
792 superfulgentia ... radii om. M
793 habens] his Dionysiaca
794 supersubstantiam] substantiam Dionysiaca
795 qui] quae Dionysiaca
796 supersubstantialis] supersubstantia Dionysiaca
797 predeterminavit]  predeterminat Dionysiaca
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et conceptionem;  et convenienter  nutrit adhuc in matrice vel in eo quod est pro matrice;  et  
custodit per nutrimentum;  et perficit per adaptationem videlicet perfectam ad susceptionem 
forme specifice et vite convenientis  et perficientis;  et discernit ab aliis per proprias forme 
suscepte differentias; et unit cum aliis per differentias generaliores, et sic iam perfecta798 per 
specialem  naturam  non  tamen   adhuc  solidata;  refovet calore suo  vitali;  et facit  esse 
germinabilia seu, ut aliquis transtulit, ‘fecunda’799 id est  augmentabilia usque ad statum in 
quo uti poterunt virtute generativa vel virtutem generativam tribuit; et auget et commutat ab 
etate  videlicet  in  etatem;  et  collocat seu  firmat  cum  venerit  videlicet  ad  perfectum 
augmentum; et naturalia perficere facit seu, si latine diceretur uno verbo composito <239ra> 
sicut est in greco, ‘exnaturat’ id est naturalia et naturales actus perfecte explicat. In etate enim 
completi et augmenti et status perficiuntur plene naturales actus. Et removet a statu videlicet 
perfecto per declinationem in senectutem senium; et vivificat omnia id est viventibus omnibus 
tam terre nascentibus quam sensibilibus vitam tribuit et conservat; et unumquodque totorum, 
id  est  universorum hic  viventium,  participat proprie  sibi  ipsi id  est  secundum quod sue 
susceptibilitati convenit, eodem et uno sole, et unus sol hiis multorum participantium causas 
prehabet,  vel  secundum  aliud  exemplar  ‘preaccipit’800,  quia  a  causante  ipsum  accepit 
uniformiter in se ipso multorum videlicet causas. 
In  uniformi  enim natura  solis  uniformiter  presunt  et  prehabentur  omnes  figure  et 
omnes qualitates, que multiformiter causantur et sunt in istis inferioribus. Si inquam ita est de 
isto sole visibili  multo quidem magis concedendum801 presubsistere exempla omnium entium 
id est ideas et rationes exemplares et causales omnium entium secundum unam unionem super 
substantiam vel secundum aliud exemplar “secundum unam supersubstantialem unionem”802 
in  ea  causa que  et  ipsius solis  videlicet  et  omnium est  causa videlicet.  Et  bene  est  hoc 
concedendum,  quia  et  adducit  a  non  esse  videlicet  in  esse,  illa  solis  et  omnium  causa 
substantias secundum eam egressionem que a substantia hoc est  secundum intelligentiam 
benevolam qua, intelligens  propriam substantiam et essentiam, intelligit omnia benevole et 
complacenter. Hec enim intelligentia benivola, qua intelligens se intelligit omnia in quantum 
est omnium intelligentia  ea predeterminans, dicitur hic, ut existimo, egressio803 a substantia. 
Cum  itaque  intelligentia  sui  sit  intelligentia  simplicitatis  et  unitatis  in  termino  quin 
supersimplicitatis et superunitatis, et in illa sint omnia predeterminata, manifestum est quod in 
798 et sic iam perfecta om. M
799 Eriugena (see Dionysiaca, 358)
800 Eriugena (see Dionysiaca, 359)
801 concedendum] extendendum M
802 Hilduin, Sarrazin (see Dionysiaca, 359)
803 egressio om. M
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ea sunt omnia secundum unam unionem supersubstantialem et super omnem substantiam. 
Ubi autem supra posuimus “et multorum participantium habens unus sol causas et 
cetera” aliqui translatores non ponunt ‘habens’804. 
Quia  autem  mentionem  fecit de  exemplis  presubsistentibus  in  causa  omnium,  de 
quibus diversi diversimode senserunt, explanat hic suum intellectum de illis exemplis dicens 
ea esse eternaliter preexistentes rationes et bonas voluntates divinas, id est intelligentias Dei 
benivolas omnium predeterminativas et secundum predeterminationem in esse adductivas et805 
ad se et in se unitivas. Que rationes benivole cum non sint nisi806 supersimplex et superuna sui 
bonivola  intelligentia,  propter  multitudinem  tamen  entium  in  illa  sui  intelligentia 
intellectorum dicuntur plures rationes et voluntates. Ait itaque: Exempla quidem dicimus esse 
eas rationes que in Deo presubsistentes substantificas id est inesse adducentes et unitivas in 
se et ad se  entium quas rationes videlicet  theologia vocat predeterminationes, et divinas et  
bonas  voluntates  discretivas. Causa  in  eterna  predeterminatione  quam  in  eorum  proprio 
<239rb> esse et factivas entium, secundum quas rationes videlicet  qui  supersubstantialis et 
predeterminavit eternaliter videlicet et adduxit in esse videlicet in seipsis omnia entia. 
Quod autem nos hic  transtulimus ‘in predeterminationem’ aliqui807 transtulerunt  ‘in 
predestinationem’ sicut interpretes epistole beati Pauli ad romanos fecerunt.808 
(Dionysiaca  361-362)  Si  autem  philosophus  dignificat  Clemens  et  ad  quaedam  
exemplaria  dici  que  in  existentibus  principaliora,  procedit  quidem  non  per809 propria  et  
omnino  perfecta  et  simplicia  nomina  ratio  ipsi,  concedentem  autem  et  hoc  recte  dici,  
theologiae recordandum dicentis quam810 “non ostendit tibi ipsa ad ambulare post ipsa”811 
sed  ut  per  horum  analogicam  cognitionem  ad  omnium  causam,  ut  et  possibiles  sumus,  
reducamur.
Determinato  qualiter  intelligenda  sunt  exempla  ad  que  fiunt  entia  –  quia  beatus 
Clemens, Rome episcopus, usus est nomine exempli non secundum eundem intellectum, sed 
dicens  exempla  similitudines  sumptas  ex  rebus  creatis  vel  causas  creatas  in  se  causaliter 
804 habens: non legitur in Dionysiaca (see. p. 359)
805 secundum ... adductivas et om. M
806 nisi om. M
807 Eriugena (see Dionysiaca, 361)
808 See Romans 8:29
809 per om. Dionysiaca
810 quam] quia Dionysiaca
811 Fortasse Wisdom 13:5, Exodus 25:40, Deuteronomy 4:19.
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prehabentes ea que efficiunt in causatis –, manifestat auctor quod beatus Clemens non utitur 
nomine  exempli  secundum primam et  principalem et  propriissimam significationem illius 
nominis. Primo enim et principaliter et propriissime dicuntur exempla, ut predictum est, idee 
et rationes eterne rerum omnium ad earum imitationes fiendarum. Secundo autem, et minus 
proprie, possunt dici exempla causae create rerum ab ipsis causatarum imitationem quadam 
causas habentium. Tertio  autem dicitur  exemplum res causata  inquantum est vestigium et 
imago causantis reducens cognitionem in speculationem causantis. Dicitur etiam exemplum 
quilibet  inductum ad manifestandum812 aliud  per  aliquam sui813 similitudinem ad illud.  Si 
itaque quis dicat recte, dici exemplum secundum quod eo nomine usus est beatus Clemens, et 
post exempla propriissime dicta sit omnino ambulandum, et cum non sint aliud ab ipso Deo 
ipsa sint adoranda.
Post exempla autem, alia et aliter dicta, non sit ambulandum nec sint adoranda ne per 
nominis idenptitatem decipiatur. Ambulans post exempla creata recordari debet scripture que 
precipit  non  ambulandum post  exempla  creata  sed  ab  hiis  sursum duci  ad  solius  crean- 
<239va>  -tis  speculationem  et  adorationem.  Ait  itaque  si  autem  clemens  philosophus  
dignificat et que in existentibus principaliora sine causatione videlicet sine manifestatione in 
manifestorum, dici exempla ad quedam ut ad causata videlicet vel manifestata, ratio procedit 
quidem ipsi Clementi non per propria et omnino perfecta et simplicia nomina hoc est non per 
proprie et perfecte et simpliciter et principaliter significantia. Concedentes autem et hoc quod 
videlicet dicit Clemens  recte dici, recordandum theologie dicentis quam “non ostendit tibi 
ipsa exempla videlicet creata  ad ambulare post ipsa”814 sed ut reducamur, ut et possibiles  
sumus, per horum analogicam id est comproportionalem cognitionem ad omnium causam.
(Dionysiaca  362-367) Omnia  igitur  ipsi  entia,  secundum  unam  ab  omnibus  
segregatam  unionem  reponendum;  quia  quidem  ab  esse  substantificum  processum  et  
bonitatem inchoans, et per omnia incedens, et omnia ex ipsa ipso esse implens, et in omnibus  
existentibus exultans.
Omnia quidem in se ipsa prehabet, secundum unam simplicitatis superabundantiam  
omnem duplicitatem refutans. Perfecte autem similiter continet secundum supersimplificatam  
ipsius infinitatem; et ab omnibus singulariter participatur, quemadmodum et vox una existens  
et eadem a multis auditibus ut una participatur.
812 ad manifestandum om. M
813 sui om. M
814 See n. 131.
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Omne igitur principium et finis entium, qui praeest. Principium quidem, ut causa; finis  
autem,  ut  huius  gratia.  Et  terminus  omnium  et  infinitas  omnis  infinitatis  et  termini  
superexcellenter ut oppositorum. In uno enim, ut multoties dictum est, entia omnia et prehabet  
et substituit815, presens omnibus <239vb> et ubique.
Et secundum unum et idem et secundum idem omne, et ad omnia procedens, et manens  
in seipso, et stans et motus, et neque stans neque motus, neque principium habens aut medium  
aut finem; neque in quodam entium ens, neque sic adhuc entium ens; et neque totaliter ipsi  
convenit aliquid seculariter entium aut temporaliter subsistentium.
Sed et a tempore et seculo, et his que in seculo816 et his que in tempore ab omnibus  
segregatur, quia et per se seculum et entia et mensurae entium et mensurata per ipsum et ab  
ipso.
Interposita  intentione  beati  Clementis  de  exemplis,  redit  ad  suam  intentionem 
recapitulando  concludens  omnia  entia817 esse  in  Deo  secundum  unam  et  superunitam 
unionem, dicens Omnia igitur entia reponendum ipsi id est omnium causae secundum unam 
ab omnibus segregatam quia omnibus superexcellenter  enim  unionem vel  secundum aliud 
exemplar ‘cognitionem’818.  In cognitione enim sui qua etiam cognoscit  omnia, sunt omnia 
unita. 
Recapitulando quoque et huius manifestationem subiungit  quia quidem inchoans ipsa 
videlicet  omnium causa  substantificum processum et  bonitatem id  est  extensionem sui  in 
omnem utilitatem  ab esse,  ut  preostensum est,  et  incedens  per  omnia ipso  videlicet  suo 
processu, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et  disponens omnia suaviter;  et  implens  
omnia ipso esse ex ipsa omnium videlicet causa et exultans id est sibi complacens in omnibus  
existentibus.  Prehabet quidem omnia  in  seipsa quia  in  eternis  rationibus  continet  et 
predeterminat  omnia  secundum  unam  simplicitatis superhabundantiam,  refutans  omnem 
duplicitatem substantialem  videlicet.  Multitudo  enim  eternarum  rationum,  ut  patet  ex 
predictis,  non  multiplicat  substantiam  vel  essentiam  sed  omnis  uniuntur  in  super 
simplicissima unitate. 
Quod autem nos transtulimus “in substantificum processum et bonitatem”  accusative, 
in  greco  est  genitivi  casus.  Verbum  enim  ‘inchoandi’ in  greco  exigit  genitivum  casum. 
815 substituit]  subsistit Dionysiaca
816 et his que in seculo om. Dionysiaca
817 entia om. M
818 vel ... exemplar: non legitur in Dionysiaca.
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Quidam819 tamen transtulerunt illud in genitivum quidam820 vero in ablativum. 
Qui casus si sumantur in designationem causae, satis convenienter ponuntur, quia esse, 
quod est primum largitum a substantifico processu et boni-  <240ra> -tate largitur, predicto 
itaque modo, prehabet omnia in se ipsa omnium causa et superperfecte et similiter continet ea 
secundum infinitatem virtutis sue supersimplicem et supersimplificatam. In ipsa enim omnia 
etiam in  se  non viventia  sunt  vita  et  que  non sapiunt  sapientia  et  que  mutabilia  sunt  et 
corruptibilia in ipsa sunt immutabilitas et incorruptibilitas. Perfectissime igitur et simillime 
sunt in ipsa omnium causa.
Omnia et singula participant ea non diversificata in se. ex diversorum participatione et 
hoc est quod sequitur  perfecte autem seu omnino perfecte  similiter continet omnia videlicet 
ipsa omnium causa secundum supersimplificatam seu super expansam ipsius causae videlicet 
infinitatem; et  participatur singulariter seu unice ex parte videlicet ipsius causae participate 
ab  omnibus.  Quemadmodum  et  vox existens  una  et  eadem a  multis  auditibus  ut  una  
participatur. Plures enim auditus licet forte hic acutius ille vero obtusius eam821 suscipiens 
non iudicant eam plures et diversas voces sed ut in se omnimode unam. 
Recapitulans itaque breviter predicta, finem ponit huic capitulo dicens Omnium igitur  
principium et  finis  entium qui  preest  seu  preens.  Principium  quidem  ut  causa efficiens 
videlicet et ex non ente inesse adducens; finis autem ut huius gratia.  omnia enim facit ut 
omnia et singula participent ipso secundum quod eis est possibile. 
Et  terminus  omnium quia  omnia  ipsum  appetentia  cum  ad  ipsum  pro  ut  eis  est 
possibile822 attigerint non ultra tendunt, vel ‘terminus omnium’ dicitur quia omnibus terminatis 
terminos qui  preteriri non poterunt constituit et termini et videlicet est terminus. Sic enim 
oportet coniungere in constructione licet in sermone distent ‘terminus’ et ‘termini’ et infinitas 
omnis infinitatis quia termini privationem sive temporis vel seculi seu numeri in augendo seu 
quanti continui in dividendo et minuendo sive  materie in trasfigurando  in formas ipse sua 
infinita virtute. 
Adducit  superexcellenter est  videlicet  infinitas  infinitatis  et  terminus  termini  ut  
oppositorum opponuntur  enim  ne  ut  affirmatio  et  abnegatio  terminus  et  infinitas  quia 
terminum abnegat infinitas. Est autem “qui  pre est” hoc et omnia alia, quia omnia prehabet,  
ut sepe dictum est,  in se  uno in eternis rationibus et ex illis ea substituit in esse et in esse 
conservat. Unde subiungit In uno enim ut multotiens dictum est, et phrehabet omnia entia et  
819 Sarrazin (see Dionysiaca, 362)
820 Hilduin, Eriugena (see Dionysiaca, 362)
821 eam] etiam M
822 et terminus ... possibile om. M
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substituit ea videlicet  presens omnibus per omnium intelligentiam et complacentiam in illis, 
ea conservans et ubique celum et terram, ut dicit, implens non mole corporeo aut dimensione 
quantitativa sed nihil reliquendo vacuum a sua gubernatione.  Et secundum unum et idem est 
videlicet presens omnibus et ubique. 
Et secundum idem omne. In nullo enim ex parte sui diversificatas est presens diversis 
et ubique et  dictus omne omnium, ut pretactum est, suscipiens nominationes  et ad omnia 
procedens per  bonificas  videlicet  largitiones  <240rb>  et  manens  in  seipso.  Non  enim 
procedens egreditur a se, sed manet immutabiliter in se nec contrariatur, hoc est quod supra 
dicitur secundum eam que a substantia egressionem. 
Et stans per immutabilitatem,  et motus per rerum productionem et gubernationem in 
esse seculari vel temporali, et neque stans neque motus quia nihil dictum de creatura univoce 
dicitur de ipso sed super substantialiter  et  super omnem intelligentiam.  Neque principium 
habens quia non habet causam efficientem vel medium quia omnia habet823 simul,  vel finem 
quia  nihil  quod  ab  ipso  habet  recedit;  neque  in  quodam  entium  ens et  in  quodam  non 
subintellige quia in omnibus et ubique ens vel neque in quodam entium ens, quia nihil entium 
ipsum continet et circumscribit; neque adhuc entium ens quia, ut supra dictum est, ipsius est 
esse, et non ipse ipsius esse. 
Et  neque totaliter  convenit  ipsi  aliquid seculariter  entium vel  temporaliter  
subsistentium. Sed segregatur et a tempore et a seculo et hiis que in seculo et hiis que in  
tempore omnibus. et quia per se seculum et entia et mensure entium et mensurata per ipsum 
et  ab  ipso. Quia  itaque  hec  omnia  per  ipsum  sunt  et  ab  ipso,  ipse  non  est  secundum 
substantiam  aliquid  horum  sed  supersubstantialiter  ab  omni  segregatus  qui  tamen 
supersubstantialiter  est  hec  omnia.  Seculariter  autem  entia  dicit  hic  intelligibilia  et 
temporaliter subsistentia dicit materialia et sensibilia.
823 habet] habent M
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Capitulum  Septimum: De sapientia, intellectu, ratione, veritate, 
fide
(Dionysiaca 380-385) Age autem si videtur veram et eternam vitam ut sapientem et ut  
per  se  sapientiam laudemus,  magis  autem ut  omnis  sapientie  substantiam,  super  omnem 
sapientiam et intelligentiam superexistentem: non enim solum Deus superplenus est sapientia,  
et  intellectione824 ipsius  non  est  numerus,  sed  et  omni  rationi  et  intellectui  et  sapientie  
supercollocatur. Et hoc supernaturaliter intelligens divinus vere vir et  communis nostri  et  
ducis  sol,  «stultum  Dei  sapientius  hominibus»  ait.  Non  solum  quam825 omnis  humana 
deliberatio  error  quidam826 est,  iudicata  ad  firmum  et  permansivum  divinarum  et  
perfectissimarum intelligentiarum, sed quia et consuetum est theologis contraria passione in  
Deo ea que privationis abnegare. Sic et invisibile aiunt eloquia omnino manifestum lumen; et  
multum laudabilem et multivocum ineffabilem et innominabilem; et omnibus praesentem et ex  
omnibus inventum incomprehensibilem et non investigabilem. Et hoc utique modo et nunc  
divinus apostolus laudare dicitur stultitiam Dei, quod apparet in ipsa praeter rationem et  
inconveniens in ineffabilem et ante rationem omnem reducens veritatem. Sed quod in aliis  
dixi, proprie nobis quae super nos  <243ra> accipientes et connutrito sensibus infixi et hiis  
que  secundum  nos  divina  comparantes,  decipimur,   secundum  apparens  divinam  et  
ineffabilem rationem persequentes.827
Quia sapientia est, in habentibus828 vitam sempiternam, suprema virtus comprehensiva 
Dei et divinorum, in esse adducta et conservata et illuminata a divina sapientia, post laudem 
Dei per nominationem vite laudat ipsum per nominationem sapientie ut substantificum omnis 
sapientie et super omnem sapientiam sine mensura supercollocatam. Ait itaque Age autem (si  
videtur), tibi videlicet o timothee, laudemus veram, vel secundum aliud exemplar829 “bonam”, 
et eternam, seu saecularem, vitam quam videlicet laudavimus in precedenti capitulo ut vitam, 
laudemus inquam in  hoc  capitulo  et  ut  sapientem et  ut  per  se  sapientiam.  Ipsa  enim est 
sapiens  non  sapientia  participata  ut  qualitate  sed  ut  per  se  naturaliter,  essentialiter,830 et 
824
intellectione] intellectionis Dionysiaca
825 quam] quia Dyonisiaca
826 quidam] quidem Dyonisiaca
827 persequentes] prosequentes Dyonisiaca
828 in habentibus om. M
829 Sarrazin (see Dionysiaca, 380)
830 essentialiter] generaliter M
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substantialiter  sapientia.  sic  inquam  laudemus  eam  et  non  solum  sic,  magis  autem ut  
substantiam, vel secundum aliud exemplar831 autem rursus “substantificam”, omnis sapientie,  
et superexistentem super  omnem  sapientiam  et  intelligentiam,  id  est  actionem  virtutis832 
sapientialis. Et  bonum sic est laudanda non enim Deus est solum superplenus sapientia, non 
est numerus intelligentiae ipsius sed et supercollocatur, seu superfirmatur, et omni rationi et  
intellectui et sapientie. 
Hanc autem supereminenciam divine sapientie manifestavit divinus Paulus cum dixit 
“stultus Dei, sapientius est hominibus”.833 Quem divinum apostulum834 vocat hic auctor solem 
sui et ducis ipsius, id est sancti Ierothei, qui dux et doctor fuit beati Dionysii. Utriusque enim 
illuminator ad fidem fuit beatus Paulus, hoc itaque apostoli dictum inducens auctor subiungit 
et  divinus vere vir, id est Paulus sapientissimus et fortissimus, et  communis sol nostri835 et  
ducis, id est Hierothei, intelligens supernaturaliter, id est mente836 excedens Deo, hoc, id est 
supereminentiam divine sapientiae,  ait “stultum Dei,  sapientius hominibus”.837 Hoc dicens 
Non solum quam omnis  humana deliberatio est, iudicata quidam error ad  firmum,  vel 
secundum aliud  exemplar838 “ad  stabile”,  et permansivum  divinarum et  perfectissimarum 
intelligentiarum, sed quam theologis est consuetum abnegare, id est privato sermone dicere, 
in Deo, seu de Deo, contraria passione ea que privationis, hoc est attribuere Deo significantia 
privationes. Cuiusmodi attributio  videtur esse oppositi habitus  abnegatio in designationem 
quod ei conveniunt839 superexcellenter habitus oppositi privationis  utpote cum ei attribuitur 
stultitia  que  est  privatio  sapientie  et  insipientia. Secundum  sermonis  faciem, abnegatio 
sapientie  attribuitur  ei  sapientie  privatio,  sed secundum  interiorem  sermonis  intentionem 
econtrario attribuitur  ei  divinarum sapientie  et  scientie  incomprehensibilis  altitudo,  et  sic 
patitur sermo contrarium eius quod pretendit secundum faciem. Potest quoque supereminens 
Dei sapientia ideo dici stultitia quia hereticis et gentilibus videtur stultitia quod non possunt 
sillogistice  ex  principiis  sumptis  a  sensibilibus  demonstrare  ut  esse  nostre redemptionis 
dispensatio. 
Ad declarationem autem eius  quod  dixit “theologis  esse consuetum”,  et  specialiter 
sermonis  apostoli, inducit exempla  dicens sic,  id  est  contraria  passione,  aiunt  eloquia  et  
831 Sarrazin (see Dionysiaca, 380)
832 actionem virtutis om. M
833 1 Corinthians 1:25
834 apostolum om. M
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837 1 Corinthians 1:25
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lumen omnino manifestum invisibile, lucem enim inaccessibilem quam inhabitat Deus dicunt 
tenebram et eius latibulum.  Et multum laudabilem et multivocum, id est dictum ex omnibus, 
laudatum et  nominatum  aiunt ineffabilem  et  innominabilem,  et  omnibus  presentem et  ex  
omnibus inventum, aiunt incomprehensibilem et non investigabilem, seu inperscrutabilem, has 
videlicet privationes et consimiles ei attribuentia in designationem superexcellentie eorum que 
ab ipso privatur. 
Hoc  utique  modo et nunc,  id  est  in  proposito  sermone,  divinus  apostolus  laudare 
dicitur stulticiam Dei, ipse dico, reducens in veritatem ineffabilem et ante rationem omnem, id 
est in veritatem anteriorem et superiorem omni ratione investigativa, apparens in ipsa, id est 
in divina stulticia hoc est in eius supereminenti sapientia,  praeter rationem et inconveniens. 
Verbi enim incarnationem et mortem in carne visam preter rationem et inconvenientem, et sic 
stulticiam  reduxit apostolus  sua  doctrina  in  veritatem  qua  non  potest  effari  lingua  vel 
investigare ratio, maxime fide non precedente. Mente enim excessit Deo transcendens omnia 
materialia  et  sensibilia.  Non  ex  hiis  iudicans  divina.  Iudicantes  enim divina  ex  hiis  que 
secundum nos  decipiuntur,  et  divinam veritatem ut  falsam et  stultam prosequuntur,  quod 
manifestans auctor subiungit sed (quod in aliis dixi) accipientes que supra nos proprie nobis, 
tamquam videlicet essent similia et equalia hiis que secundum nos, et infixi, seu involuti id est 
inviscati, connutrito sensibus, id est phantasie imaginative sensibilium, et comparantes divina 
hiis quae secundum nos, decipimur, secundum apparens persequentes divinam et ineffabilem 
rationem.
Hec autem determinatio “secundum apparens” adiungi potest et “ad decipimur” et “ad 
perse-  <243va> -quentes.”  Ubi  autem nos  supra posuimus “sol”  aliqua  translatio840 habet 
“leticia” quia in aliquo exemplari greco pro “hlios” quod est “sol”, scribitur “hdis” quod sonat 
in  “leticiam”  seu  “delectationem”,  sed  verior lectura est  “sol” sicut patet per  scolium 
marginale. Ex  eo  autem  quod  in  principio  capituli  dicit  “veram  vitam”  quae  Deus  est, 
secundum grecam linguam saecularem. Patens  est  quod saeculum quandoque sumitur  pro 
eternitate.
(Dionysiaca 385-386)   Oportet841 scire  eum, qui  secundum nos intellectum habere  
quidem  virtutem  ad  intelligere  per  quam  intelligibilia  conspicit,  unionem  autem  
superexcellentem intellectus naturam per quam convertitur ad ulteriora seipso.  Secundum  
840 Eriugena (see Dionysiaca, 381)
841 oportet] oportunum Dionysiaca
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hanc  igitur divina intelligendum non secundum nos, sed totos ipsos a totis nobismet ipsis  
extra statutos et totos Dei effectos. Melius enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum sic enim erunt  
divina data cum Deo effectis.
Dicto in proximo unde decipimur circa divina, adiungit auctor breviter modum cavendi 
hanc deceptionem que est quod intellectus  noster naturaliter potens intelligere et conspicere 
intelligibilia transcendat non solum omnia sensibilia, sed et omnia intelligibilia et seipsam, et 
sic copuletur et uniatur ad superiora seipso, hoc est ad divina, divino radio elevante ipsum 
intellectum omnia transcendentem ad se. Et velut absorbente eum in se ut totus sit non sui sed 
absorbentis  eum divini radii sic enim unitus  cum divinis circa illa non errabit. Hoc igitur 
manifestans auctor ait  Oportet scire hoc videlicet  eum intellectum qui secundum nos id est 
humanum intellectum  habere  quidem  virtutem,  seu  potentiam  ad  intelligere,  per  quam 
virtutem  scilicet,  conspicit  intelligibilia unione,  autem habere  videlicet  superexcellentem 
naturam intellectus per  quam unionem,  videlicet,  connectitur, seu  copulatur,  ad  ulteriora 
seipso id est ad divinum et divina. 
Secundum  hanc  igitur, unionem  videlicet  excedentem  naturam  intellectus, 
intelligendum divina non secundum nos, sed totos ipsos, id est nos ipsos, extra statutos a totis  
nobismet ipsis et  totos  effectos  ei.  Oportet  subsistandi  intelligere  divina  vel  resume hanc 
particulam secundum sic non secundum nos intelligendum divina, sed secundum totos ipsos. 
Et  cum  melius enim esse Dei,  secundum  conformitatem  videlicet  voluntatis  nostre 
omnimodam cum voluntate  divina,  et  non nostri  ipsorum,  sequendo  videlicet  voluntatem 
propriam, sic enim, id est essendo Dei, erunt divina data, divinarum videlicet illuminationum, 
effectis cum Deo. Virtutem itaque intellectus ad intelligere habemus ex conditione unionem, 
autem eius ad superiora ipso habemus ex divino radio ipsum super omnia elevante et velut in 
seipsum absorbente.
(Dionysiaca 386-388) Hanc igitur irrationalem et sine intellectu et stultam sapientiam  
superexcellenter  laudantes,  dicamus  quam842 omnis  est  intellectus  et  rationis  et  omnis  
sapientie et  intelligentie causa, et  ipsius est  omne consilium et ab ipsa omnis cognitio  et  
intelligentia,  et  in  ipsa  omnis  thesauri  sapientiae  et  cognitionis  sunt  absconditi.  Etenim  
consequenter iam predictis, supersapiens et omnisapiens causa et per se sapientie843 et totius  
842 quam] quia Dionysiaca
843 sapientie] sapiens Dionysiaca
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et eius que secundum844 unumquodque est substantificatrix.
Hiis praehabitis, accedit ad principale propositum huius capituli, hoc est ad laudandum 
sapientiam divinam ut superexcellentem omnem rationem et intelligentiam et sapientiam, et ut 
existentem causam omnis habentis per aliquam vim apprehensivam sapientie resonationem. Et 
ait  hanc igitur sapientiam,  de  qua videlicet  locutus  est  Paulus,  irrationalem,  id  est  super 
omnem rationem, et sine intellectu, seu  si latine diceretur sicut est in greco uno vocabulo 
“inintellectualem”   vel “inintellectivam”, id est supra omnem intellectum,  et stultam, id est 
excedentem  omnem  sapientiam  reputatam  tamen  ab  hominibus  stultitiam,  quia  ad  eius 
supereminentiam non possunt attingere. Hanc inquam sapientiam laudantes superexcellenter, 
id  est  ut  superexcellentem,  dicamus  quam,  ipsa  videlicet,  est causa omnis  intellectus  et  
rationis et omnis sapientie et intelligentie, et ipsius, ut cause videlicet, est omne consilium et  
ab ipsa omnis cognitio et intelligentia et in ipsa, in eternis <244ra> videlicet rationibus, sunt 
omnes  thesauri  sapientie et  cognitionis  absconditi.  Et  vere  est  sic.  Etenim  consequenter 
predictis iam supersapiens causa et omnis sapiens est substantificatrix et per se sapientie, id 
est sapientie secundum se considerate,  et totius, id est universaliter considerate,  et eius que 
secundum unumquodque, id est cuiuslibet  particularis sapientie,  sicut enim supra dictum est 
quod super bona et omnibona causa est substantificatrix omnimode bonitatis. Et  consimiliter 
de superente et  supervita, sic consequenter est de supersapiente et omnisapiente causa. 
Licet autem in superioribus tetigimus quorumdam  nominum hic positorum proprias 
significationes et eorum differentias,  non existimo inconveniens esse et hic de hiis tangere, 
quia  poterit  esse  aliquis  huius  loci  lector  qui  non  legerit,  vel  memoritur, vel  retinuerit 
superiora. Sapientia itaque est virtus apprehensiva Dei qui est lux in se manifestissima propter 
sue tamen supereminentie vehementiam nostre infirmitati inaccessibilis.  Intellectus vero est 
virtus et potentia apprehensiva principiorum immediatorum et per se notorum quorum lux est 
menti  nostre  manifestissima.  Ratio  autem  est  virtus  que  decurrit  a  principiis  notis  in 
cognitionem conclusionis;  hec autem subdividitur in  virtutem que dicitur  scientia,  que est 
discursiva a principiis per se notis, necessariis, et necessario in conclusiones; et in virtutem 
artis que est discursiva a principiis notis ut plurimum uno modo in semper se habentibus in 
conclusiones prius ignotas. Uno modo ut plurimum semper se habentes sub ratione quoque est 
virtus que dicitur consilium que, posito fine optimo, inoperabili a nobis est perscrutativa et  
electiva vie que optime et directissime ducit ad finem propositum. Actio autem tam virtutis 
artis quam virtutis scientie dicitur cognitio et actio virtutis intellectus dicitur intelligentia; hec 
844 Secundum] per Dionysiaca
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itaque  sunt  nominum  predictorum  hic  positorum  proprie  significationes  sumuntur  tamen 
pluramque  communiter  ita  etiam  quod  unumquodque  pro  unoquoque  extenso  et  nomine 
cognitionis usque ad sensitivam.
(Dionysiaca 388-390) Ex ipsa intelligibiles et intellectuales angelicorum intellectuum 
virtutes simplices et beatas habent intelligentias, non in partibilibus aut a partibilibus aut  
sensibus  aut  rationibus  egressivis  <244rb> congregantes  divinam cognitionem,  neque  ab  
aliquo  communi  ad  hec  contente.  Omni  autem  materiali  et  multitudine  purgate,  
intellectualiter, immaterialiter et  intelligibiliter845 intelligibilia divinorum intelligunt. Et est  
ipsis  intellectualis  virtus  et  operatio  inmixta  et  immaculata  puritate  splendificata,  et  
conspectiva divinarum intelligentiarum; impartibilitate et immaterialitate et deiformiter unio  
ad divinum et supersapiens et intellectum et rationem ut possibile refigurata.
Dicto generaliter  quod divina sapientia  est  causa virtutum habentium resonationem 
sapientie,  adicit quod ipsa est causa virtutum specialium angelicorum dicens: Ex ipsa, divina 
videlicet  sapientia,  virtutes  intellectuum angelicorum,  id  est  intellectuum qui  sunt  angeli, 
intelligibiles,  quia  intelliguntur  a  nobis  et  superiores  inter  illas  virtutes  intelliguntur846 ab 
inferioribus,  et  intellectuales,  quia Deum eis superiorem intelligentes,  habent  simplices et  
beatas  intelligentias,  id  est  actiones  virtutis  sapientie,  quibus847 comprehendunt  Deum 
simplicem non per imagines et symbola, ut nos, sed simplici contemplatione in quam et omnia 
contemplantur quod est beatissimum, quia optimum ad angelicas voluntates habitum. 
Habent  inquam  simplices  intelligentias  ille  virtutes  non congregantes divinam 
cognitionem in partibilibus, id est in virtutibus apprehensivis et retentivis multis et partitis ut 
sunt in nobis quinque sensus et phantasia et memoria et ratio egressiva,  vel a partibilibus, 
utpote  a  materialibus,  vel  sensibus vel  rationibus  egressivis.  Non  enim  utuntur  actione 
sensitiva, vel rationis discursu successivo a principiis in conclusiones, vel rationis egressu ad 
exteriora, nec ab hiis tanquam a symbolis colligunt divinam cognitionem,  neque ab aliquo 
communi,  congregantes videlicet divinam cognitionem, non enim ut nos a communioribus 
inveniunt specialia, nec Deus habet aliquid cum aliquo commune a quo possit investigari. 
Simplici  itaque  intelligentia  contuentur  Deum celestes  virtutes  et  in  <244va>  ipso,  ut 
pretactum est, omnia et in omnibus ipsum. 
845  intelligibiliter] uniformiter Dionysiaca
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Non  tamen contemplatur ipsum in causatis et ex creatis ut nos non potentes ipsum 
aliter speculari nisi ex causatis, et ideo quasi contenti ad848 illa. Ille vero virtutes in omnibus et 
ex omnibus Deum conspiciunt, non tamen contente ad illa tanquam ex illis colligentes eam 
quam de ipso habent cognitionem. Unde adiungitur  ad hec contente, seu si latine diceretur, 
sicut  est  in  greco,  ad  hoc “circumhabite”  vel  “circumtente”,  quasi  diceret  habent  quidem 
celestes virtutes divinam cognitionem et in se et in omnibus causatis; non tamen habent849 eam 
in  causatis  ut  contente ad  hec et  secundum modum eorum cognoscentes,  sed  secundum 
modum eorum850 simplicitatis  proprie  et  simplicitatis  divine.  Quod  manifestans  subiungit 
Omni autem materiali  et  multitudine purgate. Non enim utuntur sensitiva aut imaginativa 
comprehensivis materialium tantum, nec multitudine virium apprehensivarum, sed simplici 
intelligentia  veritatem  agnoscunt  hiis  inquam purgate  intelligunt  intellectualiter,  quia  per 
modum virtutis proprie intellective, vel secundum aliud exemplar851 “pure”,  immaterailiter, 
intelligibiliter,  quia  secundum  quod  possibile  est  intelligi  divina,  vel  secundum  aliud 
exemplar852 “uniformiter”, intelligibilia divinorum id est ea que de Deo sunt intelligibilia; non 
enim ut saepe dictum est omnino incomprehensibile853 est a creatura quid et ut est in se divina 
essentia. 
Et est ipsis virtutibus videlicet celestibus virtus seu potentia  intellectualis et operatio 
intellectualis  simpliciter  splendificata  puritate immixta  et  immaculata, et conspectiva 
inpartibilitate divinarum  intelligentiarum et  immaterialitate et  refigurata,  intellectualis 
videlicet virtus et operatio,  intellectum et rationem, id est habens refiguratum intellectum et 
refiguratam rationem, (ut possibile) deiformiter unio, id est deiformi unitate, ad divinum, vel 
secundum aliud exemplar854 “ad intellectuale”, et supersapiens, id est ad Deum et eius super 
sapientiam. 
Virtus enim intellectualis angelica clara est eo quod non egreditur ad spirituales entium 
ut ex earum ad mixtionem intelligat entia ex huius commixtione sibi preter naturam maculata 
et eo quod impartibili conspectu et simplici et immateriali conspicit rationes omnium eternas 
et exemplares in mente divina, in quibus conspicit se et omnia,  quas rationes hic dicit divinas 
intelligentias. Et hac claritate refigurata est et reformata secundum  actum diligendi Deum. 
Quem actum hic  dicitur  intellectum,  et  secundum  actum intelligendi  in  ipso omnia  quem 
848 ad] de M
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actum hic vocat rationem deiformi unione ad divinitatem supersapientem.
(Dionysiaca  390-392) <244vb>  Propter  divinam  sapientiam  et  anime  rationale  
habent, egressive quidem et circulo circa entium veritatem circumambulantes, et partibilium  
et  omnimodorum  varietate  deficientes  ab  unitivis  intellectibus,  ea  autem  que  multorum  
convolutione in unum, et equalibus angelorum intellectibus inquantum animabus proprium et  
possibile  dignificate.  Sed  et  sensus  ipsos  non  utique  quis  peccet  intentione  sapientie  
resonationem dicens.
Ostenso quod angelice  intelligibiles  virtutes  et  intellectuales  sunt  per  se  ex  divina 
sapientia, consequenter ostendit quod et anime virtutes ex eadem per se sapientia et directe 
causantur  earum insinuans  proprietatem et  differentiam ad  virtutes  angelicas  sic  inquiens 
propter divinam sapientiam et anime habent rationale circumambulantes per varios videlicet 
ratiocinationum  modos.  Egressive,  ad  varias  videlicet,  entium species  et  circulo,  entia 
videlicet circumeundo et non repentine eorum cognitionem accipiendo, de qua circulatione in 
superioribus latius dictum est. Circumambulantes inquam sic et sic circa entium  veritatem 
adquirendam videlicet et deficientes ab unitivis intelligentiis, vel secundum aliud exemplar855 
“ab  unitivis intellectibus”,  id  est  ab  angelis  simplici  intelligentia  veritatis  cognitionem 
accipientibus.  Varietate  partibilium  et  omnimodorum;  variis  enim  virtutibus  et  modis 
accipiunt  cognitionem partitorum et  multimode differencium in  quo deficiunt  ab  angelica 
uniformi  deiformitate  vel  secundum  aliud  exemplar856 “partibili  et  omnimodo  varietatis 
deficientes” et cum et est idem in sensu cum priori littera; sic enim deficiunt anime ab unitivis 
intelligentiis angelorum dum hic vident per speculum in enigmate. 
Sed cum in resurrectione videbunt facie ad faciem et erunt homines beati sicut angeli 
Dei in caelis, multitudinem et varietatem cognitionum convoluent in unam contemplationem 
Dei857 absque et simbolis subfigurationibus et nuda et simpli- <245ra> -ci  contemplatione 
contemplantes  ipsum et  in  ipso  omnia  sic  quantum animabus est  possibile  et  conveniens 
dignificare intelligentiis equalibus angelorum. Et hoc est quod sequitur ea autem convolutione 
que multorum in unum,  hoc est  multarum cognitionum et  multorum cognitorum in unam 
contemplationem  Dei,  quia  in  illo  contemplabuntur.  Et  omnia  dignificate (in  quantum 
animabus proprium, id est conveniens,  et possibile) et, id est etiam,  intellectibus equalibus  
angelorum seu  si  latine  diceretur  uno  vocabulo  sicut  est  in  greco  “equangelis”  vel 
“equangelicis”. 
855 ab unitivis intellectibus non legitur in Dionysiaca (p. 391)
856 partibili et omnimodo varietatis deficientes non legitur in Dionysiaca (p. 391)
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Quidem autem anime non solum habent rationem et rationale a divina sapientia sed et 
sensus et sensitivum in quibus duobus comprehendi possunt omnes vires anime apprehensive, 
manifestat  per hoc quod subsequenter dicit  ipsos sensus esse resonationem sapientie.  Non 
enim directe resonarent et tamquam vestigium, licet minus formatum, subobscure nuntiarent 
sapientiam nisi ab ea directe procederent. Hoc itaque manifestans subiungit  sed non utique  
quis peccet intentione, sue dictionis videlicet.,  dicens et sensus ipsos resonationem sapientie 
ac per consequens ipsos a divina sapientia causatos. 
Nec dicat  aliquis  auctorem quod858 in  superfluis  laborare  enumerans  quidam quasi 
specialiter sapientie causata cum omnia859 in sapientia fecerit Deus quia cum de Deo dicantur 
multa  ut  vita,  sapientia,  intellectus,  veritas  et  quam plurima  huiusmodi.  Intentio  sua  est 
ostendere que procedunt ab ipso vita inquantum vita et ab ipso sapientia inquantum sapientia 
et sic de ceteris ut pretactum est. Licet enim dicta de Deo ex parte ipsius de860 quo dicuntur 
sunt omnimode unum et idem, comparatione tamen ad creaturas habent aliquas varietates et 
est uni convenienter appropriatum quod non sic proprie convenit alii.
(Dionysiaca 392)  Et quidem et demonius intellectus,  secundum quod intellectus ex  
ipsa est.  Secundum quantum861 quam causam autem intellectus  est  a ratione decidens,  ut  
sortiri  quod  appetit  non  sciens  neque  volens,  casum  a  sapientia  magis  proprie  ipsum862 
asserendum.
Quod etiam demonum intellectus,  inquantum intellectus,  est  a divina sapientia.  Est 
casus autem eorum a sapientia ex voluntate propria appetente quod eis non convenit et preter 
naturam,  ostendit  consequenter  dicens  et  quidem  demonius  intellectus  secundum  quod  
intellectus ex  ipsa  est,  divina  videlicet  <245rb>  sapientia.  Secundum quantum autem 
intellectus est a ratione decidens, ut non sciens sortiri quod appetit, id est esse equalem Deo, 
neque  volens ordinata  videlicet  et  rationabili  voluntate,  sed  appetens  illud  irrationabili  et 
libidinosa  cupiditate.  Secundum  hoc, inquam,  asserendum ipsum,  id  est  demonium 
intellectum,  magis proprie casum a sapientia;  appetens enim absque ratione quod nescivit 
qualiter  apprehenderet  et  quod  ei  est  preter  naturam omnino  decidit  a  ratione;  qui  casus 
nequaquam est a sapientia causatus. 
858 quod] quasi L, Maz
859 omnia om. M
860 de] in M
861 quantum] quam causam Dionysiaca
862 ipsum] ipsam Dionysiaca
235
Ubi autem nos posuimus “a ratione decidens”, quod est in greco una dictio, velut si 
latine diceretur “irrationizatus”, aliud exemplar863 habet “si ratione quidem”, et secundum hoc 
sic ordinanda est lectura: “secundum quantum autem intellectus est si non sciens neque volens 
ratione quidem ut id est qualiter sortiri quod appetit asserendum ipsum et cetera”. Intellectus 
enim  si  ratione  non  sciat  qualiter  sortiatur  quod  appetit  neque  rationabiliter  velit  viam 
sortiendi quod appetit casus est a sapientia.
(Dionysiaca  392-398)  Sed  quam864 quidem  sapientie  ipsius  et  omnis  et  intellectus  
omnis et rationis et omnis sensus divina sapientia et principium et causa et hypostasis et  
perfectio  et  custodia  et  terminus  dicta  est,  qualiter  autem ipse  Deus  supersapientia865 et  
intellectus et ratio et cognitor laudatur? Qualiter enim intelliget866 aliquid intelligibilium, non  
habens  intellectuales  operationes?  Aut  qualiter  cognoscet  sensibilia,  omni  sensui867 
supercollocatus?  Et  quidem  omnia  ipsum  scire  aiunt  eloquia  et  nihil  effugere  divinam  
cognitionem. Sed quod dixi multotiens divina deodecenter intelligendum. Sine intellectu enim  
et insensibile secundum superexcellentiam, non secundum defectum, in Deo ordi-  <245va> 
-nandum; quemadmodum et irrationale reponimus ei qui super rationem, et imperfectionem  
superperfecto et praeperfecto et impalpabilem et invisibilem caliginem lumini inaccessibili  
secundum superexcellentiam invisibilis luminis.
Quare divinus intellectus omnia continet ab omnibus segregata cognitione, secundum  
omnium  causam  in  seipso  omnium  scientiam  praeaccipiens,  ante  angelos  fieri  sciens  et  
adducens angelos, et  omnia alia ab intus et  ab ipso, ut  sic dicam, principio sciens, et in  
substantiam ducens.
Et  hoc existimo tradere eloquium quando ait :  “qui  scit  omnia ante generationem 
ipsorum”.868
Non enim  ex existentibus entia dicens, novit divinus intellectus; sed869 ex ipso et in  
ipso,  secundum causam, omnium scientiam et  cognitionem870 et  substantiam praehabet  et  
preaccepit, non secundum ideam singulis apponens, sed secundum unam cause continentiam  
863 Eriugena (see Dionysiaca, 392)
864 quam] quia Dyonisiaca
865  supersapientia] supersapiens sapientia Dionysiaca
866  intelliget] intelligit Dionysiaca
867 omni sensui] omnem sensum Dionysiaca
868 Ecclesiastes 23:29 : “Domino enim Deo, antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita.”
869 sed] secundum Dionysiaca
870 et cognitionem om. Dionysiaca
236
omnia sciens et continens. Quemadmodum et lumen secundum, causam in seipso871, scientiam 
tenebrose praeaccepit, non aliunde sciens tenebram872 quam a lumine.
<245vb>  Laudato  Deo  ex  nominatione  sapientie  et  consequenter  laudando  ex 
nominationibus intellectus et rationis quia et eorum, sicut et sapientie, est causa. Quia tamen 
hec nominationes videntur inferiores nominatione sapientie, et inferior virtus virtute sapientie, 
non  videtur  infra Deo  convenire,  querit primo qualiter  hiis  nominationibus  convenienter 
laudatur, dicens sed quam, quidem divina sapientia dicta est et principium ex nihilo adducens 
in  aliquid, et  causa formans, et hypostasis supportans  videlicet  inesse,  et  perfectio per 
largitionem bene esse, et custodia per conservationem in benefice largitis, et terminis ad quem 
et non ultra tendunt  ipsius sapientie id est  sapientie in se  considerate,  et omnis particularis 
videlicet  sapientie  et  intellectus  omnis  et  rationis  et  omnis  sensus id  est  potentie 
apprehensivae inferioris ratione quam inquam ita est, qualiter autem ipse Deus supersapiens 
sapientia laudatur et  intellectus et  ratio  et cognitorum? Qualiter  enim  intelliget  aliquid 
intelligibilium,  non  habens intellectuales  operationes? Vel  qualiter cognoscet sensibilia, 
supercollocatus omni sensui? 
Sic  quoque  intellige  de  ratione.  Non enim  videtur  quod  alia  virtute,  quam virtute 
intellectuali  qualem habent  angeli  et  anime,  possint  intelligi  intelligibilia,  nec  alia  virtute 
quam sensitiva cognosci sensibilia quibus virtutibus vel earum operationibus non participat 
Deus.  Scriptura  tamen  horum  omnem  cognitionem  etiam  supercertam  Deo  attribuit. 
Unde sequitur  et  quidem  omnia  ipsum  scire  aiunt  eloquia et  nihil  effugere  divinam 
cognitionem. Huius autem dubitationis posite subiungit solutionem  dicens  sed (quod dixi  
multotiens) intelligendum divina  deodecenter. Dicta  enim de  Deo ut  sepe  dictum est  non 
secundum  significationes  proprias  sed  superexcellenter  intelligendum.  Quemadmodum  se 
habet  in exemplis  subnexis.  Sine intellectu enim,  seu si  latine diceretur sicut  est  in greco 
“inintelligens  “et  “insensibile”,  ordinandum in  Deo hoc  est  dicendum de  Deo  secundum 
superexcellentiam, non secundum  defectum.  Non  enim  auferunt  a  Deo  cognoscitivum 
intelligibilium et sensibilium, sed insinuant ipsum cognoscere illa excellentius quam intellectu 
vel sensu  quemadmodum et irrationale reponimus ei qui super rationem, et imperfectionem 
superperfectio et praeperfectio, et impalpabilem et invisibilem caliginem lumini inaccessibili 
secundum  superexcellentiam  invisibilis  luminis vel  secundum  aliud  exemplar873 “visibilis 
luminis”.  Attribuentes  enim Deo  caliginem,  significamus  ipsum esse  lumen  inaccessibile 
871 seipso] semetipso Dionysiaca
872 tenebram] tenebras Dionysiaca
873 Sarrazin (see Dionysiaca, 396)
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propter superexcellentiam luminis eiusdem, nobis invisibilis propter suam supereminentiam 
ad  nostram  videndi  possibilitatem,  secundum <246ra>  sui,  tamen  manifestum  maxime 
visibilis. Est quoque Deus lumen inaccessibile propter superexcellentiam sui ad omne aliud 
lumen et invisibile et visibile, spiritale et corporale.
Quia  itaque  omnia  dicta  de  Deo  sive  positive  sive  privative  secundum 
superexcellentiam  dicuntur  de  ipso  et  insinuant  ipsum  superexcellente  virtute  simplicis 
sapientie omnia superexcellenter facere quae creatis virtutibus faciunt creata, consequenter 
laudatur  Deus  inferiorum virtutum nominationibus.  Non  enim signatur  quod  in  ipso  sint 
virtutes inferiores874 nec quod habeat earum proprias actiones sed quod que ipse agunt propriis 
actibus  ipse  supereminenter  agit.  Superexcellentia  divine  virtutis  simplici  enim  et 
supereminente cognitione sui supereminenter cognoscit que intellectuali operatione cognoscit 
intellectus  et  que  rationali  ratio  et  que sensitiva  sensus  et  que omnis  virtus  apprehensiva 
propria  operatione.  Hec itaque  manifestans  subiungit:  Quare,  hoc  est  quia,  secundum 
superexcellentiam ordinandum in Deo dicta de ipso divinus intellectus id est intellectus dictus 
de  Deo  omnia continet cognitione  segregata id  est  superelevata  ab  omnibus secundum 
omnium causam. Cum enim dicitur Deus est intellectus  vel Deus intelligit significatur quod 
superelevata ab omnibus secundum omnem causam. Cum enim dicitur Deus est intellectus vel 
Deus  intelligit  significatur  quod superelevata  ab  omnibus cognitione  sui  existentis  causae 
omnium continet omnia in ipsa sui cognitione omnium creativa. Ille dico divinus intellectus 
preaccipiens id est eternaliter habens antequam res cognite sint in seipsis. Scientiam omnium 
in seipso utpote ante fieri angelos sciens et adducens angelos, et omnia alia ab intus sciens. 
Non enim a rebus exterioribus accipit  earum scientiam,  et ducens in substantiam,  ab ipso 
principio, id est a sui ipsius interiori cognitione principiante omnia.  Ut sic dicam, id est ut 
nomen principii ad illam superexcellentiam super eveham. 
Sed si adductio rerum in esse sic eas facere et facere et fieri naturalis sint quomodo 
dicit adducens angelos ante angleos fieri. Eorum et aliorum adductio quantum est ex parte 
adducentis est eorum eterna benivola scientia et  cognitio. Propter hoc sicut  scientia divina 
eternitate priori est rebus factis sic et adductio earum quantum est ex parte adducentis. Quod 
autem dixit  de hac prioritate   confirmat  per  eloquia subiungens:  Et hoc existimo tradere 
eloquium quando  ait:“qui scit  omnia  ante  generationem ipsorum”.  Non enim  ex entibus 
entia, discens novit divinus intellectus; sed ex ipso et in ipso,  secundum causam, hoc est ut 
omnium causa,  praehabet et  preaccepit  omnium scientiam  et cognitionem  et substantiam 
eternaliter  enim sciens  se  et  cognoscens in  ipsa eterna scientia  sui   sciens  omnia  accepit 
874 inferiores] maiores M
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<246rb> ea eternaliter in sua scientia; non apponens singulis, hoc est non intelligens singula 
secundum  ideam,  id  est  secundum  formam  et  speciem  ab  unoquoque  acceptam,  sicut 
cognoscunt  nostre  vires  apprehensive,  sed  sciens  et  continens omnia  secundum  unam 
continentiam cause. Sciens enim et continens se causam omnium scit et continet in se causa 
omnia causata. Insuper quoque in se causa omnium cognoscit malum cuius non est causa quia 
nec habet causam nec est principium ei oppositum, sed est defectio et privatio boni et eius 
quod secundum naturam ipsam existens preter naturam. 
Quemadmodum lumen etc. Sicut et sciens in eo quod cognosceret se et sui naturam 
naturaliter  protensivam sui undique et illuminativam  circumstanciam in hoc cognosceret et 
illuminationes illuminatorum quarum est causa.  Et in eodem agnosceret  tenebram que est 
defectus  et  absentia  luminis  et  privatio  illuminationis.  Quod  explanans  auctor  subiungit 
quemadmodum et lumen secundum causam, hoc est in eo quod ipsa est causa illuminationum, 
praeaccepit. Posito videlicet quod ipsum sit sciens  in seipso scientiam tenebre non aliunde 
sciens tenebram quam a lumine. Unde enim aliter sciret lumen tenebram cum ubi lumen est et 
illuminatio non sit tenebra nisi a sui et in sui natura cognita naturaliter protensiva sui undique 
et circumstantiam illuminativa cuius absentia est tenebra
(Dionysiaca 398-402) Seipsam igitur divina sapientia cognoscens, cognoscet omnia:  
immaterialiter  materialia,  et  impartibiliter  partibilia,  et  multa unitive,  ipso uno omnia  et  
cognoscens et adducens. Etenim si secundum unam causam Deus omnibus existentibus esse  
tribuit,  secundum  ipsam  singularem  causam  sciet  omnia,  ut  ex  ipso  entia  et  in  ipso  
presubsistentia. Et non ex entibus suscipiet ipsorum cognitionem; sed et ipsis singulis eius  
que ipsorum et  aliis  eius que aliorum cognitionis  erit  largitor.  <246va> Non igitur  Deus  
propriam  habet  sui  ipsius  cognitionem,  alteram  autem  communem  entia  omnia  
comprehendentem. Ipsa enim se ipsam ominum875 causam876 cognoscens, vacatione alicubi ea 
que ab ipsa et  quorum est  causa ignorabit? Sic Deus igitur entia  cognoscit  non scientia  
entium, sed ea que sui ipsius.
Etenim  et  angelos  scire  aiunt  eloquia  que  in  terra,  non  secundum  sensus  ipsa  
cognoscentes  sensibilia  quidem  entia,  secundum  propriam  autem  deiformis  intellectus  
virtutem et naturam.
875 omnium om. Dionysiaca
876 causam] causa Dionysiaca
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Ostenso quod divinus intellectus, qui idem est cum divina sapientia, cognoscens se 
cognoscit  omnia,  adiungit  quod cognoscit  ea non per modum cognitorum sed per modum 
ipsius cognoscentis  dicens  seipsam igitur cognoscens divina sapientia, cognoscet omnia ita 
videlicet quod  immaterialiter materialia, et impartibiliter partibilia, et multa unitive. Sicut 
ipsa a se cognita in hoc cognoscens omnia; est immaterialis et impartibilis et una ipsa dico et 
cognoscens et  adducens  omnia entia  videlicet  et  causata  ipso  uno hoc  est  ipsa  unitate 
immaterialis et impartibilis et simplicis essentie.
Quod autem sic cognoscit, declarat per hoc quod ipse Deus omnibus existentibus variis 
et diversis, secundum unitatem causalem esse tribuit. Verissima enim cuiusque cognitio est 
cause ipsius et  eius in sua causa cognitio.  Unde sequitur  etenim si Deus secundum unam 
causam, ex parte videlicet cause  non  multiplicatam, tribuit esse omnibus existentibus, sciet  
omnia secundum ipsam singularem causam ut entia ex ipso et presubsistentia in ipso, in eius 
videlicet eterna  sui intelligentia.  Et non suscipiet cognitionem ipsorum ex entibus, sed erit 
largitor et ipsis singulis, habentibus videlicet intellectivam cognitionem, eius cognitionis que 
ipsorum et aliis, id est ipsis existentibus aliis ab hiis qui extra se, <246vb> eius cognitionis  
que  aliorum.  Tribuit  enim  Deus  unicuique  intellectivo  et  cognitionem  sui  ipsius  et 
cognitionem aliorum a se. 
Ex hiis itaque manifestum quod simplici intelligentia intelligens se, Deus simplicem 
causam omnium eadem et non alia intelligentia intelligit omnia. Ex quo sequitur quod non 
alteram habet  cognitionem  sui  et  alteram entium.  Unde  sequitur  non ergo Deus  habet  
propriam cognitionem sui ipsius, alteram autem communem entia omnia comprehendentem.  
Ipsa enim causa omnium cognoscens  seipsam, vacatione  alicubi, hoc  est  si  cognoscens 
seipsam vacat in hac cognitione, id est a cognitione alicuius alterius, ignorabit ea que ab ipsa 
et quorum est causa? Cum ab ipsis, ut predictum est, non suscipiat eorum cognitionem. Esset 
enim secundum hoc  aut  posterior  rebus  cognitis  aut  aliquando  non  cognoscens  quod  est 
inconveniens. 
Ex  predictis  itaque  patet  quod  unica  cognitione  cognoscit  Deus  se  et  omnia non 
sumens scientiam entium ab entibus sed in scientia sui sciens ea. Unde sequitur:  sic igitur  
Deus entia cognoscit non scientia entium sed ea, scientia videlicet, que sui ipsius. Quod hoc 
non sit admirandum in Deo declarat per hoc quod est in angelis, videlicet quod isti cognoscunt 
sensibilia  que sunt  in  terra  non accipientes  earum cognitionem ab ipsis  sensibilibus,  cum 
ipsi angeli  non  utantur instrumentis  sensitivis,  sed  virtute  et  natura  intellectus,  qua 
supereminenter  operantes  sensibilia  comprehendunt et  cognoscunt,  ut  patet ex  eloquiis  in 
pluribus locis. Hoc itaque est quod sequitur.  Etenim et angelos aiunt  eloquia scire que in  
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terra ipsos dico  non cognoscentes ipsa entia sensibilia quidem secundum sensus, secundum 
propriam autem virtutem et naturam intellectus deiformis cognoscentes videlicet sensibilia. 
Modis itaque predictis laudatur Deus deodecenter per nominationem intellectus.
(Dionysiaca 402-408) In his autem quaerere oportet qualiter nos Deum cognoscimus,  
neque intelligibilem neque sensibilem neque  quid universaliter entium existentem. Ne forte  
igitur verum dicere quam877 Deum cognoscimus non ex ipsius natura, incognoscibile enim hoc  
et omnem rationem et intellectum superexcedens.
Sed  ex  omnium  <247ra> entium  ordinatione,  ut  ex  ipso  proposita,  et  imagines  
quasdam et similitudines divinorum ipsius exemplorum habente, in quod ultra omnia via et  
ordine, secundum virtutem, redeundum, in omnium ablatione et superexcellentia, in omnium  
causa.
Propter quod et in omnibus Deus cognoscitur et  sine omnibus. Et per cognitionem  
Deus cognoscitur et per ignorantiam. Et est ipsius intelligentia878 et ratio et scientia, et tactus  
et sensus et opinio et phantasia et nomen et alia omnia, et neque intelligitur neque dicitur  
neque nominatur.
Et non est aliquid entium, neque in aliquo entium cognoscitur, et in omnibus omnia est  
et in nullo nihil, et ex omnibus omnibus cognoscitur et ex nullo nulli.
Etenim et  hec et  recte  de Deo dicimus: et  ex entibus omnibus laudatur,  secundum  
omnium analogiam quorum est causa.
Et est rursus divinissima Dei cognitio per ignorantiam cognita, secundum eam que  
super  intellectum  unionem,  quando  intellectus,  ab  omnibus  entibus  recedens,  deinde  et  
seipsum dimittens, unitur supersplendentibus radiis, inde et illic imperscrutabili profunditate  
sapientie illuminatus.
Et  quidem et  ex omnibus,  quod quidem dixi,  ipsam cognoscendum; ipsa enim est,  
secundum eloquium, omnium factiva, <247rb> et semper omnia concordans, et indissolubilis  
omnium  concordie  et  ordinis  causa,  et  semper  fines  priorum  connectens  principiis  
secundorum, et unam universi conspirationem et harmoniam pulchrificans.
Quesito  qualiter  Deus  cognoscit  intelligibilia  et  sensibilia  cum  non  habeat 
intellectuales  et  sensitivas  operationes,  quia  hec  operationes  et  virtutes  ex  quibus  ille 
877 quam] quia Dyonisiaca
878 intelligentia] intellectus Dionysiaca
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egrediuntur  sunt  inferiores quam deceant  et  conveniant  divine nature,  querit  consequenter 
qualiter nos cognoscimus Deum, cum ipse sit superior omni virtute nostra apprehensiva et 
cognoscitiva et omni operatione omnis virtutis nostre apprehensive et cognoscitive, dicens: in  
hiis autem, id est  consequenter predictis,  oportet quaerere qualiter nos cognoscimus Deum, 
neque intelligibilem, id est inappehensibilem, vel cognoscibilem virtute creata cognoscitiva 
immaterialium et spiritalium,  neque  sensibilem id est apprehensibilem virtute apprehensiva 
materialium et corporalium;,  neque existentem universaliter quid entium vel secundum aliud 
exemplar879 “quid intelligibilium”.
Nullum enim omnino ens aut intelligibile est Deus, sed super omne ens et omnem 
intellectum ac per hoc nullum ens aut intellectus potest ad ipsum. Posita itaque questione et 
motivus ad dubitandum subiungit solutionem dicens quod non cognoscimus Deum ex ipsius 
natura. Quemadmodum cognoscimus intelligibilia et sensibilia per species eorum intelligibiles 
et  sensibiles  nostris  viribus  apprehensivis  eis  apponentes  sed cognoscimus eum primo ex 
entium ordinatione. In cuiusque entis comprehensi a nobis, unitate quasi in vestigio et speculo 
comprehendentes Dei factoris unitatem in materia  et forma et  compositione  ipsius  entis880 
potentiam factoris ex  nihilo educentis  et sapientiam formantis et bonitatem  compositis881 et 
sic in unitatem trinitatem. 
Et in entibus inferioribus inferiori882 virtute comprehensis, cognoscitur  minus limpide 
tanquam in vestigio  minus formato et speculo  minus lucido et imagine minus imitante.  In 
entibus vero superioribus superiori virtute comprehensis, cognoscitur limpidius tanquam in 
predictis formationibus lucidioribus et magis imitantibus. Cum vero per ordinem creaturarum 
ordinatis operationibus  virium apprehensivarum sic ascendimus ab imis usque ad supremas. 
Oportet  etiam  transcendere  supremas  creaturas  et  operationes  omnium  virium 
apprehensivarum et  fieri in actuali omnium ignorantia et in illa  supersplendentem divinum 
<247va> radium suscipere et ab eo illuminari et ei uniri. Et in hac unione Deum, ut possibile, 
sine imaginibus videre.
Potentiam itaque quam dicimus virtutem naturalem sapientie, id est cognitionis Dei in 
se,  ut  possibile,  sine  imaginibus,  est  potentia  transcendendi  operationes  omnium  virium 
apprehensivarum et fieri in supereminentia, in ignorantia omnium, secundum se impotens, 
superius agere et  apponere in  divinum radium. Sed solum potens  suscipere ab ipso quod 
dignatur  largiri.  Sic  itaque  solvens  quesitum subiungit:  ne forte igitur verum dicere,  et 
879 quid intelligibilium non legitur in Dionysiaca (p. 402)
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insinuat per istud “ne forte” quod  non presumptuose asserit, sed pie credit, “verum dicere” 
hoc  videlicet  quod  sequitur  quam Deum cognoscimus  non  ex  ipsius  natura,  per  nostram 
videlicet  potentiam apponentes  et agentes  in   ipsius  naturam. Incognoscibile  enim hoc et  
superexcedens  omnem  intellectum  et  rationem. Sed  ex  omnium  entium  ordinatione, ut  
proposita, hoc est ut in esse posita, ex ipso et nobis ostensa et habente imagines quasdam et  
similitudines divinorum exemplorum,  id  est  idearum  et  rationum  eternarum,  ipsius,  Dei 
videlicet. 
Omnis enim natura imago est et similitudo eterne rationis in mente divina ad cuius 
exemplum est  formata  et  ex  ipsa  tamquam ex  imagine  et  similitudine  ascendi potest  in 
divinam rationem que ipsius  est  exemplum prout  possibile  speculandam.  Ex  hac inquam 
entium ordinatione sic proposita et habente divinorum exemplorum imagines et similitudines 
redeundum, vel secundum aliud exemplar883 “redimus”,  (secundum virtutem) via et ordine, 
gradatim videlicet, ab infimis ad suprema ascendendo in quod ultra omnia, id est in Deum, in  
omnium ablatione et superexcellentia, et in  omni causa. Quia cum gradatim ascendimus ad 
summitatem  creaturarum  per  summas  operationes  summarum  virium  apprehensivarum, 
abnegamus  a  Deo  has  omnis  attendentes  ipsum hiis  omnibus  incomparabiliter 
superexcellentem, utpote omnium causam educentem omnia in esse et bene esse ex nihilo. Et 
sic  ut  ipsius  illuminationem et  manifestationem  suscipiamus,  auferimus  a  nobis  omnes 
operationes  omnium  virium apprehensivarum in  actuali  omnium  ignorantia,  exspectantes 
divini radii gratuitam superfusionem. 
Redimus itaque ad Deum, ut possibile nobis, cognoscendum post speculationem eius 
via ordinata in creaturis, velut in ipsius vestigiis speculis et in imaginibus, in ablatione et 
abnegatione  omnium  ab  ipso  Deo.  Et  in  ablatione  omnium  ab  operationibus  et 
apprehensionibus nostrarum virium apprehensivarum attendentes eius inapprehensibilem ad 
omnia superexcellenti- <247vb> -am omnium inapprhensibiliter causativam. propter quod, id 
est propter hoc quod predicto modo redeundum in id quod ultra omnia cognoscendum, et in  
omnibus  cognoscitur Deus. Dum ex omnibus, videlicet ut ex vestigiis et imaginibus ipsum 
speculamur,  et sine omnibus dum videlicet in omnium ignorantia radii ipsius superfusionem 
suscipimus  et  per  cognitionem  Deus  cognoscitur.  Cum videlicet  in  creaturarum  speculis 
videtur et  per  ignorantiam  cum  superegressi  omnia  et  actu  ignorantes  per  ipsam 
ignoranciam884 susceptioni  radii  ipsius  adaptamus.  Et  est  ipsius intelligentia  et  ratio  et  
scientia, et tactus et sensus et opinio et phantasia et nomen et alia omnia. Quia in intellectis 
883 redimus non legitur in Dionysiaca (p. 403)
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spiritalibus  per  intelligentiam,  et  incognitis  artificialibus  per  rationem,  et  in  necessariis 
cognitis per scientiam, et in corporalibus apprehensis per infimum corporalium sensuum, id 
est  tactum,  et  in  sensibilibus  per  alios  sensus  corporeos,  et  in  opinabilibus,  id  est 
estimabilibus, ex sensatis, et in imaginabilibus per fantasiam id est imaginativam. 
Speculatur  ipsum  vis speculativa  non ut  est  et  quid est in se,  nec sine symbolo et 
imagine, sed, ut saepe dictum est, ut causam in causatis, ut artificem in artificiis, ut rem veram 
in  rei  imaginibus  et in  obscuris  speculis. Et  propter  hoc  vis  speculativa  Dei  in  omnibus 
apprehensis  quacumque  virtute  apprehensiva  cum  speculatur  ipsum  in  propriis 
apprehensibilibus  huius  alicuius  virtutis et  illa  virtus in  actu  ipsius  speculative  cognoscit 
Deum. Et sic est omnis virtus apprehensiva aliquo modo per speculum et in enigmate Dei 
cognoscitiva.  Ac per hoc convenienter ipsius Dei dicta et  omne nomen, ut  in superioribus 
dictum est, ipsum nominat. Et sic est ipsius et alia omnia a virtutibus pretactis ipsius sunt ut in 
ipsum reducentia  virtutem  speculativam,  et  in  virtute speculativa  virtutes  proprie  eorum 
apprehensivas.  Ita  inquam  sunt  hec  predicta  ipsius  et  tamen  neque intelligitur,  propria 
videlicet operatione intellectus ut est in se et absque enigmate, et per hoc nec virtute aliqua 
inferiori  apprehensiva  apprehenditur.  Neque dicitur,  hoc  est  sermone  enarratur, neque 
nominatur, aliquo videlicet simplici nomine ut est in se sed, ut saepe dictum est, nominatur 
secundum superexcellentiam et  beneficos  eius  processus  in  creaturas. Et  non  est  aliquid 
entium, neque cognoscitur in aliquo entium ut est videlicet in se, et in omnibus omnia est. Illa 
videlicet omnino causans inesse supportans, promovens, consummans  et secundum omnia 
dirigens  et  in  nullo  nihil id  est non  est aliquid  eorum  que in  quocumque  et  cognoscitur  
omnibus cognoscitivis videlicet ipsius ex omnibus ut ex predictis est  liquidum <248ra> et ex  
nullo nulli quia ex nullo cognoscitur alicui ut est in se. Et bene opposita sic attribuuntur Deo 
qui est super omnia. 
Etenim hec opposita videlicet ut quod eius est intellectus et non intelligitur et similia 
dicimus  de  Deo et  recte quia  suple  et  laudatur  ex  omnibus  entibus quorum  est  causa 
secundum omnium analogiam quia excellentioribus excellentius et ex inferioribus secundum 
quod competit  eorum dignitati.  Et  sic  eius  dicuntur  omnia.  Et est  rursus  divinissima Dei  
cognitio cognita  id  est  adepta  per  ignorantiam, secundum  eam  unionem quae  super  
intellectum.  Cum  enim  transcenderit  mens  operationes  intellectuales  et  facta in  omnium 
ignorantia suscipiens divinum radium ei unitur. Et est hec eminentissima nobis possibilis Dei 
cognitio. Et potentia ascendendi in hanc ignorantiam est in nobis virtus supprema quam et 
supra nominavimus virtutem sapientie. 
Explanans  autem  hanc  ignorantiam  et  in  ea  unionem adiungit  quando  intellectus  
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recedens ab omnibus entibus, deinde et se ipsum dimittens per superexcessum videlicet sui et 
omnium unitur radiis supersplendentibus, inde id est ex illis radiis et illic id est in illis radiis 
illuminatus imperscutabili profunditate sapientie hoc enim est rapi in tertium et supremum 
celum. Et videre ibi secreta que non licet homini loqui.885 In primum namque caelum rapitur 
qui in actus virtutis artis et scientiae sustollitur incognitis per artem et scientiam speculans 
Deum.  In secundum vero  qui in actus virtutis intellectus elevatur et in intellectis limpidius 
Deum886 speculatur. Post quod caelum non est superius nisi illud quod prediximus. In hac 
itaque  cognitione  omnia  a  Deo  auferuntur  et  sic  quasi  opposita  non  inconvenienter  ei 
attribuuntur. 
Quod autem a creaturis sic ascendendum in Dei cognitionem et tandem in sapientiae 
profunditatem in caligine  supereminentis  omnium ignorantiae,  explanat  adhuc manifestius 
adiungens.  Et quidem et cognoscendum ipsam id est supremam et profundissimam divinam 
sapientiam ex omnibus (quod quidem dixi) inferioribus videlicet pluries. Et bene cognoscenda 
est ex omnibus quia ipsa est causa effectiva omnium et concordativa et causa indissolubilitatis 
concordie  et  ordinis  omnium  adinvicem  non  solum similis  existentium  sed  et  sibi 
consequenter  succedentium  et  sic  omnium  adinvicem  concordi  ordine  universitatem 
pulchrifaciens. Unde subiungit: ipsa enim, divina videlicet sapientia, est, secundum eloquium, 
factiva omnium, causa artifex est enim, omnium secundum eloquia divina sapientia et cuncta 
componens. Cum patre omnia in sapientia faciente  et causa  concordans semper omnia, et  
causa  indissolubilis concordie  et  ordinis <248rb> omnium  connectens semper armonice 
videlicet  fines priorum principiis  secundorum,  id  est  consequenter  succedentium, et 
pulchrifaciens seu  pulchrificans unam  conspirationem, id est unam appetitionem naturalem 
universorum  qua  appetunt  pacificam  et  ordinatam  permanentiam  in  universitate,  et  
harmoniam id est concordiam appetitam universi. Dicitur autem sapientia pulchrificare unam 
conspirationem  et  armoniam  universi  quia  facit  eam  pulchritudinem  universi  qua 
pulchritudine ipsum universum pulchrificatur.
(Dionysiaca 408-414) Ratio autem Deus laudatur a sacris eloquiis, non solum quam887 
et rationis et intellectus et sapientie  est largitor,888 sed quam889 et omnium causas in seipso  
885 et videre...loqui om. M
886 Deum om. L, M
887 quam] quia Dyonisiaca
888 est largitor] indultor est Dyonisiaca
889 quam] quia Dyonisiaca
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uniformiter praeaccepit, et quam890 per omnia incedit, attingens (ut eloquia aiunt) usque ad  
omnium finem; et ante hec quidem quam891 omni simplicitati divina supersimplificatur ratio,  
et ab omnibus est super omnia secundum supersubstantiale absoluta.
Ista ratio est simplex et vere existens veritas, circa quam, ut puram et inerrabilem  
totorum  cognitionem,  divina  fides  est,  manens  credentium  collocatio,  hos  collocans  in  
veritate,  et  in  ipsis  veritatem,  intransmutabili  identitate,  simplicem  veritatis  cognitionem  
habentibus credentibus.  Si  enim cognitio unitiva cognoscentium et cognitorum, ignorantia  
autem transmutationis semper et eius quae ex ipso ignoranti divisionis causa, in  <248va> 
veritate credentem secundum sacram rationem, nihil removebit ab ea que secundum veram892 
fidem communicatione, in qua mansionem habebit immobilis et intransmutabilis identitatis.
Bene enim novit ad veritatem unitus quam bene habet, et si multi corripiant ipsum ut  
extasim passum. Latet quidem enim (ut conveniens) ipsos ex errore veritate per eam que vere  
fidem mente excedens. Ipse autem vere novit seipsum non (quod893 aiunt illi) insanientem, sed  
ab instabili et alterata circa omnimodam erroris varietatem latione, per simplicem et semper  
secundum eadem et  sic  habentem veritatem liberatum. Sic  igitur  eius  que  secundum nos  
divine  sapientie  principales  duces  pro  veritate  moriuntur  omni  die,  testificantes  (ut  
conveniens)  et  verbo  omni  et  opere  unitive  christianorum veritati  et  cognitioni,  omnibus  
ipsam esse et simpliciorem et diviniorem, magis autem ipsam esse solam veram et unam et  
simplicem Dei cognitionem.894
Laudato  Deo  ex  nominatione  intellectus,  et  consequenter  ostenso  qualiter  nos 
cognoscimus  Deum qui  est  super  omnem intellectum,  secundum ordinem praelibatum,  in 
titulo huis capituli laudat ipsum ex nominationibus rationis seu verbi in greco. Enim habetur 
logos quod significat  rationem et verbum que de Deo dicta non differunt et veritatis et fidei.  
Laudant itaque eloquia Deum nominantia ipsum hoc nomine logos non solum quam ipse est 
omnis rationis et verbi causa et largitor quemadmodum et omnis sapientie et intellectus, sed et 
quam eterno  verbo  et  eterna  ratione <248vb>  dicendo  se  dicens  omnia.  In  ipsa  dictione 
omnium praehabet in se ideas omnium et rationes causales que non sunt aliud nisi ipsa dictio 
omnium in dicendo se ipsum quibus ordine rationabili  causat et disponit  omnia unicuique 
tribuens sibi ad se et ad alia rationabiliter congruentia. Et quam ipsa dictio et ratio Dei que 
non est nisi dictio et intelligentia sui ipsius simplicissimi est supersimplex, et nullo modo in se 
890 quam] quia Dyonisiaca
891 quam] quia Dyonisiaca
892 veram om. Dionysiaca
893 quod] quoad Dionysiaca
894 cognitionem] cognitione Dionysiaca
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multiplex. Quemadmodum est dictio et ratio nostra dicens et comprehendens diversa. Et quam 
nihil accipit ab hiis quae dicit et intelligit, sed omnino est ab hiis superelevata et segregata. 
Hoc igitur manifestans ait. Ratio autem seu verbum Deus laudatur a sacriis eloquiis id 
est sacra eloquia laudando Deum dicunt quam est logos id est ratio seu verbum non solum 
quam est largitor et rationis, ut suple, et intellectus et sapientie, sed quam et praeaccepit, id 
est eternaliter prehabuit uniformiter, in seipso omnium causas, id est eternas omnium rationes 
causales. Dicendo se unico, id est uniformi verbo, dicens omnia. Et quam per omnia incedit, 
ipsa  videlicet  suo  verbo  inesse  adducendo  rationabiliter,  disponendo  in  esse  ordinato, 
supportando, promovendo  et  consummando.  Et  sic  (ut  eloquia  aiunt)  attingens  usque ad  
finem omnium tam initiativum secundum esse quam perfectivum tam incohativum secundum 
durationem  quam terminativum  tam  summum secundum  dignitatem et  nobilitatem quam 
unum in hoc incessu necessario attingens ad omnia inter finem et finem intermedia. 
Et ante hec,  quidem duo videlicet que praedicta sunt propter que laudatur Deus ab 
eloquiis,  ut  ratio  seu  verbum laudatur,  resume ab  eisdem quam divina  ratio  seu divinum 
verbum  supersimplificatur omnium  simplicitati, et  absoluta  est ab  omnibus secundum 
supersubstantiale,  ipsius  videlicet  divinitatis  super  omnia,  primum  enim  est  secundum 
ordinem naturalem quod Deus supersubstantialis ab omnibus supersubstantialiter segregatus. 
Supersimplici verbo eterno dicit se et consequens est ut dicendo se eodem eterno verbo dicat 
omnia. Et ipsa dictione omnium eternaliter praehabeat in se eternas omnium ideas et rationes 
et tercium est quod secundum has rationes omnia educat in esse, ut praetactum est, per omnia 
incedat attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponat omnia suaviter. 
Hec itaque ratio et hoc verbum est prima et eterna veritas. Communiter enim apud nos 
dicta veritas est adequatio sermonis cum re per sermonem dicta cum videlicet sic est res sicut 
sermo dicit eam esse verbum autem eternum eternaliter dicens se est summe adequatum ei 
quod dicit et sic est res dicta sicut verbum dicit eam esse. Et cum dicens se dicat omnia et ipsa  
dictione faciat omnia esse sicut eternaliter <249ra> dicta sunt. Ipsum verbum est adequatum 
non  aequalitate  paritatis, cum  ei  nihil parificetur,  sed895 privatione  dissonantie  cum rebus 
dictis.  Sic  enim  sunt  res  dicte  ut  eternum  verbum  eternaliter  dicit  eas  esse.  Est  enim 
unaquoque et id et tale et tantum et tunc et ibi et eo ordine et eo modo utpote  necessario  vel 
contingenter  quod et  quale  et  quantum et  quando et  ubi  et  quo ordine et  quo modo dicit 
unamquamque esse. Et similiter de aliis unicuique accidentibus.  Hec igitur adequatio, quae 
non est  aliud secundum rem quam ipsum eternum verbum adequatum, et  eterna ratio  est 
veritas simplicitatis et vere existens quia eternaliter et non ab aliquo extra se existens. Circa 
895 sed] si M
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hanc veritatem quae vere est, Dominus noster Jesus Christus est divina fides credentium. Hec 
enim veritas  illuminat  vim creditivam et  unit  secum ad videndum se et  per  se  patrem et 
spiritum sanctum et ipsius incarnationem et reductionem nostram per  ipsam ad patrem et 
cetera divinitus credenda. 
Fides autem est comprehensio aliquorum non per se notorum, ut sunt axiomata, que 
vocat dignitates et  communes animi conceptiones nec notorum sillogistice ex per se notis aut 
ex notis per se nota aut alio modo logice ratiocinationis sed notorum ex auditu solo verbi Dei 
divina illuminatione uniente potentiam naturalem aptam natam ex solo auditu consentire cum 
rebus  ex  auditu  susceptis.  Et  est  hoc  vis  apprehensiva  sic  unita  cum  suis  propriis 
apprehensibilibus  id  est  ex  solo  auditu  absque  logicis  ratiocinationibus  supponibilibus 
firmioris cognitionis aliis virtutibus apprehensivis et illis omnino certior unde cum hoc vis per 
divinam illuminationem unitur suis propriis apprehensibilibus id est credibilibus non potest 
eam sic formatam scindere vel avertere tribulatio vel angustia vel aliquod de ceteris896 que 
cum hiis enumerat apostolus. Hec igitur declarans auctor ait ista ratio, seu istud verbum, est  
simplex et  vere  existens veritas, circa  quam  veritatem videlicet  ut  puram et  inerrabilem 
cognitionem totorum, id est universorum, est divina fides, qua scilicet nos credimus in Deum 
trinum  et  unum  et  verbum  incarnatum  et  cetera  divinitus  credenda.  Fides  dico  manens 
collocatio, seu firmitas,  credentium collocans seu firmans,  hos, id est credentes,  in veritate, 
creditorum  videlicet in  ipsis,  seu  ipsis  identitate  intransmutabili,  seu  si  latine  diceretur 
intranscendibili897, id  est  a  fide  non  transmutabili.  Et  hoc  dico  credentibus habentibus 
simplicem cognitionem veritatis creditorum videlicet. Quia enim non sillogistice sed simplici, 
ut <249rb>  dictum est, cognitione cognoscunt credentes divinitus credenda firmi et stabiles 
sunt  in veritate et firma et stabilis est semper eadem veritas creditorum in ipsis. 
Quod autem in credentibus est intransmutabilitas a fide probat subsequenter per hoc 
quod fides  est898 cognitio  unitiva cognoscentium cum cognitis  que cognita  per  fidem, per 
eandem  videntur  identiter  semper  vera  et  certissime,  videntur  vera  et  sequuntur  summe 
delectabilia.  Unde  sequitur  si  enim  cognitio,  quae  per  fidem  videlicet  maxime unitiva 
cognoscentium  et  cognitorum,  ignorantia  autem causa  semper transmutationis et  eius 
divisionis seu separationis, id est variationis et multiplicationis in varias dubitationes et varias 
circa  idem sententias  quae  divino videlicet  ignoranti  ex  ipso,  id  est  ex  seipso inquantum 
ignorante  si  inquam:  ita  est  nihil removebit credentem  in  veritatem secundum  sacram 
rationem seu secundum sacrum verbum hoc est vere credentem secundum doctrinam sacre 
896 de ceteris om. M
897 seu si...intranscendibile om. M
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scripture ab ea communicatione  quae secundum veram fidem,  id est  a leta et  iocunda et 
refectiva  mentis  delectatione  quam habet,  et  vera  fide  in  qua,  consummatione  videlicet, 
habebit mansivum,  id  est  perseverativum,  identitatis.  In  fide  scilicet  immobilis et  
intransmutabilis, identitatem enim fidei immobilem et intransmutabilem habebit perseveranter 
in omni  vento doctrine et tribulationum turbine. 
Et merito  bene enim novit unitus ad veritatem quam bene habet,  vel secundum aliud 
exemplar899 “ubi”, bene habet veritatem videlicet fidei vere et firmiter cognoscendo. Etsi multi 
corripiant ipsum ut passum exstasim, seu ut excedentem, seu ut extra-stantem, id est extra 
mentem sanam stantem.  Latet quidem enim mente  excedens seu exstasim passus seu extra 
stans veritate per eam quae vere fidem hoc est qui mente excedit Deo et supra se elevatus est 
veritate vere fidei.  Latet ipsos,  multos videlicet corripientes vere credentem. Latet  inquam 
ipsos ex errore, eorum videlicet ut conveniens est videlicet quod mente excedens Deo per vere 
fidei  cognitionem lateat  errantes  in  fide  et  reputetur  ab  eis  insane  mentis.  Aliquis  autem 
legeret  hanc  lecturam  sub  hoc  sensu  videlicet  quod  qui  mente  excedit  Deo  per  fidei 
cognitionem latet erroneos in fide (ut conveniens) hoc est quod ipse est conveniens et non 
erroneus sed greca scriptura ostendit hoc nomen conveniens positum neutraliter et hoc nomen 
extra  stans  pro  quo  nos  posuimus  mente  excedens  positum masculine  ita  inquam mente 
excedens per fidem latet erroneos in fide. Ipse autem vere novit seipsum non (quod autem illi  
aiunt) insani hoc  est  non  passum  <249va>  extasim  per  mentis  insaniam  quod  dicunt 
multi ipsimet  insani  per  errorem circa  fidem quemadmodum Festus  dixit  Paulo:  “insanis 
Paule”.900 Sed novit,  resume liberatum se ipsum videlicet,  ab instabili et901 alterata, id est 
aliter et aliter per vices se habente,  latione circa omnimodam varietatem erroris liberatum 
inquam ab huius latione per simplicem veritatem et  habentem semper secundum eandem. Et 
similiter, hoc est per veritatem fidei quae simplex est, ut predictum est, et non variabilis in  
multitudinem errorum licet multi multipliciter ab ea aberrent. Et quia fides christiana talis est 
qualis predicta est in veritate firmitate et delectatione doctores divine sapientie glorianter pro 
ipsa moriuntur et testificantur verbo et opere quod ipsa est omnibus aliis simplicior et divinior 
et quod ipsa sola est vera et simplex Dei cognitio.  Omnes enim alie credulitates in quibus 
confidunt alii se salvos fieri, falsae sunt et errore corrupte et non sunt vere Dei cognitiones. 
Unde sequitur:  sic igitur id est quia fides christiana se habet ut predictum est  principales  
duces eius divine sapientie que secundum nos id est apostoli et eorum imitatores doctores 
sacre scripture moriuntur pro veritate fidei videlicet christiane testificantes omni die, id est per 
899 Hilduin, Eriugena (see Dionysiaca 411)
900 Actes of Apostles 26:24.
901 et om. M
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omnem diem et omni tempore,  (ut conveniens) convenit enim omni tempore veritatem fidei 
protestari  testificantes  inquam  et  testimonium  per  habentes  unitive  veritati  et  cognitioni 
christianorum id est vere fidei christianorum unienti eos Christo testificantes inquam illi  et  
verbo omni et opere hoc videlicet  ipsam esse omnibus et simpliciorem et diviniorem, magis 
autem hoc est quod maius est testificantes hoc scilicet  ipsam esse solam veram et unam et  
simplicem Dei cognitionem. 
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